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STATEMENT 


OF 


A  PROPER  MILITARY  POLICY 


FOR  THE 


UNITED  STATES 


PREPARED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION,  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

IN  COMPLIANCE  WITH   INSTRUCTIONS   OF  THE   SECRETARY  OF  WAR 

MARCH,  1915 

W.  C.  D.  9053  90 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE 

SEPTEMBER 

1915 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 

1916 


AS 

/f/6 


i 
t 

^  War  Department, 

s-  Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff, 

War  College  Division, 
Washington^  Septemher  11,  1915. 
Memorandum  for  the  Chief  of  Staff: 
Subject:  Military  policy. 

1.  Memorandums  from  your  office,  dated  March  11  and  March  IT, 
1915,  directed  the  War  College  Division  to  make  a  complete  and  ex- 
haustive study  of  a  proper  military  policy  for  the  United  States,  and 
to  prepare  a  clearly  and  succinctly  expressed  statement  of  the  policy, 
basing  it,  in  a  general  way,  upon  the  "  Eeport  on  the  Organization  of 
the  Land  Forces  of  the  United  States,  1912,"  "  eliminating  every- 
thing that  is  not  necessary  for  the  easy  and  quick  comprehension  of 
the  military  policy,  and  adding  anything  which  may  be  necessary  to 
afford  such  comprehension." 

2.  The  following  extract  from  the  memorandum  of  March  17, 1915, 
gives  the  subjects  which  the  "  statement "  was  to  cover,  viz : 

The  substance  of  this  policy  will,  therefore,  be  a  clearly  and  succinctly  ex- 
pressed statement,  with  the  reasons  therefor,  of  the  recommended  strength  and 
organization  of — 

I.  («)  The  Regular  Army; 
(6)   The  Organized  Militia. 

This  should  be  followed  by — 

II.  A  careful  study  of  the  question  of  a  reserve  for  both  the  Regular  Army 
and  the  Organized  Militia  and,  if  possible  to  agree  upon  it,  a  plan  for  the  forma- 

Q)tion  of  such  reserves. 

^      III.  The  Volunteers :  Their  organization  and  relation  to  the  Regular  Army 
J  and  the  Organized  Militia. 

S^  IV.  Reserve  material  and  supplies  which  should  be  available  and  which  can 
;^  not  be  promptly  obtained  if  delayed  till  the  outbreak  of  war. 
w  The  Secretary  of  War  is  of  the  opinion  that  a  statement  which  shall  contain 
^^  everything  that  is  pertinent  to  the  foregoing  subjects  will  inform  Congress  of 
^  all  the  essential  things  that  the  best  judgment  of  the  War  Department  thinks  it 
,  is  justified  in  asking  Congress  to  provide  in  peace  and  to  be  prepared  to  provide 
in  war.  These  things,  being  such  as  commend  themselves  to  the  general  mili- 
tary intelligence  (if  they  do  not  so  commend  themselves  there  can  be  no  policy 
such  as  is  now  aimed  at),  may  be  assumed  to  be  those  that  will  be  asked  for  by 
succeeding  administrations  of  the  War  Department — at  least,  they  will  indicate 
the  general  line  of  development  to  be  pursued.  Such  a  statement  will  constitute 
what  he  has  in  mind  as  a  comprehensive  military  policy. 

There  are  many  other  things  that  will  from  time  to  time  be  asked  of  Congress 
or,  when  authority  exists  for  it,  that  will  be  done  without  asking  legislation. 
Such  things  may  be  requests  for  appropriations  to  build  new  posts  in  view  of 
the  abandoning  of  others;  the  concentration  of  the  Army  in  a  smaller  number 
of  posts  in  definite  areas  of  the  country  ;  projects  for  promotion,  retirement,  etc. ; 
lans  for  training  the  Army  and  the  militia,  etc. 

uch  things  have  no  part  in  the  statement  of  a  general  military  policy  which 
Secretary  of  War  now  desires  to  have  prepared,  and  in  order  to  save  time 


IV  A   PEOPER    MILITARY    POLICY    FOE    THE    UNITED    STATES. 

aud  labor  and  to  concentrate  attention  upon  that  which  is  essential,  he  desires 
any  such  extraneous  matter  to  be  eliminated  from  the  study  which  he  has 
directed. 

3.  Following  these  lines  the  accompanying  "  Statement  of  a  Proper 
Military  Policy  for  the  United  States  "  was  prepared. 

4.  It  is  proposed  to  supplement  this  statement  later  with  brochures 
on  such  subjects  as  require  more  detailed  discussion  than  would  be 
appropriate  herein. 

M.  M.  Macomb, 
BHgadier  General^  Chief  of  "War  College  Division. 


CONTENTS, 


Page. 

Memorandum  for  the  Chief  of  Staff • in 

Introduction 1 

The  Military  Problem  Confronting  the  United  States 1 

The  evolution  of  national  military  policies 1 

Our  abiding  national  policies 2 

Coordinote  relationship  of  Army  and  Navy 2 

Coordinate  relationship  of  statesman  and  soldier 3 

Preparedness  of  the  world  powers  for  oversea  expeditions 3 

Statement  of  the  militarj^  problem 5 

I.  The  Regular  Armv 5 

General  Functions  of  the  Regular  Army 5 

Mobile  and  Coast  Artillery  Troops  and  Their  Functions...  6 

Relation  between  Home  and  Oversea  Garrisons 7 

General  Requirements  of  Oversea  Service 7 

The  Philippines 7 

Oahu ,  Hawaiian  Islands 8 

The  Panama  Canal 8 

Guantajiamo 9 

Alaska 9 

Porto  Rico 9 

G ENERAL  Requirements  of  Home  Service 9 

Genera!  distribution  of  Coast  Artillery  troops  in  fortifiea  areas. . .  9 

General  distribution  of  mobile  troops  in  strategic  areas 9 

Puget  Sound  area 10 

California  area 10 

Atlantic  area 10 

Middle  West  area • 11 

Necessary  Strength  of  Mobile  Troops  for  Oversea  Service.  11 

The  Philippines 11 

Oahu 11 

Panama 11 

Guantnnamo 11 

Alaska 12 

Porto  Rico 12 

Tabular  statement 12 

Necessary  Strength  of  Mobile  Troops  for  Home' Service 12 

Tabular  statement  showing  distribution  of  administrative  units 

of  mobile  troops  m  strategic  areas 12 

Formation  of  higher  tactical  units  and  their  distribution  in  stra- 
tegic areas 13 

Necessary  Strength  of  Coast  Artillery  Troops  Required  for 

Service  Overseas  and  at  Home 13 

Total   Strength   of  the   Regular  Troops   Reouired  for  all 

Servici^s 13 

Organ  ization 14 

II.  The  Organized  Militia 15 

Constitutional  functions 15 

Some  uses  a?  a  Federal  force 15 

Limitations 15 

Recommendations 16 

III.   Reserves 16 

The  Regular  Reserve 16 

Citizen  soldiers 17 

Reserve  ofhcers 17 

IV.  The  Volunteers 17 

V.  Reserve  Materiel  and  Supplies 18 

List  of  Brochxnes 22 


A  PROPER  MILITARY  POLICY  FOR   THE  UNITED 

STATES. 


INTRODUCTION. 
THE  MILITAKY  PROBLEM  CONFRONTING  THE  UNITED  STATES. 

1.  The  evolution  of  national  military  policies. — National  policies 
are  evolved  and  are  expanded  as  the  Nation  groM  s.  They  reflect  the 
national  sense  of  responsibility  and  also  the  national  ambitions. 
They  constitute  the  doctrine  underlying  acts  of  statesnumship  and 
diplomacy.  A  nation's  military  policy  is  the  national  doctrine  of 
self-preservation.  The  world  is  never  without  virile,  capable,  and 
progressive  nations,  the  circumstances  of  whose  development  have 
imbued  thefti  with  the  belief  that  their  vital  interests  demand  an 
active  aggressive  policy.  They  are  forced  to  resort  to  universal 
service  in  the  effort  to  fulfill,  at  any  cost,  wdiat  they  conceive  to  be 
their  destiny.  In  the  United  States  the  development  of  the  Nation 
has  proceeded  under  an  euA^ironment  so  favorable  that  there  is  no 
Avell-defined  public  opinion  in  regard  to  wdiat  constitutes  an  ade- 
quate military  policy.  Heretofore  isolation,  combined  with  the  neces- 
sity of  preserving  the  balance  of  power,  has  been  a  sufficient  guaranty 
against  strong  hostile  expeditions  from  Europe  or  Asia.  The  safe- 
guard of  isolation  no  longer  exists.  The  oceans,  once  barriers,  are 
now  easy  avenues  of  approach  by  reason  of  the  number,  speed,  and 
carrying  capacity  of  ocean-going  vessels.  The  increasing  raclii  of 
action  of  the  submarine,  the  aeroplane,  and  Avireless  telegraphy  all 
supplement  ocean  transport  in  placing  both  our  Atlantic  and  Pacific 
coasts  Avithin  the  sphere  of  hostile  activities  of  oversea  nations. 

The  great  mass  of  the  public  does  not  yet  realize  the  effect  of  these 
changed  conditions  upon  our  scheme  of  defense. 

Another  thing  that  militates  against  the  evolution  of  a  sound 
military  i)olicy  for  our  country  is  the  erroneous  conclusion  drawn  by 
the  people  from  our  past  experiences  in  war.  In  develoi:>ing  such  a 
policy  victory  is  often  a  less  trustworthy  guide  than  defeat.  We 
have  been  plunged  into  many  wars  and  have  ultimately  emerged 
successfully  from  each  of  them.  The  general  public  points  to  these 
experiences  as  an  indication  that  our  military  policy  has  been  and 
still  continues  to  be  sound.  That  this  is  not  really  the  belief  of  those 
in  authority  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  each  Avar  of  importance  has 
been  folloAved  by  an  official  investigation  of  our  military  system  and 
the  policy  under  Avhich  it  operated.  The  reports  of  these  investiga- 
tions give  a  startling  picture  of  faulty  leadership,  needless  Avaste  of 
lives  and  property,  costly  overhead  charges  augumented  by  payment 


2  A    PROPER    MILITARY    POLICY    POR    THE    UNITED    STATES. 

of  bounties  to  kee})  up  voluntary  enlistments,  undue  prolong-ations  of 
all  these  wars,  and  linally  reclvless  expenditure  of  public  funds  for 
continuing-  pensions.  These  documents  supply  convincing  proofs 
that  all  such  shortcomings  have  been  due  entirely  to  a  lack  of  ade- 
quate preparation  for  war  in  time  of  peace.  But  we  have  not  yet 
learned  our  lesson.  It  has  never  been  driven  home  by  the  bittei-ness 
of  defeat.  AVe  liave  never  known  a  Jena  or  a  Sedan.  At  no  stage 
of  our  national  life  have  we  been  brought  face  to  face  with  the  armed 
strength  of  a  great  world  power  free  to  land  sufficient  forces  to  gain 
a  foothold  at  any  desired  portion  of  our  coasts.  Tliat  we  have  to 
some  extent  felt  this  danger  is  evidenced  by  our  efforts  to  provide  a 
navy  as  a  first  line  of  defense  and  to  supplement  it  with  the  necessary 
harbor  fortifications;  but  we  have  not  yet  realized  tluit  our  ultimate 
safeguard  is  an  adequate  and  well-organized  mobile  land  force. 
Experience  in  war  has  shown  the  need  of  these  three  elements  but 
the  public  has  not  yet  demanded  that  they  be  perfected,  coordinated, 
and  combined  in  one  harmonious  system  of  national  defence.  Not 
until  this  has  heen-  accotnplhhcd  irill  a  proper  military  polic}/  for  the 
United  States  he  adopted. 

2.  Our  ahiding  national  polieies. — The  majority  of  our  i)eople  have 
always  believed  in  asserting  their  own  rights  and  in  respecting  those 
of  others.  They  desire  that  the  cause  of  right  should  prevail  and  that 
laAvlessness  should  be  crushed  out.  To  live  up  to  these  high  ideals 
imposes  upon  us  new  duties  as  a  world  power;  duties  that  require 
something  more  positive  than  a  policy  of  mere  passive  defense.  In 
addition,  there  are  two  underlying  and  abiding  national  policies 
whose  maintenance  we  must  consider  as  necessary  to  our  national  life. 
These  are  the  '"  Monroe  doctrine  "  and  the  policy  of  avoiding  "  entan- 
gling alliances."  They  are  distinctive  and  affect  our  international 
relations  in  a  definite  manner.  In  addition,  policies  may  develop  in 
the  future  as  a  result  of  international  relations  with  respect  to  trade 
conditions. 

A  general  consideration  of  our  responsibilities  as  a  nation  and  of 
our  geographical  position  indicates  that  the  maintenance  of  oui- 
abiding  policies  and  interests  at  home  and  abroad  involves  problems 
of  defense  measures  both  on  land  and  on  sea.  The  solution  of  the 
general  problem  of  national  defense  nuist  be  sought  in  the  provision 
of  adequate  land  and  sea  forces  and  a  consideration  of  their  co- 
ordinate relationship. 

3.  Coordinate  relation^shi/)  of  Arm;/  and  Nari/. — Upon  the  Navy 
devolves  the  solution  of  the  problem  of  securing  and  maintaining 
control  of  the  sea.  To  accomi)lish  this  it  must  be  free  to  take  the 
offensive  promptly — that  is.  to  seek  out  and  defeat  the  enemy  fleet. 
The  use  of  any  part  of  the  high-sea  fleet  for  local  defense  defeats  the 
chief  object  of  the  Navy  and  is  a  misuse  of  naval  power.  A  fleet  de- 
feated at  sea  and  undefended  by  an  adequate  army  is  powerless 
either  to  prevent  invasion  or  even  its  own  idtimate  destruction  by 
combined  hostile  land  and  naval  forces.  In  illustration  comi)are  the 
cases  of  the  Spanish  fleet  at  Santiago  and  the  Eussian  fleet  at  Port 
Arthur  with  the  present  exam|)le  of  the  German,  Aiistiian,  and 
Turkish  fleets  luuler  the  protection  of  land  forces. 

Upon  the  Army  devolves  the  task  of  gaining  and  maintaining  on 
shore  the  ascendency  over  hostile  land  and  naval  operations.     To 


A    PBOPER    MILITARY    POLICY    FOR    THE    UNITED    STATES.  3 

accomplish  this  it  must  be  able  to  seek  out  promptly  and  to  defeat, 
capture,  or  destroy  the  invader  wherever  he  may  attempt  either  to 
secure  a  footing  upon  our  territory'  or  to  enter  the  waters  of  our  har- 
bors with  the  object  of  threatening  the  destruction  of  the  seaport 
or  of  a  fleet  driven  to  seek  refuge  or  repair  therein. 

The  problems  involved  in  operations  against  hostile  land  forces 
are  complex  and  include  only  as  an  incident  the  protection  of  harbor 
defenses  on  the  land  side.  The  problems  of  harbor  defense  against 
attack  from  the  sea  are  simple  and  passive  in  their  nature. 

4.  Coordinate  relationship  of  statesman  and  soldier. — In  our  coun- 
try public  opinion  estimates  the  situation,  statecraft  shapes  the 
policy,  while  the  duty  of  executing  it  devolves  upon  the  military 
and  naval  departments. 

Such  a  doctrine  is  sound  in  direct  proportion  to  its  success  in  pro- 
ducing a  military  system  capable  of  developing  fighting  power  suffi- 
cient to  meet  any  given  national  emergency,  at  the  proper  time,  sup- 
ported by  all  the  resources,  technical  and  economic,  of  the  country, 
in  a  word — preparedness.  All  the  other  world  powers  of  to-day  have 
realized  the  necessity  of  maintaining  highl}"  trained  and  organized 
military  and  naval  forces  in  time  of  peace,  and  all,  or  nearly  all,  are 
allied  in  powerful  coalitions. 

Without  superiority  on  the  sea  or  an  adequate  land  force  there  is 
nothing  to  prevent  any  hostile  power  or  coalition  of  powers  from 
landing  on  our  shores  such  part  of  its  trained  and  disciplined  troops 
as  its  available  transports  can  carry.  The  time  required  is  limited 
only  by  the  average  speed  of  its  vessels  and  the  delay  necessarily 
consumed  in  embarking  and  disembarking. 

In  order  that  the  American  people  can  intelligently  decide  on  a 
doctrine  of  preparedness  which  shall  constitute  the  military  policy 
of  the  United  States,  and  that  Congress  and  the  Executive  may  be 
able  to  carry  out  their  decision,  information  concerning  the  military 
strength  of  other  great  nations  and  shipping  available  for  transport 
purposes  must  be  clearly  set  forth. 

The  work  of  the  statesman  and  of  the  soldier  and  sailor  are  there- 
fore coordinate;  where  the  first  leaves  off  the  others  take  hold. 

5.  Preparedness  of  the  icorld  powers  for  oversea  expeditions. — 
Control  of  the  sea  having  been  once  gained  by  our  adversary  or 
adversaries,  there  is  nothing  to  prevent  them  from  dispatching  an 
oversea  expedition  against  us.  In  order  to  form  an  idea  of  the 
mobile  force  we  should  have  ready  to  resist  it  an  estimate  must  first 
be  made  of  the  approximate  number  of  troops  that  other  nations 
might  reasonably  be  expected  to  transport  and  of  the  time  required 
to  land  them  on  our  coasts. 

The  number  of  thoroughly  trained  and  organized  troops  an  enemy 
can  bring  in  the  first  and  succeeding  expeditions  under  such  an 
assumption  is  a  function  of — 

(<z)  The  size  of  the  enemy's  army,  and 

(5)  The  number,  size,  and  speed  of  the  vessels  of  the  enemy's  mer- 
chant marine  that  can  be  used  as  transports. 

Should  our  enemy  be  a  nation  in  arms — that  is,  one  in  which  all  or 
nearly  all  of  the  male  inhabitants  of  suitable  physique  are  given  a 
minimum  of  two  years'  training  with  the  colors  in  time  of  peace  (and 
this  is  true  of  all  world  powers  except  ourselves  and  England),  it  is 

36085—16 2 


4  A    PROPER    MILITARY    POLICY    FOR    THE    UNITED    STATES. 

evident  that  the  size  of  the  first  expedition  and  succeeding  expeditions 
would  be  limited  only  by  the  number  of  vessels  in  the  transport  fleets. 
It  also  follows  that  as  the  capacity  and  number  of  steamers  in  the 
merchant  marine  of  any  nation  or  group  of  nations  increase  in  the 
future,  the  number  of  trained  soldiers  which  such  nation  could  send 
in  such  expedition  will  also  increase,  and  our  trained  forces  should 
be  correspondingly  augmented. 

What  the  conditions  were  in  August,  1914,  is  shown  in  the  follow- 
ing table,  which  may  be  regarded  as  a  reasonable  estimate: 

Preparedness  of  the  great  powers  for  over-sea  expeditions. 


Nation. 


AustriarHungary 

France 

Germany 

Great  Britain . . . 

Italy 

Japan 

Russia 


Strengtli 
of  army. 


1  Tonnage  available  of  ships 
with  capacity  over — 


3,000 
tons. 


2,000 
tons. 


4,320,000 !     762,756 

.5,000,000 11,705,931 

.5,000,000 
1695,000 
2,000,000 
2,212,000 
5,000,000 


3,  .569, 962:4, 018, 185 

13,000,0001 

jl, 065,321 


428, 019 


1,000 
tons. 


2  1,013,985 


First  expe- 
dition using 
50  per  cent 
of  tonnage 
given. 


Men. 


72,000 
160,931 
1  387,000 
170, 000 
91, 000 
95, 745 
37, 630 


An- 
imals. 


Second  expe- 
dition using 
75  per  cent 
of  tonnage 
given. 


Time 
I  needed  to- 


Men. 


14,000   108,000 

32,186    243,295 

<  81, 270  ^  440,000 

90,000i 

13,650'  136,0001  20,475' 
24,416,  142,6221  36,623 


An- 
imals. 


Load 
and 
cross 
ocean 
with 
first 
expe- 
di- 
tion. 


Days. 

21, 600:    20.  7 
48, 279 
4  94,600 


15.8 
15.8 
14.0 
18.3 
22.5 


7,940!     66,444!  11,918     20.5 


Re- 
turn, 
load, 
and 
re- 
cross 
with 
sec- 
ond 
expe- 
di- 
tion. 


Days. 
40.4 
30.0 
30.8 
27.0 
35.0 
41.0 
40.0 


» 240,500  territorials. 

2  Japanese  field  regulations  indicate  the  mteution  to  use  steamers  of  1 ,000  tons;  for  this  reason  and  because 
of  the  large  amoimt  of  steamers  between  10  and  12  knots  speed,  all  Japanese  steamers  over  10  knots  speed 
and  a  thousand  tons  gross  have  been  considered. 

3  Fifty  per  cent  has  been  assumed  as  the  figure  representing  the  amount  of  shipping  in  or  within  call  of 
home  ports  at  outbreak  of  war. 

*  Usmg  no  ships  less  than  3,000  tons. 

Note.— The  allowance  prescribed  in  our  Field  Service  Regulations  of  3  tons  per  man  and  8  tons  per 
animal  for  ships  over  5,000  tons  and  4  tons  per  man  and  10  tons  per  animal  for  vessels  under  5,000  tons  has 
been  used  in  estimating  the  capacity  of  ships,  except  where  the  regulations  of  any  coimtry  prescribe  a 
different  allowance.  These  allowances  include  rations,  water,  forage,  etc.,  for  thevovage  and  a  margin 
for  three  months'  reserve  supplies.  The  tonnage  allowance  covers  men,  animals,  and  all  accessories  and 
is  sufTieient  to  provide  for  vehicles  fincluding  guns). 

Fighting  power  is  the  result  of  organization,  training,  and  equipment  backed  by  the  resoiu'ces  of  the 
country.    Availal^le  shipping  is  a  matter  of  commercial  statistics. 

The  quality,  organization,  and  efficiency  of  these  troops,  except 
fhose  of  Japan,  which  demonstrated  their  excellence  in  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War,  are  now  undergoing  a  supreme  test  of  military 
strength  on  land  and  sea.  This  test  by  the  ordeal  of  battle  is  visibly 
demonstrating  their  organization,  their  fighting  power,  and  the  rate 
at  which  each  is  capable  of  developing  and  maintaining  its  military 
strength.  In  addition,  where  certain  nations  have  transported  troops 
by  sea  their  capabilities  in  this  respect  have  to  some  extent  been 
shown. 

This  evidence,  produced  under  conditions  of  actual  warfare,  pre- 
sents an  example  of  the  resultant  efficiency  of  any  nation  that  has  de- 
veloped a  sound  military  policy;  the  soundest  policy  being  the  one 
which  insures  a  successful  termination  of  the  war  in  the  shortest  time. 


A    PROPER    MILITARY    POLICY    FOR    THE    UNITED    STATES.  5 

6.  Statement  of  the  military  problem. — From  what  has  been  stated, 
we  are  forced  to  the  conclusion  that  we  must  be  prepared  to  resist  a 
combined  land  and  sea  operation  of  formidable  strength.  Our  prin- 
cipal coast  cities  and  important  harbors  have  already  been  protected 
by  harbor  defenses  which,  by  passive  method  alone,  can  deny  to  an 
enemy  the  use  of  these  localities  as  bases  for  such  expeditions. 

The  enemy  being  unable  to  gain  a  foothold  in  any  of  these  fortified 
areas  by  direct  naval  attack  will  therefore  be  forced  to  find  some  suit- 
able place  on  the  coast  from  which  land  operations  can  be  conducted 
both  against  the  important  coast  cities  and  the  rich  commercial  cen- 
ters in  the  interior.  Long  stretches  of  coast  line  between  the  fortified 
places  lie  open  to  the  enemy.  The  only  reasonable  way  in  which  these 
localities  can  be  defended  is  by  provicling  a  mobile  land  force  of  suffi- 
cient strength,  so  located  that  it  may  be  thrown  in  at  threatened 
points  at  the  proper  tjme. 

It  has  just  been  shown  what  the  strength  of  these  expeditions  might 
be,  as  well  as  the  time  required  for  any  one  of  them  to  deAelop  its 
whole  effective  force.  Hence  it  can  be  seen,  when  we  take  into  con- 
sideration the  possible  two  months'  delay  provided  b}'  the  Navy,  that 
our  system  should  be  able  to  furnish  500,000  trained  and  organized 
mobile  troops  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  and  to  have  at  least  500,000 
more  available  within  90  days  thereafter.  Here,  however,  it  must  be 
pointed  out  that  two  expeditions  alone  will  provide  a  force  large 
enough  to  cope  with  our  1,000,000  mobile  troops,  and  consequently  we 
must  at  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  provide  the  system  to  raise  and 
train,  in  addition,  at  least  500,000  troops  to  replace  the  losses  and 
wastage  in  personnel  incident  to  war.  To  provide  this  organized  land 
force  is  the  military  problem  before  us  for  solution. 

I.   THE  EEGXTLAE  ARMY. 
GENERAL  FUNCTIONS  OF  THE  REGULAR  ARMY. 

7.  In  the  endeavor  to  reach  a  just  conclusion  as  to  the  strength 
and  organization  of  a  Regular  Army,  adequate  to  play  its  part  in 
our  national  defense,  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  this  defense  is  a 
joint  problem  requiring  for  its  correct  solution  the  united  efforts  of 
both  Army  and  Navy,  and  that  the  ultimate  strength  of  the  greater 
w^ar  army  is  dependent  to  a  considerable  extent  upon  the  part  to  be 
played  by  the  fleet.  It  is  therefore  assumed  in  this  discussion  that 
the  Navy  is  preparing  to  place  and  maintain  in  the  Pacific,  when  the 
occasion  requires,  a  force  superior  to  that  of  any  oriental  nation,  and, 
in  the  Atlantic,  one  second  only  to  that  of  the  greatest  European 
naval  power. 

The  Regular  Army  is  the  peace  nucleus  of  the  greater  war  army  of 
the  Nation.  Its  strength  and  organization  should  be  determined  not 
only  by  its  relation  to  the  larger  force  but  by  its  own  peace  and  war 
functions.  It  must  be  prepared  at  all  times  to  meet  sudden  and 
special  emergencies,  which  can  not  be  met  by  the  army  of  citizen 
soldiers.  Its  units  must  be  the  models  for  the  organization  and  train- 
ing of  those  of  the  great  war  army. 

Some  of  the  functions  of  the  Regular  Army  are : 

(a)  To  furnish  the  entire  strength  of  our  garrisons  outside  of  the 
United  States  proper  both  in  peace  and  war. 


6  A    PKOPEE    MILITARY    POLICY    FOE    THE    UNITED    STATES. 

(b)  To  garrison  our  harbor  defenses  within  the  United  States 
proper  in  time  of  peace. 

(c)  To  furnish  detachments  of  mobile  forces  in  time  of  peace  suffi- 
cent  for  the  protection  of  these  harbor  defenses  and  naval  bases 
against  naval  raids  which,  under  modern  conditions,  may  precede  a 
declaration  of  war. 

(d)  To  furnish  sufficient  mobile  forces  to  protect  our  principal 
cities  by  preventing  the  landing  of  hostile  expeditions  for  their  cap- 
ture in  the  intervals  between  our  fortified  harboi's  or  near  such  cities. 

(e)  To  supph"  a  mobile  reserve  to  reenforce  our  garrisons  outside 
of  the  United  States  proper  during  periods  of  insurrection  and 
disorder. 

(/)  To  furnish  expeditionary  forces  for  minor  wars  resulting  from 
the  occupation  of  foreign  territory  where  treaty  rights  or  funda- 
mental national  policies  may  have  been  threatened. 

(g)  To  prepare  in  advance  its  existing  administrative  and  supply 
departments  for  the  equipment,  ti'ansportation.  and  supply  of  the 
great  war  army  of  the  Xation. 

(h)  To  assist  in  the  training  of  organizations  of  citizen  soldiers. 

8.  Concerning  the  strength  and  organization  of  the  Regular  Army, 
the  following  points  are  to  be  considered : 

(a)  At  the  outbreak  of  war  the  Regular  Army  at  home  should  be 
strong  enough,  with  the  addition  of  organized  and  trained  citizen 
soldiers,  to  form  the  first  line  of  defense  in  order  to  give  sufficient 
time  to  permit  the  mobilization  and  concentration  of  our  greater  war 
army,  and  to  seize  opportvmities  for  such  immediate  initial  operations 
as  may  be  undertaken  before  the  mobilization  of  the  army  of  citizen 
soldiers  can  be  completed. 

(b)  It  should  be  so  organized  and  located  that  it  can  be  economi- 
cally and  efficiently  trained,  quickly  and  easily  mobilized  and  concen- 
trated, and  readily  used  as  a  model  in  the  education  and  training  of 
the  citizen  forces. 

MOBILE    AND   COAST   ARTILLERY   TROOPS    AND    THEIR   FUNCTIONS. 

9.  Experience  has  shown  that  our  regular  land  forces  and  others 
modeled  upon  them  must  consist  of  two  distinct  classes,  i.  e. : 

(a)  Mobile  troops. 

(b)  Coast  Artillery  troops. 

These  two  groups  have  theii'  own  special  functions  for  which  they 
are  trained  and  equipped  and  from  which  they  should  not  be  diverted 
except  in  some  emergency. 

The  function  of  the  Coast  Artillery  is  to  man  our  harbor  defenses 
designed  to  protect  important  seaports  from  direct  naval  attacks  and 
raids  from  the  sea.  The  armament  and  accessories  of  these  forts  are 
intended  to  be  so  complete  and  powerful  as  not  only  to  prevent 
hostile  landings  at  all  places  wathin  range  of  the  guns,  but  also  to 
cover  all  navigable  waters  in  the  vicinity  of  great  seacoast  cities  so 
thoroughly  as  to  leave  no  dead  spaces  from  which  enemy  ships,  either 
at  anchor  or  during  a  run-by,  could  bring  them  under  bombardment. 
While  these  harbor  forts  are  important  elements  in  our  scheme  of 
defense,  they  are,  nevertheless,  powerless  to  prevent  invasion  at 
points  outside  the  r.mge  of  their  guns.     The  total  length  of  our  coast 


A    PROPER    MILITARY    POLICY    FOR    THE    UNITED    STATES,  7 

line  is  enormous,  and  the  stretches  covered  by  harbor  defenses  are 
and  must  remain  ver}'  small  compared  with  the  unprotected  inter- 
vals that  lie  between  them.  If  we  should  lose  conmiand  of  the  sea 
an  invader  Avould  simply  land  in  one  of  these  intervals.  It  there- 
fore follows  that  the  ultimate  defense  of  our  coasts  depends  upon 
defeating  a  mobile  army  of  invasion,  and  this  can  be  done  only  by 
having  mobile  forces  prepared  to  operate  in  an}'  possible  theater  of 
war.  At  this  stage  of  hostilities  the  problem  becomes  one  of  cooper- 
ation between  Coast  Artillery  and  mobile  troops,  but  there  can  be  no 
fixed  relation  in  the  strength  of  these  two  classes  of  land  forces. 
The  necessary  strength  of  Coast  Artillery  troops  depends  upon  the 
number  and  character  of  harbor  defenses  established ;  that  of  mobile 
troops  upon  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  defensive  and  offensive 
o])erations  for  which  the  Xation  decides  to  be  prepared. 

RELATIOX    BETWEEX    HOME    AXD   OVERSEA    GARRISONS. 

10.  The  most  rational  method  of  determining  the  proper  strength 
and  organization  of  the  Eegular  Army  is  based  upon  the  fact  that 
this  force  is  and  must  be  divided  into  two  distinct  parts — one  for 
oversea  service,  the  other  for  home  service.  Each  of  these  parts 
must  have  its  proper  quota,  both  of  mobile  and  Coast  Artillery 
troops. 

The  troops  on  oversea  service  consist  of  the  detachments  required 
to  meet  the  special  military  problems  of  the  Philippines.  Oahu, 
Panama,  Alaska,  Guantanamo,  and  Porto  Eico.  Each  of  these  de- 
tachments has  a  distinct  tactical  and  strategic  mission,  and  is  to 
operate  within  a  restricted  terrain.  All  of  them  are  limited  to  over- 
sea communication  with  the  home  country,  and  all  of  them  may 
therefore  be  isolated  for  considerable  periods,  especially  in  the  criti- 
cal first  stages  of  war.  It  is  obvious  that  under  these  circumstances 
these  detachments  should  be  prepared  to  meet  all  military  emergen- 
cies until  reenforcements  from  the  United  States  can  reasonably  be 
expected.  They  must,  therefore,  be  maintained  at  all  times  at  full 
statutory  strength,  and  must,  in  addition,  be  organized  with  the  view 
to  being  self-supporting,  preferably  during  the  continuance  of  war, 
or  at  least  until  the  Navy  has  accomplished  its  primary  mission  of 
securing  the  command  of  the  sea. 

The  force  at  home  is  on  an  entirely  different  basis.  It  may  or  may 
not  be  given  an  adequate  number  of  units  in  time  of  peace,  but  it  is 
supported  by  all  of  the  resources  of  the  Nation.  It  may  be  increased 
at  the  pleasure  of  Congress,  and  it  may  be  reenforced  by  considerable 
forces  of  citizen  soldiery.  It  follows  from  these  considerations  that 
the  military  establishment  of  the  United  States  in  time  of  peace 
should  first  provide  effective  and  sufficient  garrisons  for  the  political 
and  strategic  outposts  of  the  United  States,  and  that  the  residue  at 
home  should  be  organized  with  the  view  to  ultimate  expansion  into 
such  war  forces  as  national  interests  may  require.  The  possibility 
of  a  satisfactory  mobilization  of  this  home  force  is  dependent  upon 
keeping  the  units  of  the  regular  contingent  at  full  statutory  strength. 

GENERAL  REQUIREMENTS  OF  OVERSEA   SERVICE. 

11.  The  Philijypines. — A  decision  to  defend  the  Philippines  against 
a  foreign  enemy  is  a  matter  of  national  and  not  of  military  policy. 


8  •  A    PEOPEK    MILITARY    POLICY    FOR    THE    UNITED    STATES. 

But  ill  studying  the  military  requirements  of  such  defense  it  must  be 
remembered  that,  under  conditions  of  modern  warfare,  unless  our 
Navy  has  undisputed  control  of  the  sea,  we  can  not  reenforce  the 
peace  garrison  after  a  declaration  of  war  or  while  war  is  imminent. 

12.  Oahu.— The  maintenance  of  the  naval  base  at  Pearl  Harbor, 
Oahu,  is  an  essential  factor  in  the  military  problem  of  holding  the 
Hawaiian  Islands.  These  islands  constitute  a  vital  element  in  the 
defense  of  the  Pacific  coast  and  in  securing  to  ourselves  the  full  value 
of  the  Panama  Canal  as  a  strategic  highway  between  the  two  oceans. 

The  problem  of  holding  the  Hawaiian  Islands  can  be  solved  by 
making  Oahu,  and  therefore  Pearl  Harbor,  secure  against  all  coiners. 
A  satisfactory  solution  requires  the  joint  action  of  the  Army  and 
Navy.  Peari  Harbor  and  Honolulu  are  already  protected  from 
direct  naval  attack  by  fortifications  now  nearing  completion.  These, 
while  deemed  adequate  to  meet  the  conditions  existing  when  they 
were  designed,  must  now  be  strengthened  to  meet  the  recent  increase 
in  power  of  guns  afloat;  but  no  matter  how  complete  these  harbor 
fortifications  on  the  southern  coast  of  Oahu  may  be,  they  are  unable 
to  prevent  attacks  either  on  the  remaining  hundred  miles  of  coast 
lying  beyond  the  range  of  their  guns  or  on  the  other  islands  of  the 
group.  Consequently  there  should  be  in  addition  a  force  of  modern 
submarines  and  destroyers  forming  part  of  the  permanent  naval 
equipment  of  Pearl  Harbor  with  sufficient  radius  of  action  to  keep 
the  Hawaiian  waters  thoroughly  patrolled  throughout  their  whole 
extent  and  to  make  them  dangerous  for  enemy  vessels.  Should  this 
force  be  worsted  in  combat  and  withdrawn  before  the  arrival  of  our 
high-sea  fleet,  the  complete  control  of  the  local  waters  might  pass 
temporarily  to  the  enemy,  so  that  the  ultimate  security  of  both  Hono- 
lulu, the  naval  base  at  Pearl  Harbor,  and  indeed  of  the  whole  group, 
depends  upon  including  in  the  Oahu  garrison  enough  mobile  troops 
to  defeat  any  enemy  that  may  land  anywhere  on  the  island.  It  is 
clear  that  perfect  coordination  between  the  Army  and  Navy  at  this 
station  is  absolutely  essential  to  success  in  holding  this  key  to  the 
Pacific.  Unless  we  provide  such  dual  defense  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands 
we  can  not  be  sure  of  retaining  control  even  of  that  part  of  the  Pacific 
lying  within  the  sphere  of  defense  of  our  western  coast.  By  making 
such  provision  the  high-sea  fleet  is  left  free  to  seek  out  the  enemy  fleet 
in  Pacific  waters. 

13.  Panama. — The  Panama  Canal  is  a  very  important  strategic 
position  which  it  is  our  duty  to  hold.  By  our  control  of  this  highway 
betAveen  the  two  oceans  the  etfectiveness  of  our  fleet  and  our  general 
military  power  is  enormoush^  increased.  It  is  therefore  obvious  that 
the  unquestioned  security  of  the  canal  is  for  us  a  vital  military  need. 
The  permanent  garrison  should  be  strong  enough  to  guard  the  locks, 
spillways,  and  other  important  works  and  to  prevent  a  naval  attack 
which,  under  modern  conditions,  may  even  precede  a  declaration  of 
war.  We  should  therefore  be  able,  even  in  peace,  to  man  the  sea- 
coast  guns  and  mine  defense  that  cover  the  approach  to  the  canal, 
and  we  must  have  enough  mobile  troops  to  defeat  raids.  A  modern 
fleet  might  land  a  small  raiding  party  of  several  thousand  bluejackets 
at  any  one  or  more  of  a  number  of  places,  and  such  a  force  landing 
out  of  range  of  the  seacoast  guns  could,  if  unopposed,  penetrate  to 
some  vunerable  part  of  the  canal  within  a  few  hours.  The  permanent 
garrison  should  therefore  include  a  mobile  force  strong  enough  to 


A    PROPER    MILITARY    POLICY    FOR    THE    UNITED    STATES.  9 

anticipate  and  defeat  naA^al  raids  at  the  beginning  of  hostilities  and 
to  protect  the  canal  against  more  serious  land  operations  liable  to  be 
undertaken  later.  If  the  enemy  is  operating  on  one  ocean  only,  it 
might  be  possible  to  send  reenforcements  from  the  United  States,  but 
to  count  on  such  relief  would  be  running  too  great  chances.  By  au- 
thority of  the  Republic  of  Panama,  this  garrison  is  given  facilities 
in  time  of  peace  to  operate  beyond  the  Canal  Zone  in  order  that  the 
troo]i)S  may  be  properly  trained  for  their  special  mission  and  made 
familiar  with  the  terrain  over  which  they  may  be  called  upon  to 
operate  in  defending  the  canal. 

14.  Gvantanamo. — The  policy  of  the  United  States  contemplates 
the  establishment  of  a  naval  base  at  Guantanamo.  Garrisons  of  coast 
artillery  and  mobile  troops  are  necessary  for  its  defense  and  should 
be  assigned  to  station  there  at  the  proper  time. 

15.  Alaska. — The  garrison  of  Alaska  should  be  large  enough  to 
support  the  authority  of  the  United  States,  and,  in  time  of  war,  to 
maintain  our  sovereignt}^  over  a  small  selected  area  of  the  Territory. 
As  work  on  the  Alaskan  Railroad  progresses,  the  military  needs  of 
Alaska  will  increase. 

16.  Porto  Rico  is  to  be  classified  w'ith  the  Philipines  and  Guam. 
Unlike  Alaska  and  Hawaii,  these  island  possessions  have  not  been 
organized  as  Territories;  nevertheless,  they  all  belong  to  the  United 
States  and  must  be  protected. 

GENERAL    REQUIREMENTS    OF    HOME    SERVICE. 

17.  General  distribvtion  of  Coast  Artillery  troops  in  fortiflecl 
areas. — It  has  already  been  shown  where  we  should  have  garrisons 
for  oversea  service  and  why.  It  now  remains  to  shoAv  how  we  should 
distribute  our  regular  troops  for  service  at  home.  Coast  Artillery 
stations  should  correspond  to  the  fortified  areas  on  the  seacoast,  and 
these  are  indicated  by  the  position  of  the  harbor  defenses,  which  are 
at  present  located  as  follows: 

Portland,  Me.  The  Potomac.  New  Orleans. 

Portsmouth,  N.  H.  Chesapeake  Bay.  Galveston. 

Boston.  Cape  Fear.  .San  Diego. 

New  Bedford.  Charleston.  Los  Angeles. 

Narragansett  Bay.  Savannah.  San  Francisco. 

Long  Island  Sound.  Tampa.  Puget  Sound. 

New  York.  Key  West.  The  Columbia. 

The  Delaware.  Pensacola. 

Baltimore.  Mobile. 

18.  General  distribution  of  mobile  troops  hi  strategic  areas. — As 
previously  explained,  the  influence  of  harbor  defenses  is  limited  to 
the  areas  within  the  range  of  their  guns.  To  provide  harbor  defenses 
without  mobile  forces  necessary  to  cover  the  unprotected  intervals  that 
lie  between  them  would  be  comparable  with  attempting  to  make  a 
house  burglar  proof  by  barring  the  doors  and  leaving  the  windows 
open.  There  is  not  a  case  in  history  where  seacoast  fortifications, 
efficiently  manned,  have  been  captured  by  direct  attack  from  the  sea. 
In  all  cases  of  capture  mobile  land  forces  have  been  employed  for  the 
purpose,  and  an  enemy  that  hopes  for  success  must  undertake  landing 
operations  against  us.  We  must  therefore  decide  upon  a  rational 
distribution  of  our  mobile  forces  to  meet  this  contingency. 


10  A    PROPER    MILITARY    POLICY    FOR    THE    UNITED    STATES. 

19.  Paget  Sound  area. — Western  Washington  is  bordered  on  the 
east  by  the  steep  and  rugged  Cascade  Mountains,  on  the  south  by 
the  Cohnnbia  Eiver,  and  on  the  north  by  Juan  de  Fuca  Strait  and 
Canada.  This  corner  of  the  United  States  is  completely  cut  off  from 
the  rest  of  the  country  by  great  natural  obstacles  and  presents  an 
extensive  front  for  attack  by  sea.  While  the  maps  show  some  twenty 
passes  across  the  Cascade  Mountains,  communication  with  the  east 
is  almost  entirely  by  three  railroads,  all  crossing  at  points  less  than 
50  miles  apart  and  having  tunnels  or  other  vulnerable  structures. 
The  only  practicable  wagon  road  is  effectually  closed  to  traffic  for 
between  four  and  five  months  each  year  by  heavy  snows.  Communi- 
cation with  the  south  is  by  one  line  of  railroad,  crossing  the  Columbia 
River  by  bridge  at  Vancouver.  Communication  between  this  sec- 
tion and  the  east  and  south  is  thus  largely  dependent  upon  a  number 
of  structures  readily  destroyed  by  high  explosives,  and  impossible  of 
restoration  to  traffic  within  a  definite  time.  The  two  railroads  along 
the  Columbia  River,  at  the  point  where  it  breaks  through  the  moun- 
tains, could  be  easily  wrecked  so  as  to  require  considerable  time  to 
repair,  and  the  gorge  could  be  held  by  a  small  force  against  a  large 
one  coming  from  the  east.  If  an  enemy  succeeds  in  entering  western 
Washington  and  in  seizing  and  destroying  the  important  bridges  and 
tunnels,  he  would  be  so  securely  established  as  to  render  it  extremely 
difficult  to  dislodge  him.  In  this  rich  region  an  invader  could  main- 
tain himself  indefinitely.  The  harbor  defenses  maintained  in  this 
region  are  reasonably  strong.  Ordinary  precaution  demands  that  a 
mobile  force  of  reasonable  strength  be  also  maintained  in  this  region. 

20.  California  area. — There  are  five  transcontinental  lines  of  rail- 
way entering  California.  The  Western  Pacific  and  Southern  Pacific 
by  the  passes  through  the  Sierras  northeast  of  Sacramento;  the 
Atchison,  Topeka  &  Santa  Fe,  and  the  San  Pedro,  Los  Angeles  & 
Salt  Lake  via  Daggetts  Pass  northeast  of  Los  Angeles;  and  the 
Southern  Pacific  via  the  Salton  Sea  and  Gorgonia  Pass  southeast  of 
Los  Angeles.  There  are  no  other  passes  through  the  Sierras  that 
have  been  considered  practicable.  There  is  no  railroad  running  south 
into  Lower  California.  Only  one  railroad,  the  Southern  Pacific, 
runs  north  into  Oregon.  As  in  the  Puget  Sound  region,  communica- 
tion with  the  east  is  largely  dependent  upon  structures  readily  de- 
stroyed by  explosives  and  impossible  of  restoration  to  traffic  within  a 
definite  time ;  California  and  the  greater  centers  of  population  are 
separated  by  wide  expanses  of  sparsely  settled  countr3^  To  trans- 
port promptly  large  bodies  of  troops  into  California  would  be  difficult 
if  not  impossible  in  face  of  opposition  at  the  passes.  The  invader 
would  have  a  most  fertile  region  at  his  back,  while  the  reverse  would 
be  the  situation  with  us. 

The  harbor  defenses  maintained  in  this  region  are  reasonably 
strong,  but  they  are  of  little  use  unless  supported  by  a  reasonably 
strong  mobile  force  maintained  in  this  region. 

To  rely,  for  defense,  during  the  first  stages  of  a  war  upon  a  mobile 
force  shipped  in  from  the  east  is  to  invite  disaster. 

21.  Atlantic  area. — In  case  of  war  with  a  first-class  power  on  the 
Atlantic,  that  portion  of  our  country  lying  between  and  including 
Maine  and  Virginia  would  undoubtedly  be  the  primary  object  of  an 
invader.    While  all  other  points  along  the  Atlantic  and  Gulf  coasts 


A    PKOPEE    MILITARY    FOLIC V    FOR    THE    UNITED    STATES.  11 

and  all  points  on  our  land  frontieis  would  undoubtedly  be  in  danger, 
the  danger  would  be  secondary  to  that  of  the  North  Atlantic  States 
above  named.  Here,  also,  the  harbor  defenses  are  reasonably  strong, 
and  here  also,  a  mobile  force  should  be  kept  sufficient  in  size  to  hold 
important  points  until  the  citizen  soldiery  can  be  mobilized. 

While  many  other  regions  are  important,  the  three  regions  de- 
scribed— Puget  Sound.  California,  and  the  North  Atlantic  States — 
contain  the  critical  areas. 

22.  Middle  West  area. — The  center  of  population  of  the  United 
States  is  in  the  middle  west,  and  here  should  be  located  a  mobile 
force  for  use  in  case  of  need,  on  either  the  Pacific  or  Atlantic  coast, 
the  northern  or  southern  border. 

NECESSARY   STRENGTH   OF    MOBILE   TROOPS   FOR  OVERSEA    SERVICE. 

23.  Constant  study  of  the  problem  which  confronts  each  of  our 
oversea  garrisons  in  connection  with  the  advance  made  in  arms,  trans- 
portation, tactics,  lines  of  information,  methods  of  communications, 
undersea  craft,  and  aerial  operations,  has  led  to  the  conclusions  that 
the  strength  of  the  oversea  garrisons,  herein  given  is  the  minimum 
below  which  they  should  not  be  allowed  to  fall  at  any  time. 

The  general  requirements  of  oversea  service  have  already  been 
stated  for  each  of  the  several  localities  concerned.  It  now  remains 
to  determine  the  necessary  strength  to  meet  these  requirements, 
taking  up  each  case  in  turn. 

24.  The  Philippines. — If  in  accordance  Avith  national  policy  it  is 
decided  to  keep  the  American  flag  flying  in  the  Philippines  in  war 
as  in  peace  it  becomes  essential  to  hold  Manila  Bay. 

25.  Oahu. — Having  in  mind  the  principles  governing  the  relations 
between  home  and  oversea  garrisons,  the  force  maintained  at  all 
times  in  Oahu  should  include  : 

9  regiments  of  Infantry  (3  brigades). 

1  regiment  of  Cavalry. 

2  regiments  of  Field  Artillery. 

2  battalions  Engineers;  1  field  battalion  of  .Signal  troops;  1  aero  squad- 
ron ;  1  telegraph  company. 
2  ambulance  companies. 
14  companies  Coast  Artillery. 

This  force  will  total  about  25,000  combatant  officers  and  men. 

26.  Panavia. — The  force  maintained  at  all  times  in  the  Canal  Zone 
should  include : 

9  regiments  of  Infantry  (3  brigades). 
1  regiment  of  Cavalry. 

1  regiment  of  Field  Artillery. 

2  battalions  of  Engineers ;  1  field  battalion  Signal  tr(wps ;  1  aero  squad- 

ron ;  1  telegraph  company. 
1  ambulance  company ;  1  evacuation  hospital. 
21  companies  Coast  Artillery  Corps. 

This  force  will  total  about  24.000  combatant  officers  and  men. 

27.  Guantanamo.- — The  policy  of  the  United  States  contemplates 
the  establishment  of  a  naval  base  at  Guantanamo.  Garrisons  of 
Coast  Artillery  and  mobile  troops  are  necessary  for  its  defense  and 
should  be  assigned  to  station  there  at  the  proper  time. 


12 


A    PROPEE    MILITARY    POLICY    FOE    THE    UNITED    STATES. 


28.  Alaska. — The  garrison  of  Alaska  should  be  large  enough  to 
support  the  authority  of  the  United  States  and,  in  time  of  war,  to 
maintain  our  sovereignty  over  a  small  selected  area  of  the  Terri- 
tory. As  work  on  the  Alaskan  Railroad  progresses  the  military 
needs  of  Alaska  will  increase. 

In  time  of  peace  it  is  believed  that  the  Alaskan  garrison  should  be 
one  regiment  of  Infantr}^  (1,915  officers  and  men),  to  be  increased 
later  as  circumstances  may  demand. 

29.  Porto  Rico. — The  present  garrison,  reorganized  into  a  full 
regiment  of  three  battalions,  etc.,  is  sufficient  (1,915  officers  and  men). 

30.  The  following  table  gives  a  summary  of  the  minimum  garrison 
to  be  maintained  on  over-sea  service : 

Table  of  garrisons  for  over-sea  stations. 


I 

'■    Regi- 
Localities.                    ments  of 
Infantry. 

Regi- 
ments of 
Cavalry. 

Batteries 
of  Field 
Artillery. 

Battal- 
ions of 
Engi- 
neers. 

Battal- 
ions, 
Signal 
Corps.i 

Aero 
squad- 
rons. 

1 
1 
1 

Compa- 
nies of 
Coast 

Artillery 
Corps. 

Philippines 9 

Oahii 9 

Panama 9 

Alaska                 1 

3 

1 
1 

18 
12 

6 

2 

li 

26 
14 

21 

Porto  Rico           f           3  1 

Total 29 

5 

36 

5i 

44 

3 

61 

*  Includes  1  telegraph  cornpany  in  each  garrison. 
2 1  company  mounted  for  Cavalry  brigade. 
8  Native. 
Combatants—  Officers  and  men. 

Mobile 74, 500 

Coast  Artillery  Corps 7,500 

Total 82,000 

NECESSARY  STRENGTH  OF  MOBILE  TROOPS  FOR  HOME  SERVICE. 

31.  Careful  studies  made  at  the  War  College,  extending  over  a 
period  of  years,  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  the  strength  of  the 
Infantry,  Cavalry,  Field  Artillery,  Engineers,  and  signal  troops  of 
the  Regular  Army  maintained  at  home  in  time  of  peace,  and  the  dis- 
tribution of  administrative  units  of  these  arms  in  the  principal 
strategic  areas,  should  be  as  given  in  the  following  table : 


Combatant  troops. 


Localities. 

Infantry 
regiment. 

Cavalry 
regiment. 

Field 
Artillery 
regiment. 

Engi- 
neer 

bat- 
talions. 

Bat- 
talions 
Signal 
Corps. 

Aero 
squad- 
rons. 

Puget  Sound  area 

9 
9 
9 
9 

3 
4 
4 
3 
6 

^3i 
11 
1 

2i 
2J 
2J 
2i 

li 
li 

1> 

California 

North  Atlantic  States 

Middle  West 

Mexican  border 

Total 

36 

20 

15 

10 

7 

6 

•  Each  Cavalry  brigade  to  have  1  battalion  horse  artillery;  1  company  mounted  Engineers;  1  company 
Signal  Corps. 

Approximate  total,  121,000  otTicers  and  men. 


A    PROPER    MILITARY    POLICY    FOR    THE    UNITED    STATES. 


13 


These  troops  should  be  organized  in  higher  tactical  units  and  dis- 
tributed in  strategic  areas  substantially  as  follows : 

Puget  Sound  area One  division  (less  divisional  Cavalry)  and  one  Cavalry 

brigade  ( of  3  regiments ) .  ' 

California One  division  and  one  Cavalry  brigade. 

North  Atlantic  States__.One  division  and  one  Cavalry  brigade. 

Middle  West One  division  (less  divisional  Cavalry)  and  one  Cavalry 

brigade. 
Mexican  border — 

West  of  El  Paso One  Cavalry  brigade. 

East  of  El  Paso One  Cavalry  brigade. 

NECESSARY  STRENGTH  OF  COAST  ARTILLERY  TROOPS  REQUIRED  FOR  SERVICE 
OVERSEAS  AND  AT  HOME. 

32.  The  strength  of  the  Coast  Artillery  depends  upon  the  number 
of  guns  and  mine  fields  installed  and  projected  and  upon  the  assist- 
ance to  be  received  from  Organized  Militia  units.  An  estimate  pre- 
pared in  the  Office  of  the  Chief  of  Coast  Artillery  ^  gives  the  follow- 
ing strength,  in  companies,  required  under  the  supposition  that  all 
mine  fields  and  all  oversea  guns  and  one-half  the  guns  at  home  are 

manned  from  the  Regular  Army : 

Companies. 

Philippines 26 

Oahu 14 

Panama 21 

United  States 228 

Total 289 

Total  companies  (gun  and  mine) 289 

Officers  and  men 34,413 

TOTAL   STRENGTH  OF  THE   REGULAR   TROOPS   REQUIRED   FOR   ALL   SERVICES. 

33.  Combining  all  previous  estimates  of  Coast  Artillery  and  mobile 
troops  required  for  service  in  oversea  garrisons  and  at  home,  the  fol- 
lowing tabular  statement  of  the  required  strength  of  the  Regular 
Army  in  units  appropriate  to  each  arm,  results,  viz : 


Localities. 


Philippines  2 

Oahu 

Canal  Zone 

Alaska 

Porto  Rico , 

Puget  Sound  area 

California 

North  Atlantic  States. 

Middle  West 

Mexican  border 

United  States 


Total  required. 


Infantry 
regi- 
ments. 


65 


Cavalry 

regi- 
ments. 


25 


Field 
Artillery 
regi- 
ments. 


Coast         Engi- 
Artillery  1      neer 
com-  bat- 

panies.  talions. 


228 


289 


m 


Signal  Corps, 


Battal- 
ions. 


nj 


Aero 

squads. 


'  This  estimate  can  only  be  verified  by  an  inspection  of  all  the  harbors  in  question,  for  which  inspection 
there  has  not  been  sufficient  time  since  this  estimate  was  received. 

2  Nine  regiments  Infantry,  2  regiments  Field  Artillery,  2  battalions  Engineers.  Filipinos  to  be  added, 
21,000  officers  and  men. 


14  A    PEOPER    MILITARY    POLICY    FOR    THE    UNITED    STATES. 

These  figures  may  be  summarized  as  follows : 

Oversea : 

Mobile  (combatant) 74,500 

Coast  Artillery  Corps 7,  500 

In  United  States : 

Mobile   (combatant) 121.000 

Coast  Artillery  Corps 27,  000 

Total : 

Mobile  (combatant) 195,500 

Coast  Artillery  Corps 34,  500 


82,000 


148.  000 


230,  000 

To  this  total  should  be  added  officers  and  men  for  the  Sanitary; 
Quartermaster.  Ordnance  Department,  etc..  appropriate  to  a  force  of 
this  strength,  amounting  approximately  to  30,000  officers  and  men. 
Including  Philippine  Scouts.  21,000,  the  grand  total  becomes  281,000. 

34.  Organization. — The  Tables  of  Organization,  approved  and 
published  on  Februar}'^  25,  1914,  for  the  information  and  government 
of.  the  Regular  Army  and  Organized  Militia  of  the  United  States 
have  been  taken  as  the  guide  in  estimating  the  numerical  strength  of 
the  personnel  of  the  various  tactical  and  administrative  units  men- 
tioned in  this  report.  This  was  done  as  a  matter  of  convenience  and 
because  the  service  generally  is  familiar  with  these  tables,  which  are 
the  latest  official  publication  of  the  War  Department  on  this  subject. 
They  conform  to  the  Field  Service  Regulations  and  are  the  best  that 
can  be  devised  under  the  limitation  of  the  present  laws  governing  the 
Army,  but  it  can  not  be  too  emphatically  stated  that  they  are  for 
emergency  vse  only  and  contain  certain  undesirable  and  unscientific 
features  which  should  be  corrected  as  soon  as  the  necessary  legisla- 
tion can  be  obtained.  For  example,  the  war  organization  shown  in 
the  tables  is  provisional  only,  while  the  peace  strength  is  arranged 
so  as  not  to  exceed  the  total  enlisted  strength  of  about  93,000  men 
now  permitted  by  existing  appropriations. 

This  limitation  falls  heaviest  upon  the  Infantry,  whose  organiza- 
tions on  home  service  are  maintained  at  only  43  per  cent  of  full  statu- 
tory strength,  while  the  Cavalry  organizations  are  maintained  at  75 
?er  cent  and  those  of  Field  Artillery  at  Y7  per  cent  of  such  strength, 
t  is  generally  conceded  that  our  Infantry  companies  should  each 
have  the  full  statutory  strength  of  150  men  in  order  to  permit  proper 
training  of  the  officers  in  time  of  peace  and  supply  efficient  fighting 
strength  in  time  of  war. 

In  consequence  of  the  greatly  reduced  strength  of  these  Infantry 
organizations,  their  efficiency  is  unduly  decreased  and  overhead 
charges  correspondingly  increased. 

The  requirements  of  modern  war  demand  that  a  machine-gun  unit, 
a  supply  unit,  and  certain  mounted  men  be  attached  to  each  regiment, 
and  that  units  of  various  strengths  be  assigned  to  brigade  and  divi- 
sion headnuarters.  None  of  these  units  is  authorized  by  law,  vet  all 
are  essential.  Tables  of  Organization,  1914,  represent  an  effort  to 
adapt  an  archaic  statutory  ovwanization  to  modern  requirements  by 
organizing  the  necessary  additional  units,  'provisionally.  This  has 
been  done  by  detaching  from  statutory  organizations  the  personnel 
required.  An  examination  of  the  tables  will  show  that  more  than 
5  per  cent  of  the  Infantry  personnel  authorized  by  Congress  have 


A   PEOPEE    MILITAEY    POLICY    FOE    THE    UNITED    STATES.  15 

been  diverted  from  their  legitimate  duty  as  members  of  statutory 
organizations  and  have  been  assigned  to  provisional  units  which, 
while  necessary  and  essential,  have  only  the  sanction  of  departmental 
authorit3\  and  lack  the  efficiency  Avhich  can  only  be  given  by  statute. 
In  the  Cavah  V  more  than  9  per  cent  are  similarly  diverted. 

Recognizing  these  facts,  the  War  College  Division  of  the  General 
Staff  has  prepared  a  plan  for  organizing  on  modern  lines  an  army 
of  the  strength  just  shown  to  be  necessary  for  the  national  needs. 
Should  this  plan  be  approved,  the  organization  of  the  Regular 
Army,  the  militia,  and  whatever  reserves  are  formed  would  proceed 
along  the  ncAv  lines. 

II.    THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA. 

35.  The  act  of  Congress  approved  April  25,  1914,  commonly  know^n 
as  the  volunteer  hiAv,  defines  the  land  forces  of  the  United  States  as 
"  the  Regular  Army,  the  organized  land  militia  while  in  the  service 
of  the  United  States,  and  such  volunteer  forces  as  Congress  may 
authorize." 

The  Organized  Militia,  in  addition  to  its  use  as  a  State  force,  is 
available  for  use  by  the  Federal  Government,  as  provided  in  the 
Constitution. 

36.  Constitutional  functions  of  the  Organized  Militia. — Its  consti- 
tutional functions  are  the  following: 

{a)  A  State  force  to  preserve  order  within  the  State  limits,  in 
order  to  avoid  calling  upon  the  Regular  Army  or  the  Organized 
Militia  of  other  States  to  discharge  such  function. 

(b)  A  Federal  force  when  called  forth  by  the  President,  and  duly 
mustered  as  prescribed  by  Congress,  for  any  of  the  three  purposes 
authorized  by  the  Constitution. 

37.  Some  uses  of  the  Organized  Militia  as  a  Federal  force. — Hav- 
ing been  called  forth  as  militia,  they  may  be  used  as  follows : 

{a)   As  Coast  Artillery  supports  and  reserves. 

(b)  To  guard  and  protect  certain  bridges,  canal  locks,  arsenals, 
depots  of  supplies,  docks,  navy  yards,  and  other  vulnerable  points  in 
the  home  territory. 

((?)  To  guard  lines  of  communication  within  the  limits  of  the 
United  States. 

38.  Limitations. — It  is  stated  later  in  this  report  that  12  months 
at  150  hours  per  month,  "  is  considered  the  minimum  length  of  time 
of  actual  training  considered  necessary  to  prepare  troops  for  war 
service."  Due  to  constitutional  limitations.  Congress  has  not  the 
power  to  fix  and  require  such  an  amount  of  training  for  the  Organ- 
ized Militia.  No  force  can  be  considered  a  portion  of  our  first  line 
whose  control  and  training  is  so  little  subject  to  Federal  authority 
in  peace.  No  force  should  be  con.sidered  a  portion  of  our  first  line  in 
war  unless  it  be  maintained  fully  organized  and  equipped  in  peace  at 
practically  war  strength.  This  would  exclude  the  Organized  Militia 
from  consideration  for  service  in  the  first  line  mainly  because  of  the 
impossibility  of  giving  it  in  peace  the  training  required  for  such 
function.  It  may  be  necessary  to  continue  Federal  support  of  the 
Organized  Militia  in  order  that  some  organized  force  may  be  imme- 
diately available  for  the  purposes  set  forth  in  paragraphs  36  and  37. 


16  A    PROPER    MILITARY    POLICY   FOR    THE    UNITED    STATES. 

39.  Recominendations. — In  the  preparation  of  plans  for  the  na- 
tional defense  and  for  the  prese^^'ation  of  the  honor  and  dignit}''  of 
the  United  States,  the  number  of  troops  that  are  deemed  necessary  are 
largely  in  excess  of  the  total  Regular  and  Militia  forces  available  in 
the  United  States. 

It  is  only  during  the  existence  of  war,  or  when  war  is  imminent, 
that  any  other  forces  may  be  raised  under  existing  law.  When  Con- 
gress so  authorizes  the  President,  he  may  call  forth  volunteers. 

Section  3  of  the  volunteer  law  provides  that  under  certain  con- 
ditions organizations  of  the  Organized  Militia  may  be  received  into 
the  Volunteer  Service  in  advance  of  any  other  organizations  of  the 
same  arm  or  class  from  the  same  State,  Territory,  or  District;  and 
section  4  of  the  act  of  May  27,  1908,  amending  the  militia  law,  pro- 
vides that  the  Militia  shall  be  called  into  the  service  in  advance  of  any 
volunteer  force  that  may  be  raised. 

It  is  evident  that  it  can  not  be  known  prior  to  the  existence  of  the 
imminence  of  war  what  organizations,  if  any,  of  the  Organized 
Militia  will  enter  the  volunteer  service,  and  that  no  definite  plans  can 
be  prepared  providing  for  the  use  of  such  organizations,  either  as 
militia  or  as  volunteers,  until  war  is  actually  upon  us. 

No  legislation  affecting  the  Organized  Militia  is  recommended 
beyond  the  repeal  of  all  provisions  of  laws  now  in  effect  whereby 
militia  or  militia  organizations  may  or  must  be  received  into  the 
Federal  service  in  advance  of  any  other  forces. 

This  recommendation  is  not  to  be  construed  as  advocating  express 
repeal  of  certain  sections  of  existing  laws  relating  to  the  Organized 
Militia,  but  as  suggesting  that  any  legislation  hereafter  proposed 
for  the  organization  of  a  Federal  reserve  force  shall  contain  the 
usual  concluding  section  repealing  all  laws  and  parts  of  laws  incon- 
sistent therewith,  and  that  such  legislation  be  so  framed  as  to  render 
inconsistent  with  it  the  provisions  of  law  just  referred  to. 

III.    RESERVES. 

40.  Reserves  include:  {a)  Well-instructed  soldiers  of  the  Regular 
Army  furloughed  to  what  is  herein  termed  the  regular  reserve,  (6) 
citizen  soldiers,  (c)  reserve  officers. 

41.  The  regular  reserve. — As  the  United  States  should  have  a 
mobile  force  of  500,000  soldiers  available  at  home  at  the  outbreak  of 
war,  the  Army,  with  the  regidar  reserve,  should  amount  to  this 
strength.  In  order  to  develop  the  necessary  regular  reserve  with  the 
Army  at  the  strength  advocated  in  this  policy,  enlistments  would 
have  to  be  for  about  eight  years — two  with  the  colors  and  six  in 
reserve.  That  would,  in  eight  years,  result  in  approximately  the 
following  mobile  forces  at  home  available  at  the  outbreak  of  war: 

(1)  Mobile  regular  troops  (combatant)  with  the  colors 121,000 

(2)  The  regular  reserve 379,000 

Total 500,000 

During  the  first  weeks  of  war  in  this  country  the  military  situation 
will  probably  be  critical.  At  that  time  every  fully  trained  soldier 
should  be  put  in  the  field.  To  do  that  with  the  small  military  estab- 
lishment herein  advocated  it  is  necessary  that  during  peace  the  Army 


A    PKOPEK    MILITARl    POLICY    FOR    THE    UNITED    STATES.  17 

be  kept  at  war  strength,  and  that  the  regidar  reserve  be  organized 
and  not  kept  back  to  replace  losses  expected  during  war.  Such  losses 
should  be  replaced  from  depot  units. 

42.  Citizen  soldiers. — In  addition  to  the  500,000  fully  trained 
mobile  troops  mentioned  above,  at  least  500,000  more — a  total  of 
1,000,000  men- — should  be  prepared  to  take  the  field  immediately  on 
the  outbreak  of  war  and  should  have  had  sufficient  previous  military 
training  to  enable  them  to  meet  a  trained  enemy  within  three  months. 
Twelve  months'  intensive  training  is  the  minimum  that  will  prepare 
troops  for  war  service.  Therefore  the  500,000  partly  trained  troops 
above  referred  to  require  nine  months'  militar}^  training  before  war 
begins.  Military  efficiency  of  reserves  requires  that  Regular  Army 
officers  be  assigned  thereto  for  training  purposes — at  least  one  to 
every  400  men — and  that  organizations  and  specially  designated  non- 
commissioned officers  of  the  Army  be  utilized  in  instructing  reserves 
as  far  as  practicable. 

Based  upon  exjoerience  with  Tables  of  Organization.  1914,  the 
War  College  Division  has  recently  prepared  a  new  plan  of  organiza- 
tion for  the  Army.  The  Regular  Army  and  the  reserves  should  be 
organized  according  to  this  plan.  Organizations  should  be  formed 
of  men  from  the  districts  to  which  their  respective  organizations  are 
assigned  for  recruiting.  For  this  purpose,  each  organization  should 
be  assigned  to  a  district  from  which  recruits  most  suitable  for  the 
service  required  of  the  organization  may  be  obtained — mounted  units 
to  horse-raising  districts,  technical  troops  to  manufacturing  districts, 
etc.  As  a  rule  the  size  of  districts  should  be  about  in  proportion  to 
population  of  the  qualifications— age,  etc. — required.  Organizations 
in  war  should  be  kept  at  full  strength  from  the  depot  units  which 
they  should  have  in  their  respective  recruiting  districts. 

43.  Reserve  officers. — Officers  for  staff  and  organizations  of  re- 
serves, and  officers  for  temporary  appointment  in  the  Regular  Army 
as  provided  for  in  section  8  of  the  volunteer  law  (act  of  Congress 
approved  Apr.  25,  1914),  should  be  selected  and  trained  in  time  of 
peace.  The  President  should  be  authorized  to  issue,  by  and  with 
the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  commissions  as  reserve  officers 
to  citizens  of  the  United  States  who,  upon  examination  prescribed  by 
the  Secretary  of  War,  demonstrate  their  phj'^sical,  mental,  moral, 
and  professional  fitness  therefor,  and  who  duly  obligate  themselves 
to  render  military  service  to  the  United  States  while  their  commis- 
sions are  valid.  Such  commissions  should  be  valid  five  years,  and 
renewable  under  such  regulations  regarding  examinations  and  quali- 
fications as  the  Secretary  of  War  may  from  time  to  time  prescribe. 

IV.    VOLUNTEERS. 

44.  In  addition  to  any  forces  that  may  be  maintained  and  trained 
in  time  of  peace,  provision  must  be  made  for  vastly  increasing  such 
forces  in  time  of  war.  These  must  come  from  the  untrained  body  of 
citizens  and  provisions  for  raising  them  is  contained  in  the  act  of 
Congress  approved  April  25.  1914. 

45.  This  act  meets  the  military  needs  for  raising  volunteer  troops 
as  far  as  concerns  the  enlisted  personnel,  except  in  two  particulars, 
which  are :  First,  that  under  the  existing  laws  certain  organizations 


18  A    PROPER    MILITARY    POLICY    FOR    THE    UNITED    STATES. 

of  the  militia,  with  numbers  far  below  the  full  strength,  can  enter  the 
volunteer  force  in  advance  of  other  similar  volunteer  organizations 
from  the  same  State ;  and  second,  no  volunteers  of  any  arm  or  branch 
can  be  raised  until  all  the  militia  of  that  particular  arm  or  branch 
have  been  called  into  the  service  of  the  United  States.  The  changes 
necessary  to  remedy  these  defects  have  been  set  forth  in  paragraph  39 
under  the  subject  of  the  Organized  Militia. 

V.    RESERVE  MATERIEL. 

46.  Of  all  the  features  disclosed  by  the  war  in  Europe  none  stands 
more  clearly  revealed  than  the  power  to  be  derived  from  national 
economic  organization  behind  the  armed  forces  of  a  nation. 

47.  In  a  war  of  gigantic  proportions  the  chances  of  success  are 
immeasurably  lessened  by  wastage,  abuse,  and  confusion.  Steps 
should  be  taken  looking  toAvard  a  national  organization  of  our  eco- 
nomic and  industrial  resources  as  well  as  our  resources  in  fighting 
men. 

48.  In  its  report  the  commission  appointed  by  the  President  to 
investigate  the  conduct  of  the  War  Department  in  the  War  with 
Spain  used  the  following  language : 

One  of  the  lessons  taught  bj  tlie  war  is  that  the  country  shouhl  hereafter  be 
in  a  l)etter  state  of  preparation  for  war.  Testimony  lias  been  talven  on  this  sub- 
ject and  suggestions  have  been  made  that  large  supplies  of  all  the  materiel  not 
liable  to  deterioration  should  be  kept  on  hand,  to  be  continuously  issued  and 
renewed,  so  that  in  any  emergency  they  might  be  available.  Especially  should 
this  be  the  case  with  such  supplies,  equipment,  and  ordnance  stores  as  are  not 
in  general  use  in  the  United  States  and  which  can  not  be  rapidly  obtained  in 
open  market. 

49.  The  lack  of  such  articles  as  shoes,  wagons,  harness,  rifles, 
saddles,  medical  chests,  and  so  on,  will  render  ineffective  an  army 
just  as  certainly  as  will  the  lack  of  ammunition. 

50.  For  the  purposes  of  storage  military  supplies  may  be  divided 
into  four  classes : 

(a)  Supplies  that  can  be  obtained  in  great  quantities  in  the  open 
market  at  any  time. 

(b)  Those  that  can  be  obtained  in  sufficient  quantities  on  15  days' 
notice. 

(c)  Those  that  can  be  obtained  on  three  months'  notice. 

(d)  Those  that  can  not  be  obtained  within  three  months. 

51.  The  War  College  Division  of  the  General  Staff  is  of  the  opin- 
ion that  for  purposes  of  defense  we  should  maintain  the  troops  enu- 
merated in  Parts  I  and  III  of  this  report. 

52.  A  fully  trained  force,  to  be  effective  during  the  critical  period 
when  war  is  imminent  and  during  the  first  few  weeks  of  a  war,  must 
not  be  hampered  by  lack  of  necessary  supplies  and  equipment.  For 
this  reason,  supplies  of  all  kinds  Avhich  can  not  be  obtained  in  the 
open  market  at  any  time  must  be  kept  on  hand,  in  use  and  in  store, 
at  home  and  oversea,  sufficient  to  equip  without  delay  all  troops  whose 
training  warrants  sending  them  promptly  into  the  field. 

53.  It  is  probable  that  as  soon  as  war  becomes  imminent,  the  Conti- 
nental Army — 500,000  mobile  troops — will  also  be  called  out.  As 
this  partially  trained  force  can  not  be  expected  to  take  the  field  within 
three  months'  time,  it  is  })racticable  to  refrain,  after  the  third  year, 
from  keeping  on  hand  or  ''a  store  for  it  any  articles  of  equipment 


A    PROPER    MILITARY    POLICY    FOR    THE    UXITED    STATES. 


19 


oxcept  those  necessaiy  to  complete  its  training  and  those  which  can 
not  be  procured  within  three  months. 

54.  The  total  number  of  harbor  defense  troops  necessary  is  al)Out 
50,000.  Due  to  conditions  of  service,  it  is  believed  that  ultimately 
supplies  of  all  kinds  for  60.000  should  be  kept  on  hand. 

55.  In  any  g"eat  war,  volunteers  must  be  called  out  in  addition  to 
the  troops  above  ciramerated. 

56.  It  would  be  unwise  to  have  on  hand  at  the  beginning  of  a  war 
merely  the  supplies  sufficient  to  place  in  the  field  our  first  contingent 
of  troops  and  tc  xmpleto  the  training  of  the  Continental  Army,  and 
to  be  unprepar  d  to  supply  to  even  a  limited  extent  the  Volunteer 
Army  we  shoukl  have  to  raise,  not  to  mention  replacements  of  arms, 
ammunition  clothing  and  equipment  of  all  kinds  for  those  already 
in  the  field ;  but  on  account  of  the  great  sum  of  money  w  hich  will  be 
necessary  in  entering  upon  a  program  for  collecting  and  storing  mili- 
tary supplies  it  is  believed  that  the  subject  of  equipment  for  a  Volun- 
teer Army  and  replacements  for  the  Regular  and  Continental  Armies 
should  be  provided  for  by  obtaining  options  with  domestic  manufac- 
turers to  furnish  the  required  supplies,  all  of  domestic  manufacture, 
in  accordance  with  tentative  contracts  to  be  made  by  the  supply  de- 
partments w  ith  such  manufacturers  in  time  of  peace.  By  so  doing  we 
will  be  taking  the  initial  steps  toward  organizing  the  industrial  and 
economic  resources  of  the  country  as  well  as  its  resources  in  fighting 
men. 

57.  Referring  to  Part  III,  approximately  the  following  troops  will 
be  available  at  the  close  of  the  successive  years : 


Fully- 
trained 
mobile 
troops. 


Partiallv- 
trained 
Conti- 
nental 
Army. 


Harbor- 
defense 
troops. 


Total. 


First  year 

Second  year. 
Third  year . . 
Fourth  year.. 

Fifth  year 

.Sixth  year.., 
Seventh  year 
Eighth  year.. 


160,000 
219,000 
320,000 
383,000 
439,000 
489,000 
534,000 
574,000 


185,000 
351,000 
500, 000 
500,000 
500,000 
500,000 
500,000 
500,000 


30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
52,000 
54,000 
56,000 
58,000 
60,000 


375,000 

610,000 

870,000 

935, 000 

993,000 

1,045,000 

1,092,000 

1,134,000 


A  study  of  these  figures  and  of  the  difficulties  we  have  experienced 
in  the  past  in  the  matter  of  supplies  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
program  adopted  for  procuring  reserve  supplies  should  be  such  that 
at  the  close  of  each  year  we  should  have  in  use  and  in  store,  at  home 
and  oversea,  supplies  of  all  kinds  necessary  to  equip : 


Cavalrv  tt„,.k-^, 
divisions  ^„^rbor- 
of  9  reei-     <iefense 


First  year . . . 
Second  year . 
Third  year. . . 
Fourth  year . 
Fifth  year . . . 
Sixth  year. . . 
Seventh  year 
Eighth  year. 


30,000 
40,000 
50,000 
52,000 
.54,000 
56,000 
58,000 
60,000 


20 


A    PEOPEK    MILITARY    POLICY    FOE    THE    UNITED    STATES. 


The  supplies  acquired  during  the  first  three  years  should  include 
all  articles  which  can  not  be  obtained  in  sufficient  quantities  on  15 
days'  notice,  those  acquired  during  the  last  five  years  to  include  only 
those  articles  which  can  not  be  obtained  on  three  months'  notice. 
After  the  eighth  year  the  program  should  be  extended  to  provide  for 
the  storing  of  such  additional  machine  guns,  rifles,  field  guns,  ammu- 
nition, etc.,  as  may  be  considered  advisable. 

58.  In  order  that  vast  supplies  pertaining  to  one  supply  bureau 
should  not  be  secured  and  relatively  nothing  be  done  by  other  supply 
bureaus,  supplies  should  be  obtained  progressively  in  complete  divi- 
sion units. 

59.  In  order  that  the  efforts  of  the  various  supply  bureaus  may  be 
properly  coordinated  by  the  Chief  of  Staff,  reserve  supplies  should 
be  collected  in  general  supply  depots  located  in  accordance  with  the 
general  principle  below  enumerated.  Each  general  supply  depot 
should  be  considered  a  place  of  issue  in  time  of  peace  for  all  articles 
of  field  equipment,  so  that  the  stock  on  hand  will  be  continually 
turned  over  and  the  machinery  for  the  issuing  and  forwarding  of 
supplies  will  be  in  operation  at  the  outbreak  of  war.  The  com- 
mander of  each  general  supply  depot  should  be  either  a  line  or  a 
staff  officer  specially  selected  by  and  reporting  direct  to  the  Chief 
of  Staff  or  to  the  department  commander  and  independent  of  the 
control  of  any  one  particular  staff  department  but  keeping  in  touch 
with  all.  The  commander  of  each  general  suppl}'  depot  should  be 
assisted  by  the  necessary  commissioned,  enlisted,  and  civilian  person- 
nel. Supplies  for  not  more  than  three  division  units  should  be  stored 
at  any  one  locality.  Each  place  selected  for  a  reserve  storehouse 
should  be  one  that  will  be  at  all  times  under  adequate  military  pro- 
tection, where  ground  is  available  and  v.here  abundant  railroad 
facilities  exist. 

60.  As  a  general  military  principle,  no  supply  depot,  arsenal,  nor 
manufacturing  plant  of  any  considerable  size,  supported  by  War 
Department  appropriations  for  military  purposes,  should  be  estab- 
lished or  maintained  east  of  the  Appalachian  Mountains,  west  of  the 
Cascade  or  Sierra  Nevada  Mountains,  nor  within  200  miles  of  our 
Canadian  or  Mexican  borders,  and  steps  should  be  taken  gradually 
to  cause  to  be  moved  depots  and  manufacturing  plants  already  estab- 
lished in  violation  of  this  military  principle. 

61.  The  estimated  cost  of  the  field  equipment  of  one  Infantry  divi- 
sion. Tables  of  Organization  1914,  is  as  follows: 


Kind  of  supplies. 


Signal  supplies 

Quartermaster  supplies 

Engineer  supplies 

Ordnance  supplies 

Medical  supplies 


Can  be  ob- 
tained in  the 
open  market 

in  great 
quantities  at 

any  time. 


S722. 12 

51,983.35 

1,835.26 

5,779.67 

10,997.95 


(-„.,  r  ^  „K     '  Can  be  ob- 

Cf"  ;e  Ob-  tained  on 

tamed  on  15  3  months- 
days  notice.         ^„ti^g_ 


SI,  688. 51 

5-1,054.45 

471. 59 

7, 730. 96 

10, 189. 63 


$6, 030. 46 

3,177,083.47 

7, 703. 97 

257, 489. 89 

88, 861.  51 


Can  not  be 

obtained  on 

3  months' 

notice. 


$385, 310. 26 


8,428.95 
4,164,770.68 


A    PEOPER    MILITARY   POLICY    FOR    THE    UNITED    STATES. 


21 


And  the  estimated  cost  of  the  field  equipment  of  one  Cavalry 
division  of  nine  regiments  is  approximately  as  follows : 


Kind  of  supplies. 


Signal  supplies 

Quartermaster  supplies 

Engineer  supplies 

Ordnance  supplies 

Medical  suppbes 


Can  be  ob- 
tained in  the 
open  market 

in  great 
quantities  at 

any  time. 


$370.80 

55, 102. 48 

1,769.59 

31,862.02 

13,454.99 


Can  be  ob- 
tained on  15 
days'  notice. 


$1,638.53 
76, 143. 40 
416. 53 
18,630.56 
13, 060. 57 


Can  be  ob- 
tained on 
3  months' 
notice. 


14,290.61 
4,584,628.93 

10,885.20 
311,056.68 
108,630.36 


Can  not  be 

obtained  on 

3  months' 

notice. 


$277,156.43 


3,999.45 
3,541,004.68 


62.  While  the  amount  of  money  involved  is  large,  practically  all  of 
it  will  remain  at  home,  especially  if  every  effort  be  made  by  the  sup- 
ply bureaus  to  eliminate  from  supply  tables  all  articles  not  of  domes- 
tic manufacture.  It  must  also  be  kept  in  mind  that  it  is  cheaper  to 
buy  war  supplies  in  time  of  peace  than  in  time  of  war. 


list  of  Brochures  Prepared  by  the  War  College  Division,  General  Staff  Corps,  as 
Supplements  to  the   Statement   of  a  Proper  Military  Policy  for  the   United 

States. 

November,  1915. 
Doc. 

No. 

506.  Changes  in  organization  found  necessary  during  progress  of  the  European 

War.    WCD  4886-23. 

507.  Comparison   of  cost  of  our   military  establishment   with   those   of  other 

countries.     WCD  9053-120. 

508.  Coordination  of  the  mobile  and  coast  artillery  units  of  the  army  in  the 

national  defense.     WCD  8911-9. 

509.  Development  of  large  caliber  mobile  artillery  and  machine  guns  in  the 

present  European  War.     WCD  9239-1. 

510.  Educational  institutions  giving  military  training  as  a  source  for  a  supply 

of  reserve  officers  for  a  national  army.     WCD  9053-121. 

511.  Elimination    of   unnecessary   expense   from    army    administration.     WCD 

9053-113. 

512.  Finances  and  costs  of  the  present  European  War.     WCD  9287-1. 

513.  Fortifications.     WCD  4896-4. 

514.  General  Staffs  of  certain  belligerent  powers.     WCD  9286-2. 

515.  Military  aviation.     WCD  9311-1. 

516.  Militia  as  organized  under  the  Constitution  and  its  value  to  the  Nation 

as  a  military  asset.     WCD  7835-9. 

517.  Mobilization  of  industries  and  utilization  of  the  commercial  and  industrial 

resources  of  the  country  for  war  purposes  in  emergency.     WCD  8121-45. 

518.  Modern  organization  for  the  Regular  Army  and   its  use  as  a  model  in 

organizing  other  forces.     WCD  9302-1. 

519.  Motor  transport  in  campaign.    WCD  9318-1. 

520.  Organization   and   administration   of  the  War  Department  adapted   to   a 

change  from  peace  conditions  to  a  state  of  war.     WCD  9262-14. 

521.  1.  Organization,  training,  and  mobilization  of  a  force  of  citizen  soldiery. 

2.  Method  of  training  a  citizen  ai'my  on  the  outbreak  of  war  to  insure 
its  preparedness  for  field  service.     WCD  7541-12. 

522.  Organization,    training,    and   mobilization   of   a   reserve   for   the   Regular 

Army.     WCD  8106-15. 

523.  Organization,  training,   and  mobilization  of  volunteers  under  the  act  of 

April  25,  1914.    WCD  8160-25. 

524.  Outline   of   plan    for   militarv    training   in    public    schools   of   the   United 

States.    WCD  9064-16. 

525.  Pension  roll  as  affected  by  the  war  with  Spain  in  1898.    WCD  9290-3. 

526.  Personnel  versus  materiel  in  plans  for  national  defense.    WCD  9314-1. 

527.  Places  of  origin  and  ability  to  procure  supplies  needed  in  vast  quantities 

in  time  of  war.    WCD  8121-39. 

528.  Proper  relationship  between  the  army  and  the  press  in  war.    WCD  8976-6. 

529.  Recruitment  of  officers  in  time  of  peace  in  the  principal  armies  of  Europe. 

WCD  9278-1. 

530.  Standardization  of  methods  of  military  instruction  at  schools  and  colleges 

in  the  United  States,  with  draft  of  a  bill  to  establish  a  Reserve  Officers' 
Training  Corps.    WCD  9089-S. 

531.  Statistical  comparison  of  universal  and  voluntary  service.    WCD  4886-25. 

532.  Strategic  location  of  military  depots,  arsenals,  and  manufacturing  plants 

in  the  United  States.     WCD  8121-42. 

533.  Sanitary  troops  in  foreign  armies.    WCD  9319-1. 

534.  Training  of  forces  of  belligerent  nations  of  Europe.     WCD  9289-1. 

535.  Utilization  of  our  resources  in   various  means  of  transportation  and  of 

the  services  of  trained  specialists.    WCD  9053-111. 

22 

o 


CHANGES  IN  ORGANIZATION  FOUND  NECESSARY 
DURING  PROGRESS  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  WAR 


PREPARED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION.  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

AS   A    SUPPLEMENT    TO    THE    STATEMENT    OF    A    PROPER    MILITARY 

POLICY  FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES 


WCD  4886-23 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE  :  WASHINGTON 

NOVEMBER,  1915 


606 


WASHTNGTON 
GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFIOB 


War  Department, 

Document  No.  506. 
Q^iu  oj  the  Chief  of  Staff, 


SYNOPSIS 


I.  Introduction. 

Paee. 

1.  Austria-Hungary 7 

Chasseurs 7 

Cavalry 8 

Field  artillery 8 

Divisional  and  corps  artillery 8 

Engineer  troops 8 

Communication  troops 9 

Cavalry  ponton  trains 9 

Aviation  corps 9 

Aero  company 9 

Signal  troops 9 

Mobile  automobile  repair  shop 10 

Machine-gun  organizations 10 

2.  France 10 

Heavy  movable  artillery 10 

Schneider  mobile  battery 1] 

Cavalry 1] 

3.  Germany .• 11 

The  42  centimeter  Howitzer  battery  (Krupp) 1] 

Depot  battalions 11 

Aero  companies 11 

Automobile  park 12 

4.  Great  Britain 12 

A.  General  and  army  headquarters 12 

General  headquarters  (3  echelons) 12 

Headquarters  of  an  army  (two  or  more  divisions) 12 

General  headquarters  ammunition  park 12 

A  printing  company 13 

B.  Army  and  corps  headquarters 13 

Headquarters  of  an  army  (two  or  more  corps) 13 

Headquarters  of  an  army  corps  (two  or  more  divisions) 13 

Army  troops  supply  column  (provisional) 13 

Corps  troops  supply  column 13 

The  cavalry  corps 14 

Cavalry  corps  troops 14 

Machine-gun  corps  (new  organization,  1915) 14 

C.  Infantry 14 

Headquarters  of  a  division  (new  armies) 14 

Headquarters  of  an  infantry  brigade  (new  armies) 15 

An  infantry  battalion  (new  armies) 15 

Divisional  ammunition  park  (new  armies) 15 

An  ammunition  subpark  for  divisions  (new  armies) 15 

Divisional  train  (new  armies) 16 

Divisional  supply  column  (new  armies) 16 

Cyclist  company,  divisional  mounted  troops  (new  armies) 16 

B06 

(3) 


4.  Great  Britain— Continued.  Page. 

D.  Cavalry 16 

The  cavalry  division 16 

Headquarters  of  a  cavalry  brigade 17 

The  cavalry  brigade 17 

The  cavalry  regiment 17 

The  cavalry  squadron 17 

Cavalry  squadron  (divisional  mounted  troops)  (new  armies) 17 

Cavalry  division  signal  squadron 18 

Eemount  units 18 

E.  Artillery 18 

Army  artillery  brigade  headquarters 18 

Army  artillery  ammunition  park 18 

Headquarters  of  divisional  artillery  (new  armies) 18 

Divisional  ammunition  column  (new  armies) 19 

Heavy  artillery  reserve  group  headquarters 19 

Heavy  artillery  battery    and    ammunition    column  (R.  G.  A.) 

(60-pounder  B.  L.)  (new  armies) 19 

Pack  artillery  brigade  ammunition  park) 19 

A  field  artillery  brigade 19 

Field  artillery  (howitzer)  brigade  (new  armies) 20 

Siege  artillery  brigade  (medium) 20 

Siege  artillery  brigade  (light) 20 

Mountain  artillery  brigade,  R.  G.  A.,  and  ammunition  column. . .  20 

Armored  motor  battery 21 

Motor  machine-gun  battery 21 

Antiaircraft  gun  detachment 21 

Workshop  for  six  antiaircraft  gun  detachments 21 

F.  Engineers 21 

Headquarters  of  divisional  engineers  (new  armies) 21 

Base  Royal  engineer  park 22 

Railway  company  (construction) 22 

Field  searchlight  company 22 

Antiaircraft  searchlight  sectioii 22 

A  tunnelling  company,  R.  E 22 

Bridging  train  (horsed  transport) 22 

Bridging  train  (mechanical  transport; 22 

A  labor  company  (Mediterranean) 23 

Field  squadron 23 

Pioneer  battalion  (new  armies) 23 

An  army  troops  company,  R.  E 23 

A  field  company  (new  armies) 23 

Railway  supply  detachment 23 

G.  Signal  service 24 

Cavalry  corps  signal  squadron 24 

Army  headquarters  signal  company 24 

Army  corps  headquarters  signal  company 24 

Motor  wireless  section 24 

Motor  air-line  section 24 

Cable  section 24 

H.  Transport  and  supply 24 

A  depot  unit  of  supply 24 

A  bakery  section 25 

An  auxiliary  horse  transport  company 25 

606 


4.  Qreat  Britain — Continued.  Page. 

Inland  water  transport  section 25 

An  auxiliary  mechanical  transport  company 25 

A  reserve  park  (mule  transport) 25 

A  reserve  park  (new  armies) 25 

A  workshop,  A.  S.  C,  for  the  motor  ambulance  cars  of  a  division. .  25 

I.  Medical  department 26 

A  field  ambulance  (new  armies) 26 

A  motor  ambulance  convoy 26 

A  casualty  clearing  station 26 

A  general  hospital  (1,040  beds) 26 

An  ambulance  train 26 

J.  Veterinary  service 27 

A  veterinary  hospital 27 

A  mobile  veterinary  section 27 

A  convalescent  horse  depot 27 

K.  Military  prisons 27 

Military  prisons  in  the  field 27 

L.  Army  service  corps 27 

Dockers'  battalion 27 

Foragers'  battalion 27 

5.  Italy 28 

Armored  motor  machine-gun  cars 28 

Aviation  service 28 

Sanitary  service 28 

Transport  service 28 

6.  Japan 28 

7.  Turkey 28 

8.  Russia 28 

9.  Serbia 28 

606 


CHANGES  IN  ORGANIZATION   FOUND  NECESSARY 
DURING  PROGRESS  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  WAR. 


I.  I^fTRODUCTION. 

It  is  not  to  be  expected  that  all  of  the  changes  in  organization  found 
necessary  during  the  progress  of  the  European  war  to  date  can  be 
ascertained,  nor  that  all  the  details  of  such  changes  as  are  known  can 
be  accurately  stated.  This  for  the  reasons  that  such  matters  are 
not  willingly  divulged  by  belligerent  nations,  and  that  facilities  for 
obtaining  this  information  differ  with  the  several  countries  con- 
cerned. Definite  and  full  information  on  this  subject  can  not  be 
expected  until  after  the  close  of  the  war. 

Such  changes  as  have  been  ascertained  may  be  attributed  to  pri- 
mary causes  as  follows : 

(a)  The  unusual  magnitude  of  the  war  and  the  immense  terrain 
covered,  calling  for  the  solution  of  unusual  problems  in  logistics 
and  the  formation  of  higher  units  in  armies  that  have  been  abnor- 
mally expanded. 

(b)  The  first  application  of  the  science  of  aeronautics  in  any  war. 
{c)  The  increased  use  of  field  artillery  and  the  introduction  of 

armament  of  larger  calibers  heretofore  not  considered  mobile  or 
even  movable. 

(d)  The  increased  importance  and  use  of  machine  guns. 

(e)  The  improvement  and  increased  use  of  mechanical  transport. 
(/)   Changes  due  to  faulty  organization  discovered  by  countries 

not  well  prepared  before  the  war. 

Even  with  due  allowance  made  for  perhaps  greater  facilties  of 
information,  and  incomplete  returns  from  other  countries,  Great 
Britain  seems  to  have  found  more  changes  necessary  than  have  prob- 
ably been  made  in  any  other  country,  due,  as  was  to  be  expected, 
from  too  small  a  standing  army  in  peace,  and  too  much  dependence 
upon  raising  untrained  volunteer  armies  after  war  began. 

1.  AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 

By  decree  of  the  War  Office  of  June  8,  1914,  the  following  changes 
in  organization  of  troops  was  to  be  completed  by  March  1,  1915 : 

CHASSEURS. 

The  fourth  company  of  each  battalion,  formerly  converted  into  a 
cyclist  company,  was  to  be  reestablished. 

506 

(7) 


8 

CAVALRT. 

Eegiments  of  the  common  army  consist  of  6  troops  of  150  men 
each. 

Uhlan  regiments,  heretofore  having  only  5  troops,  increased  to  6 
troops  each. 

FIELD  ARTILLERY. 

(a)  Brigade  headquarters  established  for  the  existing  14  brigades 
of  field  artillery.  Field  gim  regiments  reduced  from  5  to  4  bat- 
teries— the  fifth  battery  transferred  to  raise  other  regiments  to  same 
strength. 

{b)  A  horse  artillery  division  (1|  regiments)  of  3  batteries  to  be 
organized. 

(c)  Heavy  field  artillery  divisions  increased  from  2  batteries 
to  3  batteries. 

(d)  Siege  artillery,  formerly  organized  as  6  regiments  and  10 
separate  battalions,  of  4  companies  each.  Two  siege  artillery  brigade 
headquarters  organized.  A  seventh  regimental  siege  artillery  head- 
quarters organized.  One  siege  artillery  regiment  increased  from  6 
to  8  companies. 

The  field  artillery  has  a  makeshift  organization  at  present,  due  to 
large  increase  in  number  of  guns  per  1,000  rifles,  and  of  so  many 
types  and  characters.  Six  guns  to  1,000  rifles  are  now  provided,  but 
many  are  of  obsolete  pattern.  Some  regiments  now  have  as  many  as 
12  batteries.  Many  of  their  batteries  now  have  only  4  guns.  Bat- 
teries have  only  1  caisson  per  gun.  The  4  ammunition  trains  are 
to  be  reduced  to  2,  and  use  motor  trucks  in  place  of  the  2  in  rear, 
i.  e.,  2-horsed  ammunition  trains  (1  caisson  for  each  gun),  and  1 
motor-truck  train  carrying  the  equivalent  of  2  caissons  per  gun. 

DIVISIONAL  AND  CX)RPS  ARTILLERY. 

Each  landwehr  infantry  division  provided  with  a  brigade  of  field 
artillery  commanded  by  a  major  general,  and  consists  of  2  regi- 
ments— 1  field-gim  regiment  (4  batteries),  and  1  field-howitzer  regi- 
ment (4  batteries).    Each  battery,  6  pieces. 

Landwehr  divisions  have  the  same  strength  in  artillery  as  those 
of  the  common  army,  namely,  60  guns,  including  the  corps  artillery. 

ENGINEER  TROOPS. 

(a)   Sapper  battalions  increased  from  3  to  4  companies  each. 
(h)  A  cadre  for  an  experimental  sapper  battalion  established. 

606 


COMMUNICATION    TROOPS. 

(a)  A  telegraph  regiment  of  4  battalions  of  4  companies  formed 
from  peace  cadre. 

(b)  An  additional  regiment  of  railway  troops  formed. 

CAVALRY  PONTON  TRAINS. 

Each  cavalry  troop  division  provided  with  a  ponton  train  of  four 
6-horse  vehicles  and  36  pioneers  for  crossing  rivers  by  boat,  or 
bridges  of  a  length  of  18  to  50  meters — 18  meters  of  "  riding " 
bridge,  or  50  meters  of  "  walking "  bridge.  The  pioneer  section 
taken  from  one  of  the  4  regiments  forming  the  division. 

AVIATION    CORPS. 

Proposed  organization  into  a  brigade  of  2  regiments  of  the  16 
companies,  with  2  additional  companies  being  organized.  Formerly 
not  organized  into  battalions  or  higher  units. 

AERO  COMPANY. 

(Four  flying  machines  in  service  and  4  in  reserve.) 

Captain;  field  pilots  (2  officers  and  2  noncommissioned  officers); 
observers  (3  to  4  officers)  ;  2  noncommissioned  officers;  1  photog- 
rapher; 5  chauffeurs,  flying;  12  machiuists;  2  property  men;  4 
workmen;  5  chauffeurs,  auto;  50  train  soldiers,  20  to  30  guards 
(attached)  ;  total,  7  to  8  officers,  39  enlisted. 

Wireless  now  installed  on  flying  machines.  Current  generated  by 
dynamo  driven  by  belt  connection  with  propellers.  Sending  instru- 
ment in  observer's  compartment.  Antenna?,  3  multiple  wires — 2 
extended  from  tip  of  tail  to  wing  tips  and  third  carried  on  reel  and 
payed  out  after  rising,  with  plumb-bob  to  hold  it  free  from  machine. 

Latest  flying  machines  are  armored  with  steel  to  protect  against 
rifle  and  shrapnel  bullets  when  flying  at  1,200  meters  or  higher.  Ar- 
mor covers  entire  body  occupied  by  crew  and  motor. 

SIGNAL   TROOPS. 

.Material  increase  in  allotment  of  signal  troops  since  war  began. 

(a)  Field  telegraph  platoon  (4  section?)  consists  of  5  officers,  135 
enlisted,  60  horses,  5  station  wagons,  and  11  material  wagrns. 

(5)  Corps  telephone  platoon  (4  sections)  consists  of  3  officers,  50 
enlisted,  20  horses,  9  station  wagons,  and  9  material  wagons. 

(c)  Division  telephone  platoon  (2  sections)  consists  of  3  officers, 
90  enlisted,  23  horses,  5  station  wagons,  and  5  material  wagons. 

30669°— No.  506—16 2 


10 

Infantry  companies,  artillery  batteries,  pioneer,  and  railway  com- 
panies equipped  with  telephones. 

Cavalry  regiments  equipped  with  telegraph  instruments. 
{d)   Assignment  to  higher  units. 


Telegraph 
stations. 


Telephone 
stations. 


Visual 
stations. 


Telegraph 
wire. 


Telephone 
wire. 


Superior  command 

Field  army 

Corps 

Infantry  division 

Cavalry  division 

Mountain  brieade 

Mountain  Infantry  division. 


Kilometer  K. 
80 

Kilometers. 

160 

80 

80 
40 

80 

40 

40 

40 

To  the  field  army  is  assigned  a  special  platoon,  for  repairs,  as  a 
reserve,  and  to  handle  special  equipment. 

In  principle,  each  subdivision  connects  up  with  the  next  higher 
command.  In  practice,  when  possible,  aid  is  given  the  next  lower 
command. 

MOBILE  AUTOMOBILE  REPAIR  SHOP. 

One  or  two  for  each  field  army. 

Organization  increased  by  16  additional  enlisted  specialists. 

New  features  added  to  equipment  of  latest  type;  second  dynamo 
and  gasoline  engine  added,  electric  lighting  apparatus  extended, 
windlass  turned  by  auto  motor. 

MACHINE-GUN  ORGANIZATIONS. 

{a)  Infantry. — Each  battalion  has  a  platoon  of  4  machine  guns 
instead  of  2  provided  before  the  war  began.  In  practice,  organiza- 
tions gather  in  all  the  machine  guns  they  can.  To  keep  the  troops 
supplied  with  machine  guns  in  working  order,  a  repair  and  supply 
depot  is  maintained  at  the  advance  depot,  where  guns  are  issued  and 
repaired,  pack  saddles  and  other  equipment  exchanged  or  replaced. 

{h)  Cavalry. — Each  regiment  has  a  machine-gun  platoon  of  4 
guns,  formerly  the  allowance  for  a  cavalry  division  of  4  regiments. 


2.  FRANCE. 

HEAVY  MOVABLE  ARTILLERY. 

Organization  not  known. 

Armament:  305-millimeter  (12-inch)  navy  gun,  mounted  on  and 
fired  from  specially  constructed  railroad  car.  Projectile  weighs 
848  kilos  (767  pounds),  with  108  kilos  (238  pounds)  bursting  charge. 

Six  such  guns  said  to  have  been  completed  or  under  construction. 

606 


11 

SCHNEIDER   MOBILE   BATTERT. 

Organization  not  known. 

Armament:  2  howitzers,  caliber  200  millimeters  (7.9-inch),  each 
mounted  on  and  fired  from  a  truck  carriage,  an  ammuniton  carriage 
and  a  carriage  for  the  personnel,  with  an  apparatus  for  observation 
(a  sort  of  mast).  Together  this  forms  a  train  of  4  carriages  that  a 
locomotive  can  draw  on  a  normal  line. 

CAVALRY. 

Cavalry  of  all  kinds,  for  service  as  infantry  in  trenches,  is  pro- 
vided with  bayonets  for  their  carbines.  The  lance  is  still  retained 
for  cavalry  service  proper. 

Each  cavalry  division  in  addition  to  its  6  regiments,  400  cyclists, 
and  3  batteries  of  artillery,  has  a  "  light  group  "  of  1,000  dismounted 
men,  intended  to  accompany  the  cavalry,  usually  in  automobiles. 

Each  cavalry  regiment  has  a  machine-gun  section  of  2  guns  drawn 
by  horses. 

Each  army  has  from  4  to  6  veterinary  hospitals. 

3.  GERMANY. 

THE  4  2-CENTIMETER  HOWITZER  BATTERT    (KRUPP). 

Organization  not  reported. 

Armament:  42-centimeter  (16.5-inch)  howitzer,  mounted  on  car- 
riages hauled  by  motor  tractors,  loaded  wagons  average  15  tons; 
motor  tractors  also  15-ton.  Shell  weighs  820  kilograms  (1,800 
pounds).  Most  effective  range  9,400  meters.  Used  as  heavy  field 
artillery. 

DEPOT  BATTALIONS. 

Originally  designed  to  complete  and  supply  personnel  for  and 
replace  wastage  in  3  regiments;  have,  since  the  war  began,  been  ex- 
panded to  maintain  4  to  6  regiments  each. 

AERO    COMPANIES. 

Equipped  with  6  flying  machines. 

Officers  are  observers  and  pilots.    But  noncommissioned  officers  are 
trained  as  pilots  for  replacement  of  casualties. 
All  mechanical  transport. 

600 


12 

AUTOMOBILE    PARK. 

(Repair  shop — fixed  and  mobile.) 

Personnel:  1  captain  (taken  from  the  railway  regiments),  2  lieu- 
tenants ( 1  from  the  cavalry  and  1  from  the  artillery )  and  about  400 
men  (from  recruit  depots,  most  of  them  skilled  workmen). 

Plant  (fixed)  :  Buildings  arranged  on  a  rectangle  including  car- 
penter, painting  and  glazing,  machine,  vulcanizing,  blacksmith  and 
oxy-acetylene  welding  shops;  (mobile)  :  inclosed  motor  trucks, 
parked,  and  contain  repair  shops  and  appliances  which  follow  the 
movements  of  an  army. 

New  organization. 

4.  GREAT  BRITAIN. 
A.  General  and  Army  Headquarters. 

GENERAL    HEADQUARTERS     (THREE    ECHELONS). 

First  eschelon : 

Personnel :  36  officers,  25  clerks,  91  rank  and  file ;  total,  152. 

Transport:  8  motor  cars,  3  motor  vans  (for  G.  S.,  A.  G.,  Q.  M.  G., 
any  pay  branches).    Total  vehicles,  11. 

Second  echelon: 

Personnel :  4  officers,  36  enlisted ;  total,  40. 

Transport:  1  bicycle,  3  motor  cars,  1  cart,  1  motor  van  (P.  O.  and 
medical  branches)  ;  total  vehicles,  6. 

Third  echelon  (Adjutant  general's  office)  : 

Personnel:  29  officers,  229  clerks,  31  rank  and  file;  total,  289. 

Transport:  1  motor  car. 

Organization  materially  changed. 

HEADQUARTERS  OF  AN  ARMY    (TWO  OR  MORE  DIVISIONS), 

Personnel:  19  officers,  73  enlisted;  total  92.  (If  at  some  distance 
from  general  headquarters,  or  on  separate  lines  of  communication, 
an  extra  G.  S.  officer  added  for  censorship  work.) 

Transport:  1  bicycle,  6  motor  cars  (1  for  chaplain),  2  motor  vans 
(medical  equipment  and  baggage). 

New  organization  connected  with  general  headquarters. 

GENERAL  HEADQUARTERS  AMBIUNITION  PARK. 

(One  mechanical  transport  company,  A.  S.  C.) 
Army  service  corps  personnel :  7  officers,  366  enlisted ;  total,  373. 
Artillery  attached  personnel:  1  officer,  115  enlisted;  total,  116. 
Grand  total,  489. 

006 


13 

Transport:  4  motor  cars,  8  motorcycles  (3  with  side  cars),  3  lor- 
ries (workshop),  3  lorries  (store),  125  lorries,  3-ton  (4  first-aid,  16 
spare,  105  ammunition)  ;  total  vehicles,  143, 

Capacity  of  a  3-ton  lorry :  225  rounds  of  18-pounder,  or  120  rounds 
4.5-inch,  or  80  rounds  4.7-inch,  or  90  rounds  GO-pounder,  or  80,000 
small-arms  ammunition. 

New  organization. 

A   PRINTING   COMPANY. 

Headquarters,  general  headquarters  section,  inspector  general  of 
communications  section,  and  army  section  (1  for  each  army). 

Personnel:  1  officer  (headquarters),  and  1  (for  each  army),  2 
enlisted  (headquarters),  17  enlisted  (general  headquarters  section), 
5  enlisted  (I.-G.  C.  section),  14  enlisted  (each  army). 

Transport:  1  motor  car  for  photographic  equipment  and  1  lorry, 
3-ton,  each  army  section  for  printing  and  lithographic  equipment. 

Organization  materially  changed. 

B.  Army  and  Corps  Headquarters. 

HEADQUARTERS  OF  AN  ARMY    (TWO  OR  MORE  CORPS). 

Personnel :  31  officers,  106  enlisted ;  total,  137. 

Transport:  8  motor  cars,  1  motor  lorry  (for  electric-lighting  ap- 
paratus), 2  motor  vans  (medical  equipment,  baggage,  etc.);  total 
vehicles,  11. 

New  organization. 

HEADQUARTERS  OF  AN  ARMY  CORPS    (TW^O  OR  MORE  DIVISIONS). 

Personnel:  17  officers,  72  enlisted;  total,  89. 

Transport:  5  motor  cars,  1  motor  lorry  (for  electric-lighting  ap- 
paratus), 2  motor  vans  (medical  equipment,  baggage,  etc.). 
New  organization.     Similar  to  former  army  headquarters. 

ARMY    TROOPS    SUPPLY    COLUMN     (PROVISIONAL). 

Personnel :  3  officers,  56  enlisted ;  total,  59. 

Transport :  1  motor  car,  1  motorcycle,  5  lorries,  30-hundredweight, 
1  lorry  (workshop),  1  lorry  (store). 
New  organization. 

CORPS   TROOPS   SUPPLY   COLUMN. 

Personnel:  5  officers,  68  enlisted;  total,  73. 

Transport:  2  motor  cars,  2  motorcycles,  6  lorries,  3-ton,  2  lorries, 
30-hundredweight,  1  lorry  (workshop),  1  lorry  (store). 
New  organization. 

606 


14 

THE   CAVALRY  CORPS. 

As  originally  organized  the  cavalry  of  the  expeditionary  force,  ex- 
clusive of  the  divisional  cavalry,  consisted  of  1  division  of  4  brigades, 
and  1. brigade  (the  fifth)  in  addition. 

This  has  been  changed  to  a  cavalry  corps  of  3  divisions  of  3 
brigades  each.  The  3-brigade  division  was  found  from  experience 
to  be  a  handier  and  more  mobile  command  miit  than  the  4-brigade 
division. 

CAVALRY  CORPS  TROOPS. 

One  squadron  of  cavalry  for  headquarters  duty ;  one  signal  squad- 
ron for  intercommunication;  one  detachment  of  military  mounted 
police  for  provost  duty;  one  detachment,  Army  Service  Corps,  for 
headquarters  transport. 

MACHINE-GUN   CORPS    (nEW  ORGANIZATION,   1915). 

Three  branches :  (a)  Cavalry  of  the  line;  (&)  infantry  of  the  line; 
(c)  motor  machine-gun  service. 

Cavalry  and  infantry  branches,  organized  as  brigade  machine-gun 
squadrons  and  companies. 

Motor  machine-gun  service,  organized  as  machine-gun  batteries  of 
4  armored  cars  of  2  guns  each. 

Machine-gun  company  (16  guns)  :  9  officers,  1  warrant  officer,  10 
staff  sergeants  and  sergeants,  2  artificers,  128  rank  and  file  (2  at- 
tached) ;  total,  150. 

Company  composed  of  4  sections  of  4  guns  each. 

Personnel:  2  officers,  2  staff  sergeants  and  sergeants,  25  rank  and 
lile. 

Animals:  9  horses,  riding;  43  horses,  draft;  4  bicycles. 

This  machine-gun  corps  is  in  addition  to  the  machine-gun  sections 
(4  guns)  with  each  infantry  battalion  and  cavalry  regiment,  making 
48  machine  guns  with  each  infantry  division  and  cavalry  division. 

This  machine-gun  corps  is  said  to  be  similar  to  the  German 
organization. 

C.  Infantry. 

HEADQUARTERS  OF  A  DI\T[SI0N    (nEW  ARMIES ). 

Personnel:  22  officers  (1  major  general,  2  aids,  6  staff,  7  other 
personnel,  5  veterinary,  and  1  interpreter),  12  clerks,  86  enlisted; 
total,  120. 

Transport:  6  motor  cars,  1  cart,  4  wagons  (cooks,  baggage,  and 
supplies),  1  motor  lorry  for  electric  lighting  apparatus,  6  bicycles. 
Total  vehicles,  12. 

Change  and  increase  in  personnel  and  transport  over  regular  estab- 
lishment. 

606 


15 

HEADQUARTERS  OF  AN   INFANTRY  BRIGADE    (nEW  ARMIES). 

Personnel:  8  officers  (1  brigadier  general,  2  staff,  3  chaplains,  1 
brigade  machine-gun  officer,  1  signal  officer  attached),  3  clerks,  22 
enlisted ;  total,  33. 

Transport:  4  wagons  (cooks,  baggage,  and  stores),  2  wagons  (in- 
trenching tools),  7  bicj'cles.     Total  vehicles,  6. 

Change  and  increase  in  personnel  and  transport  over  regular 
establishment. 

AN  INFANTRY  BATTALION    (NEW  ARMIES). 

Personnel:  30  officers  (5  headquarters,  1  machine-gun  section,  24 
company,  6  each),  995  enlisted;  total,  1,025. 

Transport :  Headquarters,  9  bicycles  for  signalers,  4  carts,  7 
wagons,  limbered,  for  tools  and  small-arms  ammunition;  machine- 
gun  section,  2  wagons  for  4  guns,  tripods,  ammunition,  2  wagons  for 
ammunition,  and  4  ammunition  pack  saddles  for  lead  horses;  4  com- 
panies, 8  pack  mules  for  ammunition  (2  per  company),  4  ti'aveling 
kitchens,  6  wagons  for  baggage,  stores,  etc.     Total  vehicles,  28. 

Change  and  increase  in  personnel  and  transports  mainly  due  to 
increase  in  machine  guns  from  2  to  4  per  section. 

DIVISIONAL  AMMUNITION  PARK   (NEW  ARMIES). 

One  mechanical  transport  company,  A.  S.  C. 

Personnel:  6  officers,  364  enlisted;  total  A.  S.  C,  370.  Artillery 
attached,  1  officer,  77  enlisted;  total,  78.  Grand  total,  7  officers, 
435  enlisted;  total,  448. 

Transport :  5  motor  cars,  9  motorcycles,  4  workshop  lorries,  4  store 
lorries.  Lorries,  3-ton:  17  for  stores,  spares,  first-aid  and  reliefs, 
82  for  18-pounder,  12  for  4.5-inch,  3  for  60-pounder,  20  for  S.  A.  A. 
Divisible  into  4  sections. 

Change  and  increase  in  personnel  and  mechanical  transport. 

AN   AMMUNITION  SUBPARK  FOR  DIVISIONS    (NEW  ARMIES). 

One  mechanical  transport  company,  A.  S.  C. 

Personnel:  4  officers,  164  enlisted;  total,  168.  Artillery  attached, 
37  enlisted.    Grand  total,  205. 

Transport:  3  motor  cars,  6  motorcycles,  1  workshop  lorry,  1  store 
lorry.  Lorries,  3-ton:  10  for  first-aid,  artillery  and  engineer  stores, 
spares  for  reliefs,  1  for  13-pounder,  16  for  18-pounder,  4  for  4.5-inch 
and  11  for  S.  A.  A.  Divisible  into  2  sections.  Capacity :  280  rounds 
13-pounder,  3,600  rounds  18-pounder,  480  rounds  4.5-inch  howitzer, 
and  840,000  rounds  S.  A.  A. 

New  organization. 

606 


16 

DIVISIONAL    TRAIN     (NEW    ARMIES). 

Four-horse  transport  companies,  A.  S.  C. 

Organization :  Headquarters,  headquarters  company,  and  3  other 
companies. 

Personnel :  25  officers.  482  enlisted ;  total,  507. 

Transport :  For  headquarters  and  headquarters  company,  31  bi- 
cycles, 5  carts,  23  wagons,  and  4  motor  cars.    Total  vehicles,  64. 

Baggage  section  :  98  wagons  (for  attachment  to  the  several  units  of 
the  division  as  baggage  train). 

Supply  section:  83  wagons  (for  attachment  to  the  several  units 
of  the  division  as  supply  train). 

Total  vehicles,  245.  For  each  infantry  battalion  allotted  to  this 
division,  6  G.  S.  wagons  additional. 

Modification  of  regular  establishment  organization.  Increased 
personnel. 

DIVISIONAL   SUPPLY   COLUMN    (NEW   ARMIES). 

One  mechanical  transport  company,  A.  S.  C. 

Personnel :  5  officers,  312  enlisted ;  total,  317. 

Transport:  2  motor  cars,  7  motorcycles,  45  lorries  (3-ton),  14 
lorries   (30-hundredweight),  2  workshop  lorries,  2  store  lorries. 

Modification  of  regular  establishment  organization.  Increased 
personnel  and  change  in  transport. 

CYCLIST   COMPANY,   DIVISIONAL   MOUNTED  TROOPS    (NEW   ARMIES). 

Personnel :  8  officers,  196  enlisted ;  total,  204. 

Transport:  202  bicycles,  1  cart,  1  wagon  (ammunition),  2  wagons 
(baggage  and  supplies).    Total  vehicles,  4. 
New  organization. 

D.  Cavalry. 

THE    CAVALRY    DIVISION. 

The  proportion  of  officers  to  men  in  the  cavalry  is  1  to  22;  in  the 
infantry  it  is  1  to  33.5. 

Cavalry  field  ambulances  reduced  from  4  to  3. 

The  guns  of  the  first  line  transport,  horse  artillery  brigade  ammu- 
nition columns,  have  been  assigned  to  the  brigades;  one  battery, 
reduced  from  6  to  4  guns  and  changed  from  13-pounders  to  18- 
pounders,  is  assigned  to  each  brigade. 

The  cavalry  ammunition  parks  (M.  T.)  and  the  cavalry  supply 
columns  (M.  T.),  formerly  units  of  the  lines  of  communication,  have 
been  transferred  to  the  field  troops. 

SOB 


17 

Mobile  veterinary  sections,  one  to  each  brigade  or  3  to  the  division, 
have  been  added  to  the  cavalry  division  troops. 

HEADQUARTERS    OF   A    CAVALRY   BRIGADE. 

(With  cavalry  division.) 

Personnel:  1  brigadier  general,  1  aid,  2  staff,  1  brigade  machine- 
gun  officer,  and  4  others ;  total,  8 ;  enlisted,  45 ;  grand  total,  53. 

Transport:  1  motor  car,  7  bicycles,  3  wagons;  total  vehicles,  11. 

Principal  change:  Increase  in  commissioned  personnel  (machine- 
gun  officer  and  1  other)  and  enlisted  (from  41  to  45). 

THE  CAVALRY  BRIGADE. 

Headquarters;  3  cavalry  regiments;  1  battery,  horse  artillery;  1 
signal  troop. 

THE  CAVALRY  REGIMENT. 

Headquarters,  machine-gun  section,  4  guns,  and  3  squadrons. 

Personnel:  26  officers,  551  enlisted;  total,  577. 

Horses:  534  riding,  89  draft,  6  pack;  total,  629. 

Transport:  Headquarters,  3  bicycles,  3  carts,  2  wagons  (cooks  and 
baggage).  Machine-gun  section,  8  wagons  (for  materiel,  ammuni- 
tion, and  12  pack  saddles  for  use  with  lead  horses).  Squadrons  (3), 
9  wagons  (1  each  squadron  for  ammunition,  tools,  and  baggage),  12 
bicycles  (4  per  squadron),  for  intercommunication.  Total  ve- 
hicles, 37. 

Principal  changes:  Increase  in  personnel  (28),  machine  guns 
(from  2  to  4),  and  transport  vehicles  (from  33  to  37). 

As  in  the  infantry  battalion,  the  machine  guns  with  the  regiment 
have  been  doubled — 4  instead  of  2  guns. 

THE  CAVALRY  SQUADRON. 

Two  trumpeters  replaced  by  privates. 

Interpreters  provided. 

Trumpet  signals  are  not  used  in  the  field. 

CAVALRY  SQUADRON    (DIVISIONAL  MOUNTED  TROOPS)     (NEW  ARMIES). 

Personnel :  6  officers,  152  enlisted ;  total,  158. 
Horses:  148  riding,  11  draft,  2  pack. 

Transport:  1  cart,  9  wagons;  total  vehicles,  10  (3  wagons  and  6 
horses,  heavy  draft,  provided  by  Army  Service  Corps), 
New  organization. 

506 


18 

CAVALRY   DIVISION    SIGNAL   SQUADRON, 

Personnel :  3  officers,  42  enlisted ;  total,  45. 

Transport :  2  motor  cars,  1  wagon. 

Total  vehicles  3,  bicycles  14,  motorcycles  12. 

Horses :  15  riding,  6  draft. 

New  organization. 

REMOUNT   UNITS. 

(a)  A  headquarters: 

Personnel :  5  officers,  16  enlisted ;  total,  21. 

(b)  A  remount  squadron: 

Personnel:  4  officers,  197  enlisted  (including  40  privates,  rough- 
riders)  ;  total,  201. 

Transport :  Headquarters,  1  wagon ;  squadron,  2  wagons ;  total  ve- 
hicles, 3. 

New  organization. 

E.  Artillery. 

ARMY  ARTILLERY  BRIGADE  HEADQUARTERS. 

(Horse  and  tractor  drawn.) 
Personnel :  5  officers,  29  enlisted ;  total,  34. 

Transport:  1  bicycle,  2  carts,  1  wagon  (telephone),  1  wagon  (bag- 
gage) ;  total  vehicles,  4. 
New  organization. 

ARMY    ARTILLERY    AMMUNITION    PARK. 

(4.7-inch  or  60-pounder  gun  ammunition,  or  both.) 

One  mechanical  transport  company.  Army  Service  Corps. 

1.  Army  service  corps  details. 

Personnel :  4  officers,  140  enlisted ;  total,  144. 

Artillery  personnel  attached :  1  officer,  32  enlisted ;  total,  33.  Grand 
total,  5  officers,  172  enlisted;  total,  177. 

Transport:  3  motor  cars,  6  motorcycles,  1  workshop  lorry,  1  store 
lorry,  34  lorries,  3-ton  (26  for  ammunition). 

Capacity  3-ton  lorry :  80  roimds  4.7-inch  or  90  rounds  60-pounder. 

New  organization. 

HEADQUARTERS  OF  DIVISIONAL  ARTILLERY    (NEW  ARMIES). 

Personnel :  4  officers,  21  enlisted ;  total,  25. 

Transport:  1  motor  car,  3  bicycles,  2  wagons  (baggage  and  sup- 
plies).   Total  vehicles,  4. 

Change:  Increase  in  personnel  and  transport  over  regular  estab- 
lishment. 

506 


19 

DIVISIONAL   AMMUNITION    COLUMN     (nEW    ARMIEs). 

Personnel:  (Headquarters  and  3  sections),  12  officers,  537  enlisted; 
total,  549. 

Transport:  5  bicycles,  3  carts,  57  wagons  (18-poiinder),  12  wagons 
(4.5-inch  howitzer),  24  wagons  (small  arms),  12  wagons  (store, 
baggage,  and  supplies) ;  total  vehicles,  104. 

New  organization. 

HEAVY    ARTILLERY    RESERVE    GROUP    HEADQUARTERS. 

Personnel :  4  officers,  26  enlisted ;  total,  30. 

Transport:   2   motor  cars,  3   motorcycles,   1   lorry    (30-hundred- 
weight)  ;  total,  vehicles,  6. 
New  organization. 

HEAVY  ARTILLERY  BATTERY  AND  AMMUNITION    COLUMN     (R.   G.   A.)     (60- 
POUNDER  B.  L.)    (NEW  ARMIES). 

Personnel:  6  officers,  199  enlisted;  total,  205. 

Transport :  4  gun  carriages,  1  bicycle,  1  cart,  12  wagons  with  lim- 
bers (ammunition),  4  wagons  (ammunition),  7  wagong  (stores,  bag- 
gage, etc.) ;  total  vehicles,  26. 

New  organization. 

PACK  ARTILLERY  BRIGADE  AMMUNITION  PARK. 

One  mechanical  transport  company,  Army  Service  Corps. 
1.  Army  service  corps  details. 
Personnel :  1  officer,  90  enlisted ;  total,  91. 
Artillery  attached :  1  officer,  10  enlisted. 
Grand  total:  2  officers,  101  enlisted;  total,  103. 
Transport:  1  motor  car,  3  motorcycles,  19  lorries  (3-ton),  1  lorry 
(workshop),  1  lorry  (store) ;  total  vehicles,  25. 
New  organization. 

A   FIELD   ARTILLERY    BRIGADE. 

(Four  batteries,  each  four  18-pounder  Q.  F.  guns.) 

Headquarters,  4  batteries  and  ammunition  column. 

Personnel :  26  officers,  732  enlisted ;  total,  758. 

Transport:  16  gun  carriages,  6  bicycles,  11  carts,  48  wagons  with 
limbers  (ammunition),  12  wagons  (small-arms  ammunition),  19 
wagons  (stores,  baggage,  etc.)  ;  total  vehicles,  98. 

Changed  from  3  batteries  of  6  guns  to  4  batteries  of  4  guns  each. 

506 


20 

FIELD  ARTILLERY    (HOWITZER)    BRIGADE    (NEW  ARMIES). 

Four  batteries  and  ammunition  column. 

(Q.  F.  4.5-inch  howitzer  equipment.) 

Personnel :  23  officers,  688  enlisted ;  total,  711. 

Transport:  16  carriages,  howitzer,  with  limbers,  6  bicycles,  11 
carts,  48  wagons  with  limbers  (ammunition),  16  wagons  (stores,  bag- 
gage, etc.)  ;  total  vehicles,  83. 

Changed  from  3  batteries  of  6  howitzers  to  4  batteries  of  4  howitz- 
ers each. 

SIEGE   ARTILLERY    BRIGADE    (MEDIUM). 

With  mechanical  transport. 
Headquarters  and  two  batteries,  R.  G.  A. 
Each  armed  with  four  9.2-inch  B.  L.  howitzers. 
Personnel:  23  officers,  768  enlisted;  total,  791. 
Transport:  7  motor  cars,  31  motorcycles,  76  lorries  (3-ton),  2  lor- 
ries, 30-hundredweight,  10  "Holt"  tractors;  total  vehicles,  126. 
Changed  from  4  batteries  each  of  four  6-inch  howitzers. 

SIEGE   ARTILLERY    BRIGADE    (MEDIUM). 

With  mechanical  transport. 

Headquarters  and  2  batteries,  R.  G.  A.,  each  armed  with  four 
8-inch  B.  L.  howitzers. 

Personnel:  23  officers,  651  enlisted;  total,  674. 

Transport:  7  motor  cars,  25  motorcycles,  45  lorries.  3  ton,  1  lorry 
(30-hundredweight),  10  "Holt"  tractors;  total  vehicles,  88. 

Changed  from  4  batteries  each  of  four  6-inch  howitzers. 

SIEGE    ARTILLERY    BRIGADE     (LIGHT). 

Headquarters,  2  or  3  batteries,  each  with  four  6-inch  howitzers, 
and  ammunition  column,  R.  G.  A. 

Personnel:  19  officers,  535  enlisted;  total,  554.     (For  2  batteries.) 

Transport:  8  carriages  with  limbers,  9  carts,  20  wagons  for  am- 
munition and  technical  stores,  26  petrol  lorries,  2  motor  cars,  4 
motorcycles,  5  wagons  (baggage  and  stores)  ;  total  vehicles,  69. 

Changed  from  4  batteries  each  of  four  6-inch  howitzers. 

MOUNTAIN  ARTILLERY  BRIGADE,  R.  G.  A.,  AND  AMMUNITION  COLUMN. 

Headquarters,  3  batteries  each  of  six  2.75  B.  L.  guns,  and  am- 
munition column. 

Personnel:  23  officers,  997  enlisted;  total,  1,020. 

Animals:  62  horses,  riding;  83  horses,  draft;  20  horses,  draft, 
heavy;  490  pack  mules. 

50O 


21 

Transport:  5  bicycles,  5  carts,  12  wagons  (ammunition,  technical 
stores),  9  wagons  (baggage  and  stores) ;  total  vehicles,  31. 
New  organization. 

AR3I0RED    MOTOR   BATTERT. 

(Four  armored  cars,  each  with  2  machine  guns.) 

Personnel :  4  officers,  56  enlisted ;  total,  60. 

Transport:  4  armored  cars,  2  motor  cars  (baggage  and  supplies), 
1  lorry,  30-hundred weight  (ammunition)  ;  1  lorry,  3-ton  (workshop 
and  store) ;  19  motorcycles,  1  motor  car;  total  vehicles,  28. 

New  organization. 

jIOTOR   machine-gun   BATTERT. 

(Six  machine  guns.) 

Personnel :  4  officers,  55  enlisted ;  total,  59. 

Transport:  4  motorcycles  (officers),  5  motorcycles  (scouts),  18 
motorcycles  with  side  cars  (6  for  guns,  12  for  men  and  ammunition), 
3  motor  cars  (with  box  bodies)  for  spare  men  and  ammunition,  2 
motor  cars  (with  box  bodies)  for  baggage  and  supplies;  total  ve- 
hicles, 32. 

New  organization. 

ANTIAIRCRAFT  GUN  DETACHMENT, 

(Two  13-pounder  Q.  F.  guns.) 

Personnel :  2  officers,  41  enlisted ;  total,  43. 

Transport:  2  motor  cars  for  guns,  4  lorries  (30-hundredweight)  for 
ammunition,  1  motor  vehicle  for  personnel,  1  motor  car,  1  motor- 
cycle.    Total  vehicles,  9. 

New  organization. 

WORKSHOP   FOR   SIX   ANTIAIRCRAFT   GUN   DETACH^rENT. 

(13-pounder  Q.  F.  guns.     Capable  of  division  into  two  sections.) 

Personnel :  2  officers,  43  enlisted ;  total,  45. 

Transport:  2  motor  cars,  5  motorcycles,  2  lorries  (workshop),  2 
lorries  (store),  2  lorries  (30-hundredweight)  for  personnel  and  first 
aid.     Total  vehicles,  13. 

New  organization. 

F.  Engineers. 

HEADQUARTERS   OF   DIVISIONAL   ENGINEERS    (nEW   ARMIES), 

Personnel :  3  officers,  1  clerk,  9  enlisted ;  total,  13. 
Transport:  1  bicycle,  1  cart,  2  wagons. 
Organization  similar  to  that  of  regular  service. 

506 


22 

BASE  ROYAL  ENGINEER  PARK. 

Personnel :  9  officers,  241  enlisted ;  total,  250. 
New  organization. 

RAILWAY  COMPANY    (CONSTRUCTION). 

Personnel :  6  officers,  249  enlisted ;  total,  255. 
Transport:  2  motorcycles,  2  motor  lorries. 
Principal  change  in  transport :  From  horse  to  motor. 

FIELD  SEARCHLIGHT  COMPANY. 

Personnel:  4  officers,  88  enlisted;  total,  92. 

Transport:  5  power  lorries,  4  30-hundredweight  lorries,  1  motor 
car,  6  limbers. 

New  organization. 

ANTIAIRCRAFT  SEARCHLIGHT  SECTION. 

Personnel :  1  officer,  22  enlisted ;  total,  23. 
Transport:  1  30-hundredweight  lorry. 
New  organization. 

A  TUNNELING  COMPANY,  R.  B. 

(Headquarters  and  4  sections,  each  3  reliefs.) 

Personnel :  14  officers,  325  enlisted ;  total,  339. 

Transport:  6  bicycles,  13  motorcycles,  3  lorries  (3-ton)  for  stores, 
tools,  and  baggage,  1  lorry  (30-hundredweight),  1  box  car  (15- 
hundredweight),  1  water  cart,  4  wagons,  G.  S.  (train)  for  supplies; 
total  vehicles,  29. 

New  organization. 

BRIDGING  TRAIN    (hORSED  TRANSPORT). 

Personnel:  8  officers,  193  enlisted  (mounted)  and  36  (dismoimted) ; 
total,  237. 

Transport:  1  bicycle,  3  carts,  55  wagons  (equipment),  2  wagons 
(supplies) ;  total  vehicles,  59. 

Slight  change  in  personnel  and  vehicles. 

BRIDGING  TRAIN    (MECHANICAL  TRANSPORT). 

Personnel:  6  officers,  175  enlisted;  total,  181. 

Transport:  4  motor  cars,  6  motorcycles,  50  wagons  (convertible  for 
horse  or  mechanical  transport),  32  lorries  (quadruple  drive);  total 
vehicles,  86. 

New  organization. 

506 


23 

A   LABOR    COMPANY     (MEDITERRAITEAN"), 

Personnel :  2  officers,  258  enlisted ;  total,  260. 

Transport:  1  water  cart,  2  wagons,  G.  S.,  for  tools,  baggage,  and 
supplies. 

New  organization.    Officers,  Eoyal  Engineers. 

FIELD    SQUADRON, 

Headquarters  and  4  troops. 

Personnel:  7  officers,  186  enlisted;  total,  193. 

Transport:  Headquarters,  2  carts,  8  wagons  (6  for  bridge  mate- 
rial) ;  total,  10  vehicles. 

For  4  troops :  8  carts,  8  wagons ;  total  vehicles,  16 ;  grand  total,  26 ; 
vehicles. 

Changes  in  personnel  and  equipment. 

PIONEER  BATTALION    (NEW  ARMIES). 

Headquarters,  machine-gun  section,  4  guns  and  4'companies. 
Personnel:  30  officers,  1,008  enlisted;  total,  1,038. 
Horses :  12  riding,  60  draft,  9  draft,  heavy,  98  pack  mules. 
Transport:  9  bicycles  for  signalers,  4  carts,  26  wagons;  total  ve- 
hicles, 32. 

New  organization. 

AN  ARMY  TROOPS   COMPANY,  R.  E. 

Personnel :  3  officers,  146  enlisted ;  total,  149. 

Transport:  3  motorcycles  with  side  cars,  10  bicycles,  4  carts,  tool, 
5  wagons,  2  lorries,  3-ton ;  total  vehicles,  23. 
New  organization. 

A   FIELD    COMPANY    (NEW    ARMIES). 

Headquarters  and  4  sections. 

Personnel:  6  officers,  223  enlisted  (54  mounted,  169  dismounted). 

Transport:  33  bicycles,  9  carts  (water  and  tool),  19  Avagons 
(searchlights,  pontoons,  trestles,  technical  stores,  and  baggage)  ;  total 
vehicles,  52. 

New  organization. 

RAILWAY  SUPPLY  DETACHMENT, 

Personnel :  3  officers,  18  enlisted ;  total,  21, 
New  organization. 

506 


24 

G.  Signal  Service. 

CAVALRY    CORPS    SIGNAL    SQUADRON". 

Headquarters  and  2  troops. 
Personnel:  10  officers,  184  enlisted;  total,  194. 
Transport:  4  wagons,  3  lorries,  7  motor  cars;  total,  14  vehicles. 
New  organization:  2  troops  instead  of  4,  as  per  normal  signal 
squadron. 

ARMY   HEADQUARTERS   SIGNAL   COMPANY. 

Personnel :  7  officers,  142  enlisted ;  total,  149, 

Transport:    7   loiTies    (1-ton,   30-hundredweight,   and   3-ton) ;    3 
motor  cars;  total  vehicles,  10. 

Principal  change,  increase  in  personnel  and  all  motor  transport. 

ARMY    CORPS    HEADQUARTERS    SIGNAL    COMPANY. 

Personnel :  5  officers,  73  enlisted ;  total,  78. 

Transport:  4  lorries   (1-ton  and  3-ton),  2  motor  cars;  total  ve- 
hicles, 6. 

New  organization. 

MOTOR   WIRELESS    SECTION. 

Personnel :  1  officer,  27  enlisted ;  total,  28. 

Transport:  2  wagons,  motor  wireless,  2  lorries,  30-hundredweight; 
total  vehicles,  4. 
New  organization. 

MOTOR   AIR-LINE    SECTION. 

Personnel:  1  officer,  50  enlisted;  total,  51. 

Transport:  5  lorries  (3-ton  and  30-hundredweight),  1  motor  car 
(light)  ;  total  vehicles,  6. 
New  organization. 

CABLE   SECTION. 

Personnel :  1  officer,  35  enlisted ;  total,  36. 

Transport:  2  wagons,  cable,  2  limbered;  total  vehicles,  4. 

New  organization. 

H.  Transport  and  Supply. 

A   DEPOT   UNIT   OF    SUPPLY. 

Personnel :  1  officer,  13  enlisted ;  total,  14. 
New  organization. 

506 


i 


25 

A   BAKERY   SECTION, 

Personnel :  2  sergeants,  2  corporals,  11  privates ;  total,  15, 
New  organization. 

AN  AUXILIARY  HORSE  TRANSPORT  COMPANY. 

(Two-horsed  wagons.    Three  sections,  each  of  20  wagons.) 
Personnel:  5  officers,  125  enlisted;  total,  130. 
Lines  of  communication  transport. 
New  organization. 

INLAND  WATER  TRANSPORT  SECTION", 

Personnel:  18  officers,  327  enlisted;  total,  345, 
Transport:  1  motor  car,  16  motor  bicycles. 
New  organization. 

AN    AUXILIARY    MECHANICAL    TRANSPORT    COMPANY     (STEAM    LORRIES). 

Line  of  communications. 
Headquarters  and  3  sections,  A.S.C 
Personnel:  5  officers,  143  enlisted;  total,  148. 

Transport:  1  motor  car,  1  motorcycle,  46  lorries,  3-ton  steam  (15 
to  each  section),  1  lorry  (workshop),  1  lorry  (store). 
New  organization. 

A   RESERVE   PARK    (MULE   TRANSPORT), 

One  horse  transport  company,  A.S.C. 
Personnel :  9  officers,  500  enlisted ;  total,  509. 

Transport:  3  carts,  8  wagons   (organization),  144  wagons  (sup- 
plies) ;  total  vehicles,  155. 
Draft  mules,  673. 
Personnel  increased.    Animals  changed  from  horses  to  mules. 

A  RESERVE  PARK  (NEW  ARMIES), 

(Two-horsed  wagons.) 

Similar  to  regular  establishment. 

Enlisted  personnel  decreased  by  2. 


Personnel :  1  officer,  20  enlisted ;  total,  21. 

Transport:  2  lorries  (3-ton)  (workshop  and  stores),  1  lorry  (30- 
hundred weight)  for  stores  and  personnel,  1  motor  car  for  personnel; 
total  vehicles,  4. 

New  organization. 

506 


26 

I.  Medical  Department. 

A  FIELD  AMBUI^NCE    (NEW  ARMIES), 

(Accommodating  150  patients.)  (Seven  motor  ambulance  cars 
and  three  horsed  ambulance  wagons.) 

Personnel  (3  sections)  :  10  officers,  238  enlisted;  total,  248. 

Transport:  1  bicycle,  4  carts,  3  wagons  (cooks  and  medical  stores), 
3  wagons  (ambulance),  6  wagons  (medical  stores  and  baggage),  7 
motor  cars  (ambulance),  4  wagons  (train) ;  total  vehicles,  25. 

New  organization. 

A   MOTOR   AMBULANCE   CONVOY. 

(Fifty  motor  ambulance  cars.) 

Personnel  (3  sections)  :  8  officers,  157  enlisted;  total,  165. 

Transport:  50  motor  ambulances,  4  motor  cars,  7  motorcycles,  1 
lorry  (30-hundredweight),  1  lorry  (workshop),  2  lorries  (store); 
total  vehicles,  65. 

New  organization. 

A    CASUALTY    CLEARING    STATION. 

(Two  hundred  sick.) 

Personnel :  11  officers  (including  3  chaplains),  87  enlisted;  total, 98. 

Transport:  3  lorries  (3-ton),  3  bicycles  (for  chaplains). 

New  organization. 

A   GENERAL   HOSPITAL    (1,040    BEDS). 

(Including  40  beds  for  officers.) 

Personnel:  35  officers  (including  3  chaplains  attached),  206  en- 
listed ;  total,  241. 

Transport :  Furnished,  as  required,  by  the  inspector  general  of  com- 
munications. 

New  organization:  Capacity  doubled. 

AN    AMBULANCE   TRAIN. 

(For  rail  transport  of  396  bed  patients.) 
Personnel :  3  officers,  3  nursing  sisters,  47  enlisted ;  total,  53. 
Organization  personnel  increased. 
6oe 


27 

J.  Veterinary  Service. 

A  VETERINARY  HOSPITAL, 

(For  1,000  sick  horses.) 

Personnel :  10  officers,  389  enlisted ;  total,  399. 
Transport:  7  carts,  2  wagons,  1  lorry  (30-hundredweight)  ;  total 
vehicles,  10. 
New  organization. 

A   MOBILE  VETERINARY  SECTION, 

Personnel :  1  officer,  27  enlisted ;  total,  28. 

Transport :  3  wagons. 

New  organization  for  service  with  divisions. 

A   CONVALESCENT-HORSE   DEPOT, 

(For  1,200  horses.) 

Personnel:  3  officers,  128  enlisted;  total,  131. 

Transport:  1  cart,  1  ambulance  (horse),  5  wagons.  Total  ve- 
hicles, 7. 

New  organization. 

E.  Military  Prisons. 

MILITARY   PRISONS    IN    THE    FIELD. 

(Military  prison,  each  500  prisoners.) 
Headquarters  personnel :  1  officer,  2  enlisted ;  total,  3. 
Military  prison  personnel :  1  officer,  28  enlisted ;  total,  29. 
Change  in  organization  and  increase  in  personneL 

L.  Army  Service  Corps. 

dockers'   BATTALION. 

A  new  organization  of  stevedores  given  a  military  status  for  better 
control.  Enlisted  personnel  organized  with  a  proportion  ranking  as 
staff  sergeants,  sergeants,  and  corporals. 

rORAGERs'    BATTALION. 

A  new  organization  of  forage  supply  service  given  a  military  status 
for  better  control.  Enlisted  personnel  must  be  men  over  41,  or  phys- 
ically unfit  for  fighting,  or  boys  between  15  and  17;  a  proportion 
ranking  as  staff  sergeants,  sergeants,  and  corporals. 

506 


28 

5.  ITALT. 

ARMORED  MOTOR  MACHINE-GUN  CARS. 

Each  3  guns  of  the  Maxim  type.    Cars  are  provided  with  under- 
mountable  tires.    About  120-130  on  hand. 
Organization  not  known. 

AVIATION    SERVICE. 

Has  all  mechanical  transport. 

SANITARY    SERVICE. 

Besides  the  usual  ambulance  cars,  motor  ambulance  cars  have  been 
provided.  Each  carries,  besides  a  doctor  and  a  nurse,  6  patients 
lying  and  4  sitting,  or  12  sitting. 

TRANSPORT  SERVICE. 

Mechanical  transport,  in  addition  to  animal-drawn  carts  and 
wagons,  has  been  adopted.  To  these  motor  vehicles  are  attached 
trailers,  either  of  the  mechanical  traction  type,  or  the  usual  four- 
wheel,  animal-drawn  type  of  cart. 

6.  JAPAN. 

No  changes  in  organization  known. 

7.  TURKEY. 
No  changes  in  organization  known. 

8.  RUSSIA. 
No  changes  in  organization  known. 

9.  SERBIA. 
No  changes  in  organization  known. 

606 

o 


STUDY  ON 

THE  COST  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

AS  COMPARED  WITH  THE  COST  OF  THE 

ARMIES  OF  OTHER  NATIONS. 


PREPARED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION,  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

AS   A    SUPPLEMENT   TO   THE    STATEMENT    OF   A   PROPER   MILITARY 

POLICY  FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES 


WCD  9053-120 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE  :  WASHINGTON 

NOVEMBER,   1915 


507 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 

1916 


War  Department, 

Document  No.  507. 

Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff. 


STUDY  ON  THE  COST  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  UNITED 
STATES  AS  COMPARED  WITH  THE  COST  OF  THE  ARMIES 
OF  OTHER  NATIONS. 


In  compliance  with  the  direction  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  dated 
September  3,  1915,  the  following  study  of  the  cost  of  the  Army  of 
the  United  States,  as  compared  with  the  cost  of  the  armies  of  other 
nations,  is  submitted. 

Many  articles  have  been  published  in  which  the  cost  of  our  Army 
has  been  compared  with  the  cost  of  the  armies  of  foreign  nations. 
Very  few  of  the  conclusions  drawn  in  these  articles  are  of  any  prac- 
tical value,  due,  in  some  cases,  to  the  fact  that  the  writers  were  not 
in  possession  of  the  necessary  data,  and  in  others  to  their  assump- 
tion of  improper  bases  for  comparison. 

It  is  a  matter  of  common  knowledge  that  there  are  two  general 
systems  in  use  by  the  nations  of  the  w^orld  for  maintaining  their 
armed  forces.  These  are  the  systems  known  as  that  of  "  universal 
military  service,"  and  that  of  "  voluntary  enlistment."  In  nations 
employing  the  first  system,  the  armed  forces  consist  of  all  physically 
qualified  male  citizens  between  certain  ages.  These  citizens  are  re- 
quired to  submit  themselves  for  training  in  time  of  peace  as  well 
as  for  service  in  time  of  war.  In  the  nations  employing  the  second 
system  the  armed  forces  are  composed  of  citizens  who  voluntarily 
submit  themselves  for  training  in  peace  and  for  service  in  war.  In 
the  first  case  the  obligation  of  military  service  is  paid  by  personal 
service,  and  the  remuneration  given  the  individual  soldier  has  no 
relation  to  the  value  of  the  service  actually  rendered  by  him ;  in  the 
second,  the  soldier  must  be  paid  an  amount  sufficient  to  induce  him 
to  submit  himself  for  training  and  service. 

In  countries  employing  the  system  of  "  universal  military  service," 
military  training  is  looked  upon  as  a  part  of  the  education  of  the 
individual  citizen,  just  as  is  the  common  school  course,  and  citizens 
of  those  countries  would  no  more  think  of  demanding  pay  for  their 
individual  services  during  this  education,  than  they  would  while  at- 
tending the  common  schools. 

In  those  countries  employing  the  system  of  "  voluntary  enlistment," 
however,  the  citizen  looks  upon  the  profession  of  arms  in  time  of 
peace  as  a  trade  or  profession  by  means  of  which  he  expects  to  earn 
his  livelihood,  and  he  will  not  offer  himself  unless  he  is  assured 
remuneration  at  least  equal  to  that  which  he  would  receive  in  civil 

507  (3) 


occupations.  As  the  item  of  pay  in  those  countries  employing 
the  system  of  "  voluntary  enlistment "  is  by  far  the  largest  single 
item  in  the  expense  account,  it  is  to  be  expected  that  nations  employ- 
ing this  system  will  have  to  pay  for  their  armed  forces  an  amount 
greatly  in  excess  of  those  employing  the  system  of  "  universal  mili- 
tary service,"  and  we  will  find  this  to  be  the  case. 

From  what  has  been  said,  it  is  obviously  unscientific  to  compare 
the  cost  of  maintaining  an  army  by  these  two  widely  differing  sys- 
tems in  terms  of  money  actually  paid  out  of  the  treasury,  since  we 
would  be  comparing  two  absolutely  dissimilar  things.  If  we  wish, 
then,  to  compare  the  cost  of  our  Army  with  the  cost  of  those  of  other 
nations,  we  must  limit  our  comparison  to  those  nations  which  em- 
ploy the  same  general  system  as  ourselves.  We  will  find  that  only 
one  other  nation  in  the  world  does  so — Great  Britain. 

It  is,  therefore,  with  cost  of  the  army  and  military  establishment  of 
Great  Britain  only  that  we  can  compare  the  cost  of  our  own  if  we 
hope  to  obtain  results  that  mean  anything.  This  comparison  has,  of 
course,  been  made  many  times,  as  has  been  said  above.  The  usual 
method  of  procedure  has  been  to  obtain  the  per  capita  cost  of  the 
soldier  by  dividing  the  total  cost  of  the  military  establishment  in 
each  country  by  the  total  number  of  enlisted  men  employed  and  com- 
paring the  results.  But  even  a  superficial  study  of  the  subject  reveals 
the  fact  that,  while  the  broad  systems  on  which  the  armed  forces  of 
Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  are  maintained  are  the  same, 
they  differ  from  each  other  in  important  details.  So  much  so,  in 
fact,  as  to  make  the  method  of  comparison  mentioned  above  abso- 
lutely false  and  misleading,  unless  considered  in  connection  with 
certain  other  subjects,  as  will  be  evident  as  we  proceed  with  this 
study.  So,  if  we  desire  to  reach  a  real  basis  for  comparison  of  cost, 
we  will  find  it  necessary  to  make  a  detailed  study  of  the  various  items 
of  expenditure  in  Great  Britain  and  in  the  United  States,  and  en- 
deavor to  bring  them  to  a  common  basis.  This  is  a  most  difficult  thing 
to  do,  as  will  be  evident  as  we  proceed  with  the  study,  and  we  will 
find  that  our  comparison,  at  best,  is  only  an  approximation. 

Appended  to  this  study  will  be  found  tables  containing  the  data 
from  which  the  conclusions  have  been  deduced.  The  authority  is 
given  for  each  table. 

It  will  be  noted  that  the  figures  and  other  data  for  the  United 
State  have  been  taken  for  the  fiscal  year  ending  June  30,  1915.  This 
was  done  in  order  that  we  might  have  the  latest  available  data  on 
costs.  The  year  1912-13  has  been  chosen  for  Great  Britain,  in  order 
to  avoid  becoming  involved  in  consideration  of  extraordinary  expen- 
ditures in  that  country  incident  to  the  present  war  in  Europe. 

For  both  coimtries  those  items  of  expenditure  for  purposes  other 
than  military  will  be  deducted.    The  resulting  totals  will  give  us  the 

507 


total  costs  of  the  military  establishments  in  each  country.  In  both 
countries  consideration  of  the  subject  of  reserves  has  been  omitted 
since  the  United  States  has  no  reserves.  In  Great  Britain  the  Indian 
Army  has  been  excluded,  since  the  total  expenses  of  the  British  Army 
in  India,  including  the  cost  of  transportation,  etc.,  to  and  from 
India,  is  defrayed  by  the  Indian  Government. 

'\'\^ien  we  come  to  examine  and  compare  the  various  items  of  ex- 
penditure in  Great  Britain  and  in  the  United  States,  we  will  find 
that  many  of  them  are  not  susceptible  of  direct  comparison,  item  for 
item,  due  to  the  fact  that  the  systems  of  organization  and  administra- 
tion differ  so  materially  in  the  two  countries.  Thus  the  comparative 
figures  arrived  at  do  not  express  the  whole  truth,  and  we  will  find,  as 
a  matter  of  fact,  that  it  is  impossible  to  make  a  true  comparison  of 
costs  by  means  of  figures  alone. 

Again,  even  after  having  arrived  at  the  actual  money  costs  of  the 
military  establishment  in  each  country,  there  are  still  certain  condi- 
tions to  be  considered  which  vitally  effect  the  subject  and  which 
must  be  taken  into  account  if  we  are  to  make  a  comparison  on  any- 
thing like  a  scientific  basis.  For  example,  the  comparative  cost  of 
living,  standard  of  living,  rates  of  wages,  etc.,  all  affect  materially 
the  cost  of  maintaining  the  military  establishments  in  each  country. 
Certain  deductions  must  also  be  made  from  the  various  totals  in  order 
to  bring  the  resulting  figures  to  a  comparable  basis.  This  will  be  ap- 
parent as  we  proceed. 

The  total  expenditure  for  the  fiscal  year  191J— 15  from  appropria- 
tions for  the  support  of  the  Army  of  the  United  States  was  $116,127,- 
753.60.  (Table  1.)  Of  this  amount  $2,879,212.15  was  for  unusual 
expenses  incident  to  the  Mexican  situation  (memorandum  Q.  M.  G.) 
and  must  be  deducted.  This,  because  the  totals  for  Great  Britain 
contain  no  similar  item.  Deducting  this  amount  from  the  total  ex- 
penditures we  have  $113,248,54:1.52.  A  further  deduction  is  now 
necessary  of  certain  sums  disbursed  by  the  War  Department  pur- 
suant to  appropriations  which  have  but  slight  connection  with  the 
cost  of  the  Army.  No  such  items  appear  in  the  totals  for  Great 
Britain.  These  sums,  listed  in  detail  in  Table  3,  amount  to  $7,242,- 
567.99.  Deducting  this  amount  we  have,  as  the  total  military  ex- 
penditure for  the  United  States,  $106,005,973.53.  This  amount  is 
logically  comparable  with  the  total  military  expenditure  for  Great 
Britain,  which  was  $114,264,512.57,  and  which  is  shown  in  detail  in 
Table  2. 

The  actual  strength  of  the  Army  of  the  United  States  on  July  1, 
1915,  was  101,195.  (Table  4.)  This  includes,  of  course,  the  3,993 
enlisted  men  of  the  Hospital  Corps  and  the  4,388  enlisted  men  of 
the  Quartermaster  Corps,  which,  by  law.  are  not  included  in  the 
"  authorized  strength  of  the  Army.'" 

507 


The  actual  enlisted  strength,  of  the  British  Army  on  March  1, 
1913,  was  171,563.  (Appropriation  account,  Great  Britain,  1912-13, 
with  report  of  comptroller  and  auditor  general.)  This  includes 
the  "  standing  "  army  "  at  home  "  and  in  the  colonies  (exclusive  of 
India,  for  reasons  mentioned  above).  Based  on  the  above  figures, 
therefore,  the  per  capita  costs  per  enlisted  man  are  as  follows : 

Great    Britain $660.  01 

United    States 1,  047.  54 

On  the  same  basis  the  per  capita  costs,  all  ranks  being  considered, 

are: 

Great    Britain $630.03 

United    State.s 1,  000. 13 

The  above  figitres,  however,  do  not  show  the  true  comparative  per 
capita  costs,  as  will  be  shown  in  what  follows:  First,  the  total  for 
the  United  States  includes  $1,138,322.68  for  pay  and  allowances  of 
officers  on  duty  not  connected  with  the  Regular  Army.  (Table  3.) 
As  no  equivalent  item  appears  in  the  British  accounts  of  effective 
strength,  this  sum  should  also  be  deducted  from  the  total  for  the 
United  States.    Deducting  this  sum  we  obtain  $104,867,650.85. 

Owing  to  the  very  limited  extent  of  her  coast  line,  Great  Britain 
has  depended  almost  entirely  upon  her  navy  for  protection  against 
serious  invasion.  Consequently  only  her  navy  yards,  dock  yards,  and 
certain  exposed  arsenals  have  been  fortified. 

The  situation  in  the  United  States  is  vastly  different,  as  can  be 
seen  from  the  percentages  of  coast  artillery  maintained  in  the  two 
countries  in  Table  8;  8.2  per  cent  for  Great  Britain  and  18,59  per 
cent  for  the  United  States.  Our  strictly  coast  defense  expenditures 
are  shown  in  Table  7.  However,  the  costs  of  these  fortifications  for 
Great  Britain  are  impracticable  of  separation  from  the  total  expendi- 
tures for  permanent  military  works  of  all  kinds,  which,  as  shown 
in  Table  2,  amounted  to  $5,884,847.37  in  1912-13.  The  correspond- 
ing items  in  the  United  States  expenditures  for  1915  amounted  to 
$10,188,667.58  (total  permanent  works,  etc.,  Table  1,  less  correspond- 
ing items  Table  3,  already  deducted).  After  deducting  from  the 
totals  last  above  stated,  the  amounts  expended  respectively  for  per- 
manent works,  etc.,  the  resulting  totals  are : 


Total  cost,  effective  army ,  less  cost  of  permanent  works. 

Per  capita  cost  per  enlisted  man 

Per  capita  cost,  all  ranks  considered 


Great  Britain. 


$108,379,665.20 
631.71 
597.58 


XTnited  States. 


$94,678,983.27 
935. 60 
893. 26 


Percentage 

United  States 

to  Great 

Britain. 


87.35 
148. 10 
149. 48 


507 


One  of  the  incidents  of  service  in  our  Army  which  greatly  in- 
creases its  cost  is  the  necessity  of  maintaining  troops  in  Alaska, 
Hawaii,  Porto  Rico,  the  Canal  Zone,  the  Philippine  Islands,  and 
China.  The  additional  cost  for  maintaining  garrisons  in  the  above- 
mentioned  localities,  in  excess  of  the  amount  necessary  to  maintain 
garrisons  of  the  same  strength  and  composition  in  the  United  States, 
amounted  in  1914^15  to  $3,047,583.64,  or  to  an  increased  per  capita 
cost  per  enlisted  man  serving  in  those  localities  of  $84.62.  (See 
Table  14.)  In  other  words,  after  making  the  deductions  as  set  forth 
in  the  body  of  this  study,  the  per  capita  cost  for  the  United  States 
Army  would  be  $905.51  if  our  entire  Army  were  stationed  in  the 
United  States.  These  figures  include  only  those  pertaining  to  the 
Quartermaster  Corps.  There  is,  of  coui*se,  an  increased  cost  of 
maintenance  in  all  other  departments  incident  to  foreign  service, 
but  figures  for  them  are  not  available. 

Since  from  lack  of  data  it  is  impossible  to  obtain  a  similar  figure 
of  per  capita  cost  for  Great  Britain,  this  figure  is  not  a  comparable 
one.  It  is  only  given  as  showing  one  of  the  causes  of  the  high  per 
capita  cost  of  our  Army.  But,  while  exact  figures  on  increased  cost 
of  maintenance  on  foreign  service  are  not  available  for  Great  Britain, 
it  is  well  loiown  that  the  British  colonies  contribute  certain  sums 
toward  the  support  of  the  colonial  forces  and,  in  addition,  pay  a 
certain  amount  into  the  British  treasury  as  their  share  of  the  gen- 
eral expenses  of  the  British  military  establishment.  Thus,  during 
the  fiscal  year  1912-13  the  colonial  governments  of  Egypt,  Ceylon, 
Mauritius.  Hongkong,  the  Straits  Settlements,  and  Malta  contributed 
a  total  of  $3,211,675.59  for  this  purpose.  (See  "Army  appropriation 
accounts,  1912-13,"  with  the  report  of  the  comptroller  and  auditor 
general.)  The  United  States,  of  course,  receives  nothing  from  its 
outlying  possession  in  support  of  its  military  establishment. 

This  is  as  far  as  we  can  carry  our  comparison  as  expressed  in  actual 
figures,  but  it  by  no  means  gives  us  a  true  comparison. 

Based  on  the  above  figures,  the  United  States  soldier  ajyparently 
costs  the  Government  $303.89  more  than  does  the  British  soldier, 
considering  enlisted  strength  only.  Let  us  see  if  this  is  really  true, 
and  if  true,  why. 

As  will  be  seen  from  Tables  1  and  2,  one  of  the  principal  items  of 
cost  in  both  countries  is  that  of  "  pay  and  mileage."  This  item  for 
the  United  States  was  $49,722,369.91,  and  for  Great  Britain  $39,967,- 
066.82.  The  number  of  officers  for  the  United  States  was  4.797  and 
the  number  of  enlisted  men  101,195.  In  Great  Britain  the  number  of 
officers  was  9,800  and  the  number  of  enlisted  men  171,563.  . 

The  relative  rates  of  pay  for  the  various  grades  in  both  coun- 
tries, in  so  far  as  they  can  be  compared,  are  shown  in  Tables  5  and  6. 
In  these  tables  the  rates  of  pay  quoted  are  ''  base  "  pay  of  the  grade. 

507 


8 

In  the  United  States  the  officer  is  paid  in  accordance  with  his  rank ; 
in  Great  Britain  only  partially  so.  The  United  States  officer  gets 
the  pay  corresponding  to  his  rank  and  length  of  service,  regardless 
of  the  duty  he  is  performing;  in  the  British  service  the  officer's  pay 
depends  on  many  things  in  addition  to  his  rank.  For  example,  a 
British  officer  holding  a  particular  position  or  performing  certain 
work  is  paid  a  fixed  sum  in  addition  to  the  ''  base  "  pay  of  his  rank. 
Thus  a  lieutenant  colonel  in  command  of  his  battalion  is  paid  a  sum 
in  addition  to  his  pay  as  a  lieutenant  colonel.  An  adjutant  is  paid 
an  additional  sum  while  holding  this  position.  In  other  words,  the 
pay  of  the  British  officer  depends  largely  on  the  duty  he  is  perform- 
ing at  the  time  and  only  to  a  limited  extent  on  the  rank  he  holds. 
In  addition  to  this,  the  British  officer  receives  many  and  various 
allowances.  He  receives  an  increase  of  pay  when  under  canvas  or 
in  the  field,  an  allowance  for  servants,  an  allowance  for  messing,  and 
an  allowance  for  his  kit.  He  receives  additional  pay  for  having  per- 
fected himself  in  a  foreign  language.  Also  certain  brevet  and  hon- 
orary titles  carry  increased  pay.  These  are  only  a  few  of  the  items 
which  go  to  make  up  the  pay  of  the  British  officer.  The  regulations 
covering  the  subject  of  "allowances"  in  the  British  Army  are 
promulgated  in  a  publication  entitled  "  Regulations  for  the  Allow- 
ances of  the  Army,"  which  contains  188  pages  of  fine  print.  This 
publication  deals  exclusively  with  the  subject  of  "allowances"  and 
is,  in  addition  to  the  regulations  governing  pay  proper,  which  are 
contained  in  a  publication  entitled  "  Eoyal  Warrant  for  the  Pay, 
Appointment,  Promotion,  and  Noneffective  Pay  of  the  Army,"  which 
contains  327  pages  of  fine  print.  From  all  this  it  will  be  seen  how 
very  difficult  it  is  to  ascertain  the  exact  actual  compensation  of  the 
British  Army  officer.  To  do  so  we  would  have  to  loiow  just  what 
duty  each  officer  of  the  British  Army  is  performing  and  where  he 
is  stationed,  which,  of  course,  is  impossible.  We  can  not,  therefore, 
ascertain  the  exact  amount  of  the  pay  of  British  officers  by  rank. 

In  the  United  States  Army  the  officer  on  duty  with  troops  receives 
the  pay  of  his  grade  and  no  more,  with  the  exception  of  the  compara- 
tively small  allowance  for  heat  and  light. 

It  is  therefore  evident  that  the  comparison  of  the  "  base  "  pay  of 
the  British  officer  with  the  "base"  pay  of  the  United  States  officer 
is  not  an  accurate  one.  To  make  the  comparison  accurate  we  would 
have  to  add  to  the  pay  of  the  British  officer  such  "  allowances  "  as 
he  receives  in  addition  to  his  base  pay. 

Unfortunately,  it  is  not  possible  to  do  this,  as  no  data  are  available 
from  which  we  can  ascertain  what  officers  are  drawing  these  allow- 
ances. So  it  is  impossible  to  make  an  actual  comparison  in  figures 
of  the  pay  of  the  British  and  United  States  officer,  grade  for  grade. 
The  best  we  can  do  is  to  show  the  "  base  "  pay  of  the  United  States 

507 


1 


officer  and  for  the  British  officer  the  "  base "  pay  plus  those  allow- 
ances which  all  officers  in  the  British  service  receive,  bearing  in  mind 
the  fact  that  in  the  case  of  the  United  States  officer  this  covers  all 
of  his  remuneration  (less  the  heat  and  light  allowance),  while  in  the 
case  of  the  British  officer  his  "base"  pay  is  only  a  portion  of  his 
total  remuneration,  often  only  a  small  portion  of  it. 

But  even  with  the  addition  of  "  allowances,"  it  is  undoubtedly  true 
that  the  British  officer  does  not  receive  as  high  pay  as  the  United 
States  officer.  Is  there  any  reason,  then,  why  Great  Britain  can 
obtain  officers  at  a  smaller  rate  of  pay  than  can  be  done  by  the  United 
States  ? 

It  is  a  well-known  fact  that  the  majority  of  British  officers  are  not 
expected  to  live  on  their  army  pay.  In  order  to  remain  in  the  service 
and  live  as  his  fellows  live,  the  British  officer  must  have  an  income 
in  addition  to  his  pay.  The  men  who  enter  the  British  Army  as 
officers  in  peace  time  come,  as  a  rule,  from  a  class  that  does  not 
engage  in  trade  or  depend  on  their  own  efforts  to  gain  a  livelihood, 
and  they  embrace  the  profession  of  arms  not  as  a  means  of  gaining 
a  living  but  because  it  offers  them  a  position  which  is  considered  a 
fitting  one  for  men  of  their  social  standing.  The  question  of  pay, 
then,  is  to  the  British  officer  a  secondary  one. 

This  is  not  the  case  with  the  officer  in  the  United  States  Army. 
He  comes  into  the  service  from  every  walk  of  life  and  social  class 
and  chooses  the  Army  as  he  would  any  other  profession.  He  seldom 
has  any  income  in  addition  to  his  pay,  and  the  question  of  the 
remuneration  he  is  to  receive  is  a  very  vital  one,  since  he  must  com- 
pare it  with  the  amount  he  would  be  able  to  earn  in  some  other  trade 
or  profession.  The  principle  that  the  pay  of  a  public  officer  should 
be  sufficient  to  support  him  obtains  universally  in  the  United  States, 
and  this  country  does  not  expect  the  public  servant  to  give  his  service 
to.  the  state  without  adequate  compensation. 

It  will  have  been  noted  in  Tables  11  and  12  that  the  items  of 
"pay"  and  "mileage"  have  been  considered  together.  This  was 
necessary  because  the  items  of  pay  and  mileage  for  Great  Britain 
were  not  given  separately  and  could  not  be  ascertained.  The  item 
for  mileage  is  undoubtedly  much  larger  for  the  United  States  than 
lor  Great  Britain,  owing  to  the  comparatively  small  area  of  the 
United  Kingdom  and  to  the  fact  that  the  stations  of  regiments  in 
England,  Ireland,  Scotland,  and  Wales  are  never  changed.  In  this 
connection,  too,  the  numerous  changes  of  station  of  officers  to  and 
from  the  Philippines,  Hawaii,  and  the  Canal  Zone  made  necessary 
by  law  and  the  changes  of  station  of  officers  due  to  the  operation  of 
the  so-called  "  Manchu  "  law  must  not  be  lost  sight  of.  Great  Britain 
relieves  her  troops  on  foreign  service  once  in  12  years,  while  the 
United  States  is  compelled  by  law  to  relieve  them  (or  the  individuals 
30669°— No.  507—16 2 


10 

thereof)  once  in  two  years.  From  all  of  the  above  it  is  evident  that, 
while  the  pay  of  the  British  officer  is  undoubtedly  less  than  the  pay 
of  the  United  States  officer,  the  difference  is  not  nearly  so  great  as 
has  formerly  been  supposed,  and  this  difference  is  largely  explained 
by  differences  in  the  circumstances  affecting  the  two  services.  In 
this  connection  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  base  pay  of  all 
captains  and  first  lieutenants  in  the  British  service  has  been  increased 
20  per  cent  and  that  of  second  lieutenants  31  per  cent  since  the  begin- 
ning of  the  present  war.  There  has  also  been  an  increase  in  the  "  kit " 
and  "  outfit "  allowances  of  from  25  per  cent  to  66  per  cent  and  a 
decided  increase  in  the  pension  rates  for  widows,  as  well  as  in  the 
"  separation  "  allowance. 

The  Canadian  rate  of  pay  for  a  private  of  the  lowest  grade  now 
serving  with  the  combatant  forces  is  $1.10  per  day,  and  his  "  separa- 
tion allowance  "  amounts  to  $20  per  month. 

We  now  come  to  the  consideration  of  the  pay  of  enlisted  men  in 
the  two  services. 

Table  6  shows  the  pay  of  such  grades  as  are  comparable  in  the  two 
countries.  There  are  "  allowances "  and  additional  items  of  pay  for 
both  countries,  but  the  tables  do  not  show  them  because  it  was 
found  to  be  impossible  to  obtain  them  and  because  they  did  not 
pertain  to  the  various  grades  as  such.  We  are  compelled,  then,  to 
compare  the  "  base  "  alone.  As  will  be  seen  from  the  table,  the  pay 
of  the  enlisted  man  in  the  United  States  Army  is  considerably  higher 
than  the  pay  of  the  same  or  similar  grade  in  the  British  service. 
What  we  desire  to  know  is  whether  or  not  there  is  any  explanation 
for  this  fact. 

The  class  from  which  the  enlisted  man  is  drawn  is  practically  the 
same  in  the  United  States  and  in  Great  Britain.  He  comes  from  the 
so-called  laboring  class.  As  each  country  obtains  its  soldiers  by  vol- 
untary enlistment,  the  recruit  is  influenced  to  enlist  by  practically 
the  same  inducement,  namely,  the  remuneration  he  is  to  receive. 
Patriotism,  of  course,  plays  a  part,  but  candor  compels  us  to  admit 
that  in  time  of  peace  it  is  a  very  small  part.  Each  country  must, 
then,  go  into  the  labor  market  and  bid  for  the  services  of  the  men 
who  are  to  make  up  the  rank  and  file  of  its  army.  This  being  the 
case,  it  will  be  necessary,  in  comparing  the  remuneration  the  soldier 
receives  in  each  country,  to  consider  several  factors  which  have  a 
very  direct  bearing  upon  enlistment  and  therefore  go  to  fix  the  rate 
of  pay  which  must  be  offered  in  order  to  induce  men  to  enlist.  The 
most  important  of  these  are  rate  of  wages,  the  cost  of  living,  and  the 
standard  of  living. 

Eeferring  to  Tables  A,  B,  C,  we  will  find  that  the  average  expendi- 
ture for  food  among  the  laboring  classes  is  66  per  cent  higher  in  the 
United  States  than  in  Great  Britain,  21  per  cent  higher  for  fuel  and 

507 


I 


11 


91  per  cent  higher  for  rent.  The  exact  figures  for  the  fourth  consider- 
able item  going  to  make  up  the  cost  of  living — namely,  clothing — it 
was  impossible  to  obtain,  because  of  lack  of  data  comparable  in  the 
two  countries.  It  is  a  matter  of  common  knowledge,  however,  that 
clothing  is  much  higher  in  the  United  States  than  in  Great  Britain. 
The  higher  cost  of  living  in  the  United  States  is  caused,  in  part,  by 
the  higher  prices  of  the  articles  consumed,  but  to  a  much  gi^eater  de- 
gree by  the  higher  standard  of  living  of  the  laboring  classes  in  the 
United  States.  It  is,  of  course,  the  latter  that  more  directly  affects 
the  rat€  of  pay  and  compels  the  higher  rate  in  the  United  States, 
although  the  former  enters  into  the  question  to  a  certain  extent.  But 
the  factor  which  affects  the  rate  of  pay  most  directly  is  the  rate  of 
wages  in  civilian  occupations. 

The  comparative  rates  of  wages  in  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain  are  set  forth  in  Tables  D,  E,  F,  G  for  those  trades  and  call- 
ings where  comparable  data  were  available.  We  find  that  the  aver- 
age wage  in  16  trades  and  callings  is  159  per  cent  higher  in  the 
United  States  than  in  Great  Britain.  In  one  calling  only  does  it  fall 
below  150  per  cent  higher,  and  that  is  school  teaching,  a  calling  which 
is  notoriously  underpaid  in  this  country. 

It  is  evident,  then,  that  in  order  to  induce  men  to  enlist  the  United 
States  must  offer  a  much  higher  rate  of  pay  than  must  Great  Britain. 
And,  if  we  compare  the  rates  of  pay  of  the  British  and  United  States 
soldier  with  the  rates  of  wages  in  the  two  countries,  we  are  com- 
pelled to  admit  that,  instead  of  being  overpaid,  the  United  States 
soldier  is  paid  relatively  less  than  the  British  soldier. 

We  now  come  to  a  consideration  of  the  items  which  go  to  make  up 
the  bulk  of  the  expense  of  the  military  establishments  in  both  coun- 
tries. We  find  that  these  consist  of  four  items:  (1)  Pay,  mileage, 
etc.  (2)  subsistence,  (3)  transportation,  and  (4)  clothing.  For  the 
two  countries  they  are  as  follow^s : 


Items. 

Great  Britain. 

United  States. 

Pav,  mileage,  etc 

$39,967,066.82 
8,260,721.66 
4,733,304.84 
5,848,651.48 

$49, 722, 369. 91 

Subsistence . '. 

9,802,141.39 

Transportation 

10, 680, 546.  69 

Clothing 

4, 623, 272. 94 

In  terms  of  percentages  to  the  total  expenditures  these  items  stand 
as  follows: 

Items. 

Great  Britain. 

United  States. 

Pay,  mileage,  etc 

Per  cent. 

34.10 
7.22 
4.14 
5.11 

Per  cent. 

43.90 

Subsistence 

8.65 

Transportation 

9.45 

Clothing.,    , 

4.08 

507 


12 

In  terms  of  per  capita  cost,  considering  enlisted  strength  only,  they 
are  as  follows: 


Items. 


Great  Britain. 


United  States. 


Pay,  mileage,  etc 

Subsistence 

Transportation.. 
Clottiing 


S232.95 
48.14 
27.58 
34.91 


$491.35 
96.86 
105. 54 
45.68 


For  Great  Britain  the  sum  of  the  expenditures  for  these  four  items 
is  50.57  per  cent  of  the  total  expenditures  for  military  purposes  and 
for  the  United  States,  66.08  per  cent. 

The  most  important  of  the  factors  affecting  pay,  mileage,  etc., 
have  already  been  considered  when  dealing  with  pay. 

In  considering  the  second  item  of  greatest  expense,  "  Subsistence," 
we  will  find  in  Table  13  that  the  ration  for  the  United  States  Army 
is  larger  both  in  total  quantity  and  in  number  of  components  than 
that  of  the  British  Army.  This  is  explained,  of  course,  by  the 
higher  standard  of  living  in  the  United  States.  In  addition  to  this, 
as  already  stated,  the  average  cost  of  the  average  workingman's  food 
expenditures  in  the  United  States  is  very  nearly  double  that  in 
Great  Britain.  This  is  brought  about  by  the  higher  standard  of 
living  and  by  the  increased  cost  of  food  articles  in  the  United  States 
over  Great  Britain. 

When  we  come  to  examine  the  third  item,  "  Transportation,"  we 
find  that  several  factors  must  be  taken  into  consideration.  In  the 
first  place  this  item  for  the  United  States  includes  the  cost  of  trans- 
portation not  only  wdthin  the  continental  limits  of  the  United  States, 
but  also  to  and  from  and  within  Haw^aii,  the  Philippine  Islands, 
Alaska,  the  Canal  Zone,  and,  to  a  limited  extent,  Guam.  In  the 
item  of  transportation  for  Great  Britain,  the  cost  of  transportation 
betw^een  England  and  India  is  not  included,  since  India  pays  all 
costs  of  transportation  both  ways  for  both  troops  and  supplies. 
Again,  our  garrisons  within  the  continental  limits  of  the  United 
States  are  distributed  over  an  area  of  2,973,890  square  miles,  while 
the  territory  of  the  United  Kingdom  embraces  an  area  of  only 
121,633  square  miles,  or  less  than  one  twenty-fourth  that  of  the  United 
States.  Not  only  are  the  distances  over  which  troops  and  supplies 
must  be  transported  so  vastly  greater  in  the  United  States,  but  the 
cost  per  individual  and  per  pound  per  mile  is  greater  than  in  the 
United  Kingdom.  In  addition  to  this,  as  has  already  been  noted 
when  considering  the  item  of  "  Pay,  mileage,  etc.,"  the  stations  of 
British  regiments  in  the  United  Kingdom  are  seldom  or  never 
changed  and  the  colonial  troops  are  changed  only  once  in  12  years. 
The  great  difference  in  the  comparative  item  of  transportation  in 

507 


i 


13 

the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  is  strikingly  shown  by  the  per 
capita  cost  of  the  soldier  as  affected  by  this  item,  $105.54  for  the 
United  States  and  $27.58  for  Great  Britain. 

In  respect  to  the  fourth  item  of  greatest  cost,  "  Clothing,"  we  find 
an  increase  of  per  capita  cost  of  only  $10.77  for  the  United  States. 
This  is  fully  accounted  for  by  the  higher  cost  of  clothing  in  the 
United  States. 

We  must  now  consider  several  other  factors  which  affect  the  rela- 
tive cost  of  the  British  and  United  States  Armies. 

As  is  well  known,  the  cost  of  equipment  and  maintenance  of  the 
various  arms  of  the  service  differs  materially.  In  a  study  made  in 
the  Office  of  the  Quartermaster  General  of  the  Army  in  September, 
1915  (already  referred  to),  we  find  a  table  showing  the  first  cost 
and  annual  cost  of  maintenance  for  organizations  of  the  various 
arms  of  the  service  expressed  in  terms  of  per  capita  cost  of  enlisted 
men,  quartermaster  expenditures  only  being  considered.  The  table, 
in  part,  is  as  follows : 

Comparative  cost  of  the  several  arms  based  upon  recent  estimates  prepared 
in  this  office  (Quartermaster  General),  the  cost  of  the  complete  quartermaster 
field  equipment  and  annual  cost  of  maintenance  of  regiments  and  smaller 
organizations  at  war  strength  in  permanent  camp  in  time  of  peace,  expressed 
in  each  instance  upon  a  per  capita  basis,  are  as  follows : 


Organizations. 


REGIMENTS. 


Infantry 

Provisional  coast  artillery  (for  infantry  duty) 

Cavalry 

Field  artillery  (average)  for  light,  horse,  heavy,  and  mountain  . 


First  cost. 


Annual 
cost  of 
mainte- 
nance. 


f 106. 67422 
119.93292 
318. 17225 
333. 42676 


$557. 61 
627.63 
772. 47 
747. 26 


This  table,  of  course,  does  not  consider  the  cost  of  the  ordnance 
equipment,  which  is  vastly  greater  for  cavalry  and  artillery  than  for 
infantry.  Nor  does  it  include  the  garrison  equipment,  either  quar- 
termaster or  ordnance,  nor  the  cost  of  upkeep  of  our  unnecessarily 
expensive  posts.  The  table  shows  what,  of  course,  is  well  known; 
that  infantry  is  the  less  expensive  arm  both  in  first  cost  and  in  cost  of 
maintenance.  Thus  the  cost  of  maintenance  of  coast  artillery 
(equipped  as  infantry  only)  is  12  per  cent,  field  artillery  34  per  cent, 
and  cavalry  38  per  cent  greater  than  infantry.  It  is  therefore  evi- 
dent that  if  the  proportions  of  the  various  arms  maintained  by  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain  differ  materially,  there  will  be  an 
increase  or  decrease  in  the  comparative  cost  of  the  two  armies  in 
proportion  to  the  numbers  comprising  the  various  arms  in  the  two 
countries.  Let  us,  then,  see  what  the  proportions  of  the  various  arms 
maintained  in  the  two  countries  are.     We  will  find  these  data  in 

507 


14 

Table  8,  expressed  in  percentages  of  the  enlisted  strength  in  each 
arm  to  the  total  enlisted  strength  of  the  army  as  follows: 


Great 
Britain. 


United 
States. 


Infantry 

Coast  artillery- 
Cavalry  

Field  artillery. 


Per  cent. 

50.51 

8.20 

7.36 

8.92 


Per  cent. 

41.06 

18.95 

14.47 

5.59 


Combining  these  percentages  we  find  that  the  United  States  main- 
tains 14.53  per  cent  more  of  the  more  expensive  arms  and  9.45  per 
cent  less  of  the  less  expensive  arms  than  does  Great  Britain. 

As  the  per  capita  cost  of  officers  is,  of  course,  greatly  in  excess  of 
that  of  enlisted  men,  it  is  evident  that  the  greater  proportion  of  offi- 
cers to  men  in  an  organization  the  greater  will  be  the  per  capita  cost 
of  the  organization. 

The  number  of  enlisted  men  per  officer  in  the  various  arms  of  the 
ser\4ce  were : 


Arm. 


Infantry 

Coast  artillery 

Cavalry 

Field  artillery 


Great 

Britain 

(Mar.  1,1913). 


Per  cent. 
29.84 
23.10 
27.40 
27.58 


United 

States 

(July  1,1915). 


Per  cent. 

24.55 
27.00 
20.28 
23.08 


Thus  in  every  arm  except  coast  artillery  (which  includes  only  8.2 
per  cent  of  her  total  enlisted  strength).  Great  Britain's  organiza- 
tions contain  more  enlisted  men  per  officer  than  do  similar  organi- 
zations in  the  United  States.  This  is  due,  of  course,  not  so  much  to 
the  fact  that  the  organizations  of  the  various  arms  differ  in  the  two 
countries  as  to  the  fact  that  the  majority  of  our  organizations  are 
maintained  at  "  peace  strength,"  while  those  of  Great  Britain  either 
are  at  "  war,"  or  nearly  "  war,"  strength  at  all  times.  If  all  of  our 
organizations  were  maintained  at  "war"  strength,  the  proportions  of 
officers  to  enlisted  men  in  the  various  arms  would  be  as  follows : 

Infantry,  1  officer  to  36.72  enlisted  men. 
Coast  Artillery,  1  officer  to  27  enlisted  men. 
Cavalry,  1  officer  to  24.72  enlisted  men. 
Field  Artillery,  1  officer  to  26.38  enlisted  men. 

The  proportion  of  officers  to  enlisted  men,  considering  the  entire 
military  establishment  in  each  country  as  now  maintained,  is:  Great 
Britain,  1  officer  to  17.50  enlisted  men;  and  the  United  States,  1 
officer  to  21.09  enlisted  men.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  Great  Brit- 
ain maintains  her  organizations  at  "  war  "  strength,  and  to  the  fact 
507 


15 

that  she  has  many  more  officers  on  staff  and  other  detached  service 
than  has  the  United  States. 

Even  with  this  small  proportion  of  enlisted  men  to  officers  in  the 
United  States  Army,  if  we  subtract  the  existing  necessary  "  over- 
head "  charges  (which  should  not  change  materially  with  the  increase 
or  decrease  of  the  combatant  forces),  we  will  find  that  the  per  capita 
cost  of  the  enlisted  man  is  $914.95. 

As  has  been  pointed  out  in  the  course  of  this  study,  it  has  been 
found  impossible  to  reduce  the  comparisons  of  cost  of  the  armies  of 
Great  Britain  and  of  the  United  States  to  absolutely  comparative 
figures  in  all  instances.  The  reasons  for  this  w^ere  mentioned  in  each 
case.  However,  it  is  believed  that  the  cost  of  the  United  States  Army 
does  not  compare  unfavorably  with  that  of  Great  Britain  if  we 
take  into  consideration  the  various  conditions  obtaining  in  the  two 
countries. 

The  impossibilty  of  comparing  the  cost  of  an  army  maintained  by 
the  system  of  "universal  military  service"  with  one  maintained  by 
the  system  of  "  voluntary  enlistment "  was  discussed  at  the  begin- 
ning of  this  study.  To  show  how  impossible  it  would  be  to  obtain 
recruits  for  our  Army  with  the  rates  of  pay  for  privates  in  their  first 
enlistment  obtaining  in  the  most  important  of  the  countries  employ- 
ing the  system  of  "  universal  military  service,"  the  following  is 
quoted : 

Monthly  pay  of  private  in  first  year  of  enlistment. 

Germany $3.  21 

France 1.  70 

Russia .  32 

Japan .  60 

Austria .  73 

Summary. 


Great  Britain, 

fiscal  year 

1912-13. 


United  States, 
fiscal  year  1915. 


Total  military  expenditure 

Same,  less  unusual  expenses  due  to  Mexican  situation 

Expenditures  for  effective  forces  only 

Pro  rata  per  enlisted  man  of  expenditures  for  effective  forces 
Pro  rata  cost,  all  ranks,  of  expenditures  for  effective  forces. . 
Expenditures:  Less  pay,  etc.,  of  officers  on  duty  not  connected  with 
Arm' 


IV. 

Same,  less  amount  of  permanent  works,  etc 

Per  capita  cost  per  enlisted  man  (lowest  comparative  figures  obtainable). 
Per  capita  cost,  all  rank  (lowest  comparative  figures  obtainable) 


Principal  items  of  expense  in  terms  of  percentage  to  total  military  ex- 
penditures: 

Pay,  mileage,  etc per  cent. . 

Subsistence do 

Transportation do 

Clothing do 

Pro  rata  per  enlisted  man,  at  present  ratio  of  1  oflacer  to  21  enlisted  men, 
of  total  expenditures,  less  existing  overhead  charges,  which  do  not 
change  with  size  of  Regular  Army 


5114,264,512.57 

114,264,512.57 

114,264,512.57 

660. 01 

630.03 

114,264,512.57 

108,379,665.20 

631.71 

697. 58 


$116,127,753.67 

113,248,541.52 

106,005,973.53 

1,047.54 

1,000.13 

104,867,650.85 

94,678,983.27 

935. 60 

893. 26 


34.10 
7.22 
4.14 
5.11 


43.90 
8.65 
9.45 
4.08 


S914.95 


507 


16 

Conditions  materially  affecting  the  foregoing  results  but  not  susceptible  of  com- 
pilation therewith. 

Average  expenditures  by  laboring  class  for—  Per  cent. 

Food Higher  in  United  States  than  in  Great  Britain. .    66 

Fuel do 21 

Rent do 91 

Average  wages do 159 


Area  in  square  miles 

Length  of  foreign  tours  in  years 

Average  annual  cost  of  maintenance  per  enlisted  man: 

Imfejatry 

Provisional  coast  artillery  for  infantry  duty 

Cavalry 

Field  artUlery 

Proportion  maintained  to  total  enlisted  strength: 

Infantry per  cent. . 

Coast  artillery do 

Cavalry do 

Field  artillery do 

Arms,  proportion  United  States  to  Great  Britain 

Number  of  enlisted  men  per  officer: 

Infantry 

Coast  artillery 

Cavalry 

Field  artillery 

Number  of  enlisted  men  to  officer,  considering  all  officers  and  enlisted  men 

in  military  establishment 

Same  if  all  United  States  organizations  were  maintained  at  "war" 
strength: 

Infantry 

Coast  artillery 

Cavalry 

Field  artillery 


United  King- 
dom. 


121, 633 
12 


(?) 
(?) 
(?) 
(?) 


50.51 

8.20 

7.36 

8.92 

U4.53 

29.84 
23.10 
27.40 
27.58 

17.50 


United  States. 


2,973,890 
3 

$557.  61 
627.63 
772.47 
747.26 

41.06 
18.95 
14.47 
5.59 
2  9.45 

24.55 
27.00 
20.28 
23.08 

21.09 


36.72 
27.00 
24.72 
26.38 


1  More  expensive. 


2  Less  expensive.  ■ 


Index  of  Tables. 


Table. 


1  A.  Total  costs : 

Pay,  mileage,  etc. 

Subsistence. 

Transportation. 

Clothing. 
Percentage  of  above  to  total  costs. 
Per  capita  costs,  enlisted  men  only. 
Per  capita  costs,  all  ranks. 

1.  Recapitulation,  expenditures,  United  States,  fiscal  year  1915. 

1  (a).  Detail    statement,    expenditures.    United    States    military    establish- 
ment, for  year  191.5. 

2.  Detail  statement,  expenditures,  British  military  establishment,  fiscal 

year  1912-13. 
2a.  Detail  statement,  expenditures,  British  military  establishment,  fiscal 
year  1912-13. 

3.  Items  not  properly  chargeable  to  cost  of  Regular  Army  of  United 

States. 
3  (a).  Pay,  etc.,  of  officers  and  enlisted  men.  United  States  Army,  on  duty 
not  connected  with  the  Regular  Army. 

4.  Strength  of  United  States  Army,  July  1,  1915   (memorandum  The 

Adjutant  General). 

5.  Comparative  statement,  pay,  etc.,  officers,  United  States  and  Great 

Britain. 


♦ 


507 


17 


Table. 

5  (a).  Pay,  etc.,  of  oflBcers,  British  Army  at  home. 
5b.  Pay,  etc.,  of  officers.  United  States  Army. 

6.  Comparative  statement,  pay  of  enlisted  men,  United  States  and  Great 
Britain. 
Minimum  pay  British  warrant  officers  and  enlisted  men  serving  at 

home. 
Minimum  pay  enlisted  men  United  States  Army. 
Items  of  United  States  expense  relating  solely  to  coast  defense. 
Comparative  statement  of   enlisted    strength   of  Infantry,   Cavalry, 

and  Artillery,  to  total  enlisted  strength. 
Comparative  statement  of  number  of  enlisted  men  to  officers  in  sev- 
eral arms.  United  States  and  Great  Britain. 
Number  of  officers  and  enlisted  men   in  principal  arms  of  British 

Army,  except  those  serving  in  India. 
Percentages  and  comparative  costs.  Great  Britain,  of  principal  items 
of  expenditure. 

12.  Percentages  and  comparative  costs,  United  States,  of  principal  items 

of  expenditure. 

13.  Comparative  statement,  ration  components,  United  States  and  Great 

Britain. 

14.  Additional  cost  Quartermaster's  Department,  for  maintaining  troops 

outside  continental  limits  of  United  States. 
A,  B,  C.  Comparative  statement,  costs  of  food,  fuel  and  rent,  United  States 
and  Great  Britain. 
D,  E,  F,  G.  Comparative  statement,  wages.  United  States  and  Great  Britain. 


6a. 

6&. 
7. 


10. 


11. 


Table  No.  lA. — Comparative  cost,  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States. 


Great  Britain. 


United  States. 


Total  cost  of  military  establishment  exclusive  of  imusual  expenses 

Pay,  mileage,  etc 

Subsistence 

Transportation 

Clothing 

PERCENTAGE  OF  ABOVE  ITEMS  TO  TOTAL  COST. 

Pay,  mileage,  etc 

Subsistence 

Transportation 

Clothing 

PER  CAPITA  COST,  CONSIDERING  ENLISTED  MEN  ONLY. 

Total 

Pay,  mileage,  etc 

Subsistence 

Transportation 

Clotlaixig 

PER  CAPITA  COST,  CONSIDERING  BOTH  OFFICERS  AND  ENLISTED  MEN 

Total 

Pay,  mileage,  etc 

Sul3sistence 

Transportation 

Clothmg 


$114,264,512.57 

39,967,066.82 

8, 260, 721. 66 

4,733,304.84 

5,848,651.48 


34.10 

7.22 
4.14 
5.U 


666. 01 
232.95 
48.14 
27.68 
34.91 


630. 03 
214. 30 
45.54 
26.09 
32.24 


$113,248,541.52 
49,722,369.91 

9,802,141.39 
10,680,546.69 

4, 623, 272. 94 


43.90 
8.65 
9.43 
4.08 


1,119.11 

491. 35 

96.86 

105.54 

45.68 


1,068.46 

469. 11 

92.48 

100.76 

43.61 


30669°— No.  507—16- 


18 


Table  No.  1. — Recapitulation. 


Appropriations. 


Maintenance. 


Permanent 
works,  etc. 


Savings. 


Deficit. 


Office  Secretary  of  War 

Office  Chief  of  StaS 

Adjutant  General's  Depart- 
ment  

Chief  Coast  Artillery  Corps. . 
Bureau  of  Insular  Affairs . . . 
Office  Chief  Signal  Officer... 

Medical  Department 

Engineer  Department 

Ordnance  Department 

Quartermaster  Department. 

Division  of  Militia  Affairs 

U.  S.  Military  Academy 


Amount  of  unusual  expenses 
for  fiscal  year  1915  due  to 
Mexican  situation  (re- 
ported by  Quartermaster 
General) 


$25,000.00 
65,350.00 

7,500.00 

108, 000. 00 

2,600.00 

1,024,444.64 

9,S5, 000. 00 

1,976,500.00 

18,249,607.62 

93, 719, 579.  47 

1,672,085.06 

997, 899. 54 


$20, 000. 00 
63,935.76 


5, 

21, 

1, 

619, 

929, 

364, 

4, 147, 

92, 021, 

1,514, 


406.00 
371. 17 
304. 60 
154.00 
261. 33 
865.  26 
380. 78 
335.  28 
935. 06 
705. 16 


$86,628.83 
'333,' 296.' 43' 


85, 000. 00 
11,414.24 

2,094.00 


1,611,634.74 

11,662,237.96 

1,648,842.92 

95,006.31 

12,452.08 


1, 195. 40 
71,994.21 
55, 733. 67 


2, 439, 988. 88 

1,049,401.27 

62, 143. 69 

6, 742. 30 


$1,000,000.00 


118,833,466.33 


100,677,654.40 
15,450,099.27 


15,460,099.27 


3,705,712.66 


1,000,000.00 


116,127,753.67 


2,879,212.15 


113,248.541.62 


Table  No.  1  (a). — Expenditures  for  the  United  States  Military  Establishment, 

fiscal  year  1915. 


Appropria- 
tion. 

Mainte- 
nance. 

Permanent 
works,  etc. 

Savings. 

Deficit. 

Contingencies  of  the  Army 

$25,000.00 

$20,000.00 

$5,000  00 

Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff: 

9,000  00 
26,000  00 
30,350.00 

8,999.63 
15,116.63 
29,819.60 

.37 

10,883.47 

530  40 

65,360.00 

63,936.76 

11,414.24 

Adjutant  General's  Department: 
Contingencies,  military  de- 
partments and  comniands. 

7, 500. 00 

5. 406. 00 

2,094.00 

Chief,  Coast  Artillery  Corps: 
Coast  Artillery  School  Fort 
Monroe,     incidental     ex- 

10,000.00 

25,000.00 
7,000  00 
3,000.00 
5,500  00 
2,500.00 

65,000.00 

10,000.00 

Construction     methods     of 
Coast  Artillery  war  instru- 

$25,000.00 
3, 74/.  02 

E  ngines ,  generators ,  etc 

Special  apparatus,  etc 

3,252.98 
3,000.00 
6,118.19 

381. 81 
2,500.00 

55,000.00 

1 

Constraction  fre  control  sta- 
tions, insular  possessions... 

108,000.00 

21,371.17 

86,628.83 

Bureau  of  Insular  AfTalrs: 

Care  of  insane  lilipino  sol- 

2,000.00 
600.00 

1,304.60 

696.40 
500.  00 

Care  of  insane  Porto  Rican 

2,600  00 

1,304.60 

1, 195. 40 

Office,  (^hief  Signal  Officer: 

Signal  Service  of  the  Army . . . 

250,000  00 
200,000.00 
122, 790. 32 

43,454.04 

10,800.00 
23,270.40 

160,283.47 

219,999.18 
200,000.00 

30,000.82 

91,766.99 

43,454.04 

10,800.00 
21,928.22 

31,034.33 

Fire  control  at  fortifications , 

Fire  control  at  fortifications, 

1,342.18 
t,  327. 23 

Maintenance,  fire  control  in- 
stallation,    seacoast     de- 
fenses   

154,060-24 

507 


19 


Table  No.  1  {a).— Expenditures  for  the  United  States  Military  Establishment,  fiscal 

year  1915 — Continued. 


Appropria- 

Mainte- 
nance. 

Permanent 
works,  etc. 

Savings. 

Deficit. 

Office,  Chief  Signal  Officer-Con. 

Washington- Alaska  military 

cable  and  telegraph  system, 

$47,559.87 

50,000.00 
42,682.75 

11,288.74 
3,800.00 

12,000.00 
6,000.00 
2,000.00 

17,068.98 

21,446.07 

$47,569.87 

50,000.00 
16,932.62 

Washmgton-Alaska  military 
cable  and  telegraph  system. 

Fire-control  installation,  in- 

$25, 760. 13 

1,244.13 
4.11 

Maintenance,  etc.,  fire-con- 
trol  installation,    insular 

$10,044.61 

Armuneiator  buzzer  system 

3, 795. 89 

Signal  equipment  for  coast 

12,000.00 

5,920.97 

778.00 

Commercial  telephone  serv- 

79.03 
1,222.00 

Commercial  telephone  serv- 

Equipment,  coast  artillery 
armories,  Organized  Militia. 

Repairs,   deep-sea   military 
cables 

17,068.98 

15,455.00 

5,991.07 

1,024.444.64 

619,154.00 

333, 296. 43 

71,994.21 

Medical  Department: 

Medical    Hospital    Depart- 

700,000.00 
6,000.00 

275,000.00 
3,500.00 

1,500.00 

694,086.29 
2,731.17 

229,846.39 
1,833.08 

764.40 

5,913.71 

2, 268. 83 

45, 153. 61 

1,666.92 

735.60 

Army  Medical  Museum 

Trusses  for  disabled  soldiers. 
Appliances  for  disabled  sol- 
diers  

986,000.00 

929,261.33 

65,738.67 

Engineer  Department: 

Engineer  depots 

25,000.00 
25,000.00 
60,000.00 

40,000.00 
6,000.00 

250,000.00 
100,000.00 

50,000.00 

100, 000. 00 

105,000.00 
6,000.00 

40,000.00 
25,000.00 

20,000.00 

300,000.00 

1,000.00 

3,000.00 
457,000.00 

150,000.00 

4,000.00 

154,000.00 
7,600.00 

25,000.00 
25,000.00 
14, 486. 85 

40,000.00 
5,000.00 

Engineer  school 

Engineer  equipment  of  troops 
Civilian  assistants  to  engi- 
neer officers 

36,513.15 

:;::::: 

Contingencies 

Construction  of  gun  and  mor- 

250,000.00 
100,000.00 

50,000.00 

100,000.00 

Modemizing  emplacements. . 

Electric    light    and    power 

plants,  sea-coast  defenses.. 

Searchlights  for  harbor  de- 

Protection,  etc.,  of  fortiflca- 

165, 000. 00 
5,000.00 

40, 000. 00 
9,878.41 

20,000.00 

Plans  for  fortifications 

Maintenance     for     search- 

Sea  walls  and  embankments. 
Preservation,  etc.,  torpedo 

15,121.59 

Sea-coast  batteries,   Philip- 

300, 000. 00 

Protection,    etc.,    fortifica- 

1,000.00 
3,000.00 

Protection,     etc.,     torpedo 
defenses,  Hawaiian  Islands 

Land    defenses,    Hawaiian 

457,000.00 
160,000.00 

Reserve  equipment,  Hawa- 
iian Islands  and   Philip- 

pine Islands 

Tools,    etc..    Engineer    De- 
partment,   Hawaiian    Is- 
lands and  Philippine  Is- 

4,000.00 

Storage,  electric  power.water 

supply,  Philippine  Islands 

Maps,  w  ar  Department — 

154,000.00 

7,600.00 

1,976,500.00 

364, 865. 26 

1,611,634.74 

,;■     , 1  = 

•07 


20 

Table  No.  1  (a). — Expenditures  for  the  United  States  Military  Establishment,  fiscal 

year  1925 — Continued. 


Appropria- 
tion. 


Mainte- 
nance. 


Permanent 
works,  etc. 


Savings. 


Ordnance  Department: 

Ordnance  Service,  1915 

Ordnance  stores,  ammuni- 
tion, 1914-15 

Ordnance  stores,  ammuni- 
tion, 1915-16 

Ordnance  stores  and  sup- 
plies, 1914-15 

Ordnance  stores  and  sup- 
plies, 1915-16 

Small-arms  target  practice, 
1914-15 

Small-arms  target  practice, 
1915-16 

Manufacture  of  arms,  1914-15. 

Manufacture  of  arms,  1915-16. 

Repair  of  arsenals,  1915 

Field  artillery  for  Organized 
Militia,  1913-15 

Field  artillery  for  Organized 
Militia,  1914-16 

Ammunition,  field  artillery, 
Organized  Militia,  1913-15. . 

Ammunition,  field  artillery. 
Organized  Militia,  1914-16. . 

Equipment,  coast  artillery 
armories,  Organized  Militia 

Exchanging  or  issuing  new 
pistols.  Organized  Militia. 

Fire  control  at  fortifications. 

Fire  control  in  insular  pos- 
sessions  

Fortifications  in  insular  pos- 
sessions  

Armament  of  fortifications.. 

Panama  fortifications 

Armament  of  fortifications, 
Panama  Canal 

Submarine  mines,  Panama 
Canal 

Submarine  mines 

Submarine  mines,  insular 
possessions 

Automatic  rifles 

Encampment,  etc.,  Organ- 
ized Militia,  1912 

Encampment,  etc..  Organ- 
ized Militia,  1913-15 

Testing  machines,  1915 

National  trophy  and  medals 

Board  or  Ordnance  and 
Fortifications 

Arsenals  and  proving  grounds 

Expenses  of  officers,  etc. . . 


$300, 000. 00 

20, 658. 06 

125,000.00 

8, 919. 55 

700,000.00 

24,434.76 

750,000.00 

9, 965. 62 

450, 000. 00 

290, 000. 00 

244.07 
2,100,000.00 

558. 59 

3,000,000.00 

10,769.51 

3,397.13 
221,413.71 

49, 989. 70 

1,118,069.46 

6,723,083.70 

463, 143. 89 

763,000.00 

48,871.70 
460, 772. 73 

57, 882. 29 
44,421.50 

8, 963. 49 

3, 700. 00 
15,000.00 
10,000.00 

28, 924. 84 

396, 420. 44 

42, 002. 88 


$299, 860. 84 

5, 000. 00 

40,000.00 

8, 176. 44 

690,013.72 

23,710.96 

705,816.96 

3,000.00 

30,000.00 

164,872.15 


$15,515.12 
79, 156. 37 


80. 682. 68 
1, 736, 265.  79 

25, 595. 90 

15. 282. 69 

2, 9.38. 39 
82, 144. 03 

11.185.65 


6, 543. 62 
412,179.80 
124,925.43 

62.95 

2,095,952.13 

558.59 

2,986,496.89 

6, 582. 28 

3,397.13 
189,610.26 

38,554.21 

931,649.48 

3,2.50,076.05 

3.38,038.61 

709,080.93 

34,177.66 
150, 749. 47 

40, 153. 76 
450.00 


$139. 16 
142.94 

5,843.63 
743.11 

9,986.28 

723.80 

44,183.04 

422.00 

7, 820. 20 

202. 42 

181. 12 

4,047.87 


13,503.11 

4, 187. 23 


31,803.45 

11,435.49 

105, 737. 30 

1,736,741.86 

99, 509. 38 

38, 636. 38 

11,755.65 
227, 879. 23 

6, 542. 88 
43,971.50 


2.29 

3,700.00 
15, 000. 00 
9,012.60 

26, 181. 91 
144,142.05 
24, 795. 73 


2, 742. 93 
3,951.17 
17,202.15 


18, 249, 607. 62 


4,147,380.78 


11,662,237.96 


2,439,988.88 


Quartermaster  Corps: 

Pay,  etc.,  of  the  Army 

Subsistence 

Mileage 

Regulars,  supplies 

Incidental  expensas 

Army  transportation 

Clothing  and  equipage 

Waters  and  sewers 

Roads,  walks,  wharves,  and 
drainage 

Barracks  and  quarters 

Military  post  exchanges 

.Horses  for  Coast  Artillery 
and  engineers 

Construction  and  repairs  of 
hospitals 

Quarters  for  hospital  stew- 
ards  

Shooting  galleries  and  ranges . 

Maintenance  .\rmy  War  Col- 
lege  


48,229,020.02 

9,802,141.39 

500,000.00 

8,155,000.00 

1, 954, 440. 00 

13,117,848.97 
6,500,000.00 
1,156,000.00 

485, 000. 00 

2,123,997.00 

154,391.00 

365,285.00 

440,000.00 

9, 700. 00 
40, 000. 00 

10,700.00 


49, 229, 020. 02 

9,802,141.39 

493, 349. 89 

7, 862, 772. 19 

1, 927, 222. 83 

13,004,437.07 
5,631,765.39 
1,044,114.35 

281,822.26 

1,484,994.80 

126,029.96 

365,071.37 

196,508.14 

9, 095. 61 
32,958.03 

9,. 520.  .56 


83,938.71 


47,061.21 
225, 389. 95 
104,351.22 

189,640.38 

602, 741. 94 

16,948.00 


218,213.66 
'"'6,'248.'83' 


6,650.11 
208,289.10 
27,217.17 
66, 350. 69 
642,844.66 
7,534.43 

13,537.36 
36,260.26 
11,413.04 

213. 63 

25,278.20 

604. 39 
793. 14 

1,179.44 


1  $1,000, 000. 00 


507 


1  Estimated;  all  accounts  not  yet  received. 


21 

Table  No.  1  (a). — Expenditures  for  the  United  States  Military  Establishment,  fiscal 

year  1915 — Continued. 


Appropria- 
tion. 

Mainte- 
nance. 

Permanent 
works,  etc. 

Savings. 

Deficit. 

Quartermaster  Corps— Contd. 
Rent  of  buildings,  Quarter- 
master Corps        

$45, 987. 00 
500, 000. 00 

125,000.00 
5,069.09 

844,751.35 
345,690.98 

125, 000. 00 
5,069.09 

$1, 235. 65 

Barracks  ancl  quarters,  Phil- 

8154,309.02 

Construction,    repair,    and 
maintenance    of     roads, 

Claims  for  damages  to  and 
loss  of  private  property 

93,719,579.47 

92,021,335.28 

1,648,842.92 

1,049,401.27 

1  $1,000, 000. 00 

Division  of  Militia  Affairs: 

Encampment   and   maneu- 

1,572,085.06 
100, 000. 00 

1,514,935.06 

57,150.00 
37,856.31 

Equipment,  Coast  Artillery 
armorieSjOrganized  Militia. 

62,143.69 

1,672,085.06 

1,514,935.06 

95, 006. 31 

62, 143. 69 

U.  S.  Military  Academy: 

Pay,   permanent   establish- 
ment and  civil          

768,  .316. 29 
1,000.00 

3, 000.  00 
40,000.00 
45,000.00 

6, 500.  00 

10,000.00 

375.  00 

2,500.00 

3,850.00 
1,700.00 
1,200.00 
1,200.00 

2, 000. 00 
250. 00 

125.00 

100. 00 
615. 00 

75.00 

1,500.00 

150. 00 

100.00 

1,200.00 
1,850.00 
725.  00 
2, 500. 00 
1,530.00 

598.  00 
350. 00 

2,000.00 

1,800.00 

500. 00 

500.00 

850.00 
1,200.00 

53, 430. 25 
39, 310. 00 

764, 816. 29 

3,. 500. 00 
1,000.00 

695. 48 
.15 
.12 

Expenses,  Board  of  Visitors . 
Contingencies  for  the  super- 
intendent                   

2,304.52 
39, 999.  85 
44,999.88 

6, 500.  00 

10,000.00 

375.  00 

2,500.00 

3, 850.  00 
1,699.99 
1,199.69 
1,200.00 

1,999.77 
244. 75 

124.  73 

99.73 

Repairs  and  improvements . . 

Gas  pipes,  gas,  etc 

Stationery  and  office  supplies 
Transportation  of  material. 

Printing  and  binding 

Tanbarlc,  etc 

.01 
.31 

Gymnasium    and    athletic 
supplies                . .  . 

.23 
5.25 

.27 

.27 
.02 

Repairs  to  saddles,  etc 

Repairs  and  maintenance  of 
searchlights 

Repairs  of  mattresses,  etc.. 

Cavalry  gymnasium 

Material  for  hurdles 

614.98 
75.00 

Purchase  of  typewriting  ma- 
chine 

1,499.94 
150.00 

99.81 

1.198.15 
1,668.17 
725.00 
2, 496.  60 
1,529.66 

598.  00 
349.  61 

1,997.92 

1,790.59 

478. 62 

496. 36 

848.35 
1,157.00 

50, 897.  89 
28,809.29 

.06 

Repair  of  mattresses,  Artil- 

.19 

1.85 
181.83 

Department  of  civil  and'  mil- 

Department  of  philosophy. . . 
Department  of  mathematics . 

Department  of  chemistry 

Department  of  drawing 

Department  of  modern  Ian- 

3.40 
.34 

.39 
2.08 

9.41 

21.38 

3.64 

1.65 
43.00 

159. 06 
1.111.91 

Department  of  practical  mil- 

Department  of  ordnance  and 
gunnery,  purchase  of  in- 

Department    of    ordnance, 

gunnery,  machines,  etc 

Department  of  military  hy- 

Department  of  English  and 

Miscellaneous  Items  and  in- 

2,373.30 
9,388.80 

Buildings  and  grounds 

997,899.54 

978,705.16 

12, 452. 08 

6, 742. 30 

507 


22 


Table  No.  2. — Expenditures  for  the  British  military  establishment,  fiscal  years    m 

1912-18,  t 


[Authority  appropriation  account,  1912-13,  with  report  of  comptroller  and  auditor  general.] 


I 


Vote 
No. 


Purpose. 


British  currency. 


United  States 
currency. 


10 


Pay  of  officers  and  troops,  etc 

Pay  of  medical  establishment 

Establishment  for  military  education 

Quartering,  transport,  and  remounts 

Supplies , 

Clothing 

Clothing  factories , 

Ordnance  establishment  and  general  stores 

Armaments,  aviation,  and  engineer  stores 

Works  and  buildings , 

Kepayment  under  military  works  acts 

Miscellaneous  eflective  services , 

War  office 

Half  pay,  retired  pay,  and  other  noneffective  charges  for 

officers 

Pensions  for  woimds 

In-pensions,  out-pensions,  and  rewards  for  distinguished 

services 


£ 

8,033, 

436, 

140, 

1,696, 

3,207, 

936, 

270, 

658, 

1,762, 

1,565, 

878, 

67, 

435, 


122    16 


363 

154      8 
935    17 


Total  expenditures. 


Deduct  repayment  under  military  works  acts. 
Cost  of  permanent  structures,  vote  10 


Total  expenditures  for  maintenance,  etc . 


0  11 
3 
3 
1 


704  5 

133  18 

271  1  6 

579  15  7 

664  14  1 

955  13  7 

998  15  11 

904  6  6 

962  11  7 


1,581,339  13  10 
29,657   0   8 

1,871,831   6  11 


$38,944,579.40 
2,095,288.03 
679,468.69 
8,226,745.06 
15,550,950.22 
4,538,377.31 
1,310,274.17 
3, 192, 794. 77 
8,545,398.49 
7,591,753.13 
4,261,386.16 
329,200.17 
2,113,546.58 

7,666,334.83 
143,777.30 

9,074,638.36 


114,264,512.67 


4,261,386.16 
1,623,461.21 


5,884,847.37 


108,379,665.20 


Table  No.  2a. — Expenditures  for  the  British  military  establishment  1912-13. 


Purpose. 


Appropriations  In 
aid. 


Gross  expendi- 
tures. 


Net  expenditures. 


Vote  1. 


Pay,  etc..  Department  I.  G 

Pay,  etc.,  staff  of  commands,  etc 

Eegularpay,  extra  pay,  messing  allowance. 

Regular  allowances,  etc 

Recruiting  staff  and  expenses 

Gratuities  and  deferred  pay  to  soldiers  on 
discharge 

Field  training 

Pay,  etc.,  of  staJEf  of  cavalry,  etc.,  schools... 

Pay,  etc.,  of  establishment  of  schools  of  gun- 
nery  

Pay,  etc.,  of  establishment  of  schools  of  en- 
gineering   , 

Pay,  etc.,  of  establishment  of  schools  of  mus- 
ketry   

Pay,  etc.,  of  establishment  of  gymnasium. 
Instructions 

Pay,  etc.,  army  reserve 

Pay,  etc.,  chaplain  department 

Pay,  etc.,  army  veteran  service 

Pay,  etc.,  pay  department 

Pay,  etc.,  establishment,  J.  A.  G 

Pay,  etc.,  establishment,  military  prisoners. 

Rewards,  etc. ,  appropriation,  deserters 

Wages  of  civilians  attached  to  units 

Expenses  of  native  Indian  troops 

Miscellaneous 


Votel 

Deduct  pay-army  reserve. 

Net  expenditures,  vote  1 . . 


£  «. 

13, 189  7 

329, 320  7 

7,159,391  9 

145,987  12 

34,137  9 

259,858  19 

208,085  11 


16,011  15 

1,303,401  13 

68,614  14 

45,655  16 

99,104  12 

3,747  18 

18, 209  3 

2,354  15 

31,127  6 

251,576  18 

98  3 


37,994  12  10 

29,700  4  9 

23,497  15  4 

16,969  16  11 


s.    d. 


761,511    13      6 


10,098,036     3      4 


9,336,524      9    10 
1,303,401    13      7 


8,033,122    16      3 


607 


28 

Table  No.  2a. — Expenditures  for  the  Britishmilitary  establishment  191S-13 — Continued. 


Purpose. 


Appropriations  In 
aid. 


Vote  2. 
Pay,  etc.,  medical  establishment 

Vote  5. 
Establishment  for  military  education. 

Vote  6. 


Lodging  and  stable  allowances 

Field  allowances 

Hire  of  buildings  to  supplement  barracks. . . 

Barracks,  services 

Conveyance  of  troops  by  land  and  coastwise. 

Sea  transport  of  troops 

Kailroad  stores 

Miscellaneous 


Carriage  of  stores 

War  Department  vessels 

Pay  wages,  etc.,  A.  S.  C 

Mechanical  transport  vehicles. 
Remounts 


Vote  7. 


Supplies 

Clothing 

Clothing  factory. 


Vote  8. 

Ordnance  Department  establishment  and 
general  stores 


Vote  9. 
Armaments,  aviation  and  engineer  stores. . 

Vote  10. 

Staff  for  works  and  engineer  services 

Incidental  expenses  of  war  department  es- 
tablishments   

Telegraph  and  telephone  services 

Miscellaneous  engineer  services 

New  works 

Compensation  to  contractors 

New  works,  part  2 

Compensation  to  contractors 

Ordinary  repairs,  etc 

Grants  in  aid  of  works 

Purchases  of  land 

Rents  of  land  and  buildings 


Repayment  under  military  works  act. 

Vote  11. 
Miscellaneous  effective  services 


Vote  12. 


War  office. 


Vote  13. 

Half  pay,  retired  pay,  and  other  noneffec- 
tive charges  for  officers 

Pensions  for  wounds 


Vote  14. 


In-pensions 

Out-pensions 

Rewards  for  distinguished  services. 


£  s.     d. 

2,  271      1      9 


91,096    17      6 


692      1      5 
7,892      9      9 


3,835      7      9 


12,319    18    11 


6, 958      3      4 


66,5.39    14      5 

102,669    18      9 

7, 766      4      6 


214,527      4      3 
272, 104      4      2 


580    16      4 
53, 800      1      8 


12,104      9    11 


3,170    18      3 
"40,'566""i"i6' 


110,222      8      0 


1,321      0      0 
620    19      3 

504,485      6     0 


Gross  expendi- 
tures. 


£ 

438, 634 


231,251      5      9 


269,913 

26, 502 

62, 909 

95, 463 

357, 885 

298, 665 

1,994 


1,113,333    12      4 


190, 709 
68, 510 

165, 797 
63,570 

194, 292 


862, 880 


3,264,243    19      6 

1,038,803    17      5 

278,027      5    U 


873,106    19    10 


2,134,768    18      3 


186,726 

22,875 

20,786 

16,400 

525, 644 

324 

212,464 

1,121 

625, 835 

9,660 

111,625 

42,711 


1,676,178      1      7 


69,225    12      6 
436,583    10    10 

2,085,824    19    10 


32,351     16      2 

2,347,117      7      4 

20, 406      8      5 


528,044      5      0  I    2,399,875    11     11 


Net  expenditures. 


£  ».    d. 

436,363      0    11 


140, 154      8      3 


1,101,013    13      5 


595,922      3    10 


3, 207, 704  6  1 
936,133  18  8 
270, 271      1      6 


658,579    15      7 
1,762,664    14      1 


1,565,965    13      7 


878,998    15    11 

67,904      e      6 

435,962    11      7 


1,581,339    13    10 
29.657      0      8 


1,871,831      6    11 


507 


24 

Table  No.  3. — Items  not  properly  chargeable  to  the  cost  of  the  Regular  Army  of 

the  United  States. 


Appropria- 
tion. 

Mainte- 
nance. 

Permanent 
works,  etc. 

Savings. 

Office  Chief  Signal  Officer: 

Washington- Alaska  military  cable  and  tele- 
graph system,  1914-1915 

847,559.87 

50,000.00 

17,068.98 
21,446.07 

5,000.00 

275,000.00 

3,500.00 

1,500.00 

244.07 
2,100,000.00 

558. 59 
3,000,000.00 

10,769.51 

8,963.49 
3, 700. 00 
10,000.00 

125,000.00 

40,000.00 

1,572,085.06 
100,000.00 

$47,559.87 
50,000.00 
17,068.98 

Washington- Alasl--a  military  cable  and  tele- 
graph system,  1915 

Eguipmerit  Coast  Ajtillery  armories,  Organ- 
ized Militia 

Repairs  deep-sea  military  cables 

815,455.00 

2,731.17 

229,846.39 

1, 833. 08 

764.  40 

85,991.07 

2,268.83 
45, 153. 61 

Medical  Department: 

Army  Medical  Museum 

Artificial  limbs 

Trusses  for  disabled  soldiers 

1,666.92 

Appliances  for  disabled  soldiers 

735  60 

Ordnance  Department: 

Field  Artillery  for  Organized  Militia— 

1913-1915 

62.95 
2, 095, 952. 13 

558. 59 
2,986,496.89 

6,582.28 

181  12 

1914-1916 

4  047.87 

Ammunition,   Field  Artillery   Organized 
Militia— 
1913-1915 

1914-1916 

13,503.11 
4,187.23 
8, 961. 20 

Equipment  Coast  Artillery  armories,  Organ- 
ized Militia 

Encampment,  etc..  Organized  Militia— 

1912 

2.29 
3,700.00 
9,012.60 

125,000.00 

40,000.00 

1,514,935.06 
37,856.31 

1913-1915 

National  trophy  and  medals 

987. 40 

Alaskan  Road  Commission: 

Construction  and  repair  of  Alaskan  roads,  etc. 

Civilian  assistants  to  engineer  officers 

Division  of  Militia  Affairs: 

Encampment    and    maneuvers,    Orgam'zed 
Militia 

57,150.00 

Equipment  Coast  Artillery  armories.  Organ- 
ized MUitia 

62, 143. 69 

7,392,395.64 

1,981,136.30 
5,261,431.69 

5,261,431.69 

149,827.65 

Pay  and  allowances  of  officers  and  enlisted  men 
on  duty  not  connected  with  Regular  Army 

7,242,567.99 
1,138,322.68 

8,380,890.67 

4 


507 


25 


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30669°— No.  507— IG- 


26 

War  Department, 
War  College  Division,  Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff, 

Washington^  October  1, 1915. 

Memorandum  for  The  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army : 
Subject:  Table  showing  authorized  strength  of  the  Military  Estab- 
lishment on  July  1,  1915. 

The  Secretary  of  War  directs  that,  if  the  data  are  available,  the 
following  table  be  filled  out  and  returned  to  the  Chief  of  the  War 
College  Division.  This  information  is  necessary  for  use  in  preparing 
a  study  by  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War. 

Table  No.  4. — Actual  strength  of  the  MUitnry  Establishment  on  July  1,  1915. 


Branches  of  service. 


Officers. 


Enlisted 
men. 


Aggre- 
gate. 


General  officers 

Adjutant  General's  Department 

Inspector  General's  Department 

Judge  Advocate  General's  Department 

Quartermaster  Corps 

Medical  Department 

Corps  of  Engineers 

Ordnance  Department 

Signal  Corps 

Bureau  of  Insular  Affairs 

Professors,  United  States  Military  Academy. 

Chaplains 

Cavalry . 


Field  Artillery 

Coast  Artillery  Corps . 
Infantry. 


Porto  Rico  Regiment  of  Infantry 

United  States  Military  Academy  detachments 

Recruiting  parties,  recruit  depots,  and  unassigned  recruits. 

United  States  military  prison  guards 

Service-school  detachments 

With  disciplinary  organizations 

Indian  scouts 

Philippine  Scouts 


25 
23 
17 
12 

185 

!553 

207 

85 

63 

3 

7 

64 

778 

262 

728 

,572 

31 


»404 


1,948 

740 

1,371 


Total,  Army 

Hospital  Corps  (Medical  Department)^ , 

Quartermaster  Corps  (Quartermaster  Department)!*. 


Total,  military  establishment. 


14,646 
5,664 
19, 185 
35,537 
586 
623 
5,757 
317 
582 
(In  arm  of  service 

24 
182  5, 430 


25 
23 
17 
12 

589 

553 

2,155 

825 

1,434 

3 

7 

64 

15, 424 

5,926 

19,913 

37,109 

617 

623 

5,757 

317 

582 


4,797 


92,814 
3,993 

4,388 


101,195 


24 

5,612 


97,611 
3,993 
4,388 


105,992 


'  Quartermaster  sergeants.  .  .         ^  , 

2  Includes  97  officers  of  the  Medical  Reserve  Corps  assigned  to  active  duty  under  the  provisions  of  the  act 
of  Congress  approved  Apr.  23, 1908  (35  Stat.  L.,  66). 

3  Not  included  in  the  enlisted  strength  of  the  Army. 

M.  M.  Macomb, 
Brigadier  General,  Chief  of  War  College  Division, 

Assistant  to  the  Chief  of  Staff. 

507 


I 


27 

Table  No.  5. — Average  rates  of  pay  and  allotcances  of  comparahle  grades  of 
commissioned  officers  of  the  armies  of  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain 


United  States  Army. 


Lieutenant  general '  $11, 000. 00 

Major  general i  S.OOO.OO 

Brigadier  general i  6, 000. 00 

Surgeon  General  (major  general) 9, 566.  00 

Colonel 5, 232.  64 

Lieutenant  colonel 4, 549.  76 

Major 3,882.00 

Captain 3,009.92 

First  lieutenant 2, 550.  80 

Second  lieutenant 2, 072.  24 

Chaplain  with  rank  of  major 3, 882. 00 

Chaplain  with  rank  of  major,  after  5 

years'  service 4, 182. 00 

Cnaplata  with  rank  of  captain 3, 009. 92 

Chaplain  with  rank  of  first  lieutenant . .  2, 550. 80 
Veterinarian  (pay,  etc.  of  second  lieu- 

enant) 2, 072. 24 

First     lieutenant,  Medical     Reserve 

Corps 2, 550.  80 

Additional  to  captain  while  adjutant 

Additional  to  first  lieutenant  while  ad- 
jutant   , 


British  Army. 


f  i$12, 604. 80 

Field  marshal i  to 

{  19,392.00 

General i  7,  756.  80 

Lieutenant  general i  6, 302.  40 

Major  general i  4, 848. 00 

Brigadier  general 

Surgeon  general 7, 019. 00 

Colonel 4, 535.  79 

Lieutenant  colonel 3, 224. 05 

Major 2, 167.  81 

Captain 1, 640. 17 

First  lieutenant 1, 197.  73 

Second  lieutenant 895.  53 

Chaplain,  first  class 2, 479.  71 

Chaplain,  first  class,  after  5  years  as 

such 2,700.90 

Chaplain,  second  class 2,443.02 

Chaplain,  third  class 1, 877. 59 

Veterinary  officer,  pay,  etc.,  of  first  lieu- 
tenant    1, 929. 62 

First  lieutenant,  medical  department,  on 

probation 1, 725.  70 

Additional  to  captain  while  adjutant 294. 92 

Additional  to  first  lieutenant  while  ad- 
jutant   331.78 


507 


1  Represents  only  base  pay. 


28 


Average 
pay,  etc., 
by  grades 

or 
positions. 

U12,604.80 
/  19,392.00 

7,756.80 
6,302.40 
4,848.00 

7,019.00 
4, 535.  79 
3,224.05 

3.870.20 

3,448.04 
2, 167.  81 
1,975.68 
3,049.90 
2, 872. 95 
3.049.90 

3,403.80 
88.48 
1,640.17 
1,710.79 
2. 356.  S6 

2,290.50 
294. 92 
1,197.73 
1,131.62 
1.725.70 

00  CO 

cox 

General 

offi- 
cers '— 
Table  5 

{$12, 604. 80 
to 
19,392.00 
7,756.80 
0,302.40 
4,848.00 

-: 

Chap- 
lains— 
Table  5 
(o)  m. 

Military 
Hying 
wing- 
Table  5 
(a)  I. 

Ordnance 
depart- 
ment— 
Talile  5 
(a)  k. 

ray 
depart- 
ment- 
Table  5 

Medical 
officers — 
Table  5 

S3 

O  30 

3,870.20 

3,448.04 
2, 828.  71 

s 

X 

CO        0 

0 

Veteri- 
nary 
officers- 
Table  5 

« 

CI 

IT 

0 
en 

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CO 

>o 

CO 

cf 

0 

i 

Army 
service 
corps- 
Table  5 

(a)<7. 

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(NCO 

g 
0 

Infantry 
of  the 
line- 
Table  5 
(a)/. 

C35 

S2 

CC  Q  lO 

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SS8 

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X  CO 

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3 
8 

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2§fe 

Garrison 
artil- 
lery- 
Table  5 

o 

1 

■^  00 
0  t^ 

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2,143.02 
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(0)TO. 

$2,479.71 

2,700.90 
2,143.02 
1,877.59 
1,317.26 

1,538.45 
878. 76 

Military 
flying 
wing — 
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mo 

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O  1- 

Ordnance 
depart- 
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Table  5 

Pay 
depart- 
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Table  5 

Medical 
officers- 
Table  5 
(a)  i. 

Veteri- 
nary 
officers- 
Table  6 
(a)  ft. 

Army 
service 
corps- 
Table  5 
(a)  9. 

Infantry 
of  the 
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Table  5 
(a)/. 

Engi- 
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Table  5 

ia)e. 

Garrison 
artil- 
lery- 
Table  5 

Field 
artil- 
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Table  5 

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artil- 
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507 


41 


Table  No.  5a  (n). 

[P.  102  (vote  13),  Army  estimates,  Great  Britain,  1913-14.] 


Pay  in 

United 

States 

currency. 


Field  marshal 

General 

Lieutenant  general 
Major  general 


£2,600 
to 
4,000 
1,600 
1,300 
1,000 


$12,604.80 
to 
19,392.00 
7, 756.  SO 
6, 302. 40 
4,848.00 


Table  No.  56. — Pay  and  allowances  of  commissioned  officers,  United  States  Army. 

;Authority:  Army  Regulations,  Army  Register,  General  Orders  War  Department,  and  Military  Laws  of 

United  States.] 


Commu- 

Commu- 

Commu- 

Pay.i 

tation  for 

tation  for 

tation  for 

quarters. 

Ught. 

hoat.2 

SI  1,000 

SI, 440 

S50. 40 

S252. 00 

8,000 

1,296 

45.00 

225.00 

6,000 

1,152 

42.12 

210. 60 

4,000 

1,008 

37.44 

187. 20 

4,400 

1,008 

37.44 

187.20 

4,800 

1,008 

37.44 

187. 20 

5,000 

1,008 

37.44 

187. 20 

5,000 

1,008 

37.44 

187.20 

3,500 

864 

30.96 

154. 80 

3,850 

864 

30.96 

154.  SO 

4,200 

864 

30.96 

154.  SO 

4,500 

864 

20.96 

154. 80 

4,500 

864 

20.96 

154. 80 

3,000 

720 

27.00 

135.00 

3,300 

720 

27.00 

135. 00 

3,600 

720 

27.00 

135.00 

3,900 

720 

27.00 

135.00 

4,000 

720 

27.00 

135.00 

2,400 

576 

22.32 

111.60 

2,640 

576 

22.32 

111.60 

2,880 

576 

22.32 

111.60 

3,120 

576 

22.32 

111.60 

3,360 

576 

22.32 

111.60 

2,000 

432 

19.80 

99.00 

2,200 

432 

19.80 

99.00 

2,400 

432 

19.80 

99.00 

2,600 

432 

19.80 

99.00 

2,800 

432 

19.80 

99.00 

1,700 

288 

14.04 

70.20 

1,870 

288 

14.04 

70.20 

2,040 

288 

14.04 

70.20 

2,210 

288 

14.04 

70.20 

2,:^80 

288 

14.04 

70.20 

2,000 

432 

19.80 

99.00 

2,200 

432 

19.80 

99.00 

2,400 

432 

19.80 

99.00 

2,600 

432 

19.80 

99.00 

2,800 

432 

19.80 

99.00 

2,000 

432 

19.80 

99.00 

2,200 

432 

19.80 

99.00 

2,400 

432 

19.80 

99.00 

2,600 

432 

19.80 

99.00 

2,800 

432 

19.80 

99.00 

720 
1,800 

432 

(') 

99.00 

1,700 

288 

14.04 

70.20 

1,870 

288 

14.04 

70.20 

2,040 

288 

14.04 

70.20 

2,210 

288 

14.04 

70.20 

2,380 

288 

14.04 

70.20 

Total. 


Lieutenant  general 

Major  general 

Brigadier  general 

Colonel 

After  5  years 

After  10  years 

After  15  years 

After  20  years 

Lieutenant  colonel 

After  5  years 

After  lO"  years 

After  15  years 

After  20  years 

Major 

After  5  years 

After  10  years 

After  15  years 

After  20  years 

Captain 

After  5  years 

After  10  years 

After  15  years 

After  20  years 

First  lieutenant 

After  5  years 

After  10  years 

After  15  years 

After  20  years 

Second  lieutenant 

After  5  years 

After  10  years 

After  15  years 

After  20  years 

1'  irst  lieutenant.  Medical  Reserve  Corps 

After  5  years 

After  10  years 

After  15  years 

After  20  years 

Dental  surgeon 

After  5  years 

After  10  years 

After  15  years 

After  20  years 

WhOe  on  examining  board,  additional .. 

Acting  dental  surgeon 

Veterinarians 

After  5  years 

Aftei  10  years   

After  15  years 

After  20  years 


S12, 742. 40 
9, 566. 00 
7, 404. 72 
5, 232. 64 
5, 632. 64 
6, 032. 64 
6, 232. 64 
6, 232. 64 
4,549.76 
4,899.76 
5, 249.  76 
5, 549.  76 
5,549.76 
3, 882. 00 
4,182.00 
4, 482. 00 
4,782.00 
4,882.00 
3,009.92 
3,249.92 
3, 489. 92 
3,729.92 
3,969.92 
2, 550. 80 
2,  750. 80 
2, 950. 80 
3,150.80 
3, 350. 80 
2,072.24 
2,242.24 
2,412.24 
2,582.24 
2,752.24 
2,  550. 80 
2,750.80 
2,950.80 
3,150.80 
3, 350. 80 
2, 550. 80 
2, 750. 80 
2, 950. 80 
3, 150. 80 
3, 350. 80 
720.00 
2,331.00 
2, 072. 24 
2, 242. 24 
2,412.24 
2,582.24 
2, 752. 24 


•  Entitled  to  10  per  cent  additional  for  foreign  service,  except  in  Hawaiian  Islands,  Porto  Rico,  Alaska, 
and  Canal  Zone. 
'  Not  practicable  to  ascertain  accurately;  assumed  as  5  times  light  allowance. 
'  No  authority  found  for  payment  of  light  allowance  to  acting  dental  surgeons. 


507 


42 

Tabie  No.  6. — Average  rates  of  minimum  pay  of  comparable  grades  of  enUsted 
men  of  the  armies  of  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain. 


United  States  Army. 


Regimental  sergeant  (battalion  sergeant 

major,  engineers) 8540. 00 

Quartermaster   sergeant,    Quartermaster 

Corps 540.00 

Stable  sergeant,  Field  Artillery 360. 00 

First  sergeant 540. 00 

Chief  trumpeter 480.00 

Sergeant 390. 86 

Trumpeter  or  musician 180. 00 

Corporal 253.14 

Saddler 252.00 

Private 180. 00 


British  Army. 


Regimental  sergeant  major  (warrant  officer)  $500. 86 

Quartermaster  sergeant 375. 94 

Farrier    quartermaster    sergeant    (warrant 

officer,  cavalry) 374. 50 

Squadron,  battery,  and  company  sergeants 

major  and  infantry  color  sergeant 358. 23 

Sergeant  trumpeter 298. 57 

Sergeants 257. 41 

Trumpeter  or  bugler 114. 97 

Corporal 199. 42 

Saddler 175. 10 

Private 102. 72 


Table  No.  6a. — Minimum  pay  of  British  warrant  officers  and  enlisted  men  serv- 
ing at  home. 

[Army  Estimates,  1913-14;  pp.  128-147.] 


Cavalry 
of  the 
line. 


Horse 
artil- 
lery. 


Field 
artil- 
lery. 


Garri- 
son ar- 
tillery. 


Engi- 
neers. 


Infan- 
try of 
the  line. 


Army 
service 
corps. 


Regimental  sergeant  major  (warrant 
officer) 

Quartermaster  sergeant 

Farrier,  quartermaster  sergeant  i 

Squadron,  battery,  and  company  ser- 
geants major  ana  infantry  color  ser- 
geant   

Sergeant  trumpeter 

Sergeants 

Trumpeter  or  bugler 

Corporal 

Saddler 

Private 


S471. 95 
383.  25 
354. 05 


383.25 
237. 25 
237.  25 
118.62 
173.  20 
156. 95 
102.20 


$528.  25 
383. 25 
390. 55 


383.25 
295.  65 
295.  65 
175.  20 
237.  25 
193. 45 
113. 15 


$514. 65 
368. 65 
354. 05 


368. 65 
281. 05 
281. 05 
105.  85 
222. 65 
175. 20 
105. 85 


$514. 65 
368. 65 


354. 05 
281. 05 
281. 05 
105.85 
222. 65 
175. 20 
105. 85 


$528.  25 
397.  85 
397.85 


332. 15 
397.  85 
288.  45 
102.  20 
219. 00 


$461. 65 
353. 90 


310. 25 


$486. 62 
376. 02 
376. 02 


376. 02 


208. 05 
94.90 
146.00 


102. 20 


87. 60 


210.  38 
102.  20 
175.  20 
175.  20 
102. 20 


$500.86 
375. 94 
374.50 


358.23 
298.  57 
257.  41 
114.97 
199. 42 
175. 10 
102. 72 


1  Warrant  officer  of  cavalry. 

Table  No.  6&. — Minimum  pay  of  enlisted  men,  United  States  Army. 

[Authority:  Army  Regulations,  Army  Register,  and  Military  Laws  of  United  States.] 


Cav- 
alry. 


Field 
Artil- 
lery. 


Coast 
Artil- 
lery 
Corps. 


In- 
fantry. 


Engi- 
neers. 


Quar- 
termas- 
ter 
Corps. 


Signal 
Corps. 


Regimental  sergeant  major  (and  bat- 
talion sergeant  major,  engineers)... 

Quartermaster  sergeant.  Quartermas- 
ter Corps 

Stable  sergeant.  Field  Artillery 

First  sergeant 

Chief  trumpeter 

Sergeant 

Corporal 

Trumpeter  or  musician 

Private 

Saddler  or  farrier 


540 


540 


640 


640 


540 


540 


540 
480 
360 
252 
180 
180 
252 


360 

640 
480 
360 
252 
180 
180 


640 


540 


360 
252 
180 
180 


360 
252 
180 
180 


640 

'432' 


180 
180 


640 


432 
288 
180 
180 


432 

288 


180 


$540.00 

540.00 
360.00 
640.00 
480.00 
390. 86 
253.14 
180. 00 
180.00 
252.00 


Note. — Pay  is  increased  20  per  cent  for  foreign  service  except  in  Hawaiian  Islands,  Porto  Rico,  Alaska, 
and  Canal  Zone.    Additional  pay  granted  for  excellence  in  marksmanship  and  gunnery. 

507 


48 

Table  No.  7. — Items  of  expenses  relating  solely  to  coast  defense,  United  States. 


Appropria- 
tion. 

Mainte- 
nance. 

Permanent 
works,  etc. 

Savings. 

OFFICE,  CHIEF  COAST  ARTILLERY. 

Construction  of  fire-control  stations,  insular  posses- 
sions   

$55,000.00 

122,790.32 
43, 454. 04 
10, 800. 00 
23, 270.  40 

160, 283. 47 
42,682.75 
11, 288. 74 
12,000.00 

250,000.00 

100, 000. 00 

50,000.00 

100,000.00 

165,000.00 

5,000.00 

40,000.00 

25,000.00 

20,000.00 

300, 000. 00 

1,000.00 

3,000.00 

$55,000.00 

91,755.99 
43,454.04 
10, 800. 00 
21,928.22 

OFFICE,  CHIEF  SIGNAL  OFFICEE. 

$31,034.33 

Fire  control  at  fortifications,  Panama  Canal 

Do  '. 

1,342.18 
5, 327. 23 

Maintenance,  torpedo  control,  seacoast  defenses 

$154,956.24 

Fire-control  installation,  insular  possessions 

Maintenance  of  fire  control,  insular  possessions. .   . . 

16,932.62 

25, 750. 13 
1, 244. 13 

10,044.61 
12,000.00 

Signal  equipment,  Coast  Artillery  posts 

ENGINEER  DEPARTMENT. 

Construction  of  gun  and  mortar  battery 

250,000.00 
100,000.00 
50,000.00 
100,000.00 

Modernizing  emplacements 

Electric,  steam,  and  power  plants,  seacoast  defense. 

Protection  of  fortifications 

165, 000. 00 
5,000.00 

40, 000. 00 
9,  878. 41 

20,000.00 

Plans  for  fortifications         

Maintenance  for  searchlights,  etc  

Sea  walls  and  embankments 

15,121.59 

Seacoast  batteries,  Philippine  Islands 

300,000.00 

Protection  fortifications,  Hawaiian  Islands  

1,000.00 
3,000.00 

Protection  torpedo  defenses,  Hawaiian  and  Philip- 
pine Islands    

ORDNANCE  DEPARTMENT. 

1,540,569.72 

221,413.71 

49,989.70 

1,118,069.46 

6, 723, 083. 70 

463, 143. 89 

763,000.00 

48,871.70 

460,772.73 

57,882.29 

420,879.26 

1,054,992.46 

189,610.26 
38,554.21 

931,649.48 
3, 250, 076. 05 

338,038.61 

709,080.93 
34,177.66 

150,749.47 
40,153.76 

64,698.00 
31, 803. 45 

Fire  control  at  fortifications,  insular  possessions 

Fortifications,  insular  possessions 

11,435.49 

80,682.68 
1,736,263.79 
25, 595. 90 
15,282.69 
2,938.39 
82,144.03 
11,185.65 

105,737.30 

Armament  of  fortifications 

1,736,741.86 
99, 509. 38 

Armnmrnt.  nf  fiirtifirat.inns    Pannmq.  Can^l    , 

38,636.38 

Submarine  mines,  Panama  Canal 

11  755.65 

Submarine  mines'. 

227, 879. 23 

Suhmfvriiifi  mineSj  insnlw  po SSeSSions 

6, 542. 88 

11,446,796.90 

2,374,974.39 

6,737,082.89 

2,334,739.62 

It  will  be  noted  that  this  table  does  not  include  any  expenditures  for  barracks  and  quarters  or  other 
expenses  connected  with  the  maintenance  of  Coast  Artillery  posts  and  fortifications,  as  such  data  can  not 
be  accurately  computed. 

Table  No.  8. — Percentage  of  enlisted  strength  of  infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery 
to  total  enlisted  strength  of  Military  Establishment. 


Great 
Britain. 


United 
States. 


Infantry 

Coast  artillery 

Cavalrv 

Field  artillery. 


507 


Per  cent. 

50.51 

8.20 

7.36 

8.92 


Per  cent. 
41.06 
18.95 
14.47 
5.59 


44 

Table  No.  9. — Number  of  enlisted  men  per  officer  in  the  various  arms  of  the 

service. 


Arm. 


Great  Britain 
(Army  esti- 
mates of  effec- 
tive and  non- 
effective 
services  for 
1913-14). 


United  States 

(Tables  of 

Organization, 

1914). 


Infantry 

Ck)ast  artllery 

Cavalry 

Field  artillery 

Engineers,  signal  corps  and  flying  corps 
Ordnance 


29.84 
23.10 
27.40 
25.58 
15.90 
9.50 


24.55 
27.00 
20.28 
23.08 
30.21 
8.70 


Number  of  enlisted  men  per  officer,  considering  total  officers,  are  enlisted  men,  actually  in  service  on 
July  1, 1915: 

Great  Britaui 17.5 

United  States 21.07 

1  In  Great  Britain  the  duties  performed  by  oiu-  signal  corps  (exclusive  of  aviation)  are  performed  by  the 
engineers.  In  the  United  States  the  duties  performed  by  the  British  Flying  Corps  are  performed  by  our 
Signal  Corps.    For  purposes  of  comparison,  therefore,  it  was  necessary  to  construe  these  various  corps. 

Table  No.  10. — Officers  and  enlisted  men  of  the  British  Army  {depots  and  depot 
organizations  not  included)  serving  at  home  and  abroad  except  in  India. 

[Army  estimation  of  eflective  and  noneffective  services  for  1913-14.] 


Officers. 


Enlisted 
men. 


Cavalry  (includes  household  cavalry) 

Horse  and  field  artillery 

Garrison  artillery 

Engineers  (includes  signal  organizations). 

Flying  corps 

Infantry  (includes  guards) 

Army  service  corps 

Ordnance  department 

Medical  corps 

Veterinary  corps 

Pay  corps 

Chaplains 


461 
598 
609 
468 
112 
2,904 
458 
232 
751 


113 


12,637 

15, 303 

14,082 

8,334 

893 

86,666 

6,005 

2,207 

3,820 

248 

565 


Totals  in  British  service,  includ  ing  general  staff  officers,  depot  organizations,  etc . 


,800 


507 


45 

Table  No.  11. — Great  Britain. 

[Authority — Appropriation  account,  1912-13,  with  report  of  the  comptroller  and  auditor 

general.] 

Total  expenditures,  military  establishment .f  114,  264,  512.  57 

Pay,  mileage,  etc 39,967,066.82 

Subsistence 8,  260,  721.  66 

Transportation 4,  733,  304.  84 

Clothing 5,  848,  651.  48 

Percentages  to  total  expenditures  : 

Pay,  mileage,  etc 34.  10 

Subsistence 7.22 

Transportation 4. 14 

Clothing 5.  11 

Total $666.  01 

Per  capita  cost,  enlisted  men  only  : 

Total 666.  01 

Pay,  mileage,  etc 232.95 

Subsistence 48. 14 

Transportation 27.  58 

Clothing 34.  91 

Per  capita  cost,  officers  and  enlisted  men  : 

Total 630.03 

Pay,  mileage,  etc 214.  30 

Subsistence 45.  54 

Transportation 26.  09 

Clothing 32.  24 

Total  officers,  9,800   (World's  Almanac). 

Total  enlisted  men,  171,563   (appropriation  account,   1912-13,  with  the  report  of  the 

comptroller  and  auditor  general). 

Table  No.  12. — United  States. 

Total  usual  expenditures  for  Military  Establishment  (table) $113,248,541.52 

Pay,  mileage,  etc.  (memorandum  Quartermaster  General) 49,722,369.91 

Subsistence   (memorandum  Quartermaster  General) 9,802,141.39 

Transportation    (memorandum   Quartermaster   General) 10,680,546.69 

Clothing  (memorandum  Quartermaster  General) 4,623,272.94 

Percentage  to  total : 

Pay,  mileage,  etc 43.90 

Subsistence 8.  65 

Transportation 9.  43 

Clothing,  etc 4.  08 

Per  capita  cost,  enlisted  men  only  : 

Total $1,  119.  11 

Pay,  mileage,  etc 491.  35 

Subsistence 96.  86 

Transportation 105.  54 

Clothing 45.  68 

Per  capita  cost,  officers  and  enlisted  men  : 

Total 1,068.46 

Pay,  mileage,  etc 469.11 

Subsistence 92.  48 

Transportation 100.76 

Clothing 43.  61 

Total  officers,  4,797   (memorandum  The  Adjutant  General). 

Total  enlisted  men,  101,195  (memorandum  The  Adjutant  General). 

507 


46 


Table  No.  13. — Ration  components. 


Great  Britain  (par.  35,  royal  warrants  for  the 
allowances  of  the  army,  1914). 


Field  rations  (issued  whenever  practicable  in 
garrison  and  field):  Ounces. 

Fresh  meat 20 

Or  preserved  meat 16 


Bacon 4 

Or  butter,  lard,  or  margarine 4 

Or  sweet  oil '  .^ 

Bread 20 

Or  biscuit 16 

Or  oatmeal  (for  each  4  ounces  of  liread  or 

biscuit),  4. 
Or  rice  (for  each  4  ounces  of  bread  or 

biscuit),  4. 

Cheese 3 

Peas ,  beans ,  or  dried  potatoes 2 

Or  fresh  vegetables 8 


United  States  (par.  1205,  Army  Ilegulations,  1913). 


Tea 625 

Or  chocolate  (for  each  i  ounce  of  tea) 5 

Jam 4 

Or  dried  fruit 4 


Sugar 3 

Salt 5 

Pepper 027 

Mustard 05 

Lime  juice '  •  1 


Rum  (at  discretion  of  commanding  officer    ' .  5 
when  recommended  by  surgeon). 

Or  porter '1 

ToDacco  (for  those  who  smoke) ,  per  week .    2 


I  GUI. 


Garrison  rations  (issued  whenever  practi- 
cable in  garrison  and  field):  Ounces 

Fresh  meat 20 

Or  canned  meat 16 

Or  bacon 12 

Or  dried  fish 14 

Or  pickled  fish 18 

Or  canned  fish 16 

Or  turkey  (Thanksgiving  and  Christ- 
mas)    16 

Lard  or  lard  substitute 64 

Butter  or  oleomargarine 5 

Soft  bread 18 

Or  hard  bread 16 

Or  flour 18 

Or  corn  meal 20 

Bakingpowder 08 

Potatoes 20 

Or  canned  j)Otatoes 15 

Or  onions,  in  lieu  of  equal  quantity  of 

potatoes,  but  not  exceeding  20  per 

cent  of  total  issue. 
Or  tomatoes,  canned,  in  lieu  of  eaual 

quantity  of  potatoes,  but  not  exceed- 
ing 20  per  cent  of  total  issue. 
Or  other  fresh  vegetaliles  (not  canned) 

in  lieu  of  equal  quantity  of  potatoes. 

but  not  exceeding  30  per  cent  of  total 

issue. 

Beans 2.4 

Or  rice  or  hominy 1.6 

Coflee,  roasted  and  ground 1. 12 

Or  coflee,  green 1.4 

Or  tea,  black  or  green 32 

Prunes 1 .  28 

Or  apples,  dried  or  evaporated 1. 28 

Or  peaches,  dried  or  evaporated 1. 28 

Or  jam,  in  lieu  of  equal  quantity  of 

prunes,  but  not  exceeding  50  per  cent 

of  total  issue. 

Sugar 3.2 

Milk ,  evaporated,  unsweetened 5 

Salt 64 

Pepper,  black 04 

Cinnamon,  nutmeg,  cloves,  or  ginger. . .      .  014 

Vinegar '.16 

Or  pickles,  cucumbers,  in  lieu  of  equal 
quantity  of  vinegar,  but  not  exceed- 
ing 50  per  cent  of  total  issue. 

Sirup 1 .  32 

Flavoring  extract,  lemon  or  vanilla 014 


>Pint. 


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507 


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49 

COST  OF  LIVING  AND  RATES  OF  WAGES. 

[Relating  to  Tables  A  to  F,  inclusive.] 

In  order  to  make  a  comparison  of  the  cost  of  living  and  rates  of 
wages  in  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  we  are,  of  course, 
restricted  to  the  classes  in  which  investigations  have  been  made  in 
both  countries  for  the  same  period.  It  is  also  necessary  to  select  a 
period  before  the  influence  of  the  present  war  in  Europe  made  it- 
self felt. 

AVe  find  that  an  investigation  was  made  in  both  countries  in  1912 
on  the  cost  of  food  for  the  average  laboring  class  family;  also,  on 
the  rates  of  wages  for  certain  trades  and  occupations.  One  of  the 
principal  items  making  up  the  cost  of  living  had  to  be  ignored 
because  the  figures  for  Great  Britain  were  not  available.  Then  there 
was  that  of  clothing.  This  item,  therefore,  in  so  far  as  actual  figures 
are  concerned,  had  to  be  ignored.  The  investigation  in  Great  Britain 
showed  that  the  cost  of  making  men's  clothing  had  increased  slightly 
since  1901,  but  not  in  proportion  to  the  increase  in  cost  of  the  raw 
product.  The  quality  of  the  clothing  purchased  by  the  workingman 
had  materially  fallen.  The  figures,  however,  were  not  given  in  the 
report. 

The  results  of  the  investigations  for  those  articles  entering  into 
the  cost  of  living  and  certain  trades  and  occupations,  which  are 
comparable  for  the  two  countries,  are  given  in  the  following  tables : 

Comparative  Cost  of  Living — Great  Britain  and  United  States — 
Food,  Fuel,  and  Rent. 

[Tables  A,  B,  C] 

Yearly  expenditure  per  average  workingman's  family. 

Food  (Tables  Al  and  A2)  : 

Great  Britain $283.  29 

United  States 471.37 

166 
Fuel  (Tables  Bl  and  B2)  : 

Great  Britain 28.08 

United  States 34.18 

121 
Rent  (Tables  CI  and  C2)  : 

Great  Britain 70.98 

United  States 135.95 

191 

FOOD. 
GREAT    BRITAIN. 

[Table  Al.] 

The  following  is  taken  from  a  British  Government  publication 
entitled  ''  Report  of  an  Enquiry  by  the  Board  of  Trade  into  Working- 
Class  Rents  and  Retail  Prices,  Together  with  the  Rates  of  Wages 

507 


50 


in  Certain  Occupations  in  Industrial  Towns  in  the  IT^iited  King- 
dom in  1912." 

In  figuring  the  expenditures  of  food  and  coal  for  the  worldng- 
man's  family,  the  report  says : 

The  list  comprised  bread,  flour,  potatoes,  meat,  bacon,  eggs,  milk,  butter, 
cheese,  tea,  sugar,  and  coal,  and  the  representative  character  of  the  articles 
of  food  included  may  be  gathered  from  the  estimate  that  an  average  of  about 
75  per  cent  of  working-class  expenditures  on  food  is  in  respect  of  those  items. 


{ 


Average  consumption  and  cost  per  tceek  for  a  family  consisting  of  two  adults 
and  three  or  four  children  in  1912. 


Articles. 

Amount. 

Cost. 

Articles. 

Amount. 

Cost. 

Meat 

Tea 

Sugar 

Bacon 

Eggs 

pounds.. 

do 

do.... 

do.... 

do.... 

do.... 

do.... 

6.5 
.6 

5.33 

1.5 
12 
.75 

2 

SI. 001 
.20 
.225 
.315 
.137 
.127 
.58 

Potatoes 

Flour 

Bread 

Milk 

Total 

.pounds.. 

do 

....do.... 
pints.. 

17 
10 
22 

10 

SO. 194 
.30 
.633 
.374 

4.086 

Butter 

As  this  is  75  per  cent  of  food  cost,  the  entire  food  cost  per  week 
would  be  $5,448. 

Average  cost  of  food  per  year,  $283.30. 


UNITED    STATES. 


[Table  No.  A2.] 

The  following  information  wag  obtained  from  a  United  States  Gov- 
ernment publication  entitled  "  Bulletin  of  the  United  States  Bureau 
of  Labor  Statistics  (whole  number  140)." 

The  following  table  has  been  calculated  from  tables  appearing 
in  the  above  publication: 

Average  annual  cost  per  workingman''s  family  of  the  principal  articles  of  food 
consumed  in  1912  in  2,567  families  in  the  TJnited  States. 

[.\verage  size  of  family,  5.31.] 


Articles. 

Cost. 

Articles. 

Cost. 

Fresh  beef     

S72. 17 

7.59 

20.22 

20.12 

14.10 

13.69 

11.69 

24.23 

30.27 

41.48 

3.79 

13.50 

7.66 

Coffee 

Sugar 

Molasses 

Flour  and  meal 

$15.49 

Salt  beef 

22.74 

2.45 

24.18 

Bread 

17.96 

Poultry                                          

Rice 

2.97 

Fish 

Potatoes 

IS.  65 

Eggs 

Other  vegetables 

27.19 

Muk        ...                   .                

Fruit 

23.83 

Butter  

Vinegar,  pickles,  and  condiments 

Other  food 

5.96 

29.44 

Tea 

471.37 

507 


I 


I 


51 

FUEL. 

GEE  AT  BRITAIN. 
[Table  No.  Bl.] 

The  following  information  was  obtained  from  a  British  Govern- 
ment publication  entitled  "  Report  of  an  Enquirj^  by  the  Board  of 
Trade  into  Working-class  Rents  and  Retail  Prices,  Together  with  the 
Rates  of  Wages  in  Certain  Occupations  in  Industrial  Towns  in  the 
United  Kingdom  in  1912." 

The  average  consumption  and  cost  per  week  for  a  family  consisting 
of  two  adults  and  three  or  four  children  for  the  year  1912:  Coal — 
amount  per  week,  2  hundredweight ;  cost  per  week,  $0.54.  Average 
cost  per  year,  $28. 

UNITED  STATES. 
[Table  No.  B2.] 

The  following  information  was  obtained  from  two  United  States 
Government  publications,  "  Bulletin  of  the  United  States  Bureau  of 
Labor  Statistics  (whole  number  138)"  and  "Bulletin  of  the  United 
States  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics  (whole  number  140)." 

Bulletin  No.  138  gives  the  prices  for  coal,  for  family  use,  in  ton 
and  half-ton  lots,  for  the  year  1912.  Bulletin  No.  140  gives  the 
relative  prices  of  coal,  in  ton  lots,  for  household  use,  from  1907  to 
1913,  from  which  we  find  that  the  average  annual  increase  in  price 
is  0.061  per  cent,  assuming  that  the  increase  has  been  fairly  constant 
since  1901.  We  will,  therefore,  have  an  increase  for  the  year  1912 
of  6.71  per  cent  over  1901.  The  average  annual  amount  expended  for 
fuel  by  the  average  workingman's  family  in  1901,  as  given  by  Bul- 
letin No.  140,  is  $32.23,  which  would  make  the  expenditure  in  1912 
$34.86. 

re>;t. 

GBEAT    BRITAIN. 
[Table  CI.] 

The  following  information  was  obtained  from  a  British  Govern- 
ment publication  entitled  "  Report  of  an  Inquiry  by  the  Board  of 
Trade  into  Working-Class  Rents  and  Retail  Prices,  Together  with 
the  Rates  of  Wages  in  Certain  Occupations  in  Industrial  Towns  in 
the  United  Kingdom  in  1912." 

Predominant  weekly  rents  of  working-class  dwellings  in  London 
(middle  zone)  in  1912 : 

Number  of  rooms  :  Price  per  week. 

Two $1.  32 

Three 1.  74 

Four 2.10 

Five 2.  52 

Six 3.00 

507 


52 

Predominant  weekly  rents  of  working-class  dwellings  in  cities 
other  than  London  in  1912 : 


Number  of  rooms  :  Price  per  week. 

Two $0.  75 

Three 1.  05 

Four 1.23 

Five 1.44 

Six 1.  77 


In  round  numbers  the  total  population  of  the  United  Kingdom 
is  45,000,000.  The  population  of  London  is  7,000,000.  The  average 
rent,  therefore,  for  Great  Britain,  including  London,  would  be 
approximately  as  follows : 

Number  of  rooms  :  Price  per  week. 

Two $0.  839 

Tliree 1.  157 

Four 1.365 

Five 1.  608 

Six 1.961 

The  figures  all  include  the  "  local  rates  "  (tax  rates)  and  charges 
for  rates. 

It  is  assumed  that  four  is  about  the  average  number  of  rooms  the 
workingman's  family  of  two  adults  and  three  or  four  children  in 
the  United  States  will  occupy  and  that  number  has  been  selected  for 
comparison. 

Average  rent  per  week $1.  365 

Average  rent  per  year 70.  98 

UNITED  STATES. 
[Table  C2.] 

The  following  information  was  obtained  from  a  United  States 
Government  publication  entitled  "United  States  Department  of 
Labor,  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  Monthly  Review  of  the  United 
States  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  Vol.  1,  October,  1915,  No.  4." 
In  this  report  we  find  that  the  Bureau  of  Standards  of  New  York 
City  "  reached  the  conclusion  that  it  is  impossible  for  an  unskilled 
laborer's  family  of  five,  consisting  of  husband,  wife,  and  three  chil- 
dren under  14  years  of  age,  to  live  in  New  York  City  on  less  than 
$840  a  year  and  maintain  a  standard  of  living  consistent  with 
American  ideals.  *  *  *  This  is  apportioned  as  follows:  Housing, 
$168    *    *    *." 

The  following  is  from  a  publication  by  Mr.  Scott  Nearing,  Ph.  D., 
entitled  "  Financing  the  Wage-earner's  Family."  In  this  publica- 
tion we  find  reports  of  investigations  in  1912  on  the  actual  cost  of 
living  in   four  localities:   Manhattan   Island;    Fall   River,   Mass.; 

507 


i 


I 


53 

Georgia  and  North  Carolina;  and  Homestead,  Pa.     The  items  for 
rent  in  these  localities  were  as  follows: 

Manhattan  Island $168.  00 

Fall  River,  Mass 131.00 

Georgia  and  North  Carolina 44.  81 

Homestead,  Pa 200.  00 

Average,  $135.95. 

COMPABATIVE     WAGES — GeEAT     BRITAIN     AND     UNITED     STATES — BUILDING,     ENGI- 
NEERING, AND  Printing  Trades. 

[Tables  D,  E,  F,  G.] 


Building  Trades. 
[Tables  Dl  and  D2.] 

•      WAGES  PER  HOUR. 

Bricklayers 

Masons 

Carpenters 

Plumbers 

Plasterers 

Painters 

Bricklayer's  laborers 

Plasterer's  laborers 

Engineeeing  Trades. 

[Tables  Dl  and  D2.] 

wages  per  week. 

Fitters 

Pattern  makers 

Iron  molders 

Laborers 

PRrNTTNG  Trades. 

[Tables  Dl  and  D2.] 

WAGES  PER  week. 

Compositors 

Letter  Carriers. 

[Tables  El  and  E2.] 

average  yearly  pay. 
Letter  carriers 

School  Teachers. 

[Tables  Fl  and  F2.] 

AVERAGE  yearly  PAY. 

School  teachers 

Policemen. 
[Tables  Gl  and  G2.] 

average  YEARLY  SALARY. 

PoUcemen 

507 


Great 
Britain. 

United 
States. 

$0,  IS 

80.6549 
.5861 
.4974 
.5782 
.6416 
.4397 
.3577 
.4096 

175 
175 
175 
175 
160 
115 
120 

8.64 
9.30 
9.36 
4.98 

25. 72 
22.83 
19.88 
12.12 

7.80 

23.15 

318.17 

1,017.  .54 

661.55 

837.  66 

392. 

91 

1,094.  78 

363 
335 
284 
330 
366 
274 
311 
341 


297 
245 
212 
243 


319 


54 

BUILDING,    ENGINEERING,    AND    PRINTING    TRADES. 

GEEAT    BRITAIN. 
[Table  Dl.] 

The  following  information  was  obtained  from  a  British  Govern- 
ment publication  entitled,  "  Report  of  an  Inquiry  by  the  Board  of 
Trade  into  Working  Class  Rents  and  Retail  Prices,  Together  with 
the  Rates  of  Wages  in  Certain  Occupations  in  Industrial  Towns  in 
the  United  Kingdom  in  1912." 

Occupations  : 

Building  trades    (average  wage  per  iiour)  — 

Bricklayers $0.  18 

Masons .  175 

Carpenters .  175 

Plumbers .  175 

Plasterers    •. .  175 

Painters .  16 

Bricklayers'  laborers .  115 

Masons'  laborers .  115 

Plasterers'  laborers .  12 

Engineering  trades    (average  wage  per  week)  — 

Fitters 8.  64 

Tinners 8.  64 

Pattern  makers 9.30 

Iron  molders 9.36 

Laborers 4.98 

Printing  trades   (average  wage  per  week)  — 

Compositors 7.  80 

In  the  case  of  the  building  trades  the  number  of  hours  of  employ- 
ment per  week  and  the  number  of  weeks  per  year  is  not  given,  nor  is 
the  number  of  weeks  per  year  for  the  engineering  and  printing 
trades.  The  rates  for  the  building  trades  in  the  United  States  are 
given  in  the  same  form,  so  the  comparison  can  be  made  without 
further  computation. 

The  rates  of  wages  for  the  engineering  and  printing  trades  are 
given  by  the  week. 

UNITED    STATES. 
[Table  D2.] 

The  following  information  was  obtained  from  a  United  States 
Government  publication  entitled,  "  Bulletin  of  the  United  States 
Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics  (whole  number  143)." 

The  average  wage  ("union")  per  hour  in  1912  for  localities  cov- 
ering the  entire  United  States  was  as  follows.  Only  those  occupa- 
tions are  here  given  on  which  figures  for  Great  Britain  were  avail- 
able: 

507 


I 


I 


55 


Building  trades: 

Bricklayers 

Masons 

Carpenters 

Plumbers  and  gas  fitters 

Plasterers 

Painters 

Bricklayers'  laborers  (hod  carriers) 

Plasterers'  laborers 

Engineering  trades: 

Steam  fitters 

Pattern  makers 

Iron  molders 

Laborers 

Printing  trades: 

Compositors 


Average 
per  hour. 


.6549 
.5864 
.4974 
.5782 
.6416 
.4397 
.3577 
.4096 

.5567 
.4390 
.3654 
.2636 

.4978 


Average 

hours  per 

week. 


46.2 
52.0 

54.4 
46.0 

46.5 


As  the  figm-es  for  the  engineering  and  printing  trades  for  Great 
Britain  are  given  as  weekly  wage,  it  is  necessary  to  compute  the 
weekly  wage  for  those  trades  in  the  United  States.  Assuming  that 
the  employment  for  the  week  is  constant,  we  have : 

Engineering  trades  (average  per  week): 

Steam  fitters 125.72 

Pattern  makers 22. 83 

Iron  moulders 19.88 

Laborers 12.12 

Printing  trades  (average  per  week) 23. 15 


POSTMEN    (LETTER  CARRIERS). 

GREAT    BRITAIN. 

[Table  El.] 

The  following  information  was  obtained  from  a  United  States 
Government  publication  entitled,  "  Bureau  of  Manufactures,  Special 
Agents,  Series  37-43,  1909-1915." 

The  following  figures  are  for  1910 : 

Cities  (rate  per  week)  : 

London .$5.10  to  $8.51. 

Dublin 6.32  (average)  ($328.67  per  year). 

Sheffield 5.57  (average). 

Manchester 5.57. 

Birmingham 4.37  to  7.29. 

Glasgow 6.66    (average). 

No  figures  are  given  as  to  the  number  of  postmen  in  each  city,  so 
it  is  only  possible  to  average  the  rate  of  pay  for  the  six  cities.  This 
gives  the  average  yearly  pay  as  $318.24. 

UNITED    STATES. 
[Table  E2.] 

The  following  information  was  obtained  from  the  published  report 
of  the  Postmaster  General  for  1910: 

Number  of  city  letter  carriers 28,  715 

Amount  paid  to  city  letter  carriers $29,  178,655.97 

Average  pay  of  carrier $1,  016.  14 

507 


56 

The  above  does  not  take  into  account  the  amounts  paid  as  follows, 
because  it  was  not  definitely  known  whether  or  not  the  numbers  of 
these  carriers  was  included  in  the  item  "  city  carriers  " : 

Carriers,  second-class  offices $93,589.03 

Substitute  carriers 1,  056,  916.  83 

Carriers  for  new  offices 63,416.81 

SCHOOL    TEACHERS. 

GREAT    BRITAIN. 
[Table  Fl.] 

The  following  information  was  obtained  from  a  United  States 
Government  publication  entitled,  "  Senate  Document,  Vol.  46,  Sixty- 
first  Congress,  second  session,  1909-1910." 

The  following  figures  are  for  1910 : 


Cities. 


Class  of  teachers. 


Pay  per  year. 


Manchaster . 


Birmingham . 


Liverpool. 


Glasgow . 


Dublin. 


Masters . 


Mistresses. 


Assistant  teachers  (men): 

Class  A 

Class  B  

ClassC 

ClassD 

Assistant  teachers  (women) : 

Class  A 

Class  B 

ClassC 

ClassD 

Average  for  the  4  classes 

Average  for  all  teachers 

Masters  (mixed  schools) 

Mistresses  (girls'  schools) 

Mistresses  (infants'  schools) 

Assistant  mistresses 

Chief    assistant    master    (secondary 

schools). 
Assistant  master  (secondary  schools) . . 
Assistant  mistresses(second"aryschools) 

Average,  all  teachers 

First  master  (mixed  schools) 

Assistant  masters  (mixed  schools) 

Headmasters,  class  A 

Headmasters,  infant  department 

Mistresses,  infant  department 

First  masters 

Assistant  masters 

Average,  all  teachers 

Headmasters 

Second  masters 

Assistant  masters 

Mistresses 

Average,  all  teachers 

Principal  teachers 

do 

Assistant  teachers 

do 

Average,  all  teachers 


for  first  4  years, 
for  second"  4  years. 
for  third  1  years. 
for  over  5  years. 
for  first  4  years, 
for  second  4  years, 
for  third  4  years. 
for  over  5  years, 
average  per  year. 


$583.98 
S656.97 
$759.17 
$851.63 
?389.32 
$437.98 
$486.65 
$535.31 
$587.62 

8778.64. 
$729.97. 
$535.31. 
$389.32. 


$583.98. 

$535.31. 

$413.65. 

$316.32. 

$535.32. 

$561.47. 

$1,333.42  (average  maximum  salary). 

$815.14  (average  maximum  salary). 

$859.75  (average  maximum  salary). 

$419.72  (average  maximum  salary). 

$875.97  (average  maximum  salary). 


$632. 
$510. 


$632, 
$267, 


$462 
)2 

i8, 
'0, 


$488.65  to  $827.30. 


$851. 
S577. 
$456. 
$866. 
$710. 
$583. 
$423. 
$355. 
$518. 


(average  maximum  salary), 
(average  maximum  salary). 

to  $9"3.30. 
to  $""29.97. 
to  $9"3.30. 
to  $875.97. 


(average), 
(average), 
(average), 
(average). 

(men), 
(women), 
(men), 
(women). 


Average  salary  for  the  5  cities,  $658.63. 
507 


57 

This  is,  of  course,  not  the  true  average  of  salaries  paid,  as  no  fig- 
ures are  obtainable  showing  the  actual  number  of  teachers  em- 
ploj^ed  in  the  various  grades.  The  above  is  the  best  approximation 
we  can  make.  As  there  are  a  greater  number  of  teachers  employed 
in  the  lower  grades  than  in  the  higher,  our  result  is,  of  course, 
higher  than  would  be  the  case  were  complete  figures  available. 

UNITED  STATES. 
[Table  F2.] 

The  following  information  was  obtained  from  a  United  States 
Government  publication  entitled  "  United  States  Bureau  of  Educa- 
tion, Bulletin  No.  31,  1915  (whole  number  658)." 

This  publication  gives  salaries  of  school-teachers  for  58  cities. 
However,  as  data  for  Great  Britain  are  only  available  for  five  cities, 
and  as  all  of  these  are  over  100,000  population,  only  those  of  the 
United  States  having  a  population  of  over  100,000  were  taken  from 
the  list.    These  were  as  follows : 

Average 
per  year. 

San  Francisco,  Cal $1,124.00 

Denver,  Colo 552.  00 

Washington,   D.   C 982.00 

Atlanta,  Ga 623.  00 

Indianapolis,  Ind 761.  00 

Baltimore,   Md 692.  00 

Boston,    Mass 1,  001.  00 

Fall  River,  Mass 642.  00 

Minneapolis,  Minn 9o7.  00 

New  York  City 1,  197.  00 

Cleveland,    Ohio 791.  00 

Dayton,  Ohio 654.  00 

Portland,  Greg 1,  006.  00 

Richmond,  Va 578.  00 

Seattle,  Wash 1,  021.  00 


Average  for  the  15  cities  above,  $837.66. 


POLICEMEN. 

GREAT  BRITAIN. 
[Tabled.] 

The  following  information  was  obtained  from  a  United  States 
Government  publication  entitled  "  Bureau  of  Manufactures,  Special 
Agents,  Series  37^3,  1909-1910." 

507 


58 


The  following  figures  are  for  1910 : 


Cities. 


Class. 


Pay  per  week. 


Average 

pay  per 

week. 


London 

Sheffield 

Nottingham . 
Manchester.. 

Birmingham 


City 

Metropolitan 

Reserves 

Average  all  policemen . . 

Average  per  year,  S435.76. 

City 

County 

Average  all  policemen. . 

Average  per  year,  S366.60. 
City 

Average  per  year,  S385.32. 

City 

County 

Average  all  policemen. . 

Average  per  year,  $366.60. 
City 

Average  per  year,  $379.60. 


S6.  56  to  $10. 23 

6. 19  to     8. 51 

9.24 


6. 33  to     8. 52 
5.  84  to     7.  54 


6. 33  to     8. 52 
5. 84  to     7. 54 


6. 10  to     8. 51 


$8.44 
7.35 
9.34 
8.38 

7.42 
6.69 
7.05 

7.41 

7.42 
6.69 
7.05 

7.30 


As  the  figures  available  for  the  United  States  consider  only  city 
policemen,  only  city  policemen  are  taken  for  Great  Britain.  We  find 
the  average  yearly  pay  of  policemen  in  the  five  cities  above  to  be 
$394.47. 


UNITED     STATES. 


[Table  G2.] 


The  following  information  was  obtained  from  a  United  States 
Government  publication  entitled,  "United  States  Bureau  of  Educa- 
tion, Bulletin,  1915,  No.  31  (whole  number  658)." 

This  publication  gives  pay  of  policemen  in  57  cities.  However,  as 
data  for  Great  Britain  are  only  available  for  5  cities,  and  as  all  of 
those  are  over  100,000  population,  only  those  of  the  United  States 
having  a  population  of  over  100,000  were  taken  from  the  list.  These 
were  as  follows: 

Average 
per  year. 

San  Francisco,  Cal .$1,464.00 

Denver.  Colo 1,  050.  00 

Washington,-  D.  C 1,  165.  00 

Atlanta,  Ga 990.  00 

Indianapolis,  Ind 1.  080.  00 

Baltimore,   Md 900.00 

Boston,   Mass 1,  316.00 

Fall  River,  Mass 945.00 

Minneapolis,  Minn 980.  00 

Cleveland,  Ohio 1,  177.  00 

Dayton,  Ohio 960.  00 

Portland,  Greg 1,  080.  00 

Richmond,  Va 1,  080.  00 

Seattle,  Wash 1, 140.  00 

Average  for  the  14  cities.  .fl,094.78. 

507 

o 


THE  COORDINATION  OF  THE  MOBILE  AND  COAST 

ARTILLERY  UNITS  OF  THE  ARMY  IN  THE 

NATIONAL  DEFENSE 


PREPARED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION,  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

AS    A    SUPPLEMENT    TO    THE    STATEMENT    OF    A    PROPER    MILITARY 

POLICY  FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES 


WCD  8911-9 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE  :  WASHINGTON 

NOVEMBER,   1915 


508 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 

1916 


War  Department, 

Document  No.  508. 

Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff. 


SYNOPSIS. 


I.  Introduction. 

Page. 

1.  Relation  between  statecraft  and  war 5 

2.  Defense  against  over-sea  invasion 5 

3.  Function  of  the  Navy 5 

4.  Function  of  the  Army 6 

II.  Functions  of  the  Mobile  and  Coast  Artillery  Troops. 

5.  Two  classes  of  troops  required :  6 

6.  Mobile  troops 6 

7.  Coast  Artillery 6 

III.  Mutual  Dependence  of  Mobile  and  Coast  Artillery  Troops. 

8.  Cooperation  of  mobile  and  Coast  Artillery  units 7 

9.  Landings  at  unfortified  points 8 

10.  Role  of  movable  Coast  Artillery 8 

11.  Development  of  heavy  movable  armament  in  the  European  war 9 

12.  Adequate  mobile  troops  necessary 10 

13.  Land  defense  of  seacoast  fortifications 10 

30669°— No.  508 16  (3) 


THE  COORDINATION  OF  THE  MOBILE  AND  COAST  AR- 
TILLERY UNITS  OF  THE  ARMY  IN  THE  NATIONAL 
DEFENSE. 

I.    INTRODUCTION. 
1.  RELATION  BETWEEN  STATECRAFT  AND  WAR. 

In  our  country  public  opinion  estimates  the  situation,  statecraft 
shapes  the  policy,  while  the  duty  of  executing  it  devolves  upon  the 
military  and  naval  departments.  In  settling  disputes  under  our 
foreign  policies,  the  weapons  of  our  statesmen  are,  first,  diplomacy 
and,  second,  war;  when  diplomacy  fails  to  settle  the  matter  in  dis- 
pute, it  may  be  necessary  to  resort  to  war.  Should  such  a  contin- 
gency arise,  we  must  be  prepared  to  meet  the  enemy  on  sea  and  land. 
This  preparation  should  be  adequate  at  all  times  or  else  our  national 
policies  will  be  aborted  or  frustrated.  Such  preparation  includes 
as  its  most  vital  element  the  development  of  our  land  and  sea  forces. 

2.  DEFENSE  AGAINST  OVER-SEA  INVASION. 

The  object  of  this  study  is  to  treat  primarily  of  operations  which 
will  come  in  one  way  or  another  from  the  sea  and  to  which  we  are 
most  vulnerable.  Consideration  is  therefore  limited  to  operations 
possible  along  our  seacoast,  and  an  attempt  is  made  to  show  clearly 
the  correlative  functions  of  the  Army  and  the  Navy  and  the  result- 
ant necessity  of  the  cooperation  of  the  mobile  and  coast  artillery 
units  of  our  land  forces  so  as  to  best  utilize  our  means  of  defense, 
in  conjunction  with  our  Navy. 

3.  FUNCTION  OF  THE  NAVY. 

Upon  the  Navy  devolves  the  solution  of  the  problem  of  securing 
and  maintaining  control  of  the  sea.  To  accomplish  this  it  must  be 
free  to  take  the  offensive  promptly,  that  is,  to  seek  out  and  defeat 
the  enemy  fleet.  The  use  of  any  part  of  the  high-sea  fleet  for  local 
defense  defeats  the  chief  object  of  the  Navy,  and  is  a  misuse  of  naval 
power.  A  fleet  defeated  at  sea  and  undefended  by  an  adequate  army 
is  powerless  either  to  prevent  invasion  or  even  its  own  ultimate 
destruction  by  combined  hostile  land  and  naval  forces. 

508  (5) 


4.  FUNCTION  OF  THE  ARMY. 

Upon  the  Army  devolves  the  task  of  gaining  and  maintaining  on 
shore  the  ascendency  over  hostile  land  and  naval  operations.  To 
accomplish  this  it  must  be  able  to  seek  out  promptly  and  to  defeat, 
capture,  or  destroy  the  invader  wherever  he  may  attempt  either  to 
secure  a  footing  upon  our  territory  or  to  enter  the  waters  of  our 
harbors  with  the  object  of  threatening  the  destruction  of  the  seaport 
or  of  a  fleet  driven  to  seek  refuge  or  repair  therein. 

II.  FUNCTION  OF  THE  MOBILE  AND  COAST  ARTILLERY 

TROOPS. 

5.  TWO  CLASSES  OF  TROOPS  REQUIRED. 

Experience  has  shown  that  our  Army  must  consist  of  two  distinct 
classes  of  troops — that  is,  mohile  troo])s  and  coast  artillery  troops. 
Broadly  speaking,  the  principal  function  of  our  mobile  troops  is  to 
oppose  an  invading  army.,  while  that  of  our  coast  artillery  is  to 
oppose  direct  naval  attacks. 

6.  MOBILE  TROOPS. 

The  best  defense  can  be  accomplished  only  by  the  ability  to  resort 
to  offensive  operations.  Our  mobile  troops  are  organized  on  the 
basis  of  being  able  to  resort  to  offensive  as  well  as  defensive  opera- 
tions.   Some  of  the  functions  of  the  mobile  troops  are : 

(a)  To  furnish  detachments  of  mobile  forces  sufficient  for  the 
protection  of  harbor  defenses  and  naval  bases  against  landing  par- 
ties during  naval  raids  which,  under  modern  conditions,  may  pre- 
cede a  declaration  of  war. 

(h)  To  oppose  an  invading  army  and  to*  operate  in  any  possible 
theater  of  war. 

(c)  To  furnish  adequate  mobile  forces  to  protect  our  principal 
cities  by  preventing  the  landing  of  hostile  expeditions  for  their  cap- 
ture in  the  intervals  between  our  fortified  harbors  or  near  such  cities. 

The  only  reasonable  Avay  in  which  these  localities  not  covered  by 
fixed  defenses  can  be  defended  is : 

(1)  By  providing  a  mobile  land  force  of  sufficient  strength,  so 
located  that  it  may  be  thrown  in  at  threatened  points  at  the  proper 
time. 

(2)  By  supplying  in  "addition  modern  movable  coast  defense  ar- 
mament of  heavy  types  to  resist  the  direct  naval  attack  of  the  cover- 
ing fleet. 

7.  COAST  ARTILLERY. 

Our  coast  artillery  is  primarily  organized  for  defensive  operations. 
Some  of  its  functions  are : 

(a)  To  prevent  naval  occupation  of  important  strategic  and  com- 
mercial harbors. 

508 


(b)  To  prevent  naval  bombardment  of  such  cities  and  military 
and  naval  bases  as  are  protected  by  seacoast  fortifications. 

(c)  To  furnish  a  strong,  fortified  base  from  which  submarines 
and  other  naval  vessels,  acting  on  the  offensive,  may  operate. 

(d)  To  repel  a  fleet  supporting  a  landing  in  force  within  range 
of  the  guns  of  a  fortified  harbor. 

(e)  To  cooperate  with  the  mobile  troops  in  the  landward  defense 
of  seacoast  fortifications. 

"With  the  development  of  modern  movable  artillery  of  large  cali- 
ber and  long  range,  the  functions  of  the  coast  artillery  will  be  ex- 
tended to  repelling  direct  naval  attack  at  certain  unfortified  harbors 
and  favorable  landing  beaches  in  the  intervals  between  the  present 
fortified  harbors,  under  the  commanders  of  the  mobile  forces. 

III.    MUTUAL  DEPENDENCE   OF   MOBILE  AND   COAST 
ARTILLERY  TROOPS. 

%  COOPERATION  OF  MOBILE  AND  COAST  ARTILLERY  UNITS. 


f  While  our  Xavy  retains  command  of  the  sea,  the  only  invasion 
,  possible  would  come  from  raiding  parties,  limited  in  numbers,  which 
an  enemy  fleet  might  land.  In  addition,  therefore,  to  the  coast 
artillery  troops  required  to  man  the  emplaced  batteries  and  the  mine 
defense  of  our  fortified  harbors,  sufficient  mobile  troops  should  be 
provided  to  repel  local  raiding  parties  that  might  land  to  attack  the 
fortifications.  The  personnel  of  the  Army  assigned  to  the  fixed-gun 
defense,  the  mine  defense,  and  the  land  defense  in  the  immediate 
vicinity  of  the  fortifications,  may  be  classed  while  on  this  duty  as 
immobile  to  the  extent  that  their  duties  are  local  and  pertain  par- 
ticularly to  the  harbors'  to  Avhich  they  are  assigned.  Thus  it  is 
manifest  that  a  portion  of  our  mobile  troops  must  be  used  at  times 
as  fortress  troops,  while  the  development  of  modern  high-power 
movable  coast-defense  armament  of  heavy  types  will  render  a  portion 
of  our  coast  artillery  troops  more  or  less  mobile. 

Should  our  Navy  lose  command  of  the  sea,  the  fleet  will  seek  ref- 
uge in  our  fortified  harbors,  under  the  protection  of  their  guns. 
Here  they  may  repair  and  refit,  and  they  may  be  able  to  render 
valuable  assistance  in  opposing  the  landing  of  an  invading  army. 
Assuming  that  our  preparations  are  sufficient  to  prevent  the  enemy 
fleet  from  capturing  the  armament  of  our  fortified  harbors,  running 
by  the  forts,  or  from  resorting  to  distant  bombardment  of  the  cities 
thereon,  he  will  be  forced  to  attempt  any  landing  (his  only  other 
means  of  inflicting  damage)  in  the  intervals  between  the  fortified 
harbors.  This  effort  can  be  frustrated  only  by  adequate  mobile 
forces  held  at  strategic  centers  near  the  coast  and  rushed  to  the 
threatened  points  at  the  proper  time.    This  force  should  be  sufficient 

508 


8 

in  numbers,  training,  armament,  and  equipment  to  accamplish  its 
purpose. 

In  defenaing  the  intervals  between  our  fortified  harbors,  the  mov- 
able coast  artillery  becomes  one  of  the  auxiliary  elements  of  the 
mobile  force;  mutual  dependence  of  the  two  kinds  of  troops  along  our 
coast  line  and  frontier  makes  their  cooperation  imperative ;  movable 
heavy  coasjt  artillery  armament  renders  such  cooperation  more 
effective. 

9.  LANDINGS  AT  UNFORTIFIED  POINTS. 

History  shows  that  landings  at  unfortified  points  have  always  been 
effected  when  backed  up  by  the  fire  of  a  fleet.  This  is  well  illustrated 
in  the  recent  landings  on  the  Gallipoli  Peninsula,  where  the  allied 
fleet,  after  being  defeated  in  the  attempt  to  run  by  or  reduce  the  Dar- J 
danelles  batteries,  supported  the  allied  army  on  Gallipoli  and  en- 
abled it  to  land,  despite  the  vigorous  defense'  of  the  Turkish  mob^e 
forces. 

10.  ROLE  OF  MOVABLE  COAST  ARTILLERY. 

With  the  development  and  employment  of  large  caliber  movable 
coast  artillery,  it  is  confidently  believed  that  at  points  near  our  coastal 
railroads  the  covering  fleet  may  be  held  off  at  such  a  distance  as  to 
prevent  the  use  of  the  secondary  batteries  in  supporting  the  landing, 
which  is  therefore  liable  to  be  defeated  by  the  fire  of  field  artillery 
and  small  arms  before  reaching  the  shore.  Thus  it  is  manifest  that 
the  development  of  heavy  movable  artillery  will  greajtly  strengthen 
our  coast  defense.  This  type  of  ordnance  may  be  concentrated  at 
points  under  attack,  and  when  no  longer  required  there  can  be  rapidly 
shifted  to  other  threatened  points  on  the  coast,  where-  its  effect  would 
be  the  greater  in  that  it  would  be  in  the  nature  of  a  surprise  to  the 
enemy,  thus  enabling  the  coast  artillery  and  heavy  field  artillery  to 
cooperate  wath  the  other  mobile  troops  in  the  protection  of  the  inter- 
vals between  the  fortified  harbors.  The  development  of  a  heavy  type 
of  movable  artillery  forms  another  link  between  the  coast  and  field 
artillery  and  between  our  present  coast  artillery  and  mobile  troops. 
Unfortified  anchorages  and  favorable  landing  beaches  near  our 
coastal  railroads  may  be  protected  against  direct  naval  attack;  the 
enemy  fleet  may  be  driven  out  of  range  of  the  coast  artillery,  and  the 
invading  army  deprived  of  the  support  of  the  fleet  during  the  land- 
ing. The  transports  will,  of  course,  be  compelled  to  lower  their  boats 
out  of  range  of  these  batteries,  and  an  excellent  opportunity  will 
be  given  to  our  mobile  troops  to  defeat  the  invaders  before  they  can 
set  foot  on  the  shore. 

508 


.  11.  DEVELOPMENT    OF    HEAVY    MOVABLE    ARMAMENT    IN 
EUROPEAN  WAR. 

All  information  from  the  European  armies  shows  that  the  develop- 
ment and  employment  of  heavy  movable  artillery  is  one  of  tlie  most 
prominent  features  of  the  present  European  war.  It  has  been  suc- 
cessfully employed  there  in  demolishing  fortifications  and  in  blasting 
the  enemy  out  of  his  trenches.  While  the  general  character  of  roads 
and  bridges  in  the  United  States  will  undoubtedly  operate  to  restrict 
the  use  of  the  large-caliber  guns  and  howitzers  in  field  warfare,  there 
is  no  question  of  the  feasibilit}^  of  their  employment  as  movable  coast 
artillery  along  our  coastal  railroads.  Descriptions  given  in  the  news- 
papers and  illustrated  periodicals  and  the  moving  pictures  of  war 
scenes  and  implements  shown  at  our  theaters  illustrate  how  this 
heavy  movable  ordnance  may  be  thus  employed. 

Successful  tests  have  been  made  with  the  12-incli  Navy  gun 
mounted  on  specially  constructed  railroad  car.  This  gun  as  mounted 
has  a  range  of  about  13  miles,  and  fires  a  projectile  weighing  about 
800  pounds  with  over  200  pounds  bursting  charge ;  it  is  transported 
on  and  fired  from  its  specially  designed  railroad  car.  On  account 
of  their  mobility  these  guns  can  be  moved  rapidly  to  the  menaced 
points  of  the  coast,  be  immediately  prepared  for  action,  and  when 
threatened  by  the  enemy's  superior  artillery  can  retreat  or  change 
position  in  a  minimum  time.  In  fact,  this  uniting  of  a  certain  num- 
ber of  pieces  of  artillery  constitutes  a  mobile  fort,  powerful  and 
economical.  In  addition  to  these  heavy  gun  batteries,  lieav}^  Iioav- 
itzers  have  been  similarly  mounted  on  specially  constructed  railroad 
trucks,  from  which  they  are  fired  without  having  to  construct  plat- 
forms to  i-eceive  them ;  the  trucks  are  braced  before  firing  to  support 
the  shock  of  discharge. 

In  line  with  the  above,  our  Ordnance  Department  has  prepared 
estimates  for  a  14-inch  gun  to  be  transported  on  and  fired  from  a 
specially  designed  railroad  truck.  This  gun  is  to  have  a  range  of 
30,000  yards  (17  miles)  and  to  fire  a  shell  weighing  1,600  pounds. 

The  30.5  centimeter  (12-inch)  Austrian  Skoda  mortar  is  practi- 
cally our  12-inch  seacoast  mortar,  while  the  12  centimeter  (16.5-inch) 
mortar  (Krupp-)  is  larger  than  any  now  emplaced  in  our  fortifica- 
tions; it  fires  a  shell  weighing  about  1,800  pounds.  Both  of  these 
types  of  mortars  are  readily  transported  by  railroad,  or  over  ex- 
ceptionally good  roads  and  bridges  by  motor  tractors.  From  photo- 
graphs and  descriptions  of  these  mortars  and  carriages  it  is  appar- 
ent that  heavy  ordnance  of  this  type  can  be  effiectually  employed 
as  an  adjunct  to  our  seaicoast  fortifications. 

These  developments  abroad  suggest  the  tremendous  gain  the  em- 
ployment of  heavy  movable  artillery  will  give  us  in  the  defense  of 

508 


10 

our  coast.  In  addition  to  the  fixed  defense  of  our  fortified  harbors, 
the  employment  of  heavy  movable  artillery  will  make  it  possible  to 
defend  not  only  our  important  strategic  fortified  harbors  and  naval 
bases,  but  also  to  repel  a  hostile  fleet  supporting  a  landing  in  force 
at  points  on  our  coastal  railroads.  It  is  understood  that  the  War 
Department's  estimates  to  Congress  will  include  14-inch  seacoast 
guns  mounted  on  specially  designed  railroad  trucks,  and  16-inch 
mortars  mounted  on  movable  carriages.  If  these  are  provided  the 
area  of  operations  of  our  coast  artillery  will  be  materially  extended. 
Certain  unfortified  anchorages  and  beaches  favorable  for  landing, 
as  well  as  the  present  fortified  harbors,  may  be  successfully  defended 
against  direct  naval  attack. 

12.  ADEQUATE  MOBILE  TROOPS  NECESSARY. 

It  should  be  understood,  however,  that  the  employment  of  movable 
coast  artillery  is  principally  against  a  direct  naval  attack,  as  is  the 
emplojanent  of  fixed  gims  in  our  fortified  harbors  and  naval  bases. 
In  landing  troops  for  an  attack  against  a  fortified  harbor  an  enemy 
would  naturally  select  a  landing  place  out  of  range  of  its  guns. 

Mobile  troops  would  be  necessary  to  defend  and  support  the  heavy 
guns,  whether  fixed,  as  in  our  fortifications,  or  movable,  as  along 
our  railroads. 

The  employment  of  heavy  artillery  alone  could  not  prevent  an  en- 
terprising enemy  from  landing  troops.  Heavy  movable  ordnance 
may  indeed  render  valuable  assistance  to  our  mobile  troops  in  re- 
pelling a  landing  in  force  in  the  intervals  between  our  fortified 
harbors,  but  trained  mobile  troops  can  be  successfully  opposed  only 
by  the  employment  of  trained  mobile  troops  against  them.  It  should 
be  borne  in  mind  that  our  coast  line  consists  almost  entirely  of  "  in- 
tervals." The  fortified  harbors  are  few  in  number  and  far  apart. 
Even  with  the  addition  to  our  armament  of  heavy  movable  artillery 
along  our  coastal  railways,  there  would  still  remain  numerous  long 
stretches  of  our  coast  line  and  anchorages  affording  facilities  for 
landing  operations  which  could  only  be  opposed  by  mobile  troops 
acting  without  the  cooperation  of  the  Coast  Artillery.  The  United 
States  should  therefore  have  sufficient  trained,  organized,  and 
equipped  mobile  troops  to  defeat  at  the  coast  line  or  frontier  the 
army  that  any  over-sea  power  could  bring  against  us. 

13.  LAND  DEFENSE  OF  SEACOAST  FORTIFICATIONS. 

The  defense  of  the  fortified  harbors  on  the  land  side  must  be  in 
the  hands  of  the  mobile  troops.  From  the  time  of  actual  investment 
by  the  enemy's  army  it  is  essential  that  all  of  the  fixed  armament 
in  the  seacoast  fortifications  capable  of  being  used  in  the  land  de- 

508 


11 

fense  be  so  mounted  that  it  may  be  fired  landward  as  an  adjunct 
of  the  Field  Artillery  as  well  as  seaward  against  the  hostile  navy. 

Generally  speaking,  the  seacoast  mortars  (which  have  all-around 
fire)  are  the  only  parts  of  the  heavy  fixed  armament  now  so  em- 
placed  that  they  can  be  used  in  the  land  defense,  but  at  all  forts  sus- 
ceptible to  land  attack,  other  elements  of  the  fixed  armament  should 
be  mounted  in  the  future  for  all-around  fire,  where  practicable,  with- 
out sacrificing  range  and  adequate  protection  against  naval  attack. 
Such  as  are  susceptible  of  being  mounted  on  movable  carriages 
should  be  so  mounted,  with  the  largest  calibers  and  longest  ranges  pos- 
sible of  development  for  such  mounting.  To  make  the  fire  of  the  sea- 
coast  armament  effective  against  the  enemy's  land  batteries  and 
trenches  it  is  essential  that  suitable  annnunition  and  fuses  be  pro- 
vided, that  an  effective  means  of  range  and  position  finding  be 
adopted ;  that  accurate  maps  of  the  land  area  Avithin  the  range  of  the 
fixed  armament  be  provided,  and  that  ample  aero  equipment  be 
furnished  for  reconnoissance  work  and  for  correction  of  fire.  The 
heavy  artillery  can,  by  the  adoption  of  these  means,  use  its  trained 
personnel  to  the  best  advantage  to  assist  the  mobile  troops  in  the 
defense  of  the  fortifications. 

508 

o 


STUDY  ON 

THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  LARGE  CALIBER,  MOBILE 

ARTILLERY,  AND  MACHINE  GUNS  IN  THE 

PRESENT  EUROPEAN  WAR 


PREPARED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION,  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

AS   A    SUPPLEMENT    TO    THE    STATEMENT    OF    A    PROPER   MILITARY 

POLICY  FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES 


WCD  9239-1 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE  :  WASHINGTON 

NOVEMBER,   1915 


509 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 

1916 


War  Department, 

Document  No.  509. 

Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff. 


STUDY  ON  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  LARGE-CALIBER 
MOBILE  ARTILLERY  AND  MACHINE  GUNS  IN  THE 
PRESENT  EUROPEAN  WAR. 


1.  ARTILLERY. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  present  European  war  two  schools  of 
artillery  thought  had  gradually  developed  among  the  European 
nations.  One  school,  fostered  by  the  French,  believed  in  the  low- 
power,  rapid-fire  field  gun  of  about  3-inch  caliber,  and  contended 
that  with  a  reasonable  supply  of  ammunition  it  was  possible  to 
render  heavy  field  or  siege  artillery  powerless  with  such  a  gun;  the 
second  school,  headed  by  the  Germans,  although  believing  in  the 
low-power,  small-caliber,  rapid-fire  fieldpiece,  believed  that  they 
must  be  reenforced  by  a  considei-able  number  of  heavier  howitzers 
or  field  gims,  which  were  to  be  used  to  combat  the  ordinary  field- 
pieces  as  well  as  such  entrenchments  as  could  be  constructed  by 
armies  in  the  field  and  for  long-range  firing  when  necessary. 

In  general,  Germany  and  Austria  were  the  only  European  coun- 
tries that  had  developed  efficient  large-caliber  mobile  artillery  at 
the  outbreak  of  the  present  European  war,  but  this  war  has  devel- 
oped the  use  of  the  large-caliber  artillery  by  all  of  the  belligerent 
countries.  This  development  of  heavy  mobile  artillery  in  Germany, 
Austria,  and  France  is  shown  in  attached  "Notes  on  development 
of  large-caliber  mobile  artillery." 

How  the  thoughts  of  the  majority  of  the  field-artillery  officers 
influenced  the  artillery  organization  of  France  and  Germany  is 
best  shown  by  their  army  organization  as  it  existed  at  the  outbreak 
of  war,  as  shown  by  the  following  table : 


Country. 

Number  of 
of  3-inch 

field  guns 

per  1,060 

rifles. 

Number  of 

light  field 

howitzers 

per  1,000 

rifles. 

Number  of 

heavy  field 

howitzers 

per  1,000 

rifles. 

Total. 

France .                 

4.66 
4.12 

0.206 
.61 

4  S7 

Germany 

1.37 

6  1 

This  table  shows  that  at  the  outbreak  of  war  Germany  had  about 
one-half  of  a  light  field  gun  (about  3-inch)  less  than  France  per 
1,000  combatants.  Germany,  on  the  other  hand,  had  1.37  light  field 
howitzers  per  1,000  combatants  more  than  France  had,  and  had  3 

30669°— No.  509 16  (3) 


heavy  field  howitzers  of  about  6-inch  caliber  for  every  1  possessed 
by  France. 

The  proportion  of  heavy  field  howitzers  was  in  reality  much  more 
than  the  table  indicates,  for,  as  is  well  know^n,  France  only  had  a 
total  of  twenty-four  4-gun  batteries  of  6-inch  howitzers  when  the 
war  opened,  whereas  Germany  had  more  than  one  hundred  and  ninety 
4-gun  batteries  of  6-inch  howitzers. 

We  may  say  that  the  results  of  the  war  have  justified  not  the 
French  but  the  German  organization,  and  that  as  a  result  the  French 
have  taken  up  the  German  idea  and  are  now  doing,  and  have  been 
doing  for  many  months  past,  everything  they  can  to  meet  the  Ger- 
man preparedness  in  heavy  field  artillery  material  by  equipping  their 
army  with  heavy  field  guns  and  howitzers.  It  is  of  interest  to  note 
that  the  French  6-inch  howitzer  had  a  maximum  range  of  about 
6,600  yards,  whereas  the  corresponding  German,  gun,  although  older 
in  years,  had  a  maximum  range  of  7,700  yards.  In  other  words,  the 
French  were  not  only  outclassed  in  number  but  also  in  the  power  of 
the  individual  gun. 

In  addition  to  this  16-Gentimeter  (6-inch)  howitzer,  which  was 
assigned  at  the  rate  of  4  batteries  of  4  gims  each  to  each  army  corps, 
Germany  had  a  certain  number  of  heavy  gun  batteries  of  10-centi- 
meter (3.94-inch)  and  13-centimeter  (5.12-inch)  caliber  and  a  field 
28-centimeter  (11.3-inch)  mortar  battery.  The  exact  number  of  these 
batteries  is  unknown. 

The  successes  of  the  German  army  for  the  first  four  months  of 
the  war  can  be  attributed,  in  a  gi'eat  measure,  to  the  heavy  field 
artillery  with  which  they  were  equipped,  and  to  its  proper  handling. 
Our  observers  all  state  that  the  moral  actual  effect  produced  on  the 
French  in  the  opening  battles  of  the  war  by  the  heavy  German  field 
artillery  was  tremendous,  and  came  to  most  of  the  Frenchmen,  who 
had  been  taught  and  had  believed  that  the  75-millimeter  gun  was  the 
ruler  of  the  artillery  w^orld,  as  a  terrific  shock.  At  the  commence- 
ment of  the  war  the  French  did  not  take  the  trouble  to  entrench  nor 
conceal  their  artillery  the  way  they  do  now ;  the  result  was  that  the 
heavy  German  batteries,  when  used  as  counterbatteries  and  assisted 
by  aeroplanes,  had  a  clear  field  and  managed  to  destroy  whole  bat- 
talions of  the  light  75-millimeter  French  guns  without  the  latter 
being  able  to  do  them  any  harm.  After  the  opening  battles  of  the 
war  the  French  realized  that  they  must  have  heavy  field  artillery, 
and  made  every  effort  to  obtain  it  as  soon  as  possible.  The  result 
was  that  between  August,  1914,  and  March,  1915,  they  had  sent  a 
number  of  4-gun  batteries  of  10.5-centimeter  guns  to  the  front  and 
had  adopted  and  issued  to  the  service  a  considerable  number  of  new 
15-centimeter  rapid-fire  howitzers,  and  had  started  to  construct  14- 
inch  mortars.    In  other  words,  a  few  months  after  the  war  started 

509 


the  French  school  of  artillery  thought  had  completely  veered  around 
and  adopted  the  German  artillery  idea> 

From  the  artillery  point  of  view,  tliQ  lesson  to  be  learned  from 
the  war  is  the  same"  lesson  that  has  been  taught  by  every  war  since 
the  discovery  of  cannon,  namely,  that  everything  being  equal,  the 
side  having  the  heaviest  gun  and  the  best  ammunition-supply  sys- 
tem is  the  one  that  i^  best  able  to  give  the  proper  support  to  its 
infantry,  and  therefore  has  the.  greatest  chance  of  success. 

Before  the  present  war  started  most  of  our  artillery  officers  be- 
lieved that  the  heaviest  field  gim  or  howitzer  which  would  be  needed 
by  an  army  was  the  G-inch  howitzer  firing  a  120-pound  projectile, 
and  in  justice  to.  them  it  must  be  stated  that,  with  the  exception  of 
the  German  and  Austrian  Armies,  this  belief  was  general.  They 
also  believed  that  the  function  of  the  heavy  field  guns  of  more  than 
6-inch  caliber,  which  it  was  known  Germany  and  Austria  possessed, 
was  to  destroy  field  forts  of  steel  and  concrete,  and  that  it  would 
not  be  possible  to  transport  either  of  these  guns  or  the  ammunition 
they  required  with  the  field  armies.  How  M'rong  this  assumption 
was  is  shown  by  the  present  war  in  which  the  Germans  and  Aus- 
trians  have  actually  transported  with  their  field  armies  11-inch 
howitzers,  12-inch  howitzers,  16-inch  howitzers,  and  17.7-inch  how- 
itzers and  used  them,  not  for  the  purpose  of  destroying  works  of 
steel  and  concrete,  but  for  the  purpose  of  destroying  field  fortifi- 
cations, supply  depots  in  rear  of  the  line,  villages  in  which  troops 
are  quartered,  wire  entanglements  and  other  obstacles.  All  reports 
now  indicate  that  the  great  successes  obtained  by  the  German  and 
Austrian  Armies  on  the  eastern  front  were  due  in  no  small  measure 
to  the  use  of  these  enonnous  fieldpieces,  which  must  hereafter  be 
considered  as  essential  to  success  in  war. 

The  lesson  to  be  learned  as  to,  the  amouint  of  artillery  to  be 
assigned  to  the  different  units  has  been  taken  advantage  o-f  by  the 
General  Staff,  who,  in  the  organization  recommended  in  their  mili- 
tary policy,  have  increased  the  number  of  Field  Artillery  regiments 
with  each  Infantry  division  from  tw^o  to  three,  and  in  the  report  of 
a  board  of  officers  which  recently  recommended  that  the  heavy  field 
artillery  with  each  field  army  be  increased  from  one  to  three  regi- 
ments. These  recommendations,  if  carried  into  effect,  will  result 
in  the  following  proportion  of  guns  per  1,000  combatants: 


Field  giin. 

Light  fleUl 
howitzer. 

Heavy  field 
gim  and 
howitzer. 

Total. 

Fnited  states 

2.70 
4.12 

1.35 
1.37 

1.12 
.61 

5  17 

6  10 

509 


The  percentage  of  guns  provided  by  Germany  for  her  army  is 
shown  above  for  the  purpose  of  comparison.  It  shows  that  before 
the  war  Germany  had  1.42  more  field  guns  per  thousand  combatants, 
about  the  same  number  of  light  field  howitzers,  and  0.51  of  a  heavy 
field  gun  less  than  we  now  contemplate.  The  number  of  heavy  field 
guns  given  in  the  above  table  for  Germany  does  not  include  any 
guns  heavier  than  the  16  centimeter  (6-inch  howitzer),  whereas  for  us 
it  included  the  heavier  contemplated  fieldpieces.  The  proposed  con- 
templated scheme  for  procuring  enough  guns,  ammunition,  and  other 
necessary  field  artillery  material  to  equip  1,000,000  men  will  involve 
the  expenditure  of  about  $470,000,000  over  a  period  of  8  years,  and, 
when  completed,  will  only  provide  for  about  twice  the  number  of 
guns  used  by  Marshal  Mackensen's  army  in  the  Galician  campaign. 
In  other  words,  if  the  scheme  is  approved  by  Congress,  in  eight  years 
from  now  we  will  have  about  enough  gims  and  ammunition  and 
other  necessary  stores  to  supply  two  German  field  armies. 

2.  ARTILLERY  AMMUNITION. 

Before  the  present  war  no  one  ever  dreamed  of  the  amount  of  am- 
munition that  would  be  required  to  keep  the  armies  supplied,  and  if 
he  did  dream  of  it  he  kept  his  dream  to  himself  for  fear  of  being 
called  crazy.  It  was  known  that  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  both 
France  and  Germany  had  a  reserve  supply  of  small-caliber  field-gun 
ammunition  of  about  2,500  rounds  per  gun,  and  a  corresponding 
amount  for  the  larger  fieldpieces  on  hand,  and  were  splendidly 
equipped  with  facilities  for  manufacturing  ammunition  of  all  kinds 
in  large  quantities.  Notwithstanding  their  reserve  supply,  which 
was  considered  immense  at  that  time,  and  their  facilities  of  manu- 
facture, both  these  nations  found  themselves  confronted  with  a  most 
serious  shortage  of  ammunition  before  the  war  had  been  going  on 
very  long,  and  in  the  case  of  France  at  least  forced  her  to  practically 
suspend  operations  for  a  protracted  period. 

At  the  present  time  the  reserve  supply  of  ammunition  to  be  kept 
on  hand  per  gun  is  considered  as  that  necessary  to  wear  out  the  gun ; 
in  other  words,  during  peace  a  suiRcient  amount  of  ammunition 
should  be  accumulated  for  each  gun  to  permit  it  to  fire  as  long  as  it 
is  capable  of  doing  so.  For  a  3-inch  field  gun  this  amounts  to  about 
5,000  rounds  per  gun. 

The  question  of  ammunition  supply  has  become  such  an  important 
one  that  France  and  England  have  both  placed  cabinet  ministers  in 
charge  of  it ;  and  England,  so  far  as  we  know,  has  not  solved  the 
problem  to  date. 

509 


3.  AERO  SERVICE  FOR  FIELD  ARTILLERY. 

Aeroplanes  are  now  recognized  as  indispensable  adjuncts  of  the 
Field  Artillery.  The  following  will  illustrate  some  of  the  service 
performed  by  the  Aviation  Corps: 

(1)  General  reconnoissance  work. 

(2)  To  discover  exposed  batteries  of  the  enemy. 

(3)  To  test  concealment  of  their  own  batteries. 

(4)  To   direct   artillery   fire  on   enemy's  batteries  and  trenches. 
Observation  captive  balloons  are  employed,  as  shown  by  the  fol- 
lowing report: 

The  officers  who  conduct  the  fire  of  these  guns  are  well  up  in  the  trenches, 
connected  with  their  guns  or  batteries  by  telephone  wires,  which  are  usually  run 
along  the  walls  of  the  communication  trenches  and  held  in  place  by  staples.  In 
one  second-line  trench  I  counted  11  different  telephone  wires  running  out  to 
different  observation  trenches.  In  addition  to  the  observation  posts  in  the 
advance  trenches  there  is  another  method  employed  by  both  sides  during  the 
day ;  it  is  the  Drachen,  or  sausage-shaped  captive  balloon  which  is  sent  up  at 
daylight  and  remains  all  day  until  dark,  at  altitudes  varying,  I  should  estimate, 
from  four  to  eight  hundred  yards,  and  far  enough  in  rear  of  the  lines  to  escape 
artillery  fire,  if  directed  against  it.  The  observer  in  this  balloon  is  equipped 
with  telephonic  communication  and  powerful  glasses.  This  silent  sentinel 
remains  up  rain  or  shine,  and  both  sides  have  the  greatest  respect  for  its  power 
of  observation.  "We  were  not  allowed  to  assemble  in  groups  in  view  of  them 
at  the  front. 

These  observers  are  on  the  alert  at  all  times,  and  we  were  informed  that 
where  groups  of  5  or  10  appeared  in  the  open,  a  shell  was  usually  sent  in  their 
direction  as  a  warning  that  nothing  escaped  their  observation.  These  balloons 
are  so  generally  used  by  both  sides  that  during  a  clear  day  tliey  can  be  seen 
up  and  down  the  lines  as  far  as  the  eye  can  reach.  I  counted  eight  along  the 
front — Notre  Dame  de  Lorette — St.  Eloi.  They  are  used  also,  I  was  informed, 
very  often  in  directing  the  fire  of  heavy  artillery.  The  steadiness  of  this  shape 
of  balloon,  even  in  a  strong  wind,  is  quite  remarkable. 

The  War  College  Division  has  not  made  recommendation  as  to 
aviation  equipment  needed,  as  tests  are  now^  being  made  under  direc- 
tion of  the  Field  Artillery  Board  at  Fort  Sill,  Okla. 

4.  CONCLUSION. 

In  general,  the  opinion  of  foreign  officers  and  all  of  our  observers 
abroad  is  that  the  largest  calibers  are  the  most  effective  and  have 
done  the  work  in  this  war  with  high-explosive  shell. 

The  large-caliber  howitzers  and  mortars  with  high-explosive  shells 
are  employed  not  only  to  reduce  concrete  forts,  but  are  generally  used 
now  against  fieldworks  and  entrenchments  of  all  kinds. 

Every  effort  should  be  made  to  provide  our  Army  with  large- 
caliber  mobile  artillery  and  ample  aero  equipment. 

509 


5.  MACHINE  GUNS. 

Machine  guns  have  phiyed  a  most  importjint  part  in  the  present 
war,  and  have  been  extensively  used  by  all  sides,  under  all  condi- 
tions, and  have  proven  their  worth. 

The  following  table  shows  the  number  of  machine  guns  per  1,000 
men  of  Infantry  or  Cavalry  provided  for  by  the  organizations  of 
the  European  armies  at  the  opening  of  the  war,  and  also  the  proposed 
proportion  contemplated  for  our  Army  in  the  tables  of  organization : 


Army  Corps. 

Infantry  Division. 

Reserve  Infantry 
Division. 

Cavalry 
Division. 

Infantry. 

Cavalry. 

Infantry. 

Cavalry. 

Infantry. 

Cavalry. 

Cavalry. 

2 
2 
2 

2 
2 
2 
2.12 

2 
1.32 

1.67 

2.2 

2.2 

1.67 

2.20 

3.24 

3.24 

Since  the  war  started  it  is  positively  known  that  all  the  warring 
nations  have  greatly  increased  the  number  of  machine  guns  with 
their  armies.  Exactly  what  this  increase  has  been  is.  however, 
unlaiown.  Reports  received  from  our  observers  indicate  that  there 
is  about  one  machine  gun  for  every  30  yards  on  the  western  front. 
At  the  commencement  of  the  war  the  Germans  had  64  and  the  _ 
French  66  guns  per  army  corps.  m 

6.  CONCLUSION. 

It  is  believed  that  machine  guns  at  the  rate  of  6  per  battalion 
of  Infantry  or  squadron  of  Cavalry  should  be  provided  for  our 
Army,  or  18  machine  guns  per  regiment  of  Infantry. 

NOTES    ON    DEVELOPMENT    OF    LARGE-CALIBER    MOBILE    ARTIL- 
LERY IN  EUROPEAN  WAR. 


GERMANY. 

The  Germans  had  42-centimeter  (16.r)-inch)  mortars,  28-centimeter 
(11.023-inch)  Krupp  siege  howitzers,  and  21-centimeter  (8.4-inch) 
howitzers  at  the  outbreak  of  war.  These  mortars  and  howitzers 
were  employed  in  the  reduction  of  the  Belgian  fortifications. 

The  4^ -centimeter  {16. 5-inch)  mortars  are  transported  by  rail,  and 
spur  tracks  are  run  directly  to  the  edge  of  the  pits  in  which  they 
are  emplaced.  It  is  probnble  that  a  derrick  car  is  used  to  mount 
the  parts  of  the  carriage  :uid  the  mortar  and  also  to  handle  the 
slioll,  which  weighs  about  2,000  pounds. 


In  the  recent  German-Austrian  oflfensive  in  Galicia,  May  2  to 
June  25,  1915,  large-caliber  howitzers  and  mortars  were  used  with 
marked  success  against  field  intrenchments  and  field  works. 

In  addition  to  tlie  regulation  quota  of  artillery  pertaining  to  the  divisional 
orgunizution,  there  was  assigned  to  the  army  for  the  special  mission  a  large 
quantity  of  heavy  artillery,  including  certain  21-centimetor  howitzers,  28-cen- 
timeter seacoast  mortars,  80..")-centimeter  mortar  batteries,  and  probably  some 
42-centimeter  mortars,  as  these  were  used  later  in  the  campaign  at  Przemysl. 

Tlie  present  war  has  shown  that  we  must  revise  our  views  as  to  what 
constitutes  "  field  "  artillery.  With  ordnance  having  calibers  as  large  as  30.5 
centimeters,  moving  steadily  along  with  the  troops,  the  artillery  features  of 
present-day  combats  have  received  a  marked  development.  Thanks  to  this 
heavy  ordnance,  the  German-Austrians  were  enabled  to  break  down  the  mate- 
rial and  moral  resistance  of  the  Russians  at  all  their  strongly  prepared  posi- 
tions, and  to  prepare  the  way  for  assault  of  the  infantry,  which  found  its  task 
relatively  easy.  At  the had  a  ring  trench  about  200  feet  in  di- 
ameter on  the  summit  of  a  low  knoll  forming  a  closed  work  about  2.50  yards 
in  rear  of  a  long  rifle  trench  lower  down  a  gentle  slope.  Within  this  ring 
trench  were  seven  craters  made  by  30..5-centimeter  (12-inch)  mortar  shells, 
some  of  the  craters  intersecting  and  sections  of  the  trench  having  been  obliter- 
ated.   At  Hill  on  the position  in  front  of the  Russians  had 

a  strong  fieldwork  consisting  of  a  double  tier  of  trenches  with  overhead  cover, 
traverses  and  splinter  proofs.  This  was  assaulted  and  carried  by  a  division 
after  about  2  hours"  artillery  preparation  by  21-centimeter  (8.25-inch)  howit- 
zers and  30.5-centimeter  (12-inch)  mortars,  with  almost  negligible  losses. 
This  work  was  inspected  before  the  field  had  been  cleared,  and  it  was  easy 
to  understand  how  demoralized  and  shaken  its  defenders  must  have  been  in 
consequence  of  the  effective  artillery  fire.  About  100  corpses  lay  in  or  close 
to  the  trenches,  most  of  them  terribly  mangled,  even  with  clothes  torn  from  the 
body  by  the  blast  which  occasionally  blew  them  out  of  the  trenches  on  the 
gi'ound  in  the  rear.  Whole  sections  of  the  parapet  were  obliterated  and 
splinter  proofs  were  wrecked.  This  work  was  built  along  the  edge  of  a  pine 
gi'oove  which  was  almost  leveled  to  the  gi'ound  by  the  artillery  fire.     Again 

at ,  the  work  on  knoll ,  to  the  west  of ,  a  very  strongly  built 

fieldwork  with  strong,  wide  wire  entanglements,  was  bombarded  for  an  hour 
with  heavy  artillery  with  similar  effects  to  those  described  above.  The  at- 
tack of  field  fortifications  by  12-incli  ordnance  is  a  novel  feature  in  war,  but 
in  no  other  way  can  the  strongly  built  positions,  which  an  enemy  can  build 
in  a  few  days,  be  prepared  for  assault  by  infantry.  The  transport  of  such 
heavy  field  ordnance,  and,  more  particularly  of  the  needful  annnunition  supply, 
of  course,  presents  tremendous  difficulties,  and,  without  fairly  good  roads,  is 
impracticable     *     *     *^ 

During  long  trips,  on  four  different  days,  over  practically  all  the  roads  be- 
tween the and  ,  military  transportation  of  every  kind,  from  the 

light,  native  country  wagon,  hauled  by  two  diminutive  horses,  to  the  heavy 
motors,  hauling  28  and  30.5  centimeter  mortai-s,  where  encountered  moving 
steadily  to  the  front  without  any  serious  difficulties     *     *     *_ 

In  their  previously  prepared  positions,  the showed  some  fine  examples 

of  technical  work,  their  fire  trenches  being  invariably  provided  with  overhead 
cover,  and  with  plenty  of  splinter  proofs  close  at  hand.     It  was  only  because 
of  their  free  use  of  the  heaviest  artillery  that  the  German-Austrians  were  able 
to  break  the  lines. 
509 


10 

The  Germans  have,  on  several  occasions,  fired  38-eentimeter  (15-inch)  shells 

into  from  a  distance,  it  is  estimated,  of  30  liilometers   (18.7  miles)  ; 

where  these  shells  have  fallen  they  have  caused  great  destruction. 

The  success  of  the  42-centimeter  mortar  and  the  excellent  results 
secured  from  this  weapon  have  steadily  spurred  the  Krupp  Co.  on 
to  developing  even  larger  and  better  calibers  of  guns.  It  is  claimed 
that  the  Krupp  Co.  has  novr  perfected  the  54-centimeter  (21.26-inch) 
gun  with  a  range  of  about  38  miles. 

AUSTRIA. 

The  Austrian  army  infantry  division  had,  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  about 
42  field  guns  and  howitzers  per  division  of  12,000  rifles.  This  percentage  is 
exclusive  of  the  corps  artillery  which  is  composed  of  8  heavy  howitzers. 

As  the  war  went  on  the  number  of  batteries  has  been  increased  in  various 
ways  until  there  are  now  probably  50  field  guns  per  division.  The  corps  artil- 
lery remains  as  at  the  beginning,  but  the  field  army  artillery,  composed  of 
24,  30.5  and  45  centimeter  (17.7-inch)  mortars,  is  being  constantly  increased 
and  is  used  as  field  artillery. 

The  Austrians  are  using  their  large  guns  up  to  45  centimeter  (17.7-inch) 
against  fieldworks,  field  guns,  storage  depots,  railway  stations  and  villages, 
where  troops  are  quartered,  and  to  tear  up  barbed  wire  and  other  entangle- 
ments.    These  uses  are  made  because  the  guns  are  available. 

The  writer  visited  three  forts  of  shortly  after  the  fortress  was  cap- 
tured. The  Germans  had  used  42-centimeter  mortars  to  prepare  the  forts,  but 
what  part  of  the  destruction  of  the  concrete  work  was  done  by  the  German 

shells  or  what  part  by  the  when  they  surrendered  the  fortress  to  the 

is  not  known,  but  it  may  be  stated  that  the  moral  elfect  of  the  bombard- 
ment was  very  great,  for  the defense  was  weak  when  the  infantry  assault 

took  place. 

The had  very  few  guns  of  position  in and  the  mobile  artillery 

was  reduced  as  much  as  possible  to  provide  field  artillery  for  the  field  army. 
In  one  artillery  position  were  found  two  8-centimeter  field  guns  and  a  5-inch 
gun  stood  on  the  road  nearby,  showing  that  it  had  been  in  use  in  the  vicinity. 
In  one  of  the  forts  there  was  a  rapid-fire  gun  pedestal  mount  of  8-inch  caliber. 
These  were  the  only  guns  seen. 

The  writer  has  seen  the  effect  of  fire  of  the  30.5  centimeter  (12-inch)  and  45 
centimeter  (17.7-inch)  mortars  on  semipermanent  earthworks.  The  craters  on 
the  hill  in  rear  of  the  line  of  works  were  20  feet  deep  and  30  feet  in  diameter, 
and  the  blast  from  the  explosion  of  the  shells  must  have  been  tremendous.    The 

usual  killing  radius  mentioned  by  officers  was  200  meters,  but  it  is 

scarcely  that  great,  but  it  is  great  enough  to  cause  the to  have  a  profound 

respect  for  the  "  ammunition  wagons,"  as  the  soldiers  called  them. 

Artillery  fire  is  very  effective  when  the  target  is  suitable;  for  instance,  en- 
filading artillery  fire  is  feared.  It  is  to  be  doubted  whether  the  3-inch  gun 
produces  the  effect  on  moving  lines  in  the  open  which  might  be  expected ;  but 
the  heavy  shell  fire  from  field  howitzers  is  very  effective  as  a  morale  destroying 
agent. 

509 


11 


FRANCE. 


At  the  outbreak  of  war,  the  mobile  artillery  consisted  of  substan- 
tially the  following  calibers : 

65-millimeter  (2.56-inch)  mountain. 
75-millimeter  (2.92-inch)  field  guns. 
155-millimeter  (6.1-inch)  rapid-fire  Rimailho  gun. 

The  following  artillery,  considered  as  obsolete  at  outbreak  of  war, 
was  put  in  action  as  soon  as  possible  after  the  superiority  of  the  Ger- 
man heavy  artillery  was  demonstrated: 

Old  material : 

120-millimeter  (4.73-inch)  long  and  short  gun. 
155-millimeter  (6.107-inch)  long  and  short  gun. 
220-millimeter  (8.66-inch)  mortar. 
270-millimeter  (10.66-inch)  mortar. 

About  one  month  before  the  outbreak  of  war,  6  regiments  of  105- 
millimeter  (4.14-inch)  guns  were  authorized,  but  the  guns  were  not 
ready  for  issue  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war.  Since  the  outbreak  of 
war  these  regiments  have  been  furnished  with  the  105-millimeter 
(4.14-inch)  guns,  and  the  following  other  calibers  have  been  in- 
troduced : 

1.50-millimeter  (6-inch)  Schneider  rapid-fire  howitzers. 

260-millimeter  (10.5-inch)  howitzers. 

305-millimeter  (12-inch)  navy  gun,  mounted  on  railway  carriage. 

340-millimeter  (13.8-inch)  navy  gun,  mounted  on  railway  carriage. 
The  French  have  been  making  a  new  370-millimeter  (14.6-inch)  mortar.     Sis 
or  eight  have  been  completed  and  are  to  be  sent  into  the  field  immediately 
This  piece  was  under  study  when  the  war  bi'oke  out,  and  is  comparatively 
simple  in  construction ;  the  trials  have  given  most  satisfactory  results. 

The  75-millimeter  field  gun  is  now  seldom  used  by  the  French  in 

bombarding  field  entrenchments. 

509 

o 


I 


STUDY  ON 

EDUCATIONAL  INSTITUTIONS  GIVING  MILITARY 

TRAINING  AS  A  SOURCE  FOR  A  SUPPLY  OF 

OFFICERS  FOR  A  NATIONAL  ARMY 


PREPARED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION.  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

AS   A   SUPPLEMENT   TO    THE    STATEMENT    OF   A   PROPER   MILITARY 

POLICY  FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES 


WCD  9053-121 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE  :  WASHINGTON 

NOVEMBER,   1915 


510 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 

1916 


War  Department, 

Document  No.  510. 

Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff  . 


SCHOOLS  AND  COLLEGES  AS  A  SOURCE  FOR  THE  SUPPLY 
OF  OFFICERS  FOR  A  NATIONAL  ARMY. 


1.  The  organization  of  any  fighting  force,  after  its  framework 
has  been  determined,  must  be  supplemented  by  providing  an  efficient, 
sure,  and  continuous  supply  of  material  for  trained  officers. 

The  present  war  in  Europe  gives  a  graphic  picture  of  the  effects 
of  this  deficiency  in  the  difficulties  experienced  by  the  British  in  the 
western,  and  the  Russians  in  the  eastern,  theater  of  operations,  in 
assuring  either  a  proper  degree  of  training  for  the  troops  at  the 
front  or  of  providing  them  with  capable  leaders.  The  proof  is  con- 
clusive that  in  our  day  and  generation  such  a  defect  may  spell 
irreparable  disaster. 

2.  The  history  of  the  organization  of  the  Federal  Armies  at  the 
beginning  of  the  Civil  War  supplies  us  with  an  even  more  striking 
example  than  the  one  above  of  a  total  lack  of  military  preparedness 
in  providing,  at  the  outbreak  of  war,  a  sufficiency  of  trained  officers. 
This  deficiency  alone  explains  to  a  considerable  degree  the  lack  of 
decisive  results  for  the  Union  Armies  before  1863.  With  these 
evident  defects  in  our  system,  brought  before  us  through  bitter  ex- 
perience, we  should  not  fail  to  organize  our  resources  of  dependable 
personnel  and  insure  a  continuous  flow  of  an  ample  supply  of  trained 
officers,  from  well-known  and  established  reservoirs.  In  no  other 
way  can  we  provide  enough  officers  for  the  Regular  Army,  the 
Regular  Army  Reserve,  and  the  Volunteers  on  mobilization,  or  later 
replace  the  wastage  incident  to  war. 

3.  The  laws  now  on  the  statute  books  provide  the  following  sources 
for  officers  for  the  Regular  Army : 

(a)  United  States  Military  Academy. — Number  at  present  gradu- 
ated yearly,  more  than  sufficient  to  fill  all  vacancies  occurring. 

(h)  Selected  enlisted  men. — None  have  been  appointed  for  two 
years  on  account  of  the  lack  of  vacancies. 

{c)  Selected  graduates  of  colleges  at  which  officers  are  detailed 
08  professors  of  military  science  and  tactics. — None  have  been  ap- 
pointed lately,  as  there  have  been  no  vacancies. 

{d)  Other  civilians. — There  will  be  no  shortage  of  officers  for 
the  Regular  Army  so  long  as  its  strength  does  not  exceed  100,000 
and  its  organization  remains  as  it  stands  to-day.    The  number  of 

80669°— No.  610 U  (3) 


graduates  can  always  be  increased  by  reenacting  the  present  law 
authorizing  the  appointment  and  entrance  of  a  cadet's  successor  one 
year  before  he  is  graduated.  This  is  now  ejffective  until  1923,  having 
been  extended  by  the  Act  of  Congress  approved  March  4,  1915. 

4.  With  an  increase  in  strength  in  the  Regular  Army,  the  organi- 
zation of  the  Regular  Army  Reserve,  the  need  for  providing  reserve 
officers  for  the  Regular  Army,  for  reserve  units,  and  for  instructors 
with  the  second  line  army  and  educational  institutions,  the  follow- 
ing sources  offer  means  for  solving  this  problem : 

(a)   The   United  States  Military  Academy. — To  be  enlarged. 

(&)  Selected  enlisted  men. — This  number  will  be  limited  and  no 
data  exist  upon  which  we  can  estimate  the  number  which  we  can 
obtain. 

(c)  Ex-volunteer  officers  and  National  Guard  oflcers. — It  is  im- 
possible to  estimate  the  number  of  officers  who  can  be  obtained  from 
the  first  class  mentioned,  for  the  reason  that  some  time  has  elapsed 
since  these  officers  left  the  military  service,  and  they  have  undoubt- 
edly not  continued  their  training  during  the  interim.  This  number, 
of  course,  will  be  limited. 

There  will  be  a  number  of  National  Guard  officers  who  will  make 
good  officers,  but  it  is  impossible  to  form  an  estimate  of  the  total 
number  which  can  be  obtained.  There  is  no  doubt,  however,  that 
there  are  many  who  will  be  glad  to  come  into  the  reserve  units  and 
thus  assure  themselves  of  the  opportunity  for  future  service  at  the 
front. 

{d)  Graduates  of  colleges  and  universities.,  at  which  there  is  a 
standard  course  of  instruction.^  and  at  which  an  officer  of  the  Army 
is  detailed  for  the  purpose  of  giving  military  instruction. — The  fol- 
lowing is  the  number  of  students  who  have  been  under  military  in- 
struction, and  graduated  from  institutions  having  military  depart- 
ments, in  the  past  10  years: 


1905. 
1906. 
1907. 
1908. 
1909. 
1910. 


Students 

under 

military 

instruction. 


17,835 
18, 138 
21,616 
24, 101 
25,222 
27, 122 


Military 

students 

graduated. 


2,441 
2,890 
3,073 
3,441 
3,789 
4,215 


1911.. 
1912.. 
19J3  1. 
1914'. 
1915  1. 


Students 

under 

military 

Instruction. 


28,843 
29, 979 
30,872 
31,911 
32,313 


Military 
students, 
graduated. 


4,700 
4,757 
5,153 
4,970 
5,200 


•  About  1,100  of  these  are  now  listed  as  suitabl'^  for  commissions 

Only  a  small  percentage  of  the  total  number  graduated,  44,529, 
will  be  "trained  officers,"  as  the  words  are  understood  to-day,  but 
all  will  have  pursued  a  course,  both  practical  and  theoretical,  in- 
suring a  working  knowledge  of  rudiments.    Since  1912  the  training 

510 


has  become  more  intensive,  and  1,100  out  of  15,323  have  been  recom- 
mended for  commissions  in  the  Regular  Army  and  Volunteer  forces. 
Previous  to  1912  nearly  all  have,  no  doubt,  lost  all  touch  with  things 
military,  and  have  consequently  forgotten  what  little  they  learned 
before  their  graduation. 

The  possibilities  may  be  better  understood  when  it  is  realized  that 
44,529  students  have  been  graduated  from  the  military  departments 
of  these  institutions  since  1905.  If  close  cooperation  between  the 
War  Department  and  authorities  of  these  institutions  had  been  the 
rule  and  not  the  exception  prior  to  1912,  a  much  greater  proportion 
of  graduate  military  students  would  now  be  available.  Notwith- 
standing the  fact  that  a  complete  standardization  of  the  military 
course  has  not  yet  been  effected,  the  authorities  of  a  majority  of 
colleges  are,  nevertheless,  sufficiently  interested  to  agree  to  practi- 
cally the  same  course  for  their  institutions.  They  do  not  all  agree 
as  to  time  to  be  devoted  to  the  course,  but  the  subjects  studied  and 
the  practical  field  work  accomplished  are  to  all  intents  and  purposes 
identical. 

5.  In  this  connection  it  is  thought  best  to  give  a  short  description 
of  the  institutions  under  consideration  and  to  explain  their  classifi- 
cation. 

Broadly  speaking,  all  educational  institutions  have  been  consid- 
ered as  divided  into  two  general  classes — the  university  and  college, 
and  the  preparatory  type.  The  selection  of  officers  should,  as  a  rule, 
be  made  from  institutions  of  the  university  and  college  type.  We 
will  thus  obtain  a  more  mature  and  better  educated  man,  more 
capable  of  fulfilling  the  functions  of  an  officer. 

The  military  schools — for  example.  Culver  Military  Academy, 
Indiana;  St.  John's,  Manlius,  N.  Y. — are  of  the  preparatory  type, 
and  their  output  as  a  rule  is  too  young  and  immature  to  make  the 
best  officers.  Exceptions  to  this  rule  will  be  found  when  the  emer- 
gency exists,  and  there  will  be  no  trouble  in  deciding  the  different 
cases  as  they  arise. 

Among  the  university  and  college  type  are  a  number  of  institu- 
tions known  as  military  colleges.  For  example,  St.  John's  College, 
Annapolis,  Md. ;  the  South  Carolina  Military  Academy,  Charleston, 
S.  C. ;  the  Agricultural  and  Mechanical  College  of  Texas;  Norwich 
University,  Northfield,  Vt. ;  and  the  Virginia  Military  Institute,  Lex- 
ington, Va. 

In  these  colleges  the  student  is  continually  in  uniform  and  through- 
out the  entire  day  subject  to  military  discipline.  The  academic  cur- 
riculum is  that  of  a  college,  the  graduate  usually  receiving  a  B.  S. 
or  M.  E.  upon  graduation.  His  training  has  been  patterned  largely 
upon  that  of  the  West  Point  cadet,  and  the  material  coming  from 

510 


6 

these  colleges  could  supplement,  in  a  very  simple  and  easy  way,  the 
material  coming  from  the  United  States  Military  Academy. 

The  patriotic  endeavors  of  these  institutions  should  be  recognized 
and  selected  graduates,  without  examination  other  than  physical,  be 
appointed  annually  to  fill  vacancies  in  the  Regular  Army  not  taken 
by  the  graduates  from  the  Military  Academy  and  by  selected  enlisted 
men.  At  present  each  of  these  institutions,  by  the  authority  of  the 
President,  can  select  one  man  each  year  for  appointment,  under  the 
above-mentioned  conditions,  to  the  Regular  Army.  This  number 
should  be  increased  to  10  annually,  and  in  this  way  foster  the  pride 
and  efficiency  of  these  useful  institutions. 

6.  The  appointment  of  officers  of  the  Army  as  professors  of  mili- 
tary science  and  tactics  at  the  several  institutions  and  the  issue  of 
equipment  is  regulated  by  the  provisions  of  section  1225,  Revised 
Statutes.  This  is  quoted  at  length,  as  it  is  the  basis  of  all  subsequent 
legislation  relating  to  the  relations  existing  between  the  War  De- 
partment and  these  institutions: 

Sec.  1225.  The  President  may,  upon  the  application  of  any  established  mili- 
tary institute,  seminary  or  academy,  college  or  university,  within  the  United 
States,  having  capacity  to  educate  at  the  same  time  not  less  than  one  hundred 
and  fifty  male  students,  detail  an  officer  of  the  Army  or  Navy  to  act  as  super- 
intendent or  professor  thereof;  but  the  number  of  officers  so  detailed  shall  not 
exceed  fifty  from  the  Army  and  ten  from  the  Navy,  being  a  maximum  of  sixty 
at  any  time,  and  they  shall  be  apportioned  throughout  the  United  States,  first, 
to  those  State  institutions  applying  for  such  detail  that  are  required  to  pro- 
vide instruction  in  military  tactics  under  the  provisions  of  the  act  of  Congress 
of  July  second,  eighteen  hundred  and  sixty-two,  donating  lands  for  the  estab- 
lishment of  colleges  where  the  leading  object  shall  be  the  practical  instruction 
of  the  industrial  classes  in  agriculture  and  the  mechanic  arts,  including  mili- 
tary tactics ;  and  after  that  said  details  to  be  distributed,  as  nearly  as  may 
be  practicable,  according  to  population.  The  Secretary  of  War  is  authorized  to 
issue,  at  his  discretion  and  under  proper  regulations  to  be  prescribed  by  him,  out 
of  ordnance  and  ordnance  stores  belonging  to  the  Government  and  which  can  be 
spared  for  that  purpose,  such  number  of  the  same  as  may  appear  to  be  required 
for  military  instruction  and  practice  by  the  students  of  any  college  or  university 
under  the  provisions  of  this  section,  and  the  Secretary  shall  require  a  bond  in 
each  case,  in  double  the  value  of  the  property,  for  the  care  and  safe-keeping 
thereof,  and  for  the  return  of  the  same  when  required :  Provided,  That  nothing 
in  this  act  shall  be  so  construed  as  to  prevent  the  detail  of  officers  of  the  Engi- 
neer Corps  of  the  Navy  as  professors  in  scientific  schools  or  colleges  as  now 
provided  by  act  of  Congress  approved  February  twenty-sixth,  eighteen  hundred 
and  seventy-nine,  entitled  "An  act  to  promote  a  knowledge  of  steam  engineer- 
ing and  iron  shipbuilding  among  the  students  of  scientific  schools  or  colleges 
in  the  United  States  " ;  and  the  Secretary  of  War  is  hereby  authorized  to  issue 
ordnance  and  ordnance  stores  belonging  to  the  Government  on  the  terms  and 
conditions  hereinbefore  provided  to  any  college  or  university  at  which  a  retired 
officer  of  the  Army  may  be  assigned  as  provided  by  section  twelve  hundred  and 
sixty  of  the  Revised  Statutes. 
510 


The  main  points  of  dispute  between  the  War  Department  and  the 
authorities  of  the  institutions  are : 

(a)  The  indifference  of  the  constituted  authorities  to  the  military 
department  and  a  misunderstanding  of  the  benefits  which  may  be 
obtained  by  carrying  out  this  training,  as  indicated  by  the  law.  This 
is  ordinarily  shown  by  the  wholesale  excusing  of  students  from 
this  work  because  of  athletics,  etc. 

(b)  By  not  providing  sufficient  funds  for  the  upkeep  of  the  mili- 
tary department  to  insure  its  efficiency. 

(<?)  By  failing  to  allot  proper  time  and  opportunity  for  the  work 
of  the  department  when  getting  up  the  college  schedule. 

(d)  By  minimizing  the  importance  of  the  military  and  by  plac- 
ing agriculture  and  mechanic  arts  in  competition  with  the  military 
department. 

The  evident  intent  of  the  original  act  is  shown  by  providing  for 
"the  establishment  of  colleges  where  the  leading  object  shall  be  the 
practical  instruction  of  the  industrial  classes  in  agriculture  and  the 
mechanic  arts,  including  military  tactics.''^ 

The  military  department  being  coequal  with  the  two  other  de- 
partments, it  should  receive  due  consideration  from  the  authorities 
of  the  institution. 

7.  Having  appointed  a  professor  of  military  science  and  tactics 
and  issued  arms  and  equipment,  the  most  economical  and  practical 
results  from  the  evident  requirement  of  the  law  for  compulsory 
instruction  would  be  obtained  if  the  same  standard  requirements 
were  prescribed  for  all.  The  original  minimum  requirements  laid 
down  by  the  War  Department  were  agreed  to  by  the  land-grant 
colleges  after  consultation  with  the  late  Chief  of  Staff,  Gen.  W.  W. 
Wotherspoon,  who,  as  head  of  the  Army  War  College,  represented 
the  War  Department  in  this  conference.  The  minimum  require- 
ment was  for  3  hours  of  instruction  per  week  or  what  was  equiv- 
alent to  84  hours  for  the  academic  year.  While  many  schools 
give  much  more  time  than  the  minimum  required  and  have  endeav- 
ored to  cooperate  with  the  War  Department  in  a  whole-hearted 
manner,  there  still  remain  many  whose  action  in  this  respect  appears 
to  be  little  more  than  a  mere  acquiescence  in  the  requirements  of  the 
law  and  which  have  practically  reduced  their  instruction  in  the 
department  to  a  standard  which  can  not  produce  efficiency.  The 
minimum  has  been  found  to  be  insufficient  and  no  results  can  be 
assured. 

8.  The  reports  of  numerous  college  inspection  boards  since  a 
standard  was  laid  down  show  that  instruction  has  not  been  wholly 
satisfactory,  and  all  point  to  the  fact  that  centralized  control  is 
necessary  before  we  can  count  on  proper  standardization.  This  will 
also  enable  us  to  be  assured  that  the  aid  extended  by  the  Federal 

610 


Government  under  the  original  Morrill  Act  (July  2,  1862)  is  being 
properly  and  equitably  divided. 

If  graduates  are  to  be  employed  as  reserve  officers  and  assigned  for 
duty  to  the  reserve  of  officers  for  the  Regular  Army,  for  the  re- 
serve units,  and  finally  for  any  volunteer  forces  (Federal  forces 
only),  it  seems  only  logical  that  their  training  should  be  safeguarded 
under  direction  of  the  Secretary  of  War.  We  can  depend  on  the 
college  doing  its  part  in  the  young  man's  academic  training,  but 
his  military  training  should  be  assured  by  legalized  cooperation 
between  the  college  authorities  and  the  War  Department. 

9.  At  the  present  time  instruction  at  our  colleges  and  universities 
has  been  gradually  brought  to  a  stage  at  which  practically  all  col- 
leges are  turning  out  men  who  have  received  instruction  in  infantry- 
drill  regulations,  theoretical  and  practical;  field-service  regulations; 
small-arms  firing  regulations;  minor-troop  leading;  and  field  engi- 
neering to  a  limited  extent. 

It  is  believed,  however,  that  the  following  subjects,  both  theo- 
retical and  practical,  ought  to  be  prescribed  for  all  collegiate  insti- 
tutions : 

Infantry  Drill  Regulations  (theoretical  and  practical)  :  School  of  the  soldier; 

School  of  the  squad  ;  School  of  the  company  ;  School  of  the  battalion. 
Manual  of  Guard  Duty. 
Field    Service    Regulations:    Service    of    information;    Service    of    security; 

Marches  ;  Shelter ;  Orders. 
Tables  of  Organization,  to  include  the  regiment  (Infantry,  Cavalry,  and  Field 

Artillery). 
Small- Arms  Firing  Regulations:  Theoretical  principles;  Estimating  distances; 

Known  distance  and  combat  practice. 
Military  Law  (Manual  of  Courts-Martial). 
Topography:  Map  reading;  Road  and  position  sketching. 
Troop  Leading. 

Military  Policy  and  Military  History. 
Company  Administration. 
Military  Hygiene. 
Field  Engineering. 

This  course  will  insure  the  student  being  grounded  in  the  rudi- 
ments by  the  time  he  graduates.  Upon  graduation  those  who  desire 
to  adopt  the  military  profession  as  a  career  can  be  selected  for 
appointment  in  the  Regular  Army  after  passing  the  prescribed  tests, 
while  those  who  desire  to  become  reserve  officers  should  be  required 
to  undergo  six  months'  training  with  Regular  Army  units. 

10.  The  adoption  of  this  plan  will  require  the  president  of  the 
institution  and  the  professor  of  military  science  and  tactics  to  report 
upon  the  student  at  the  end  of  his  second  year's  work.  This  is  sug- 
gested in  order  that  the  student  may  have  at  least  two  years'  training 
common  to  all  branches  before  deciding  whether  or  not  he  will  adopt  a 
particular  branch  of  the  service  in  which  to  serve  as  a  reserve  officer. 

610 


There  will  be  many  who,  at  the  end  of  the  compulsory  course,  do 
not  care  to  take  up  either  of  these  propositions,  and  for  this  last 
reason  it  has  been  suggested  that  military  scholarships  be  provided. 
This  is  the  recommendation  made  by  the  Association  of  Military 
Colleges  and  Schools,  and  also  by  the  association  of  Land  Grant  and 
State  Colleges. 

They  have  based  their  suggestion  upon  the  fact  that  there  should 
be  some  monetary  consideration  offered  these  young  men  before 
asking  them  to  obligate  themselves  to  serve  as  reserve  officers.  There 
is  thought  to  be  merit  in  this  proposition,  and  due  consideration 
ought  to  be  given  to  suggestions  coming  from  men  who  have  spent 
their  lives  in  educating  the  youth  of  the  country ;  this  is  especially  so, 
as  all  of  the  institutions  represented  in  the  association  are  essentially 
military  institutions. 

11.  The  introduction  in  Congress  of  the  measure  known  as  the 
McKellar  bill  caused  a  widespread  discussion  among  the  school 
authorities.  The  land-grant  institutions  were  generally  hostile  to 
the  measure,  as  it  provided  for  a  new  agency  in  each  State,  and  they 
feared  that  it  might  reduce  the  patronage  and  hence  attendance  at 
the  State  institutions.  The  military  colleges  and  schools  did  not 
care  for  the  bill,  as  it  was  taken  as  a  suggestion  that  these  institu- 
tions were  not  maintained  as  potential  military  academies,  and  hence 
the  Government  interest  might  be  transferred  to  the  new  agency. 
The  War  Department  approved  certain  features  of  the  bill,  as  it 
provided  for  central  control  under  direction  of  the  Secretary  of  War, 
and  the  future  of  an  officers'  reserve  corps  was  assured  by  the  obli- 
gatory feature  of  service  for  all  students.  Unfortunately,  the  aca- 
demic standard  for  the  student  was  not  assured  by  the  bill,  and  this 
one  feature,  should  the  measure  become  a  law,  would  probably  affect 
all  academic  standards  required  by  the  War  Department  for  entrance 
into  the  Regular  Army  or  reserve  officers'  corps. 

For  the  reasons  given  above  it  is  believed  that  no  new  agencies 
should  be  established,  but  that  every  effort  should  be  made  to  legalize 
the  instruction  and  method  of  training  at  the  agencies  now  required 
by  law  to  maintain  compulsory  military  training. 

This  subject  is  most  important.  Every  effort  should  be  made  to 
foster  these  agencies  and  provide  for  legalized  cooperation  between 
them  and  the  War  Department.  Under  our  present-day  conditions 
they  are  thought  to  be  unequaled  as  a  dependable  source  for  officers. 
In  no  other  way  than  through  our  military  colleges  and  land-grant 
institutions,  with  military  departments,  can  we  so  efficiently  and 
economically  obtain  the  large  number  of  officers  needed  in  times  of 
great  emergency. 

510 


10 

12.  A  plan  has  been  proposed  for  attaching  cadet  "organizations, 
recruited  from  educational  institutions,  to  units  of  the  Regular  Army 
for  purposes  of  instruction,  making  the  unit  a  training  school  for 
officers. 

To  provide  for  this  plan  authority  of  law  is  necessary,  together 
with  an  appropriation  to  pay  the  expense  involved.  Such  a  plan  is 
neither  practicable  nor  advisable  for  the  following  reasons: 

{a)  It  would  have  to  be  carried  out  during  the  summer  vacation 
at  which  time  the  cadet  organizations  do  hot  exist.  At  this  time 
most  of  the  students  go  to  their  homes,  where  many  of  them  have  to 
work  in  order  to  help  pay  their  expenses  for  the  coming  year. 

(h)  It  would  be  a  waste  of  time  to  try  to  train  large  numbers  of 
students  who  had  shown  no  special  aptitude  and  who  could  never  be 
used  as  officers.  The  present  system  of  military  instruction  at  edu- 
cational institutions  tries  to  give  all  students  as  much  instruction  as 
possible  with  a  view  to  the  selection  at  the  end  of  the  course  of  those 
who  have  shown  the  most  aptitude.  The  proficient  ones  are  then 
listed  as  being  available  for  future  service  as  reserve  officers.  If 
these  could  be  given  additional  instruction  with  the  Regular  Army 
they  would  be  made  into  excellent  officers.  In  this  manner  several 
thousand  reserve  officers  could  be  trained  each  year  and  they  would 
be  the  best  available  material  in  the  country. 

The  correct  policy  would  be  to  educate  selected  cadets  in  order 
to  fit  them  for  duty  as  reserve  officers  rather  than  to  train  units. 
Many  young  men  trained  under  the  proposed  system  would  never  be 
efficient  as  officers,  and  full  value  would  never  be  received  for  the 
time  and  money  expended  in  training  them.  These  selected  young 
men  who  have  shown  special  aptitude  along  military  lines  during 
their  college  course  and  who  are  recommended  by  the  professor  of 
military  science  and  tactics  should  be  given  opportunity  to  receive, 
in  addition,  such  instruction  as  would  enable  them  to  qualify  as 
reserve  officers.  This  training  could  very  well  be  given  by  attach- 
ing them  to  units  of  the  Regular  Army  and  allowing  them  to  receive 
additional  instruction,  such  as  is  ordinarily  given  to  junior  officers. 
Most  of  them  would  be  willing  to  give  up  time  for  this  purpose  if 
some  inducement  were  given  them  in  the  way  of  paying  their  ex- 
penses and  guaranteeing  their  appointment  as  reserve  officers  after 
having  been  trained. 

From  experience  gained  at  the  annual  inspections  of  civil  educa- 
tional institutions,  it  is  known  that  the  students  will  not  take  kindly 
to  the  suggested  plan,  and  to  force  this  feature  will  undoubtedly 
lessen  their  interest  in  military  training.  In  addition,  probable  ob- 
jections on  the  part  of  parents  must  be  expected  and  carefully 
weighed. 

510 


11 

As  stated  above,  the  plan  of  attaching  cadet  units  to  units  of  the 
Regular  Army  is  not  believed  to  be  feasible.  The  plan  suggested  in 
itc  place  is  believed  to  be  sound  and  workable. 

13.  Several  new  features  have  lately  been  suggested  with  respect 
to  possible  assistance  from  the  Federal  Government  to  institutions 
and  to  students  who  have  obligated  themselves  to  serve  after  gradua- 
tion as  reserve  officers,  or  with  the  continental  army  units.  These, 
briefly,  are: 

(a)  The  payment  to  each  institution  of  a  yearly  per  capita  allow- 
ance of  $10  for  every  "proficient"  cadet  in  senior  divisions,  and  a 
yearly  per  capita  allowance  of  $5  for  every  "  proficient "  cadet  in 
junior  divisions  of  the  Reserve  Officers'  Training  Corps,  the  pro- 
ficiency in  each  case  to  be  determined  by  regulations  issued  by  the 
Secretary  of  War. 

The  fund  thus  accumulated  to  be  used  by  the  institution  solely 
for  expenditures  connected  with  the  military  work,  especially  field 
work,  of  the  unit.  The  specific  items  for  which  these  funds  can  be 
expended  would  be  determined  by  the  Secretary  of  War. 

It  has  been  further  suggested  that  additional  allowances  be 
granted  for  other  stages  of  proficiency  attained  by  members  of  the 
corps,  and  the  regulations  governing  the  conditions  imposed  will  be 
issued  by  the  Secretary  of  War. 

This  resembles  the  system  now  in  vogue  in  Great  Britain  for  the 
members  of  her  university  and  college  contingents  of  the  English 
officers'  training  corps. 

(b)  The  granting  of  an  annual  allowance  of  $100  to  each  member 
of  the  reserve  officers'  training  corps  who  has  been  certified  to  as 
being  proficient  after  his  first  year's  work  and  who  has  obligated 
himself  to  serve  at  least  10  years  after  his  successful  graduation 
from  the  institution. 

There  are  a  number  of  good  features  contained  in  each  of  these 
propositions,  but  nothing  should  be  granted  along  these  lines  which 
does  not  require  the  individual  to  obligate  himself  for  future  service, 
nor  until  he  has  had  at  least  two  years'  military  training  in  the 
institution. 

14.  Considering  the  before-mentioned  facts,  the  following  steps 
in  a  logical  sequence  must  be  taken  to  insure  efficient  instruction : 

(a)  The  establishment  of  a  reserve  officers'  corps.  The  draft  of 
this  proposed  law  has  been  already  adopted  and  recommended  by  the 
War  College  Division  of  the  General  Staff. 

(b)  The  organization  of  a  reserve  officers'  training  corps  to  which 
all  existing  cadet  organizations  should  belong.  The  benefit  resulting 
from  the  creation  of  the  corps  will  be  in  part  psychological  and  the 
esprit  of  the  students  will  be  raised.  This  has  already  been  approved 
by  the  Secretary  of  War. 

610 


t 


STUDY  ON 

ELIMINATION  OF  UNNECESSARY  EXPENSE 

FROM  ARMY  ADMINISTRATION 


PREPARED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION,  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

AS  A  SUPPLEMENT  TO  THE  STATEMENT  OF  A  PROPER  MILITARY 

POLICY  FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES 


WCD  9053-113 


I 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE  :  WASHINGTON 

NOVEMBER,  1915 


511 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 

1916 


War  Department, 

Document  No.  511. 

Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff. 


I 


ELEVIINATION  OF  UNNECESSARY  EXPENSE  FROM  ARMY 
ADMINISTRATION. 


1.  In  Section  VIII  of  a  memorandum  to  the  Chief  of  Staff,  dated 
September  3,  1915,  the  Secretary  of  War  directed  that  a  "  study  be 
made  by  the  General  Staff  of  the  possibility  of  eliminating  any  un- 
necessary item  of  expense."  To  make  clear  the  character  and  scope 
of  the  study  desired  by  him,  the  Secretary  quoted  from  a  memo- 
randum of  instructions  issued  by  him,  under  date  of  April  29,  1915, 
the  substance  of  which  is  as  follows  : 

*  *  *  *  t  *  * 

lu  order  to  enable  me  to  obtain  proper  knowledge  and  to  be  wisely  guided, 
I  must  have  a  painstaking,  thorough,  impartial,  and  concentrated  investigation 
of  this  subject  matter.  Each  considerable  item  of  expenditure  must  be  studied 
with  a  view  of  reaching  an  Impartial  conclusion  as  to  whether  the  thing  for 
which  It  is  expended  Is  necessary;  whether  in  the  handling  of  the  money  our 
administrative  methods  are  proper  and  economical ;  and  whether  we  are  re- 
ceiving the  proper  return  for  the  money  expended. 

*  *  «  *  4c  41  « 

Certain  items  of  expenditure  need  not  be  considered  with  any  view  of  being 
able  to  lessen  them,  because  they  are,  by  their  nature,  fixed ;  and  the  only  thing 
to  be  considered  with  respect  to  them  would  be  the  administrative  methods 
through  which  the  money  was  expended,  and  a  consideration  of  whether  those 
methods  were  more  expensive  than  necessary.  *  *  *  i  mean  by  this  that 
certain  gi-eat  items  need  only  be  cursorily  considered,  because  it  is  not  my  in- 
tention to  attempt  economy  by  recommending  a  reduction  in  them,  unless  the 
reduction  is  one  that  has  to  do  with  tlie  administration  of  the  sum  as  con- 
trasted with  the  thing  for  which  expended. 

All  other  items  than  such  as  would  be  properly  comprehended  within  those 
just  mentioned,  I  desire  to  have  looked  into,  with  the  character  of  attention 
above  described  and  for  the  purpose  above  set  forth. 

2.  In  a  message  to  Congress  under  date  of  March  3,  1911,  the 
President  stated : 

*  *  *  Estimates  of  departmental  needs  have  not  been  the  object  of  thorough 
analysis  and  review  before  submission ;  budgets  of  receipts  and  disbursements 
have  been  prepared  and  presented  for  consideration  of  Congress  in  an  un- 
scientific and  unsystematic  manner ;  appropriation  bills  have  been  without 
uniformity  or  common  principle  governing  them ;  there  have  been  practically 
no  accounts  showing  what  the  Government  owns,  and  only  a  partial  representa- 
tion of  what  It  owes;  appropriations  have  been  overenciimbe'^ed  withovt  the 
facts  being  knoimi;  officers  of  Government  have  had  no  regular  or  systematic 
method  of  having  brought  to  their  attention  the  cost  of  Government  adminis- 
tration, operation,  and  maintenance,  and  therefore  could  not  judge  as  to  the 

30669°— No.  511 16  (3) 


economy  or  waste.  There  has  been  inadequate  means  whereby  those  who 
served  with  15delity  and  efficiency  miglit  make  a  record  of  accomplishment  and 
be  distinguished  from  those  who  were  inefficient  and  wasteful ;  functions  and 
establishments  have  been  duplicated,  even  multiplied,  causing  conflict  and  un- 
necessary expense;  lack  of  full  information  has  made  intelligent  direction  im- 
possible and  cooperation  between  different  branches  of  the  service  difficult. 

The  statements  contained  in  this  message  of  the  President  were 
based  upon  a  preliminary  general  investigation  and  resulted  in  the 
appropriation  by  Congress  of  funds  to  enable  the  President  to  con- 
tinue the  investigation,  and  to  start  the  construction  work  of  cor- 
recting the  defects  disclosed,  in  so  far  as  that  could  be  done  by 
executive  action. 

3.  A  special  commission  known  as  the  President's  Commission  on 
Economy  and  Efficiency,  commonly  referred  to  as  the  Cleveland 
Commission,  was  appointed,  with  Dr.  Frederick  A.  Cleveland,  a 
distinguished  economist,  as  its  chairman. 

4.  After  21  months  of  continuous  labor  and  the  expenditure  of  a 
total  of  $230,000,  the  President,  in  a  special  message  to  Congress, 
dated  January  8,  1913,  asked  for  the  appropriation  of  an  additional 
$250,000  to  provide  for  the  continuation  of  the  work,  which  he  char- 
acterized as  only  begun.  The  Cleveland  Commission  is  merely 
typical  of  others  which  have  been  previously  appointed.  As  the 
result  of  their  investigations  much  valuable  information  has  been 
acquired,  but  constructive  work  of  correcting  the  defects  disclosed 
has  been  curiously  lacking. 

5.  The  foregoing  facts  are  cited  as  indicating  the  magnitude  and 
character  of  the  investigation  necessary  to  ascertain  the  data  desired 
by  the  Secretary  of  War.  It  is  apparent  that  many  months  must 
elapse  before  the  data  essential  to  a  proper  analysis  can  be  gathered 
and  put  into  budgetary  form,  which  must  be  done  before  items  can 
be  studied  by  themselves  and  in  their  relationship  to  other  items. 

6.  House  of  Representatives  Document  No.  854,  Sixty-second  Con- 
gress, second  session,  publishes  a  report  of  the  President's  Commis- 
sion on  Economy  and  Efficiency,  entitled  "  The  Need  for  a  National 
Budget."  A  study  of  this  document  leads  convincingly  to  the  con- 
clusion that  the  budgetary  form  of  presenting  fiscal  data  is  the  only 
means  by  which  either  the  national  or  a  departmental  executive  may 
be  apprised  of  the  nature  and  purpose  of  past  and  proposed  expendi- 
tures, and  so  be  enabled  to  intelligently  judge  of  their  necessity. 

7.  The  conclusions  arrived  at  by  the  Economy  and  Efficiency  Com- 
mittee concerning  departmental  methods  of  transacting  business 
are  summed  up  in  a  report  dated  December  18,  1912,  which,  for  the 
reason  that  funds  were  not  available  for  continuing  the  work,  un- 
fortunately proved  to  be  the  final  report.  The  opinion  expressed 
is  to  the  effect  that  public  business  is  carried  on  "at  a  very  high 

511 


cost";  that  methods  of  accounting  in  all  departments  are  such  that 
data  are  not  readily  available;  and  that  a  proper  balance, between 
economy  of  expenditure  and  efficiency  of  operation  can  only  be  main- 
tained by  "  building  up  a  ■permanent  organization  "  as  a  constructing 
and  responsible  agency  "  continuously  at  work." 

8.  Discontinuous  investigations  may  disclose  unnecessary  past  ex- 
penditures. They  can  not  insure  against  current  or  future  waste 
in  a  different  quarter.  The  fundamental  step  in  the  "elimination 
of  unnecessary  expense"  is,  therefore,  the  organization  of  a  perma- 
nent agency  to  carry  on  continuous  investigation. 

9.  So  far  as  the  War  Department  is  concerned,  Congress  provided 
by  the  act  approved  February  14,  1903,  a  permanent  agency  equipped 
with  all  the  legal  powers  necessary  to  properly  supervise  expendi- 
tures. Full  advantage  has  never  been  taken  of  this,  however,  to  set 
the  economic  side  of  this  machinery  in  motion  by  the  exercise  of 
executive  action.  Each  disbursing  agency  within  the  War  Depart- 
ment continues  to  operate  independently  of  the  others ;  and  although 
the  sanction  of  law  exists,  a  continuous  investigation  of  the  economic 
side  of  handling  funds  and  the  corresponding  constructive  work  of 
balancing  economy  against  efficiency  by  the  annual  preparation  of  a 
budget  has  never  been  instituted. 

10.  A  presumption  is  thus  created,  strong  enough  to  warrant  as- 
suming it  to  be  true,  that  wastage  still  occurs  regardless  of  the  ex- 
cellence of  the  business  methods  of  each  individual  disbursing 
agency. 

11.  As  the  initial  and  only  step  possible  at  the  present  time  look- 
ing toward  the  elimination  of  unnecessary  expense,  a  division  or 
continuing  committee  of  the  General  Staff  Corps  should  be  em- 
powered and  instructed  to  pursue  a  continuous  investigation  of  this 
subject ;  and  should  be  made  the  responsible  agency  for  the  prepara- 
tion of  an  annual  budget  in  such  form  as  will  make  possible  a  more 
comprehensive  supervision  over  the  estimates  than  can  now  be  exer- 
cised. 

12.  When  this  has  been  accomplished  the  preparation  of  full  de- 
tailed information  will  become  a  matter  of  routine,  and  constructive 
v^'ork  may  anticipate  instead  of  follow  expenditures.  The  need  for 
intermittent  investigations  will  disappear  and  a  full  understanding 
of  past,  present,  and  proposed  operations,  together  with  the  inci- 
dental expense  attached  thereto,  will  become  possible. 

511 

o 


I 


FINANCES  AND  COSTS  OF  THE  PRESENT 
EUROPEAN  WAR 


PREPARED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION,  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

AS   A   SUPPLEMENT   TO    THE    STATEMENT    OF   A   PROPER   MILITARY 

POLICY  FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES 


WCD  9287-1 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE  :  WASHINGTON 

NOVEMBER,  1915 


512 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFIOE 

1916 


War  Department, 

Document  No.  512. 

Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff. 


I 


SYNOPSIS. 


Introduction. 

Page. 

1.  Policy  employed  in  financing  the  war 5 

(a)  Great  Britain 5 

(6)  France 5 

(c)  Russia 6 

(d)  Italy 6 

(e)  Belgium 6 

(f)  Serbia 6 

(g)  Japan 6 

(h)  Germany 6 

^          (i)  Austria-Hungary 8 

■         (k)  Turkey 8 

2.  Cost  of  the  war  (Tables  1  and  2) 9-10 

(a)  Great  Britain 9 

(6)  France 9 

(c)  Russia 9 

(rf)  Italy 9 

(e)  Belgium 9 

(/)  Serbia 9 

(g)  Japan 9 

(h)  Germany 10 

(i)  Austria-Hungary 10 

(k)  Turkey 10 

3.  Number  and  amount  of  domestic  loans  (Table  3) 10-11 

(a)  Great  Britain 10 

(6)  France 10 

(c)  Russia 10 

(rf)  Italy 10 

»{e)  Belgium 10 

(J)  Serbia 10 

(g)  Japan 10 

(h)  Germany 11 

(t)  Austria-Hungary 11 

(k)  Turkey 11 

4.  Number  and  amount  of  foreign  loans  (Table  4) 11 

(a)  Great  Britain 11 

(b)  France 11 

(c)  Russia 11 

(d)  Italy 11 

(e)  Belgium 11 

(J)  Serbia 11 

{g)  Japan 11 

(h)  Germany 11 

(i)  Austria-Hungaiy 11 

(k)  Turkey 11 

5.  Total  and  per  capita  national  wealth ;  national  debts 11 

Table  5 11 


30669°— No.  512—16 


(3) 


FINANCES  AND  COSTS  OF  THE  PRESENT  EUROPEAN 

WAR. 


INTRODUCTION. 

A  careful  search  of  the  files  of  the  War  College  has  been  made 
for  data  covering  the  various  points  of  the  study.  The  results  are 
embodied  in  the  following  pages.  As  was  to  have  been  expected, 
accurate  data  are  almost  wdiolly  lacking,  and  such  as  have  been 
secured  are  of  doubtful  accuracy.  The  various  warring  nations  are 
naturally  not  publishing  information  on  this  subject  at  this  time, 
and  the  majority  of  the  figures  quoted  in  the  following  pages  are 
little  better  than  estimates. 

1.  POLICY  EMPLOYED  IN  FINANCING  THE  WAR. 

(a)  Great  Britain. — Prior  to  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  Great 
Britain  had  made  no  plans  for  putting  the  country  upon  a  sound 
financial  basis  for  war.  The  Imperial  Government  was  as  unpre- 
pared to  meet  the  financial  emergency  caused  by  the  war  as  it  was 
to  oppose  the  trained  armies  of  central  Europe  Avith  an  adequate 
number  of  properly  trained  and  equipped  troops.  Since  the  begin- 
ning of  hostilities  England  has  endeavored  to  meet  the  situation  by 
laying  heavy  taxes  on  imports,  "  war  profits,"  incomes,  spirits,  tea, 
etc.,  and  in  some  cases  the  taxes  on  incomes  have  amounted  to  33  per 
cent.  The  increased  income  derived  from  these  sources  has,  of  course, 
proven  utterly  inadequate  to  provide  the  huge  sums  necessary  for  the 
maintenance  of  the  Government  and  the  prosecution  of  the  war. 
Great  Britain  has  therefore  been  obliged  to  borrow  extensively,  and 
according  to  the  best  available  information  the  amount  she  has  ob- 
tained in  this  way  at  home  since  the  beginning  of  the  war  is  approxi- 
mately $5,489,000,000.  Her  foreign  war  loans  aggregate  approxi- 
mately $250,000,000. 

England  has  joined  wdth  France  and  Russia  in  providing  a  fund 
of  $200,000,000  for  meeting  in  part  the  war  expenses  of  Belgium, 
Japan,  and  Serbia,  and  in  addition  it  is  believed  has  loaned  Belgium 
$50,000,000  and  Serbia  $4,000,000  without  interest  until  the  end  of 
the  war. 

(h)  France. — The  outbreak  of  hostilities  in  August,  1914,  found 
France  w^ell  prepared  financially  to  enter  the  war.    For  some  years 

512 

(5) 


6 

prior  thereto  France,  like  Germany  and  Russia,  had  been  building 
up  a  war  reserve  which,  when  war  came,  enabled  her  to  put  her  well- 
trained  and  equipped  armies  into  the  field  with  the  assurance  that 
for  a  time  at  least  there  Avas  no  fear  of  a  lack  of  funds  for  the  prose- 
cution of  the  war.  However,  it  soon  became  apparent  that  France, 
like  all  other  nations  involved  in  the  war,  must  resort  to  borrowing 
to  meet  the  enormous  expenses  of  the  situation.  Since  the  war  began 
France  has  borrowed  at  home  approximately  $1,680,000,000.  A  por- 
tion of  this  sum  was  obtained  directly  from  the  French  people,  who 
subscribed  liberally  to  what  was  known  as  National-Defense  Bonds, 
which  ran  for  from  6  to  12  months  and  bore  interest  at  5  per  cent. 
A  later  domestic  loan  which  made  up  the  total  sum  borrowed  at 
home  was  floated  through  the  Bank  of  France  in  the  form  of  bonds 
for  a  term  of  years  and  bearing  interest  at  5  per  cent.  Later,  in 
order  to  secure  gold  for  purchases  abroad,  the  Government  called 
upon  the  people  to  exchange  bullion  for  paper  currency  and  even  to 
turn  into  the  treasury  gold  ornaments,  jewelry,  etc.  The  response 
to  these  requests  Avas  most  patriotic. 

France  has  also  joined  with  England  in  negotiating  in  the  United 
States  a  loan  of  $500,000,000  at  5  per  cent,  and  has  contributed  to  a 
fund  of  $"200,000,000  to  meet  in  part  the  war  expenses  of  Belgium, 
Japan,  and  Serbia.  Her  other  foreign*  loans  aggregate  $148,000,000, 
and  are  shown  in  more  detail  imder  (b)  Table  4. 

(c)  Russia. — Russia  had  accumulated  a  large  war  reserve  at  the 
outbreak  of  hostilities.  Part  of  this  reserve  which  was  on  deposit  in 
Berlin  was  withdrawn  during  the  week  preceding  the  war.  The  in- 
creased expenses  due  to  the  war  are  being  met  by  increasing  the 
rates  of  taxes  already  in  force  and  by  borrowing.  So  far  as  known, 
Russia  since  the  beginning  of  the  war  has  made  three  domestic 
loans  aggregating  about  $1,339,000,000.  She  has  also  joined  with 
England  and  France  in  providing  a  fund  of  $200,000,000  to  meet 
in  part  the  war  expenses  of  Belgium,  Japan,  and  Serbia. 

(d)  Italy. — No  data  are  available  respecting  the  financial  policy 
of  Italy  or  the  measures  so  far  adopted  to  meet  war  conditions. 
She  has  borrowed  about  $425,000,000. 

(e)  Belgium. — Nothing  is  known  of  the  policy  of  Belgium  with 
respect  to  financing  the  war  except  that  she  has  been  aided  by  Great 
Britain,  France,  and  Russia,  as  already  stated.  She  has,  however, 
been  aided  by  Great  Britain  by  a  loan  of  $50,000,000  without  interest. 

(/)  Serbia. — Same  as  for  Belgium.  Great  Britain  has  loaned 
Serbia  $4,000,000  Avithout  interest. 

{g)  Japan. — No  data  available. 

{h)  Germany. — The  following  abstract  of  a  description  of  the 
German  method  of  financing  the  present  war,  by  Roland  G.  Usher, 

512 


in  the  December,  1914,  issue  of  the  Atlantic  Monthly,  is  given  as 
the  best  and  clearest  exposition  of  the  subject  yet  available: 

Great  sums  of  ready  money  have  invariably  been  needed  in  Anglo-Saxon 
countries  in  order  to  begin  a  war,  because  those  countries  have  invariably 
been  caught  unprepared.  The  Government  has  lacked  not  only  the  necessary 
materials,  but  the  knowledge  of  their  whereabouts,  and  has  had  to  find  them 
by  ordinary  business  methods,  which  meant  buying  them  in  open  market 
with  money.  England  and  the  United  States  have  always  obtained  in  the 
same  way  the  supplies  and  munitions  needed  to  prosecute  war  and  have  always 
found  an  abundant  supply  of  stable  currency  the  indispensable  nexus  between 
the  Government   and   its  citizens  by  whom   the  commodities  were  produced. 

German  statesmen  and  financiers  have,  however,  arrived  at  an 
entirely  different  solution  of  the  question.  The  German  system  of 
"  financing  "  war  depends  upon  the  following : 

The  army  requires  Truderwd  for  its  use  and  maintenance  as  does  the 
nation  at  large,  and  steps  were  taken  in  time  of  peace  to  insure  the 
supply  of  this  material  upon  the  outbreak  and  continuance  of  war. 

Certain  supplies  Germany  did  not  and  could  not  produce  and 
those  supplies  were  purchased  and  stored  in  quantity  before  the 
outbreak  of  war.  The  vast  supplies  necessary  at  the  outbreak  of 
war  and  before  their  manufacture  could  be  increased  were  also 
purchased  and  stored. 

Certain  other  supplies  Germany  did  not  produce  in  normal  times 
or  did  not  produce  them  in  the  quantity  sufficient  for  prosecuting 
war.  These  supplies  could  be  produced,  however,  if  adequate  prepa- 
ration were  made  therefor  in  advance. 

Supplies  of  both  the  above  classes  would  be  necessary  not  only 
for.  the  use  of  the  army,  but  for  the  nation  at  large  as  well. 

In  order  to  gather  the  class  of  supplies  which  she  could  not  pro- 
duce at  any  time,  capital  was  necessary  with  which  to  purchase 
them.  Capital  was  also  necessary  for  the  purpose  of  subsidizing 
manufactures  for  the  supply  of  materials  which  would  be  needed 
in  increased  quantities  in  time  of  war  and  which  required  special 
machinery  and  skilled  labor  for  their  production.  To  secure  this 
capital  Germany  imposed  before  the  outbreak  of  war  a  "  war  levy," 
which  was  a  direct  tax,  amounting  to  $250,000,000,  which,  they  ex- 
plained, was  necessary  to  render  the  army  efficient.  With  the  capital 
thus  obtained  she  "  purchased  in  Germany  and  abroad  every  con- 
ceivable sort  of  supplies  necessary  to  put  the  nation  in  position  nec- 
essary to  make  war." 

As  Germany  employs  the  system  of  universal  military  service,  she 
can  tell  just  what  men  wnll  be  called  away  from  their  usual  pursuits 
upon  the  outbreak  of  war.  She  knew  in  advance,  therefore,  just 
what  men  would  have  to  be  replaced  by  individuals  not  to  be  called 
to  the  colors  in  order  to  provide  for  the  supply  of  commodities  neces- 

512 


8 

sary  during  war.  She  therefore  subsidized  manufactures  in  order 
to  enable  them  to  place  in  the  factories  the  machinery  which  would 
be  required  during  war  and  to  train  enough  additional  labor  for 
operating  the  machinery — the  additional  laborers  to  consist  of  indi- 
viduals who  were  not  to  be  called  to  the  colors. 

In  this  manner  Germany  prepared  in  peace  for  the  supplies  she 
would  need  in  war. 

Money  in  time  of  war,  as  at  any  other  time,  the  Germans  concluded,  meant 
currency,  and  currency  meant  some  medium  of  excliange  wliicli  would  be 
accepted  by  the  people  at  face  value.  So  long  as  the  public  confidence  in  the* 
Government  was  unshaken  and  ultimate  success  was  believed  certain,  a  paper 
currency  would  serve  the  purpose  much  better  than  specie.  The  banking  sys- 
tem, to  be  sure,  collected  gold  as  assiduously  as  it  could  during  the  months 
preceding  the  war  and  is  supposed  to  have  vastly  increased  tlie  German  gold 
reserve,  which  was  to  give  stability  to  the  paper  currency  and  furnish  a  firm 
basis  for  such  international  exchange  as  they  might  eventually  find  necessary. 
The  central  banking  system,  however,  *  *  *  could  absolutely  control  all 
exchange,  could  accept  as  collateral  for  loans  whatever  the  individual  had  to 
offer  and  issue  him  paper  credits.  There  would  be  plenty  of  real  value  because 
there  would  be  plenty  of  real  work ;  the  Government  would  see  to  that. 

The  banks  would  make  loans  to  the  manufactui-er  and  establish  a  checking 
account  on  which  they  would  pay  him  paper,  which  in  time  he  would  pay  his 
employees,  w'ho  would  pay  it  out  for  commodities.  The  dealers  would  pay  it 
l)ack  into  the  banks,  when  the  whole  transaction  would,  as  usual,  be  canceled. 

In  this  way  Germany  is  attempting  to  avoid  the  necessity  for 
borrowing  the  vast  sums  from  neutral  countries  which  the  other 
warring  nations  are  apparently  going  to  have  to  do. 

The  bond  issues  which  she  has  made  are  not  concerned  with  the 
war  itself  so  much  as  with  the  necessary  readjustments  after  the 
war  is  over. 

As  observers  we  are  not  yet  in  a  position  to  pass  upon  the  ultimate  validity 
of  these  measures.  We  can  only  point  out  that  they  seem  to  conform  accu- 
rately to  the  experience  of  history  and  to  be  nothing  more  than  the  literal 
application  of  the  simple  postulates  of  political  economy.  So  far  as  we  can 
tell,  if  private  letters  are  any  evidence  of  what  conditions  in  Germany  at  pres- 
ent are,  every  indication  points  toward  the  overwhelming  success  of  German 
finance. 

(^)  Austria-Hungary. — No  data  are  available  concerning  the  plans 
o'f  the  Government  of  Austria-Hungary  for  financing  the  war.  It 
is  known  that  she  has  borrowed  money  and  that  her  first  loan  was 
made  quietly  through  the  banks,  but  the  amount  so  obtained  and  the 
rate  of  interest  paid  are  not  definitely  known.  Her  total  domestic 
loans  amount  to  $1,181,000,000.  No  further  data  concerning  the 
financial  transactions  of  Austria-Hungary  are  available. 

{k)  Turkey. — It  is  reported  that  Turkey  has  received  material 
financial  aid  from  Germany  in  the  form  of  a  loan  of  $250,000,000. 
No  other  data  concerning  the  financial  policy  and  transactions  of 
Turkey  are  available. 

512 


I 


2.  COST  OF  THE  WAR. 

In  so  far  as  this  can  be  ascertained,  it  is  shown  by  Tables  1  and  2 
appended,  Table  1  giving  what  is  known  of  the  total  cost  to  date 
and  Table  2  the  daily  cost  at  the  periods  stated.  These  figures  are 
only  estimates,  of  course,  and,  as  it  is  generally  conceded  that  the 
war  is  becoming  increasingly  costly,  are  probably  far  below  the 
actual  amounts  at  this  time. 

3.  NUMBER  AND  AMOUNT  OF  DOMESTIC  LOANS. 

The  number  and  amount  of  domestic  loans,  in  so  far  as  they  can 
be  ascertained,  are  shown  in  Table  3.  It  must  be  understood  that 
the  information  on  this  subject  comes  from  various  newspapers  and 
that  its  accuracy  can  not  be  vouched  for. 

4.  NUMBER  AND  AMOUNT  OF  FOREIGN  LOANS. 

This  information  is  contained  in  Table  4.  With  the  exception  of 
the  Anglo-French  loan  made  in  the  United  States,  the  same  remarks 
as  to  the  validity  of  the  information  applies  here  as  in  the  case  of 
domestic  loans. 

5.  A  TABLE  SHOWING  TOTAL  AND  PER  CAPITA  NATIONAL  WEALTH 
OF  VARIOUS  NATIONS  AT  THE  BEGINNING  OF  THE  WAR;  ALSO 
NATIONAL  DEBTS  IN  1914  AND  ESTIMATED  AMOUNTS  IN  1916. 

Table  1. — Cost  of  the  war. 

(a)  Great  ^W^arn.— $3,525,000,000  for  one  year  only.  (Collier's 
Weekly,  Nov.  6-15,  p.  11.) 

Note. — To  this  amount  shoulrl  be  added  some  portion  of  $200,000,000  furnislied 
to  Belgium,  Serbia,  and  Japan  jointly  by  Great  Britain,  Russia,  and  France. 

{h)  /'m7^ce.— $1,750,000,000  for  period  April  1,  1915,  to  August 
1,  1915.     (Review  of  Reviews,  April,  1915,  p.  452.) 

Note. — To  this  amount  should  be  added  some  portion  of  .$200,000,000  furnished 
to  Belgium,  Serbia,  and  Japan  by  Great  Britain,  Russia,  and  France. 

(c)  7?wssm.— $2,000,000,000  for  period  April  1,  1915,  to  August  1, 
1915.     (Review  of  Reviews,  April,  1915,  p.  452.) 

Note. — To  this  amount  should  be  added  some  portion  of  $200,000,000  furnished 
to  Belgium,  Serbia,  and  Japan  by  Great  Britain,  Russia,  and  France. 

{d)  Italy.— $S00, 000, 000  for  period  April  1,  1915,  to  August  1, 

1915.  (Review  of  Reviews,  April,  1915,  p.  452.) 

(e)  Belgium. — No  data. 

(/)  Serbia^ — No  data. 

{g)  Jayan. — No  data. 

512 


10 

(A)  Germany. — $2,500,000,000  (includes  Turkey's  expenditures) 
for  period  April  1,  1915,  to  August  1,  1915.  (Keview  of  Reviews, 
April,  1915,  p.  452.) 

(^)  Austna-B\mgwni.—%\,hm,^^^,m^  for  period  April  1,  1915,  to 
August  1,  1915.     (Review  of  Reviews,  April,  1915,  p.  452.) 

(7l)   Turkey. — See  Germany. 

Table  2. — Daily  cost  of  the  war. 

(a)  Great  Britain.— $U,100,000  (Collier's  Weekly,  Nov.  6,  1915, 
p.  11).    Present  time. 

(h)  Frawe.— $7,000,000  (Literary  Digest,  Dec.  5,  1914,  p.  1151). 
During  August,  September,  and  October,  1914. 

(<?)  Russia. — No  data. 

(d)  Italy. — No  data. 

(e)  Belgium. — No  data. 
(/)  Serbia. — No  data. 
{g)  Jaqmn. — No  data. 

(A)   Germany.— %^, 000, 000  to  $7,000,000  (Literary  Digest,  Dec.  5, 
1914,  p.  1152).    Prior  to  December,  1914. 
{i)  Austria-Hungary. — No  data. 
{k)   Turkey. — No  data. 

Table  3. — Domestic  loans. 

[Except  when  otherwise  noted,  the  figures  for  this  table  were  talien  from  the  Literary 
Digest,  Nov.  20,  1915,  p.  1198,  quoting  New  York  Times  Annalist.] 

{a)   Great  Britain. — 

Bonds  .3*  per  cent  (10  to  13  years  sold  at  95) $],  750,  000,  000 

Bonds  4i  per  cent 2,  925,  000,  000 

Five-year  exchequer  .Ss 2.39,  000,000 

Treasury  bills    (2|   per  cent  to   33    per  cent),   six   mont'is 

(estimated  as  now  outstanding) 575,000,  000 

Note. — Wlien  the  41  per  cent  loan  was  made  the  rate  of  interest  on  all  preceding  loans 
was  voluntarily  raised  to  4J  per  cent,  with  the  promise  that  if  further  loans  at  higher 
rates  of  interest  became  necessary  all  prior  loans  should  boar  such  higher  rates. 

{!>)  France. — 

Bonds,  national  defense,  5  per  cent  (6  to  12  months) $1,  2.30,  000,  000 

Bonds,  Treasury,  5  per  cent  (a  term  of  years) 450,000,000 

((?)  Russia. — 

Bonds  5  per  cent $515,  000,  000 

Bonds  5J  per  cent 515,  000,  000 

Bonds  4  per  cent 309,  000,  000 

Treasury  bills  at  home  and  in  England  and  France 1,  252,  000,  000 

{d)  Italy. — 

Bonds  5J  per  cent $200,  000,  000 

Bonds  41  per  cent 200,000,000 

{e)  Belgium. — No  data  available. 
(/)  Serbia. — No  data  available. 
{g)  Japan. — No  data  available. 

512 


11 


{h)   Germany. — 

First  war  loan  js $1,115,000,000 

Second  war  loan  5's 2,265,000,000 

Third  war  loan  5's 3,025,000,000 

{i)  Austria- Hungary. — 

Austrian  bonds  5*  per  cent $433,  000,  000 

Hungarian  bonds  6  per  cent 237,000,000 

War  loans,  credits,  etc 1,161,000,000 

{k)   Turkey. — Xo  data  available. 

Table  4. — Foreign  loans. 

r Except  when  otherwise  noted,  the  figures  for  this  table  were  taken  from  the  Literary 
Digest,  Nov.  20,  1915,  p.  1198,  quoting  New  York  Times  Annalist.] 

{a)   Great  Britain. — 

One-half  of  Anglo-French  credit  in   New   York   5   per   cent 

bonds ^_ .$250,  000,  000 

(5)  France. — 

One-year  5  per  cent  notes  in  London L $50,  000,  000 

One-year  5  per  cent  notes  in  New  Y'ork 25,  000,  000 

Credits  and  collateral  loan  in  New  York 73,  000,  000 

One-half  Anglo-French  loan  in  New  York 250,000,000 

(c)  Russia. — See  "Treasury  bills,"'  etc.,  under  (c)  Eussia,  table  3. 

{d)  Italy. — Loan  now  being  placed  in  New  York,  $25,000,000. 

{e)  Belgium. — $50,000,000  loaned  by  British  Government  during 
the  war  without  interest. 

(/)  Serbia. — $4,000,000  loaned  by  British  Government  during  the 
war  without  interest. 

{g)  Japan. — No  data  available. 

{h)  Germany. — 

Notes  in  United  States__^ $10,  000,  000 

(/)  Austria-Hungary. — No  data  available. 
(/i)   Turkey. — 

Loan  in  Germany $250,000,000 

Table  5. 


(o)  Great  Britain 
(6)  France , 

(c)  Russia 

(d)  Italy 

(f)  Belgium 

(/)  Serbia 


National  Per  capita 

wealth  at  be-       wealth  at  be- 
ginning of  war.    ginning  of  war. 


$85,000,000,000 
50, 000, 000, 000 
40, 000, 000, 000 
20, 000, 000, 000 
9,000,000,000 
500,000,000 


(?) 
(7) 


$1,777 

1,625 

250 

588 


National 
wealth  at  be- 
ginning of  war. 


Per  capita 
wealth  at  be- 
ginning of  war. 


(o)  Japan  i . . 

(ft)  Germany S80, 000, 000, 000 

(t)  Austria- Him- 

garv 

(fc)  Turkey 


25,000,000,000 
3,000,000,000 


(?) 


S923 


NATIONAL  DEBT. 


(o)  Great  Britain. 
(6)  France 

(c)  Russia 

(d)  Italy 

(f)  Belgium 

(/)  Serbia 


1916 


S3, 485, 000, 000 
6,345,000,000 
4, 540, 000, 000 
2, 850, 000, 000 
825, 000, 000 
125, 000, 000 


$11,000,000,000 

9, 500, 000, 000 

6,500,000,000 

3,000,000,000 

825, 000, 000 

125, 000, 000 


(o)  Japani ; 

(ft)  Germany $3, 735, 000, 0(Xt 

(i)  Austria- Hun-  ■     ■ 

gary 1,050,000,000 

(fc)  Turkey 675,000,000 


1916 


$9,985,000,000 

2,000,000,000 
675,000,000 


512 


•  No  data  available. 


o 


FORTIFICATIONS 


PREPARED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION,  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

AS    A    SUPPLEMENT    TO    THE    STATEMENT    OF    A    PROPER   MILITARY 

POLICY  FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES 


WCD  4896-4 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE  :  WASHINGTON 

NOVEMBER,   1915 


513 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFIOE 

1916 


War  Department, 

Document  No.  513. 

Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff . 


I 


I 


SYNOPSIS. 


I.  Introduction. 

Page. 

1.  Influence  of  forta  and  fortified  cities,  as  distinguished  from  intrenched  areas, 

upon  operations  on  land 5 

Fortifications  of  Liege 5 

Fortifications  of  Namur  and  along  the  French  frontier 6 

Antwerp ^ 

Verdun 7 

Przemysl  and  the  Russian  fortifications 7 

The  fortified  city  of  the  futiu-e 8 

2.  Influence  of  seacoast  fortifications  with  particular  reference  to  the  attack  by 

allied  fleet  on  Dardanelles  fortifications 10 

Description  of  the  Dardanelles 10 

Fortifications  of  the  Dardanelles 10 

(a)  Power  of  the  guns 11 

(6)  Character  of  the  batteries 12 

Reduction  of  the  forts  at  the  entrance 12 

Operations  against  the  forts  at  the  narrows 13 

Final  attack  of  March  18 13 

Efficiency  of  seacoast  fortifications 14 

Requisites  for  successful  defense 15 

Necessity  for  mobile  troops 15 

3.  Summary  of  attempt  to  take  Dardanelles  fortifications  by  mobile  troops 16 

Initial  delay 16 

Terrain 17 

Strength  of  forces 17 

Allies'  plan 17 

Landings  at  south  end  of  peninsula 18 

Landing  by  the  Australian-New  Zealand  corps 19 

Diversion  by  the  French 19 

Attempts  to  advance 19 

Landing  at  Suvla  Bay  and  subsequent  operations 20 

Necessity  for  heavy  mobile  guns 21 

The  value  of  mobile  troops  in  coast  defense 21 

513  (3) 


i 


FORTIFICATIONS. 


I.   INTRODUCTION. 

In  a  memorandum  from  the  Chief  of  Staff  dated  November  15, 
1915,  directions  were  given  for  the  preparation  of  a  brochure  upon 
the  subject  of  "Fortifications,"  with  sole  reference  to  the  present 
European  war,  giving  especial  attention  to  the  following  points: 

(a)  What  influence  forts  and  fortified  cities,  as  distinguished  from 
intrenched  areas,  have  exerted  on  the  operations  on  land. 

(b)  Influence  of  seacoast  fortifications  with  particular  reference 
to  the  attack  of  the  allied  fleet  against  the  fortifications  of  the  Dar- 
danelles. Give  in  detail  the  total  armament,  with  calibers  of  arms  of 
the  fleet  as  well  as  of  the  land  forts,  and  the  losses  in  personnel  and 
material  suffered  by  both  fleets  and  forts. 

(c)  A  brief  summary  of  the  attempt  to  take  these  forts  by  the 
operation  of  the  mobile  troops ;  the  number  of  mobile  troops,  as  near 
as  can  be  determined,  used  to  date,  both  in  the  attack  and  in  the 
defense,  with  total  losses. 

This  has  been  done  as  far  as  practicable  with  the  data  now  avail- 
able, and  the  results  are  noted  in  the  following  paragraphs : 

1.  INFLUENCE  OF  FORTS  AND  FORTIFIED  CITIES,  AS  DISTIN- 
GUISHED FROM  INTRENCHED  AREAS,  UPON  OPERATIONS  ON 
LAND. 

FGRTin CATIONS  OF  LIEGE. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  present  European  war  the  Germans,  in 
their  march  through  Belgium,  were,  on  the  evening  of  August  4, 
1914,  closing  in  on  Liege,  which  lies  astride  the  Meuse  River  near 
the  eastern  boundary  of  Belgium.  The  fortifications  of  Liege  had 
been  constructed  by  Brialment,  a  Belgian  officer,  who  also  designed 
the  fortifications  of  Namur  and  Antwerp.  They  were  completed  in 
1892,  and  consisted  of  a  circle  of  forts  commanding  the  main  ap- 
proaches to  the  city  and  about  4  miles  therefrom.  There  were  six 
main  forts  of  the  pentagonal  type  and  six  smaller,  triangular  in 
shape;  the  greatest  distance  between  forts  was  7,000  yards,  and  the 
average  less  than  4,000  yards.  Each  fort  had  a  garrison  of  about  80 
men  and  an  armament  of  two  6-inch  guns,  four  4.7-inch  guns,  two 
8-inch  mortars,  and  three  or  four  quick-fire  guns,  the  total  number 
of  guns  in  the  12  forts  being  about  400.    It  was  intended  to  construct 

513 

(5) 


between  the  forts  lines  of  trenches  and  redoubts  for  infantry  and 
gun  pits  for  artillery,  but  this  had  not  been  done. 

The  fort  itself  consisted  of  a  low  mound  of  concrete  or  masonry, 
roofed  with  concrete  and  covered  with  earth;  a  deep  ditch  sur- 
rounded the  mound,  the  top  of  the  latter  barely  showing  above  the 
margin  of  the  ditch.  The  top  was  pierced  with  circular  pits,  in 
which  "  cupolas  "  or  gun  turrets  moved  up  and  down.  Within  the 
mound  there  were  quarters,  machinery,  stores,  etc. 

When  the  Germans  appeared  the  Belgian  mobilization  was  still  in 
progress,  and  it  is  probable  that  the  garrison,  instead  of  being  30,000 
as  was  intended,  was  only  20,000.  The  Germans,  numbering  about 
30,000,  concentrated  the  attack  on  the  four  forts  at  the  southeast 
sector  and  opened  up  with  field  gims  on  the  night  of  August  4—5. 
One  of  the  forts  was  silenced  by  this  fire  on  the  5th,  and  on  the  6th 
the  Germans  brought  up  their  8.4-inch  howitzers  and  probably  some 
11-inch  mortars,  outranging  the  Belgian  gims.  Shells  are  said  to 
have  gone  through  12  feet  of  concrete.  The  accurate  firing  of  the 
Germans  showed  that  the  forts  could  not  long  withstand,  and  in  the 
afternoon  of  the  6th  the  Belgian  field  force  was  withdrawn  from  the 
city  and  all  the  forts  abandoned  except  the  northern  ones.  The  Ger- 
mans left  the  remaining  forts  in  peace  until  the  13th,  when  the 
11-inch  mortars  opened  on  them,  and  by  the  15th  all  had  been  cap- 
tured. The  cupplas  had  been  smashed  and  shells  had  penetrated  the 
roofs  and  exploded  the  magazines. 

FORTIFICATIONS  OF  NAMUR  AND  ALONG  THE  FRENCH  FRONTIER. 

Namur  was  defended  by  a  ring  of  nine  forts,  2|  miles  from  the 
city,  with  an  armament  similar  to  that  in  the  Liege  forts.  The 
garrison  of  26,000  had  prepared  the  defense  of  the  interA^als  by  in- 
trenchments  and  wire  entanglements,  and  a  vigorous  defense  was 
intended,  as  French  help  was  expected.  The  Germans  brought  up 
32  modern  siege  pieces,  including  the  42-centimeter  howitzer,  its 
first  appearance,  and  the  Austrian  12-inch  mortar,  and  placed  them 
3  miles  from  the  Belgian  lines.  The  attack  began  August  20.  On 
the  next  day  the  Belgians  had  to  withdraw  from  the  advanced 
trenches  owing  to  their  inability  to  reply  to  the  German  fire;  two 
forts  fell;  three  others  were  silenced  after  an  attack  of  two  hours. 
On  the  23d  Namur  was  occupied,  and  on  the  25th  the  last  fort  had 
fallen.  One  fort  had  fired  only  10  times  and  was  itself  struck  by 
1,200  shells  fired  at  the  rate  of  20  per  minute.  The  speedy  fall  of 
Namur  came  near  playing  havoc  with  the  allies'  plans,  as  with  the 
delay  caused  by  its  resistance  they  had  intended  to  complete  the 
concentration  along  the  Belgian  frontier. 

513 


Other  fortified  places,  such  as  Lille,  Laon,  La  Fere,  and  Rheims, 
along  the  northeastern  French  boundary  fell  before  the  advancing 
Germans  without  striking  a  blow.  The  advance  was  on  such  a  broad 
front  that  an  attempt  at  defense  would  have  endangered  the  safety 
of  the  garrisons,  and  it  was  imperative  that  the  garrisons  join  the 
field  army.  By  August  28  Mauberge  of  all  the  northern  strong- 
holds alone  held  out.  The  defenses  had  been  brought  to  a  high 
state  of  efficiency,  the  intervals  well  prepared  with  an  armored  train 
running  on  a  track  encircling  the  main  line  of  defenses.  The  German 
infantry  invested  the  place  August  27,  but  the  siege  guns  did  not 
go  into  action  until  September  3.  The  place  fell  September  8  with 
a  loss  of  40,000  men. 

ANTWERP. 

Antwerp,  said  to  be  the  second  most  strongly  fortified  city  of 
Europe,  encircled  by  a  girdle  of  20  permanent  forts  and  12  earthen 
redoubts,  was  in  similar  manner  quickly  reduced  by  the  heavy  siege 
guns.  The  garrison,  beginning  to  profit  by  the  lessons  learned  at 
Liege  and  Namur,  attempted  to  keep  the  enemy's  big  howitzers 
beyond  range  of  the  forts,  but  were  driven  back  by  the  superior 
numbers  of  the  Germans,  whose  siege  gims  were  then  brought  up 
and  quickly  demolished  the  masonry  forts.  Thus  the  garrison: 
was  deprived  of  any  further  assistance  from  its  larger  guns  and, 
being  but  poorly  entrenched  and  unable  to  withstand  the  overwhelm- 
ing artillery  fire,  was  forced  back  to  the  inner  line,  thereby  per- 
mitting the  siege  guns  to  come  within  range  of  the  city,  which  had 
therefore  to  be  abandoned  promptly  in  order  to  prevent  its  destruc- 
tion by  bombardment. 

VERDUN. 

Verdun,  however,  on  the  eastern  French  frontier,  with  a  ring  of 
forts  5  miles  from  the  city,  is  still  in  the  hands  of  the  French, 
because  with  a  field  army  employing  earthworks  the  fortified  zone 
has  been  largely  extended  and  the  German  howitzers  have  been  kept 
6  miles  from  the  forts.  The  unfortified  city  of  Nancy  has  withstood 
several  heavy  attacks,  being  protected  by  a  field  army  on  the  hills 
forming  the  "  Grand  Crown." 

PRZEMYSL  AND  THE  RUSSIAN  FORTIFICATIONS. 

The  Russians  invested  the  fortress  of  Przemysl  on  September  22, 
1914,  but  later  the  siege  was  raised  and  on  November  12  it  was 
invested  a  second  time.  As  the  Russians  had  no  heavy  siege  gims,  the 
siege  resulted  in  an  attempt  to  starve  out  the  garrison,  which  suc- 

513 


8 

ceeded  March  22,  1915.  With  the  return  of  the  Teutonic  allies  in 
May,  20  days  was  sufficient  to  recapture  the  place.  The  Russians 
stated  that  their  ammunition  supply  was  low,  but  it  is  safe  to 
assume  that  the  presence  of  the  heavy  siege  guns  with  the  Germans 
had  a  great  deal  to  do  with  the  recapture. 

The  fortresses  guarding  Warsaw  and  the  Russian  frontier  on  the 
west  were  quickly  taken  during  the  advance  of  the  Teutonic  allies 
in  the  summer  of  1915,  either  by  maneuvering  the  defenders  out  of 
them  or  by  bringing  up  the  heavy  guns  and  shattering  the  fortifi- 
cations, as  at  Novo  Georgievsk.  The  fortress  of  Ossowetz  on  the  line 
Niemen-Bobr-Narew  had  a  different  history.  In  February,  1915, 
the  Russians  fell  back  across  the  Bobr  River  to  the  protection  of, 
Ossowetz,  which  stood  on  the  east  bank  along  a  long  ridge  covered 
with  woods,  affording  good  artillery  positions,  and  commanding  the 
opposite  bank,  where  artillery  positions  were  poor.  There  were  ex- 
tensive marshes  along  the  river,  but  at  this  time  of  the  year  they 
were  frozen.  The  Germans  at  first  tried  to  turn  the  position,  but 
failing,  brought  up  their  heavy  mortars,  even  the  42-centimeter 
howitzer.  The  Russian  batteries  were  so  well  concealed  that  the 
Germans  could  not  locate  them  and  their  big  guns  did  no  damage. 
The  Russians  silenced  several  batteries  without  suffering  from  their 
fire.  As  the  warm  weather  advanced,  the  marshes  made  it  difficult 
to  emplace  the  heavy  guns.  Ossowetz  did  not  fall  until  August  22 
in  the  general  Russian  retreat  after  the  capture  of  Warsaw. 

THE   FORTIFIED    CITY   OF   THE   FUTURE. 

The  failure  of  the  forts  in  the  present  war  is  due  to  several  causes : 

First.  Being  built  some  years  before  the  war,  their  position  was 
accurately  known  to  the  enemy,  thus  losing  the  advantage  of  conceal- 
ment ;  also,  the  details  of  their  construction  leaked  out  and  guns  .were 
especially  designed  to  destroy  them. 

Second.  Their  armament  had  not  been  kept  up  to  date  and  was 
entirely  overpowered  by  guns  of  recent  construction  and  of  a  type 
unknown  to  the  defense. 

Third.  The  garrisons  permitted  the  enemy  to  emplace  his  guns 
within  their  effective  range,  but  beyond  range  of  the  forts'  guns. 

The  favorable  effect  of  concealment,  as  a  defensive  measure,  is 
illustrated  by  the  operations  against  Ossowetz,  and  that  of  keeping 
the  enemy  at  a  distance  by  the  operations  against  Verdun. 

The  experiences  of  this  war  confirm  the  conclusion  reached  during 
the  siege  of  Port  Arthur  in  1904, ''  that  the  mounting  of  large-caliber 
guns  in  a  fort  for  use  against  the  siege  guns  of  the  enemy  is  a  fatal 

513 


error."  It  would  therefore  seem  preferable  to  place  the  fixed  heavy 
guns  in  emplacements  located  in  rear  of  the  line  of  forts,  depending 
for  protection  upon  concealment  rather  than  masonry  or  other  cover. 
The  forts  themselves,  whether  permanent  or  improvised  after  the 
outbreak  of  war,  should  be  designed  for  an  infantry  garrison  only, 
and  the  main  line  of  defense  should  consist  of  a  continuous  system  of 
infantry  entrenchments  (including  machine-gun  emplacements),  lo- 
cated in  advance  of  the  line  of  forts.  These  latter  would  serve  mainly 
as  supporting  points  for  organizing  a  counter  attack  in  case  the 
front  were  penetrated. 

To  check  the  enemy's  advance  before  his  heaviest  guns  have 
reached  points  within  effective  range  of  the  city,  naval  base,  or  other 
vital  object  to  be  protected,  a  garrison  sufficiently  strong  to  operate 
well  in  advance  of  the  forts,  is  indispensable,  and  its  action  should  be 
assisted  by  long-range  fire  from  the  fixed  armament,  which  should 
be  superior  in  caliber  and  range  to  the  guns  usually  supplied  to  an 
army  in  the  field. 

The  guns  of  the  fortress,  both  fixed  and  mobile,  should  be  dis- 
tributed over  a  large  area  and  advantage  taken  of  the  terrain  to 
secure  concealment,  which  must  be  had  at  any  price.  It  is  important 
to  bear  in  mind  that  the  number  of  guns  permanently  emplaced 
should  be  comparatively  small  compared  with  the  total  heavy  arma- 
ment of  the  fortress,  or,  in  other  words,  the  main  reliance  will  be 
placed  on  the  mobile  guns,  some  of  which  should  be  at  least  as  pow- 
erful as  any  the  enemy  can  bring  against  them. 

The  fortress  of  the  future  should  consist  of  a  large  area  so 
organized  as  to  insure  extreme  mobility  both  to  troops  and  guns. 
There  will  be  no  conspicuous  forts  of  masonry  and  armor.  Per- 
manent gun  emplacements  should  be  constructed  only  at  important 
points  with  the  primary  intention  of  compelling  the  enemy  to  lose 
time  in  bringing  up  his  heaviest  siege  guns.  The  mobile  guns  would 
be  located  in  earthen  emplacements  well  concealed  from  the  enemy's 
observers  who  might  endeavor  to  direct  fire  on  them.  The  point 
to  be  emphasized  is  that  unless  the  garrison  be  strong  enough  in  both 
mobile  troops  and  mobile  guns  to  keep  the  enemy  from  breaking 
through  the  line  or  coming  within  effective  range  of  the  city  proper 
or  other  vital  point  or  object  to  be  protected,  then  there  is  no  hope 
of  offering  a  prolonged  resistance. 

In  view  of  the  foregoing  it  is  apparent  that  intrenched  areas  with 
mobile  troops  and  guns  are  a  more  dependable  protection  than  a 
stereotyped  system  of  permanent  forts. 

30669°— No.  513—16 2 


10 

2.  INFLUENCE  OF  SEACOAST  FORTIFICATIONS,  WITH  PARTICULAR 
REFERENCE  TO  THE  ATTACK  BY  ALLIED  FLEET  ON  DARDA- 
NELLES FORTIFICATIONS. 

DESCRIPTION  OF  THE  DARDANELLES. 

The  western  approach  to  the  city  of  Constantinople  from  the 
Aegean  Sea  is  through  the  Dardanelles  and  the  Sea  of  Marmora. 
The  Dardanelles  (ancient  Hellespont)  is  a  long  winding  channel,  47 
miles  in  length,  but  the  really  narrow  portion,  extending  from  the 
Aegean  Sea  to  the  town  of  Gallipoli,  represents  a  sea  passage  of 
about  33  miles.  The  passage  is  at  no  point  wider  than  7,000  yards, 
and  at  one  point,  the  Narrows,  14  miles  from  the  entrance,  it  con- 
tracts to  1,400  yards.  The  surface  current  flows  westward  into  the 
Aegean  at  an  average  speed  of  1^  knots,  which  is  sometimes  trebled 
in  the  Narrows  after  strong  northerly  winds.  The  depth  in  mid- 
channel  varies  from  25  to  55  fathoms,  and  there  are  shallows  at 
some  of  the  bays  in  the  wider  sections.  Owing  to  the  narrowness, 
the  strong  current,  and  the  cross  currents  set  up  at  some  of  the 
bays,  maneuvering  of  large  vessels  is  difficult.  The  weather  is 
treacherous  and  uncertain;  the  prevailing  winds  for  nine  months 
of  the  year  are  northeasterly,  but  south  winds  spring  up  quickly, 
and  blows  last  from  three  to  five  days.  Unfavorable  weather  and 
frequent  haze  and  mist  were  encountered  during  the  earlier  stages 
of  the  naval  operations. 

The  long  narrow  tongue  of  land  to  the  north  is  the  Gallipoli 
Peninsula.  It  has  its  greatest  width,  12  miles,  just  above  the  Nar- 
rows or  opposite  Suvla  Bay;  it  is  narrowest  at  Bulair,  3  miles;  at 
the  Narrows  the  width  is  5  miles.  Ships  can  therefore  lie  in  the 
Gulf  of  Saros  and  fire  across  the  peninsula.  The  Asiatic  shore  of 
the  Dardanelles  is  lower  than  the  European.  The  hills  are  low 
and  wooded,  while  on  the  peninsula  they  are  bare  and  rocky  cliffs. 
On  both  shores  there  are  heights  which  give  advantage  to  defensive 
artillery  and  at  the  Narrows  both  shores  tower  above  the  ships. 

FORTIFICATIONS    OF    THE    DARDANELLES. 

The  original  fortifications  were  the  "  Dardanelles  Castles " ;  the 
two  inner,  the  "  Old  Castles,"  at  the  Narrows,  were  built  by  the 
Sultan  Mohammed  II,  the  conqueror  of  Constantinople,  in  1462; 
the  two  at  the  entrance,  the  "  New  Castles,"  were  built  in  1659.  At 
the  instigation  of  Great  Britain  new  fortifications  were  built  in  the 
Narrows  between  1864  and  1877.  After  the  peace  of  San  Stefano  in 
1878  the  Germans  designed  new  fortifications  and  all  the  new  fortifi- 
cations were  armed  with  Krupp  guns. 

513 


I 


11 

From  the  best  obtainable  information,  in  the  spring  of  1915  the 
armament  was  as  follows:  xVt  the  entrance  between  the  towns  of 
Seddel-Bahr  near  Cape  Helles  on  the  Europeon  side,  and  Kum  Kale 
on  the  Asiatic  side,  there  were  four  forts  or  batteries,  two  on  each 
side,  with  an  armament  of  ten  10.2-inch  guns,  four  9.2-inch  guns,  and 
two  6-inch  guns. 

Proceeding  towards  the  Narrows,  there  were  on  the  Asiatic  side 
fortifications  on  Dardanes  Hill,  4  miles  south  of  the  Narrows,  and 
two  forts  at  the  Narrows  near  the  town  of  Chanak — the  whole 
mounting  an  armament  of  four  ll-inch  guns,  six  10.2-inch  guns,  one 
8.3-inch  howitzer,  and  nine  6-inch  guns.  On  the  European  side  there 
were  three  batteries  south  of  the  town  of  Kilid  Bahr  at  the  Narrows, 
and  a  number  of  batteries  on  the  hills  around  Kilid  Bahr,  the  total 
armament  being  four  14-inch  guns,  one  11-inch  gun,  eight  10.2-inch 
guns,  fourteen  9.2-inch  guns,  fifteen  8.3-inch  howitzers,  and  twenty- 
four  6-inch  guns.  The  armament  between  the  entrance  and  the  Nar- 
rows thus  amounted  to  eight  l-t-inch  guns,  one  11-inch  gun,  fourteen 
10.2-inch  guns,  fourteen  9.2-inch  guns,  fourteen  8.3-inch  howitzers, 
and  thirty-three  6-inch  guns. 

The  fortifications  extended  4  miles  farther  north  to  the  line 
through  Nagara,  beyond  which  the  Dardanelles  turns  to  the  north- 
east and  broadens  out.  The  armament  on  both  sides  amounted  to 
two  14-inch  guns,  five  10.2-inch  guns,  five  9.2-inch  guns,  eight  8.3- 
inch  howitzers,  and  fifteen  6-mch  guns,  all  except  six  6-inch  gims 
being  on  the  Asiatic  side. 

In  addition  to  the  above  there  were  smaller  guns  to  protect  mine 
fields. 

From  an  examination  of  the  chart,  it  seems  that  a  hostile  fleet, 
after  silencing  the  guns  at  the  entrance  and  proceeding  towards  tlie 
Narrows,  would  be  subject  to  the  fire  of  the  following  guns  when  it 
had  reached  a  point  4  miles  from  the  Narrows:  ten  14-inch  guns, 
eighteen  10.2-inch  guns,  eight  9.2-inch  guns,  twenty-one  8.3-inch 
howitzers,  and  thirty-seven  6-inch  guns. 

(a)  Power  of  the  guns : 

The  guns  in  the  batteries  vary  greatly ;  alongside  old  guns  are  guns 
of  very  great  power.  The  heaviest  gun,  of  which  there  were  10,  the 
14-inch  Krupp,  with  a  projectile '  weighing  1,365  pounds,  appears 
superior  to  our  14-ihch  seacoast  gun  with  its  1,600-pound  projectile, 
as  it  has  a  reported  penetration  in  Krupp  hardened  steel  armor  at 
8,000  meters  of  20  inches,  while  our  gun  has  16.3  inches.  Its  life, 
however,  is  limited  to  80  or  90  rounds,  and  hence  it  is  probably  not 
as  accurate  as  ours  after  firing  a  number  of  shots. 

The  next  heaviest  gun  is  the  11-inch,  but  there  was  only  one  of 
that  caliber.     Then  comes  the  10.2-inch,  of  which  there  were  29,  a 

513 


12 

gun  manufactured  some  years  ago  by  the  Krupps.  It  is  not  as  power- 
ful as  our  10-inch  gun;  its  projectile  weighs  450  pounds,  as  against 
our  575  pounds,  and  its  penetration  at  3,000  meters  is  6  inches,  while 
our  gun  penetrates  9.3  inches  at  8,000  meters.  The  other  heavy- 
caliber  gun  is  9.2  inches,  of  which  there  were  25,  with  a  projectile 
weighing  420  pounds,  and  still  more  inferior  to  our  10-inch  gun. 

It  is  believed  that  Krupp  guns  of  later  pattern  were  mounted  after 
the  outbreak  of  hostilities  in  1914,  and  it  seems  to  be"  certain  that 
heavy  mobile  howitzers  or  mortars  were  used  against  the  allies. 

(6)   Character  of  the  batteries : 

The  batteries  were  built  with  great  care,  but  groups  w^ere  formed 
of  different  calibers  and  types,  which  rendered  serving  them  difficult 
and  slow  in  action.  The  emplacements  are  of  concrete  and  steel 
with  earthen  cover,  with  guns  in  embrasures  rather  than  in  turrets. 
There  was  a  mc?dern  system  of  searchlights,  telephones,  and  range 
finders,  and  good  communication  by  roads.  They  were  generally 
invisible  from  the  sea,  but  their  positions  were  detected  by  the  stone 
barracks,  which  were  usually  close  behind  them  and  in  full  view  of 
passing  ships. 

One  of  the  batteries  was  manned  entirely  by  Germans,  but  the 
others  had  Turkish  crews  that  had  been  drilled  by  German-  officers. 
The  movable  howitzer  batteries  appeared-  to  have  had  German  coast 
artillerymen  with  German  naval  officers  in  command. 

REDUCTION  OF  THE  FORTS  AT  THE  ENTRANCE:. 

On  November  3,  1914,  the  allied  fleet  bombarded  the  forts  at  the 
entrance,  but  the  real  operations  began  February  19,  1915,  with  a 
fleet  of  British  battleships  and  cruisers,  aided  by  a  strong  French 
squadron.  The  attack  was  at  first  at  long  range,  to  which  the  forts 
could  not  reply,  being  outranged.  In  the  afternoon  the  ships  closed 
in  and  opened  fire  with  the  secondary  batteries;  the  forts  returned 
the  fire.  The  forts  on  the  European  side  were  apparently  silenced ; 
one  on  the  Asiatic  side  continued  firing.  The  damage  was  subse- 
quently found  to  be  comparatively  small  and  many  of  the  gims  were 
still  intact.  Eight  battleships  were  engaged  with  a  total  of  46  guns  of 
major  caliber,  30  being  12-inch,  and  58  guns  of  minor  caliber  from 
7.5-inch  to  4-inch.  The  shore  guns  were  ten  10.2-inch,  six  9.2-inch, 
and  two  6-inch.  No  ship  was  hit.  In  general  the  guns  were  mounted 
in  open  works  near  the  old  masonry  castles,  with  the  sea  faces  pro- 
tected by  earth. 

Action  against  these  forts  continued  until  February  2|^  when  the 
reduction  of  all  four  was  completed.  In  the  meantime  the  new  bat- 
tleship, the  Queen  Elizabeth^  with  eight*  15-inch  guns  and  twelve 
6-inch  guns,  had  arrived,  giving  the  allies  16  armored  ships  of 

513 


13 

the  line,  12  British  and  4  French.  The  British  casualties  had  been 
three  killed  and  five  wounded.  Landing  jjarties  had  been  sent 
ashore  as  quickly  as  possible  to  complete  the  work  of  destruction, 
but  were  driven  back  by  the  Turks  before  completing  the  job.  It 
was  reported  by  the  British  that  all  forts  were  completely  demolished 
with  the  exception  of  one  at  Kum  Kale. 

OPERATIONS   AGAINST   THE   FORTS   AT  THE    NARROWS. 

Sweeping  operations  to  clear  the  channel  of  mines  and  obstructions 
began  February  25,  and  on  March  1  three  ships  entered  the  strait 
and  attacked  Fort  Dardanes  with  its  five  6-inch  guns  in  rectangular 
turrets  on  the  military  crest  of  a  hill  350  feet  high ;  these  were  said 
to  be  the  only  Turkish  guns  with  telescopic  sights.  Sweeping  opera- 
tions and  the  attack  on  Fort  Dardanes  with  its  outlying  smaller  bat'- 
teries  continued  until  March  5,  the  French  division  and  the  Queen 
Elizabeth  using  indirect  fire  from  the  Gulf  of  Saros  on  the  forts  at 
Kilid  Bahr  at  the  Narrows.  An  aeroplane  ship  with  sea  planes  and 
aeroplanes  accompanied  the  fleet.  But  not  a  shot  hit  the  forts  dur- 
ing the  indirect  bombardment;  according  to  the  Turks,  the  aero- 
planes did  not  remain  long  enough  in  the  air  to  direct  the  fire.  On 
^  March  8  the  Queen  Elizabeth  entered  the  strait  and  fired  on  Kilid 
,  Bahr  at  21,000  yards  range.  This  long-range  bombardment  of  the 
forts  at  the  Narrows  and  closer  action  by  the  other  ships  against  the 
batteries  south  of  the  Narrows,  together  with  mine  sweeping,  con- 
tinued until  March  18.  The  ships  were  hit  several  times,  including 
the  Queen  Elizabeth^  which  was  stnick  by  field  guns,  but  no  material 
damage  was  done  and  the  casualties  were  slight.  Fort  Dardanes  and 
other  concealed  batteries  near  by  were  almost  daily  under  the  fire  of 
frorti  four  or  five  ships,  sixteen  12-inch  guns  and  forty-eight  6-inch 
guns  being  used  against  five  6-inch  guns.  No  battery  on  the  Turkish 
side  was  put  permanently  out  of  action.  The  Turkish  casualties, 
omitting  those  in  the  forts  at  the  entrance,  which  were  heavy,  were 
23  killed  and  10  wounded. 

FINAL  ATTACK  OF  MARCH  18. 

On  March  18  there  was  a  general  attack  on  the  Narrows,  partici- 
pated in  by  12  British  and  4  French  ships,  mounting  a  total  of  82 
major  caliber  guns  from  15-inch  to  9.2-inch,  and  178  minor  caliber 
guns  from  7.5-inch  to  4-inch.  As  stated  in  paragraph  2,  subpara- 
graph 2,  "  Fortifications  of  the  Dardanelles,"  pages  4  and  5,  the 
number  of  guns  that  the  Turks  could  bring  into  action  against  this 
fleet  was  36  major  caliber  direct-fire  guns  and  21  howitzers,  a  total 
of  57,  and  37  minor  caliber  guns.     In  addition  there  were  fieldpieces 

513 


14 

and  movable  heavy  howitzers,  the  number  being  indeterminate.  In 
the  forenoon  the  Queen  Elizabeth^  just  inside  the  entrance,  10 1  miles 
from  the  Narrows,  and  three  older  British  ships  bombarded  the  forts 
at  the  Narrows,  while  two  other  British  ships  at  closer  range  at- 
tacked Dardanes  and  the  batteries  south  of  the  Narrows.  Shortly 
after  noon  the  French  division  of  four  ships  advanced  to  the  sup- 
port of  these  two  ships,  taking  up  a  position  near  Kephez  Point,  3 
miles  south  of  the  Narrows.'  A  heavy  fire  was  now  returned  by  the 
forts,  but  as  the  ships  were  maneuvering  in  circles,  few  hits  were 
made.  The  10  ships  that  were  engaged  at  this  time  mounted  58 
major  caliber  guns.  At  1.25  p.  m*.  the  forts  ceased  firing.  A  fresh 
British  squadron  of  six  ships  now  arrived  to  relieve*  a  correspond- 
ing number  of  ships  well  within  the  strait.  As  this  squadron  neared 
Kephez  Point,  the  other  ships  turned  to  withdraw  when  the  French 
ship,  Bouvet,  was  struck  several  times  and  blew  up,  the  cause  of  the 
explosion  probably  being  a  drifting  mine.  The  new  squadron  con- 
tinued the  advance,  attacking  in  line;  the  ships  just  within  the  en- 
trance continued  the  bombardment,  but  it  was  manifest  that  the 
forts  had  not  been  silenced.  Mine  sweeping  operations  continued, 
but  drifting  mines  sunk  the  British  ships  Irresistible  and  Ocean^ 
and  a  mine  and  gunfire  so  badly  damaged  the  In-jiexiblc  that  it  with 
difficulty  reached  the  harbor  of  Mudros,  40  miles  away.  The  French 
ship  Gaulois  was  also  badly  damaged  by  gunfire.  The  attack  ceased 
when  darkness  fell. 

The  attack  had  been  badly  repulsed  and  was  not  again  renewed. 
The  British  casualties  were  slight,  61  all  told,  practically  all  the 
crew  from  the  Irresistible  and  Ocean  being  saved;  but  the  French 
lost  nearl}^  the  entire  crew  of  the  Bouvet.  The  Turks  lost  23  killed 
and  60  wounded.  The  6-inch  guns  in  the  turrets  at  Dardanes,  which 
had  received  such  a  heavy  fire,  were  not  damaged;  the  turrets  were 
hit  only  three  times.  On  the  European  side  three  10-inch  guns  were 
put  out  of  action,  but  three  weeks  later  all  were  ready  again.  The 
stone  barracks  in  rear  of  the  batteries  were  destroyed;  86  shells 
fell  in  a  space  300  feet  deep  in  rear  of  one  battery,  but  the  battery 
was  untouched.  The  shells  easily  penetrated  earth,  but  not  one 
passed  through  sand  parapets.  After  March  18,  the  Turks  substi- 
tuted sand  for  earth  to  a  large  degree  in  the  parapets  and  divided 
up  the  large  interior  rooms  of  the  batteries  into  smaller  ones  by 
hollow  walls  filled  with  sand. 

EFFICIEXCY  OF  SEACOAST  FORTIFICATIONS. 

The  operations  in  the  Dardanelles  have  been  the  only  instance  in 
this  war  of  a  naval  attack  on  seacoast  fortifications,  except  the  minor 
attack  of  the  Japanese  Navy  against  the  German  fortifications  at 
Tsingtau.     Elsewhere,  by  virtue  of  their  exis-tence,  they  have  per- 

513 


15 

formed  their  functions  of  protecting  harbors,  fleets,  and  naval  bases. 
The  German  fleet,  under  the  protection  of  the  shore  guns,  has  main- 
tained its  existence  in  spite  of  the  proximity  of  the  superior  British 
fleet. 

These  operations  have  emphasized  the  fact  that  has  been  thor- 
oughly demonstrated  by  history  that  a  purely  naval  attack  can  not 
succeed  against  seacoast  fortifications  adequately  armed  and  manned, 
and  that  in  such  actions  the  proper  function  of  the  navy  is  to  convoy 
the  army,  which  -will  make  the  attack  by  land,  and  to  protect  its  line 
of  communications. 

REQUISITES  FOR  SUCCESSFUL  DEFENSE. 

The  forts  at  the  entrance  fell  and  those  in  the  Narrows  were 
scarcely  damaged,  though  in  both  cases  there  was  an  overwhelming 
fire  from  the  ships.  The  difference  in  the  two  cases  is  this:  At  the 
entrance  the  gims  were  outranged  and  the  ships  had  plenty  of  sea 
room  in  which  to  maneuver  and  bring  the  heavy  guns  to  bear,  free 
from  danger  of  mines;  in  the  narrow^  mined  channel  of  the  Narrows, 
with  both  shores  lined  with  guns,  some  of  them  equal  or  nearly  so 
to  the  heaviest  ship  gun,  the  ships  had  to  c(«ne  within  range  and 
could  attack  with  only  a  portion  of  the  force.  In  such  a  position,  a 
fleet,  exposed  to  fixed  and  floating  mines,  shore  torpedoes  and  sub- 
marines, will  fail.  The  slight  damage  sustained  by  the  shore  bat- 
teries is  illustrated  by  Fort  Dardanes,  which  withstood  the  fire  from 
the  British  ships,  admittedly  inferior  to  none  in  marksmanship. 
An  interior  city,  with  its  approach  channel  protected  with  well- 
placed  and  concealed  guns,  equal  in  range  to  the  enemy's,  and  pro- 
vided with  the  accessory  means  of  defense,  need  not  fear  capture  by 
bombardment  or  a  run  by  the  forts.  A  fort  on  the  seacoast  proper, 
exposed  to  the  fire  from  ships  at  sea,  must  have  guns  of  greater  range 
than  the  ships'  guns;  otherwise  the  sliips  could  silence  the  guns  on 
shore  at  their  pleasure,  and  under  their  fire  could  land  troops  to 
complete  the  destruction  of  the  forts. 

Concealment  and  dispersion  are  also  necessary.  The  aeroplane 
observation  of  fire  by  the  allies  does  not  seem  to  have  been  very  effi- 
cient, but  this  can  not  always  be  relied  on,  and  concealment  from 
aerial  observation  should  be  obtained.  Without  such  observation, 
long-range  indirect  bombardment  is  worthless.  By  taking  advantage 
of  the  terrain  and  resorting  to  dispersion,  the  amount  of  concrete 
might  be  reduced,  and  the  money  thus  saved  put  into  more  guns. 

NECESSITY    FOR    MOBILE    TROOPS. 

The  power  of  coast  fortifications,  to  repel  a  direct  attack  by  an 
enemy  fleet,  is  limited  to  the  area  within  range  of  their  guns,  but 
their  influence  is  extended  considerably  further  whenever  they  cover 

513 


16 

a  base  from  which  submarines  operate.  These  fortifications  must 
therefore  be  recognized  as  of  supreme  importance  within  the  scope 
of  their  proper  functions,  and  this  is  especially  true  of  a  country 
possessing  an  enormous  frontage  on  two  oceans.  Their  paramount 
value  is  that  they  relieve  the  navy  of  the  local  defense  of  important 
harbors  or  other  strategic  points  and  thus  release  our  seagoing  fleet 
for  operations  against  the  enemy  on  the  high  seas,  and  furnish  a 
refuge  for  it  in  the  face  of  overpowering  odds.  But  beyond  the 
sphere  of  influence  of  our  seacoast  forts,  enemy  ships  may  approach 
the  shore  with  impunity  and,  under  the  cover  of  their  guns,  may 
land  troops  that  can  then  proceed  against  the  important  places  de- 
fended by  the  forts  or  even  against  the  forts  themselves,  since  they 
are  vulnerable  from  the  land  side.  With  our  long  coast  lines,  the 
guarding  of  every  possible  landing  place  by  seacoast  fortifications 
is  out  of  the  question,  and,  although  the  development  and  employ- 
ment of  heavy  mobile  seacoast  armament  along  our  coastal  railroads 
will  further  restrict  the  landing  places  open  to  an  enemy,  there  will 
still  remain  many  places  afi^ording  facilities  for  landing  operations 
which  can  only  be  opposed  by  mobile  troops  acting  without  the 
cooperation  of  Coast  Artillery.  For  these  reasons  it  is  evident  that 
there  must  also  be  available  a  mobile  force  properly  trained,  organ- 
ized and  equipped,  to  send  against  the  enemy  at  the  landing  and 
defeat  them  there,  or  at  least  prevent  his  advance  toward  his  objec- 
tive, should  a  landing  be  effected.  Until  we  have  adequately  pro- 
vided for  this  dual  defense  of  our  coasts,  having  full  regard  to  both 
fixed  defenses  and  mobile  troops,  our  Navy  will  never  be  free  to 
perform  its  primary  function,  but  will  be  frittered  away  in  response 
to  clamor  for  protection  from  our  coast  population. 

An  illustration  of  the  value  of  mobile  troops  in  coast  defense  is 
afforded  by  the  operations  at  the  Dardanelles,  described  in  the  last 
subhead  under  paragraph  3,  page  12,  of  this  study. 


SUMMARY   OF   ATTEMPT  TO  TAKE   DARDANELLES   FORTIFICA 
TIONS  BY  MOBILE  TROOPS. 


INITIAL  DELAY. 


i 


Before  the  attack  of  March  18  it  had  been  decided  to  undertake 
operations  by  land  at  the  Dardanelles.  An  official  French  note 
stated  on  the  12th  that  a  force  was  on  its  way  to  the  Levant,  and 
Gen.  lam  Hamilton  was  appointed  commander  of  the  British  force 
and  arrived  in  time  to  witness  the  action  of  the  18th.  Both  the 
French  and  British  forces  had  arrived  in  the  harbor  of  Mudros  on 
the  island  of  Lemnos,  west  of  the  Dardanelles;  but  as  the  British 
transports  had  not  been  loaded  with  a  view  to  make  a  landing  in 
force  on  a  hostile  shore  and  the  lack  of  facilities  in  Mudros  made 

513 


17 

redistribution  impossible  there,  they  had  to  be  sent  back  to  Alex- 
andria for  reloading.  A  month  was  lost,  which  it  is  safe  to  say 
was  well  employed  by  the  Turks. 

TERRAIN. 

The  Gallipoli  Peninsula  is  covered  by  hills  which  rise  to  a  height 
of  1,000  feet;  on  the  southern  end  Achi  Baba,  600  feet  high,  domi- 
nates the  end  of  the  peninsula;  just  west  of  the  Narrows,  Kilid 
Bahr,  700  feet  high,  covers  the  forts  from  an  attack  from  the 
Aegean ;  and  northwest  of  the  Narrows,  Sari  Bair  Mountain  reaches 
a  height  of  970  feet.  These  hills  must  be  taken  before  an  advance 
can  be  made  to  the  shores  of  the  Narrows.  The  hills  do  not  run  in 
a  regular  or  well-defined  direction,  and  between  the  hills  there  are 
a  confusing  number  of  valleys.  The  area  is  practically  roadless  and 
most  of  it  covered  with  prickly  scrub.  The  sides  of  the  hills  are 
almost  vertical.  At  the  water's  edge  there  is  generally  a  narrow 
beach  with  a  steep  bank  10  feet  high,  and  then  the  rolling  hills  with 
their  crests  1,000  yards  from  the  beach.  Every  trail  leading  to  the 
beach  was  covered  with  one  or  more  machine  guns  in  screened  pits, 
and  the  roads  were  covered  with  field  guns  in  groups  of  from  three 
to  six. 

STRENGTH    OF    FORCES. 

The  British  force  consisted  of  the  Twenty-ninth  (Regular)  Divi- 
sion, the  East  Lancashire  (Territorial)  Division,  a-  naval  division 
of  bluejackets  and  marines,  some  Indian  troops,  and  the  Australian 
and  New  Zealand  Corps,  wnth  20  battalions  of  infantry,  together 
with  artillery  and  engineei-s.  The  strength  was  approximately 
100,000.  The  territorials  and  colonial  troops  had  been  wintering 
in  Egypt.  The  French  force  was  about  35,000.  The  Turks  were  in 
greater  force  and  better  posted  than  was  expected;  the  number  on 
the  European  side  has  been  given  as  over  150,000.  Besides,  they 
were  supported  by  the  Germans. 

allies'  plan. 

The  coast  being  precipitous,  landing  places  few,  and  trenches  and 
entanglements  being  visible  on  shipboard  at  most  of  them.  Gen. 
Hamilton  decided  to  throw  the  whole  of  his  troops  very  rapidly 
ashore  at  a  number  of  places,  and  selected  five  beaches  at  the  tip 
of  the  peninsula  and  two  on  the  west  coast,  near  Sari  Bair  Mountain, 
as  landing  places.  He  could  thus  advance  up  the  peninsula  or  cross 
it  where  it  was  about  five  miles  wide,  and  obtaining  possession  of  the 
high  hills,  secure  observation  points  whereby  the  navy  could  assist 
in  the  reduction  of  the  forts. 

513 


18 

LANDINGS  AT  SOUTH  END  OP  PENINSULA. 

April  25  was  the  date  of  the  landing.  The  Twenty-ninth  Divi- 
sion, 20,000  men,  was  to  land  at  the  end  of  the  peninsula  at  the  five 
beaches,  the  three  at  the  tip,  near  Sedd-el-Bahr,  being  the  main 
ones.  At  the  other  two  places,  the  landing  was  to  take  place  at 
dawn,  while  at  the  main  places  the  landings  were  to  be  simultaneously 
at  5.30  a.  m.,  after  half  an  hour's  bombardment  by  the  fleet.  The 
landing  parties,  covering  the  advance  of  the  division,  were  placed 
on  naval  vessels  the  previous  day  and  before  dawn  on  the  25th 
were  in  the  small  boats  in  which  they  were  to  be  towed  ashore.  The 
accompanying  squadron  of  four  battleships  and  four  cruisers  began 
the  preliminary  bombardment.  At  S  beach,  in  Morto  Bay,  the 
farthest  to  the  east,  three  companies  (750  men)  made  a  successful 
landing,  with  a  loss  of  50  men,  and  kept  the  position.  On  Y  beach, 
the  westernmost  landing,  two  battalions  (2,000  men)  landed  on  an 
undefended  beach,  but  were  subsequently  attacked  and  driven  to  the 
boats  with  heavy  losses.  On  X  beach,  3  miles  south  of  Y  beach,  1 
battalion  (1,000  men)  made  a  successful  landing,  under  cover  of 
the  fire  of  the  Imploicahle^  which  stood  close  inshore,  firing  with 
every  possible  gun,  thus  preparing  the  way  for  a  subsequent  force 
of  2,000  men,  which  joined  hands  with  the  force  landing  at  W 
beach,  the  next  to  the  south.  On  W  beach,  1  battalion  (1,000  men) 
landed  on  a  beach  350  yards  long  and  15  to  40  yards  wide,  well 
protected  with  intrenchments  and  entanglements,  the  latter  extend- 
ing under  water.  The  Turks  reserved  their  fire  until  the  first  boat- 
load of  soldiers  grounded,  and  under  this  fire  the  assailants  had  to 
make  their  way  through  the  entanglement.  A  foothold  was  gained 
and,  more  infantry  following,  connection  was  made  with  X  beach. 
At  V  beach,  west  of  Sedd-el-Bahr,  the  site  of  the  seacoast  forts  that 
had  previously  been  reduced  by  the  navy,  a  force  of  about  3,000 
attempted  to  land  on  a  beach  350  yards  long  by  10  yards  wide,  over- 
looked by  a  natural  amphitheater  rising  back  from  the  beach,  with 
concave  slopes.  On  the  very  margin  of  the  beach  ran  a  wire  entangle- 
ment and  up  the  slopes  were  two  other  lines,  the  whole  covered 
with  fire  of  rifles,  machine  guns,  and  pom-poms.  Three  companies 
(750  men),  landing  in  small  boats,  were  almost  annihilated,  the 
survivors  obtaining  shelter  under  the  lee  of  a  low  sandy  bank  4 
feet  high,  at  the  inner  edge  of  the  beach;  the  boat  crews  were  all 
killed.  It  was  intended  to  land  2,000  men  from  a  collier,  the  Clyde^ 
which  was  to  be  run  ashore,  and  lighters  used  to  form  a  gangway 
between  ship  and  shore.  The  attempt  failed;  of  1,000  men  who  left 
the  colliers,  50  per  cent  were  kill  or  wounded.  Nothing  could  be 
done  until  night,  when  the  remainder  of  the  infantry  from  the 
Clyde  went  ashore.     On  the  26th,  under  cover  of  the  fire  from  the 

513 


19 

ships,  the  troops  established  themselves  on  the  crests  of  the  sur- 
rounding hills.  During  the  night  of  the  25th,  the  disembarkation 
of  the  remainder  of  the  Twenty-ninth  Division  was  proceeding  on 
W  and  X  beaches. 

LANDING    BY   THE    AUSTRALIAN-NEW    ZEALAND    CORPS. 

This  corps  of  35,000  men  landed  north  of  Gaba  Tepe,  near  the  foot 
of  Sari  Bair  Mountain.  This  rugged  and  difficult  part  of  the  coast 
was  chosen  because  it  was  believed  it  would  be  undefended.  The 
landing  was  to  be  a  surprise  and  the  preliminary  bombardment  was 
omitted.  The  covering  force  of  4,000  men  in  ships'  boats  was 
towed  by  destroyers  to  within  500  yards  from  the  beach,  which  was 
1,000  yards  long,  when  the  destroyers  dropped  behind  and  steam 
launches  towed  the  boats  in.  In  the  darkness  the  boats  were  close 
to  the  shore  before  they  wejre  discovered.  About  a  battalion  of 
Turks  disputed  the  landing,  but  they  were  driven  back.  The  main 
body,  came  up  in  the  transports  and  by  2  p.  m.  12,000  men  and  two 
batteries  of  mountain  artillery  were  ashore.  The  Turks  promptly 
rallied  and  reinforced  to  20,000  by  11  a.  m.,  made  counter  attacks. 
These  counter  attacks  continued  for  several  days,  but  with  the 
assistance  of  the  ships'  fire  the  British  maintained  their  position. 
On  this  first  day — April  25 — 29,000  men  were  landed. 

DIVERSION    BY   THE    FRENCH. 

As  a  diversion  to  draw  the  fire  of  the  Asiatic  guns  from  Sedd-el- 
Bahr,  a  regiment  of  the  French  corps  landed  at  Kum  Kale  on  the 
Asiatic  shore  on  the  25th,  but  on  the  26th  they  reembarke«d,  aft^r  a 
loss  of  754,  one- fourth  of  its  effective  strength,  and  the  French  corps 
began  landing  at  V  Beach. 

ATTEMPTS    TO    ADVAKCE. 

On  April  28  the  allies  held  a  line  across  the  peninsula,  three  miles 
north  of  Sedd-el-Bahr,  and  an  attempt  was  made  to  capture  the 
hill  of  Achi  Baba,  which  failed.  The  troops  landing  on  the  west 
coast  also  tried  to  advance,  but  were  held  to  a  semicircle  1,100  yards 
in  diameter  from  the  beach.  Here  they  were  holding  open  a  door 
to  the  vital  point  of  the  Turkish  p,osition  and  were  keeping  24,000 
of  the  best  Turldsh  troops  out  of  the  main  action  around  Sedd-el- 
Bahr.  By  May  5  the  landing  of  the  allies  was  completed.  The 
British  official  report  gives  the  losses  among  the  British  at  this  time 
as  602  officers  and  13,377  men,  which  is  about  13.5  per  cent  of  the 
total  estimated  force  of  100,000.  It  is  estimated  that  the  Turks  lost 
18,000  in  the  operations  of  April  25-27. 

513  I 


20 

May  5  a  general  advance  was  attempted  against  the  town  of  Krithia 
and  the  hill  of  Achi  Baba,  but  the  attack  was  imsuccessfiil.  May  18 
the  Turks,  estimated  at  30,000,  attacked  the  force  at  Anzac  Cove 
(the  name  given  to  the  landing  place  of  the  Australian-New  Zealand 
Corps,  themselves  termed  "  Anzacs"),  and  were  repulsed  with  a  loss 
of  7,000,  the  Anzacs  losing  500.  To  May  31  the  British  losses  were 
38,636  (1,722  being  officers),  the  French  about  5,000,  and  the  Turkish 
estimated  at  60,000.  The  total  battle  losses  of  the  British  in  the  three 
years  of  the  Boer  War  were  38,156.  According  to  a  Turkish  report 
at  this  date  the  number  of  British  and  French  troops  amounted  to 
90,000.    The  Turks  had  received  60,000  reenf orcements. 

June  4  there  was  another  general  attack  by  the  allies  from  Sedd- 
el-Bahr ;  on  the  right  there  were  two  French  divisions,  the  rest  of  the 
line,  4,000  yards,  being  held  by  24,000  British  infantry.  The  net 
result  was  a  gain  of  200  to  400  yards  along  a  front  of  three  miles. 
The  line  then  held  extended  from  south  of  Krithia  southeast  across 
the  peninsula,  about  4  miles  from  Sedd-el-Bahr.  The  appearance  of 
German  submarines  caused  the  withdrawal  to  Mudros  Harbor  of  the 
transports  and  the  sending  of  supplies  in  small  boats.  The  Turks 
under  Enver  Pasha  made  a  general  attack  in  the  vicinity  of  Krithia 
Ju«ie  30-Ju«ly  2,  but  accomplished  little,  with  a  loss  of  5,150  killed 
and  15,000  wounded.  To  July  18,  the  British  losses  were  49,283, 
2,144  being  officers. 

LANDING   AT    8UVLA    BAY   AND    SUBSEQUENT   OPERATIONS. 

August  7  another  landing  was  made  at  Suvla  Bay,  4  miles  north 
of  Anzac  Cove.  The  landing  began  at  2  a.  m.  on  three  beaches  and 
by  day  a  force  of  two  divisions  was  firmly  established.  The  Anzac 
force  joined  in  the  attack,  the  intention  being  to  connect  the  two 
forces  and  capture  the  Sari  Bair  Ridge.  The  attack  from  Anzac 
was  carried  to  the  summit  of  the  ridge,  but  as  the  Turks  had  been 
heavily  reenforced,  the  attack  from  Suvla  Bay  did  not  make  the 
expected  progress,  and  the  line  had  to  fall  back.  The  two  forces 
were  finally  joined  on  a  line  12  miles  long.  The  number  of  men  land- 
ing at  Suvla  Bay  is  not  known;  the  British  speak  of  it  as  a  fresh 
army  and  the  Turks  estimated  it  as  70,000.  The  British  losses  were 
heavy ;  according  to  the  Turks,  30,000. 

According  to  a  German  estimate,  on  August  30  the  allies  had  from 
20,000  to  25,000  troops  at  Sedd-el-Bahr,  of  whom  9,000  were  French, 
all  that  was  left  of  the  original  35,000;  9,000  at  Anzac  Cove,  and 
70,000  at  Suvla  Bay.  These  numbers  were  not  materially  increased 
after  that  date,  though  tlie  losses  in  the  trench  warfare  since  then 
had  brought  the  casualties  on  November  9  to  106,610  among  the 
British.    The  Turkish  losses  are  unknown.    On  December  20  it  was 

513 


21 

announced  that  the  troops  at  Suvla  Bay  and  Anzac  Cove,  about 
100,000,  had  been  withdrawn  from  the  peninsuhi  for  service  else- 
where; the  troops  at  Sedd-el-Bahr  were  left  there  until  January 
9,  1916,  when  they,  too,  were  withdrawn. 

NECESSITY  FOR  HEAVY  MOBILE  GUNS. 

Although  the  Turks  had  ample  warning  of  the  impending  attack, 
with  an  abundance  of  men  to  draw  upon,  and  had  giuirded  the  most 
probable  landing  places  with  intrenchments  and  entanglements,  the 
allies  succeeded  in  getting  ashore.  With  the  limited  number  of 
beaches  suitable  for  landing,  the  Turks  apparently  had  sufficient  force 
to  guard  every  one ;  but  some  were  overlooked  and  the  success  of  the 
allies  is  due  partly  to  that  fact.  The  main  reason  for  the  success, 
though,  is  due  to  the  fire  of  the  covering  ships,  which  could  come  in 
close  enough  to  use  all  their  guns  and  thus  keep  down  the  fire  of  the 
Turks.  If  the  Turks  had  employed  guns  heavy  enough  to  stand  the 
ships  off,  the  landing  Avould  not  have  taken  place,  for  experience  has 
shown  that  even  the  most  powerful  naval  guns  at  long  range  are  im- 
able  to  put  well  concealed  shore  gims  out  of  action.  Even  chance  hits 
have  little  effect  upon  the  sand  or  earthen  parapets. 

It  may  be  accepted  then  as  a  fact,  that  to  prevent  a  hostile  force 
from  landing  there  must  be  in  addition  to  the  usual  infantry  defense 
at  all  the  possible  landings,  guns  of  sufficient  power  to  keep  the  naval 
vessels  at  such  a  distance  that  their  secondary  batteries  can  not  be 
used.  Thus  the  landing  of  troops  or  supplies  from  ships  at  so  great 
a  distance  from  the  shore  can  readily  be  prevented  by  the  infantry 
and  field  guns. 

In  the  case  of  a  landing  on  our  coast,  the  stretch  to  be  covered  is  so 
long  that  it  is  impracticable  to  implace  in  prepared  positions  enough 
of  these  guns  to  cover  all  the  possible  landing  places.  It  will  there- 
fore be  necessary  to  use  mobile  guns  that  can  be  quickly  transported 
to  the  point  threatened.  The  quickest  method  of  transportation 
appears  to  be  a  railroad  paralleling  the  beach,  from  which  spurs 
could  be  run  to  points  near  enough  to  the  front  to  keep  ships  at 
about  8,000  yards  from  the  shore.  The  railroad,  spur  tracks,  and 
gun  locations  should  be  prepared  in  time  of  peace. 

THE  VALUE  OF   MOBILE  TROOPS  IN   COAST   DEFENSE. 

After  the  allies  had  succeeded  in  the  landing  operations  and  had 
assembled  on  the  peninsula  the  entire  expeditionary  force,  their  fur- 
ther advance  was  small,  and  after  maintaining  a  position  near  the 
water's  edge  for  over  nine  months,  the  force  was  withdrawn.  The 
reason  for  the  failure  appears  to  be  threefold :  First,  the  size  of  the 

513 


22 

Turkish  force  was  underestimated  and  an  insufficient  number  of  troops 
was  sent  at  first,  and  these  troops  were  not  sufficiently  reinforced; 
second,  the  terrain  was  favorable  to  the  Truks ;  third,  most  important 
of  all,  the  Turks  had  sufficient  troops  to  prevent  the  allies  from 
advancing. 

Considering  our  own  requirements,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  ter- 
rain along  our  Atlantic  Coast  is  not  so  favorable  to  the  defense 
as  that  of  the  Gallipoli  Peninsula,  as  the  landing  beaches  are  nu- 
merous and  extensive  and  the  ground  in  rear  is  generally  favorable 
for  an  advance.  Moreover,  our  coast  is  too  extended  to  permit  the 
preparation  of  defenses  in  advance  at  all  possible  landing  places. 
There  is  consequently  the  more  necessity  for  mobile  troops. 

With  a  well-trained  and  equipped  force  equal  or  superior  to  the 
force  that  had  succeeded  in  landing,  the  operations  on  the  Gallipoli 
Peninsula  lead  us  to  believe  that  an  advance  from  the  beach  away 
from  the  cover  of  the  ships,  can  be  prevented;  but  without  such  a 
force,  once  the  outer  line  of  defense  at  the  beach  has  been  penetrated, 
the  forces  must  be  withdrawn  to  some  thoroughly  prepared  position 
covering  the  objective  of  the  enemy.  Unless  such  a  position  of  suit- 
able extent  has  been  prepared  in  advance,  further  resistance  is  hope- 
less. 

513 

o 


THE  GENERAL  STAFFS  OF  CERTAIN  BELLIGERENT 

POWERS 


PREPARED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION,  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

AS    A    SUPPLEMENT    TO    THE    STATEMENT    OF    A    PROPER    MILITARY 

POLICY  FOR  THE  UNITED   STATES 


WCD  9286-2 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE  :  WASHINGTON 

NOVEMBER,   1915 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 

1&16 


514 


War  Department, 

Document  No.  514. 

Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff . 


SYNOPSIS. 


I.  Introduction'. 

Page. 

1.  The  general  staff  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Army 5 

2.  The  general  staff  of  France 6 

3.  The  general  staff  of  Germany 8 

4.  The  general  staff  of  Great  Britain 8 

5.  The  general  staff  of  Italy 9 

6.  The  general  staff  of  Japan 9 

7.  The  general  staff  of  Russia 10 

8.  The  general  staff  of  Servia 11 

II.  Conclusion. 
soeeg'-No.  su — le  (3) 


THE  GENERAL  STAFFS  OF  CERTAIN  BELLIGERENT 

POWERS. 


I.    INTRODUCTION. 

The  object  of  this  study  is  to  give  a  concise  account  of  the  general 
staffs  of  certain  belligerent  powers  taking  part  in  the  present 
European  war,  showing  their  personnel  and  duties  under  peace  con- 
ditions, and  also  any  increases  or  changes  that  have  been  made  neces- 
sary during  the  progress  of  the  present  war,  so  far  as  data  are  at 
present  available. 

It  is  proposed  to  supplement  this  paper  wdth  full  information  as 
to  any  further  changes  in  general  staff  organizations  resulting  from 
the  experiences  of  the  present  war,  when  the  necessary  data  have 
been  supplied. 

1.  THE  GENERAL  STAFF  OF  THE  AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN  ARMY. 

The  work  of  the  general  staff  of  this  army,  1911,  included:  (1) 
Service  in  the  offices  of  the  general  staff;  (2)  with  troops;  (3)  in 
special  scientific  military  employment;  and  (4)  for  missions  abroad. 

"The  chief  of  the  general  staff  for  all  the  armed  forces"  was  the 
head  of  the  general  staff,  and  w-as  under  the  immediate  orders  of 
the  Emperor,  and  was  also  an  auxiliary  organ  of  the  war  minister. 
All  work  relating  to  operations  and  to  preparation  for  the  employ- 
ment of  the  entire  armed  force  in  war  was  incumbent  upon  him.  He 
kept  in  touch  with  the  commander  of  the  navy  regarding  operations 
of  the  fleet.  He  was  assisted  in  his  work  by  the  "  deputy  chief  of  the 
general  staff." 

The  general  staff  worked  in  seven  sections. 

The  first  section  transacted  personal  and  economic  affairs  and  did 
the  correspondence  between  the  sections  of  the  general  staff  and  with 
outside  quarters. 

The  section  for  operations  worked  at  all  operative  affairs,  the 
measures  in  connection  with  mobilization,  plans  for  strategic  move- 
ments, opinions  and  proposals  regarding  fortifications,  organization 
and  training  of  the  army,  regulations  and  instructions  of  a  tactical 
and  operative  nature,  programs  for  maneuvers  and  matters  con- 
nected therewith. 

The  section  of  instruction  attended  to  the  instruction  and  training 
of  general  staff  officers. 

514  (5) 


The  topographical  section  was  employed  in  the  military  geographi- 
cal description  of  the  monarchy  and  other  countries. 

The  intelligence  section  collected  and  recorded  data  concerning  for- 
eign armies  and  fortifications. 

The  railway  section  attended  to  all  railway  and  steamship  matters, 

The  telegraph  section  attended  to  the  telegraph  and  signal  service. 

The  general  staff  attended  to  the  war  school,  the  Military  Geo- 
graphical Institute,  and  the  war  archives. 

The  general  staff  officers  serving  with  troops  performed  duties 
corresponding  to  the  combined  duties  of  chiefs  of  staff  and  adju- 
tants general  in  the  United  States  Army. 

The  normal  strength  of  the  general  staff  in  time  of  peace,  1911, 
was: 

One  general,  chief  of  staff;  2  lieutenant  field  marshals — one  the 
deputy  chief  of  staff,  the  other  the  chief  of  the  military  geographical 
institute;  2  major  generals — one  chief  of  the  war  archives  and  the 
other  the  chief  of  the  war  school ;  41  colonels,  77  lieutenant  colonels, 
85  majors,  and  209  captains;  total,  417.  After  completing  studies 
at  the  war  school  209  additional  officers  were  attached  to  the  general 
staff  for  duty  and  try  out,  with  a  view  to  their  possible  appointment 
on  the  general  staff.  In  addition  there  were  46  other  officers  for 
clerical  work  on  the  general  staff,  but  not  with  a  view  to  being  ap- 
pointed members  of  the  general  staff.  Total  performing  general- 
staff  work,  672. 

In  time  of  war  the  chief  of  staff  takes  full  .control  of  military  mat- 
ters. According  to  information  on  file  in  the  War  College,  1914,  the 
Austrian  general  staff  was  as  follows: 

One  chief  of  staff,  1  adjutant  to  the  chief  of  staff,  2  assistant 
chiefs  of  staff — one  in  charge  of  lines  of  communication.  The  part 
of  the  general  staff  corresponding  to  our  War  Department  General 
Staff  was  divided  into  eight  bureaus:  Bureau  of  direction,  bureau 
of  operations,  bureau  of  communication  and  supplies,  bureau  of  in- 
structions, bureau  of  monographs,  bureau  of  evidence,  bureau  of 
transportation,  bureau  of  telegraphy,  and  was  charged  also  with 
the  war  college,  war  archives,  and  military  geographical  institute. 
The  number  of  general-staff  officers  allowed  by  law  was  508;  249 
officers  were  assigned  and  71  attached  to  the  general  staff:  and  101 
line  offic^ers  were  detailed  on  general-staff  work,  making  a  total  of 
929  officers  performing  general-staff  work. 

2.  THE  GENERAL  STAFF  OF  FRANCE. 

The  general  staff  of  the  French  Army  is  one  of  the  seven  main 
divisions  of  the  war  department.  Military  matters,  unless  they  con- 
cern more  than  one  department  of  the  National  Government,  are 

514 


directed  by  the  superior  military  council,  which  consists  of  the 
minister  of  war,  the  chief  of  staff,  and  10  major  generals.  The 
superior  military  council  exercises  control  OA^er  the  general  staff.  One 
of  the  major  generals  of  the  superior  military  council  is  assistant 
chief  of  staff;  others  are  assigned  in  time  of  peace  to  command 
armies  in  time  of  war,  and  have  with  them  the  three  general-staff 
officers  to  be  on  their  staffs  in  the  field.  These  prospective  army 
commanders  have,  in  time  of  peace,  supervision  of  the  troops  that 
would  be  under  their  command  in  war.  They  prepare  and  direct 
the  maneuvers  and  staff  rides  for  the  training  of  these  troops  and 
generally  see  to  their  preparation  for  war.  They  are  army  in- 
spectors. 

The  chief  of  staff  is  the  head  of  the  war  department  general  staff, 
and  deals  with  the  larger  questions.  Other  general-staff  matters  are 
under  the  assistant  chief  of  staff.  The  work  of  the  war  department 
general  staff  is  performed  by  three  groups,  each  under  a  general 
officer. 

FIRST   GROUP. 

1.  The  bureau  of  military  operations  and  general  training  of  the 
army. 

2.  The  bureau  charged  with  the  study  of  the  organization  and 
tactics  of  foreign  armies. 

3.  The  bureau  of  railways  and  lines  of  communication. 

SECOND   GROUP. 

1.  Bureau  of  organization  and  mobilization  of  the  army. 

2.  The  African  section. 

3.  The  historical  section. 

THIRD   GROUP. 

1.  The  section  of  the  personnel  of  the  general  staff. 

2.  Routine  service  section  of  the  general  staff. 

3.  The  administrative  section. 

The  chief  of  staff,  assistant  chief  of  staff,  and  the  chief  of  the  first 
group  are  major  generals.  The  chiefs  of  the  second  and  third  groups 
are  brigadier  generals.  In  addition  the  following  general  staff  offi- 
cers were  authorized  by  law  before  the  present  war :  Thirty  colonels, 
40  lieutenant  colonels,  170  majors,  and  400  captains ;  total  640. 

General  staff  officers  were  assigned  as  folloAvs:  War  Department 
general  staff,  132;  staff  with  troops,  480;  additional  staff  officers  with 
the  war  department  general  staff,  47 ;  with  troops,  216.  The  general 
staff  is  larger  now. 

514 


3.  THE  GENERAL  STAFF  OF  GERMANY. 

The  general  staff  of  Germany  consists  of  the  war  department  gen- 
eral staff  (called  the  great  general  staff)  and  the  general  staff 
officers  on  duty  with  the  troops. 

The  officers  of  the  war  department  general  staff  performed,  in 
peace,  the  following  duties: 

One  general,  chief  of  staff,  directly  under  the  Emperor,  and  has 
charge  of  the  war  academy  and  the  land  survey ;  1  lieutenant  general, 
assistant  chief  of  staff,  chief  of  division;  4  major  generals,  heads  of 
four  divisions;  11  colonels,  chiefs  of  sections;  6  lieutenant  colonels, 
four  of  them  are  chiefs  of  sections;  37  majors,  duty  with  sections  and 
committees;  52  captains  and  1  lieutenant  performing  various  general 
staff  duties;  total  113. 

This  part  of  the  general  staff  is  organized  into  9  sections  and  the 
historical  and  geographical  departments.  It  has  complete  charge 
of  the  mapping  of  the  country  and  of  the  maps  of  Germany  and 
other  countries. 

The  general  staff  officers  on  duty  with  the  troops  are  under  the 
orders  of  their  commanders,  but  special  work  may  be  assigned  to 
them  by  the  chief  of  staff. 

Before  the  present  war  the  general  staff  of  Germany  consisted  of 
1  general,  2  lieutenant  generals,  6  major  generals,  23  colonels,  21 
lieutenant  colonels,  116  majors,  139  captains,  and  1  lieutenant,  total 
309.  Additional  officers  performing  general  staff  duties  were:  Three 
colonels,  13  lieutenant  colonels.  44  majors,  36  captains,  and  132  lieu- 
tenants; total  attached  officers  228,  total  number  of  officers  perform- 
ing general  staff  duties  537. 

4.  THE  GENERAL  STAFF  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN. 

The  general  staff  at  the  war  office  has  the  following  duties:  To 
advise  on  the  strategical  distribution  of  the  army;  to  supervise  the 
education  of  the  officers  and  the  training  and  preparation  of  the 
army  for  war;  to  stud}^  military  plans  for  offense  and  defense;  to 
collect  military  information,  and  to  direct  the  general  policy  in 
army  matters. 

The  general  staff  with  troops  has  the  following  duties:  To  assist 
the  officers  on  whose  staffs  they  serve  in  promoting  military  effi- 
ciency, and  to  aid  them  in  carrying  out  the  general  policy  in  army 
matters. 

The  general  staff  at  the  war  office,  known  as  department  of  chief 
of  general  staff  at  army  headquarters,  was  divided  into  three 
branches:  Military  operations,  staff  duties,  and  military  training. 
A  major  general  was  in  charge  of  each.    General  staff  officers  in  this 

514 


department:  Three  major  generals,  G  colonels,  21  lieutenant  colonels 
and  majors,  and  27  captains.     Total,  57. 

The  general  staff  officers  with  troops  were:  One  major  general,  6 
brigadier  generals,  16  colonels,  54  lieutenant  colonels  and  majors, 
12  captains,  and  25  brigade  majors.     Total,  114. 

Besides  the  171  general  staff  officers  other  officers  were  attached  to 
the  general  staff  to  perform  general-staff  duties. 

Great  Britain  was  short  of  officers,  and  the  general  staff  was  some- 
what depleted  at  the  beginning  of  the  present  war.  The  British 
press  has  attributed  grave  errors  of  the  war  to  this  lack  of  an  ade- 
quate general  staff.  Influential  Englishmen  are  advocating  a  gen- 
eral staff  on  the  German  plan. 

5.  THE  GENERAL  STAFF  OF  ITALY. 

The  latest  information  found  at  the  war  college  shows  the  chief 
of  the  general  staff  of  Italy  was  intrusted  with  the  preparation,  in 
time  of  peace,  and  execution,  in  time  of  war,  of  all  military  opera- 
tions, but  under  the  minister  of  war;  and  that  the  general  staff 
consisted  of  260  officers. 

The  war  department  general  staff,  called  the  great  general  staff, 
consisted  of  three  sections :  The  central  section,  the  section  for  mili- 
tary operations,  and  the  section  for  railways  and  communications. 
The  central  section  supervised  the  work  of  the  others.  The  section 
for  military  operations  Avas  divided  into  five  subsections,  and  the 
section  for  railways  and  communications  w^as  divided  into  three 
subsections. 

The  general  staff  officers  on  duty  with  troops  performed  duties 
that  are  performed  in  the  United  States  by  General  Staff  officers  and 
by  adjutants  general. 

6.  THE  GENERAL  STAFF  OF  JAPAN. 

The  general  staff  has  charge  of  the  national  defense  and  the  em- 
ployment of  the  military  forces  of  the  Empire.  The  chief  of  staff 
is  directly  under  the  Emperor  and  assists  in  the  business  of  the 
imperial  personal  staff.  All  things  relating  to  national  defense 
and  strategy  are  in  his  province.  Furthermore,  he  has  under  his 
supervision  all  staff  officers  of  the  army  and  their  training.  Directly 
under  his  jurisdiction  are:  (1)  General  staff  headquarters;  (2)  the 
land  survey  department;  (3)  the  army  staff  college;  and  (4)  the 
military  attaches  at  embassies  and  legations. 

A  vice  chief  of  staff  assists  the  chief  and  supervises  the  business 
of  general  staff  headquarters. 

514 


10 

The  subjects  dealt  with  by  the  general  staff  are : 

1.  Defense  of  the  Empire  and  plans  of  mobilization. 

2.  Statistics  of  foreign  armies. 

3.  Communications  and  transportation  of  troops. 

4.  Geodesy  and  topography. 

5.  Historical  work. 

The  work  of  the  war  department  general  staff,  designated  the 
great  general  staff,  is  performed  in  5  divisions  divided  into  10 
sections.  One  of  the  divisions  is  designated  "  general  affairs "" ;  the 
others  are  numbered  1,  2,  3,  and  4.  The  chief  of  staff  is  a  general ; 
the  vice  chief  of  staff,  a  lieutenant  general;  the  chief  of  each  division 
is  a  major  general,  and  the  chief  of  each  section  is  a  colonel. 

The  general  staff  office  at  Tokj^o  consists  of  1  general,  1  lieutenant 
general,  5  major  generals,  10  colonels,  8  lieutenant  colonels,  21 
majors,  and  33  captains.  Total,  79,  In  connection  with  these  are 
72  other  officers,  making  a  total  of  151  ofiicers  performing  war  de- 
partment general  staff  duties  May  1,  1915.  They  were  assisted  by 
44  warrant  and  noncommissioned  officers  and  5  civilians.  Under  the 
chief  of  staff,  the  land  survey  department  consists  of  35  officers, 
161  warrant  and  noncommissioned  officers,  and  135  civilians;  the 
army  staff  college  consists  of  58  officers,  15  warrant  and  noncom- 
missioned officers,  and  14  civilians. 

The  exact  number  of  general  staff  officers  serving  with  troops  in 
the  Japanese  Army  is  not  stated  in  the  reports  received  at  the  War 
College.  It  is  understood  that  the  strength,  organization,  and  duties 
of  the  Japanese  general  staff  are  about  the  same  as  in  other  good, 
modern  armies.  The  organization  of  the  Japanese  general  staff  is 
not  fixed  by  law.  It  depends  on  the  orders  of  the  Emperor  and 
usually  changes  slightly  from  year  to  year. 

7.  THE  GENERAL  STAFF  OF  RUSSIA. 

The  latest  figures  on  this  organization,  found  at  the  War  College, 
show  the  general  staff  of  Russia  consisted  of  734  officers.  The 
general  staff  of  that  country  was  organized  on  modern  lines  in  1906. 
The  chief  of  the  general  staff  was  part  of  the  war  ministry.  In 
1914  the  headquarters  directorate  of  the  general  staff  consisted  of 
the  following  six  branches: 

The  quartermaster  general's  branch,  consisting  of  seven  sections; 
organization  and  administrative  branch,  seven  sections  and  two  sub- 
sections; mobilization  branch,  four  sections;  military  communica- 
tions branch,  eight  sections;  topographical  branch,  three  sections; 
aviation  branch,  two  sections. 

The  Russian  Army,  like  other  modern  armies,  has  general  staff 
officers  serving  with  troops. 

514 


11 

8.  THE  GENERAL  STAFF  OF  SERBIA. 

In  Serbia  the  general  staff  is  included  in  the  ministry  of  war. 
Part  of  the  general  staff'  officers  serve  with  troops,  as  in  the  United 
States.  The  chief  of  staff  and  the  assistant  chief  of  staff  had  head- 
quarters at  Belgi'ade.  The  general  staff  is  divided  into  three  sec- 
tions: (1)  The  operative  section,  divided  in  three  parts,  {a)  per- 
sonnel and  materiel  on  campaign,  (h)  intelligence,  (r)  communica- 
tions; (2)  historical  section,  including  (a)  archives,  (h)  library; 
(3)  geographical  section,  which  includes  four  subsections,  (a)  trigo- 
nometrical, (b)  topographical,  (r)  supplies,  (<:/)  mapping. 

II.  Conclusion. 

In  regard  to  our  own  General  Staff',  the  act  of  Congress  approved 
February  14,  1903,  creating  it  established  its  status  and  duties  on 
lines  entirely  in  accord  with  the  appro'ved  practice  in  European 
armies,  and,  so  far  as  known,  the  experiences  of  the  present  war  have 
proved  the  soundness  of  this  action. 

Actual  experience,  however,  has  shown  conclusively  that  the  per- 
sonnel originally  provided  for  our  General  Staff  was  too  limited 
for  the  comprehensive  duties  required  of  it,  even  for  our  small  Army. 
A  further  bar  to  progress  was  imposed  by  the  act  of  Congress  ap- 
proved August  24,  1912,  whereby  the  already  meager  personnel  was 
reduced  by  one  general  officer  and  eight  captains.  Under  the  present 
law  it  consists  of  2  general  officers,  one  of  whom  is  Chief  of  Staff, 
4  colonels,  6  lieutenant  colonels,  12  majors,  and  12  captains  (or  first 
lieutenants)  ;  total,  36.  In  addition,  the  Chief  of  Coast  Artillery 
and  the  Chief  of  the  Division  of  Militia  Affairs  are  also  members 
of  the  General  Staff,  eoo  officio.  The  permanent  station  of  these  latter 
officers  is  in  Washington,  but  the  specific  duties  for  which  their 
offices  were  created  to  perform  occupy  their  full  attention  and,  prop- 
erly speaking,  are  not  duties  pertaining  to  the  General  Staff  any 
more  than  are  those  of  the  Chief  of  Engineers,  Chief  Signal  Officer, 
or  other  bureau  chiefs.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  they  only  do  General 
Staff  work  when  temporarily  acting  for  the  Chief  of  Staff'  and  his 
senior  assistant  during  the  absence  of  those  officers,  and  this  duty  is 
in  addition  to  their  normal  functions. 

At  the  present  time  the  War  Department  General  Staff  consists 
of  2  general  officers,  2  colonels,  5  lieutenant  colonels,  9  majors,  and 
11  captains,  total  29,  leaving  for  service  with  troops  2  colonels,  1 
lieutenant  colonel,  3  majors,  and  1  captain,  total  7. 

Because  of  this  insufficient  personnel  the  General  Staff  has  been 
unable  to  undertake  some  of  its  most  important  functions.  For  ex- 
ample, no  historical  section  can  be  established,  and  until  this  is  done 

514 


12 

the  scientific  military  history  of  our  various  wars  can  not  be  written. 
Our  lack  of  a  definite  military  policy  was  largely  due  to  the  fact 
that  we  are  without  such  histories  and  have  consequently  not  learned 
the  lessons  to  be  derived  from  our  own  experience  in  war. 

We  can  not  utilize  to  its  full  extent  the  important  information 
gathered  abroad,  because  we  can  not  assign  officers  to  the  exclusive 
duty  of  reading  and  digesting  these  reports,  due  to  the  require- 
ments of  the  daily  routine  General  Staff  work  pertaining  to  the 
Army,  which  must  be  first  attended  to. 

For  the  same  reasons  we  can  not  properly  attend  to  the  work  of 
preparing  monographs  and  maps  pertaining  to  foreign  countries, 
matters  which  should  be  always  kept  up  to  date. 

One  thing  which  prevents  even  our  meager  General  Staff  from 
rendering  such  efficient  service  as  it  might  is  the  continual  change 
of  status  of  General  Staff  officers  before  the  full  detail  of  four  years 
has  expired.  This  is  partly  due  to  the  fact  that  the  present  law  does 
not  provide  for  the  retention  of  officers  who  are  promoted.  This 
defect  could  be  remedied  by  providing  that  an  officer  promoted  should 
serve  out  the  balance  of  his  detail  in  the  next  higher  grade,  the 
vacancy  in  the  grade  from  which  he  was  promoted  not  being  filled 
until  the  completion  of  his  term.  This  would  not  change  the  total 
number  of  officers  on  the  General  Staff  detail  and  would  greatly 
benefit  the  service  by  permitting  continuity  of  work  by  men  thor- 
oughly trained  to  it. 

A  careful  consideration  of  this  matter  shows  that  our  War  Depart- 
ment General  Staff  should  consist  of  94  officers  of  all  grades,  and  that 
at  the  present  time  there  should  be  available  for  service  with'  troops 
not  less  than  27.  This  has  been  shown  in  detail  in  special  studies 
(WCD  639-103,  Nov.  15,  1915,  "  Eeorganization  of  the  General 
Staff,"  and  WCD  9054-5,  Jan.  3,  1916,  "  Report  on  the  Chamberlain 
bill  in  connection  with  number  of  General  Staff  officers"). 

514 

o 


MILITARY  AVIATION 


PREPARED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION,  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

AS   A   SUPPLEMENT   TO    THE    STATEMENT    OF   A   PROPER   MILITARY 

POLICY  FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES 


WCD  9311-1 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE  :  WASHINGTON 

NOVEMBER,  1915 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 

1916 


516 


War  Department, 

Document  No.  515. 

Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff. 


SYNOPSIS. 


I 


I.  Introduction. 

Page. 

1.  Relation  of  aviation  to  the  military  service 6 

2.  Use  of  aircraft  on  our  coast  and  with  our  mobile  land  forces 5 

3.  Use  of  aircraft  at  over-sea  stations 6 

II.  General  Types  of  Aircraft. 

4.  Captive  balloons 7 

6.  Dirigibles 8 

6.  Aeroplanes 10 

7.  Types  of  aeroplanes 10 

8.  Requirements  of  various  types  of  machines 10 

9.  Aeroplane  engines 12 

III.  Functions  op  Aircraft. 

10.  Height  at  which  aeroplanes  must  fly 12 

11.  Strategical  reconnaissance 12 

12.  Photography  from  aeroplanes 13 

13.  Aeroplanes  and  artillery 13 

14.  Control  of  the  air 13 

15.  Surprise  movements 14 

16.  Bomb  dropping 14 

IV.  Organization  op  Aeroplane  Units. 

17.  Tactics  of  aeroplanes 15 

18.  Development  diu-ing  European  war ^ 15 

19.  Assignment  of  aeroplanes  to  Artillery 16 

V.  Development  of  Aeronautical  Personnel. 

20.  General  line  of  development  in  Europe 16 

21.  Officer-observers  and  noncommissioned  officer-pilots 16 

22.  Losses  to  aero  personnel  in  war 16 

23.  Development  of  aeronautic  personnel  in  the  United  States 17 

24.  Scope  of  needed  legislation 18 

516 

(3) 


MILITARY  AVIATION. 


I.    INTRODUCTION. 
1.  RELATION  OF  AVIATION  TO  THE   INIILITARY  SERVICE. 

In  this  paper  it  is  proposed  to  consider  various  aeronautical  appli- 
ances in  regard  to  their  practical  value  in  campaign,  as  shown  by 
such  data  as  are  now  available  from  the  theater  of  war  in  Europe. 

In  its  relation  to  the  military  service,  aviation  to-day  may  be 
regarded  as  embracing  all  aerial  appliances,  such  as  heavier-than-air 
craft,  dirigibles  lighter-than-air  craft,  and  nondirigibles  or  captive 
lighter-than-air  balloons,  together  with  the  personnel  necessary  for 
their  operation  and  management. 

2.  USE  OF  AIRCRAFT  ON  OUR  COAST  AND  WITH  OUR  MOBILE 

LAND  FORCES. 

In  considering  this  subject  account  should  be  taken,  first,  of  the 
use  of  aircraft  of  various  types  along  and  beyond  the  coasts  and 
frontiers  of  the  United  States  upon  the  outbreak  of  war;  second, 
the  use  of  aircraft  in  the  Army  by  the  mobile  forces;  third,  the  use 
of  aircraft  by  our  over-sea  garrisons. 

In  addition  to  the  battle  fleet  and  units  of  the  Navy  designed  to 
take  the  offensive  on  the  high  seas,  the  waters  contiguous  to  the 
coast  line  of  the  United  States  are  organized  into  naval  defense  dis- 
tricts. These  cover  certain  sections  of  the  coast  line  and  contain 
patrol  vessels,  both  surface  and  subsurface,  and  aircraft  for  recon- 
noissance  purposes.  These  are  essentially  for  the  purpose  of  finding 
out  and  locating  hostile  vessels  which  are  approaching  the  coast  and 
of  determining  their  strength,  dispositions,  and  probable  intentions. 

Added  to  the  strictly  naval  formations  included  in  the  naval 
defense  districts,  in  time  of  war  the  United  States  Coast  Guard  (in 
peace  under  the  Treasury  Department)  passes  to  the  control  of  the 
Navy. 

The  Coast  Guard,  in  addition  to  its  boats  and  revenue  cutters 
which  will  be  utilized  as  patrol  vessels,  embraces  the  Life-Saving 
Service.  The  latter  has  stations  more  or  less  regularly  distributed 
along  the  coasts  which  are  connected  by  telephone  lines.  They  are 
also  equipped  with  visual  signaling  appliances  to  communicate  from 
shore  to  ships.  The  Navy  maintains  a  chain  of  radio  stations  along 
our  coasts  and  over-sea  possessions. 

515 

l5) 


6 

The  naval  defense  districts  become  of  great  importance  in  case 
that  the  main  battle  fleets  are  defeated  or  in  case  they  are  operating 
at  a  great  distance.  Therefore,  when  an  enemy  expedition  breaks 
through  the  naval  defense  and  approaches  the  coast  Avith  a  view  to 
forcing  a  landing  the  resistance  to  such  an  expedition  becomes  pri- 
marily a  function  of  the  Army. 

The  defensive  formations  of  the  Army  consist  of  the  harbor 
defenses  and  accessories  and  the  mobile  units.  The  harbor  defenses 
consist  of  fixed  and  mobile  gun  defenses  and  mine  defenses;  also 
obstacles  both  on  land  and  in  the  waters.  The  aircraft  required  in 
connection  with  the  harbor  defenses  should  consist  of  machines  used 
for  one  or  more  of  the  following  purposes: 

(a)  For  reconnaissance — that  is,  to  determine  the  strength,  dis- 
positions, and  probable  intentions  of  the  enemy. 

(b)  For  preventing  hostile  aerial  reconnaissance. 

(c)  For  destroying  hostile  aircraft  and  for  offensive  work  against 
enemy  submarines  and  other  vessels,  including  the  interruption  of 
enemy  mining  or  coimtermining  operations. 

(d)  For  aiding  in  spotting  the  fire  of  Coast  Artillery,  both  against 
ships  and  against  any  invading  force  that  may  invest  the  seacoast 
fortifications. 

The  number  and  character  of  the  aircraft  required  depends  on  the 
locality,  number  of  harbor  defenses,  their  organization,  strength, 
and  positions.  Each  harbor-defense  area,  therefore,  needs  to  bo 
studied  with  this  specific  end  in  view,  and  should  have  radio  appa- 
ratus not  only  for  communicating  with  the  Navy  but  also  for  com- 
municating with  its  aircraft  and  with  the  units  of  our  mobile  forces. 

In  addition  to  the  aircraft  required  with  the  harbor  defenses  them- 
selves, aircraft  are  required  Avith  modern  movable  coast-defense 
armament  employed  as  an  auxiliary  element  of  the  mobile  forces  in 
defending  the  intervals  between  our  fortified  harbors  and  with  units 
of  the  mobile  forces. 

The  use  of  aircraft  with  the  mobile  units  is  a  definite  matter; 
each  division  requires  one  squadron  of  12  aeroplanes.  These  are 
divided  into  three  companies  of  four  aeroplanes  each,  two  companies 
having  reconnaissance  and  artillery  observation  machines  and  one 
company  having  two  high-speed  machines  especially  constructed  for 
long-distance  reconnaissance  and  for  combating  the  enemy's  aerial 
craft;  two  battle  machines  for  the  purpose  of  bomb  dropping  and 
offensive  work  against  enemy  material  of  all  sorts.  This  is  in  keep- 
ing with  the  best  practice  that  has  been  developed  in  the  European 
war. 

3.  USE  OF  AIRCRAFT  AT  OVER-SEA  STATIONS. 

The  use  of  aircraft  with  the  Army  in  the  over-sea  possessions  is 
analogous  to  that  mentioned  above  with  the  harbor  defenses;  and  in 

616 


addition,  -wherever  mobile  units  of  the  Army  happen  to  be,  they 
must  be  provided  with  suitable  aircraft.  The  defense  of  over-sea 
I)ossessions  constitutes  a  problem  in  itself,  and  these  garrisons  must 
be  equipped  not  only  with  machines  capable  of  reconnaissance  over 
land  but  also  with  those  capable  of  operations  over  water,  with  the 
power  to  alight  in  water — that  is,  hydroaeroplanes. 

The  type  of  machine  to  be  used  necessarily  depends  on  the  locality: 
for  instance,  in  Hawaii  practically  all  of  the  military  machines 
would  need  to  be  hydroaeroplanes;  in  the  Philippines  and  Panama  a 
great  proportion  of  them.  To  the  Coast  Artillery  troops  in  the 
United  States  proper  and  in  the  districts  around  the  Great  Lakes 
the  same  considerations  apply.  It  is  believed  that  the  main  prmci- 
ples  enunciated  above  should  be  followed,  and  that  an  estimate  of 
actual  machines  and  material,  both  heavier  and  lighter  than  air, 
fchould  be  made  for  all  places. 

II.    GENERAL  TYPES   OF  AIRCRAFT. 
4.  CAPTIVE  BALLOONS. 

For  over  a  century  captive  balloons  have  been  used  by  the  armies 
of  all  the  leading  military  nations.  Their  function  has  been  one  of 
observation;  that  is,  to  see  what  those  on  the  ground  Avere  unable 
to  see.  They  have  therefore  proved  a  useful  means  of  observing  and 
reporting  the  effects  of  artillery  fire.  Electrical  means  of  communi- 
cation greatly  enhanced  the  utility  of  captive  balloons,  as  it  made 
communication  instantaneous  from  car  to  ground  instead  of  by  the 
older  way  of  raising  and  lowering  written  messages  by  ropes.  In 
clear  weather  and  on  favorable  terrain  captive  balloons  are  able  to 
distinguish  different  branches  of  the  service  at  a  distance  of  1G,000 
yards  or  about  9  miles.  "With  the  best  glasses  at  the  present  time 
the  field  of  observatirn  is  said  to  extend  to  20,000  yards.  In  general, 
captive  balloons  of  the  "Sausage"  or  "  Drachen  "  type  are  used  by 
all  the  armies  of  the  great  nations.  Along  the  French-German  front 
in  northern  France  these  balh^ons  are  used  in  great  numbers  all 
along  the  lines.  Their  function  is  to  observe  t!ie  fire  of  artillery  and 
keep  watch  of  all  movements  of  hostile  parties  within  their  field  of 
view.  They  are  connected  by  telephone  directly  with  the  batteries 
whose  fire  thc}^  are  observing  and  with  the  headquarters  to  Avhich 
they  are  attached.  In  many  cases  the  ca])tive  balloons  work  in  con- 
junction with  aeroplanes.  The  aeroplanes  by  flying  over  the  terrain 
where  the  hostile  targets  are  located  find  out  the  exact  position  of 
those  which  the  captive  balloons  have  been  unable  to  locate  by  them- 
selves. "When  by  means  of  signals  the  locations  of  the  targets  have 
been  indicated  to  the  observer  in  the  captive  balloon,  the  aeroplanes 
proceed  to  other  duty.    Aside  from  the  use  of  the  captive  balloons 

615 


8 

in  conjunction  with  aeroplanes,  their  duties  are  practically  the  same 
as  they  have  been  for  many  years  or  were  in  our  own  Civil  War. 
Free  balloons  such  as  were  used  from  Paris,  for  instance,  in  1870 
are  now  a  thing  of  the  past,  their  place  having  been  taken  by  the 
aeroplane  or  the  dirigible  airship.  All  military  captive  balloons  are 
now  so  constructed  that  their  undersurface  acts  like  a  kite,  thereby 
making  them  steady  in  a  strong  wind.  To  keep  the  envelope  dis- 
tended properly  in  the  face  of  the  wind,  a  wind  sail  is  provided  so 
as  to  transmit  pressure  to  the  rear  part  of  the  envelope  by  means 
of  the  wind  itself.  Captive  balloons  are  used  not  only  with  the  field 
forces,  but  also  are  especially  useful  in  fortress  warfare.  The 
organizations  which  handle  these  balloons  consist  ordinarily  of 
some  4  officers,  72  men  for  each  balloon  section. 

5.  DIRIGIBLES. 

The  term  dirigible,  as  applied  to  aeronautical  appliances,  signifies 
a  lighter-than-air  craft,  which  is  equipped  with  engines  and  pro- 
pellers capable  of  moving  it  from  place  to  place.  Dirigibles  may  be 
roughly  divided  into  three  classes:  Nonrigid,  or  those  whose  enve- 
lope can  be  entirely  packed  into  a  small  space  when  deflated,  and 
that  have  no  rigid  framework  of  any  kind;  semirigid,  or  those  that 
have  a  stiffening  for  a  part  of  their  length  in  order  to  enable  the 
envelopes  to  maintain  their  shape  to  better  advantage  than  the  non- 
rigid;  the  rigid,  which  have  a  framework  for  the  whole  envelope 
that  maintains  itself  continuously.  All  have  been  tried  for  the  last 
15  years.  The  nonrigid  types  have  not  given  very  good  results,  as 
they  are  too  much  dependent  on  the  weather,  due  to  distortion  of 
the  envelopes;  the  semirigid  have  given  some  satisfaction  and  have 
been  largely  employed.  The  advantage  of  the  semirigid  types  is 
that  they  may  be  packed  for  shipment  and  reassembled  much  more 
easily  than  the  rigid  types;  they  can  be  deflated  quickly  and,  con- 
sequently, are  not  so  subject  to  complete  destruction  as  the  rigid 
types  when  anchored  to  the  earth.  On  the  other  hand,  they  are  not 
able  to  develop  the  speed  that  the  rigid  types,  such  as  the  "  Zeppelin," 
are  capable  of. 

Dirigibles  and  aeroplanes  are  frequently  compared  with  each  other 
as  to  their  utility  in  general.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  they  are  two 
entirely  different  military  accessories  and  are  as  different  in  many 
ways  as  is  a  captive  balloon  from  an  aeroplane.  Dirigibles  are  able 
to  stay  in  the  air  at  any  height  for  long  periods  of  time.  They  are 
capable  of  running  at  reduced  speed,  can  hover  over  localities  for 
minute  observation  and  to  take  photographs.  They  are  able  to  carry 
several  tons  weight  in  addition  to  their  passengers  and  crew.  From 
the  fact  that  they  are  able  to  remain  stationary  over  a  given  place 

515 


9 

they  are  able  to  launch  their  projectiles  with  greater  accuracy.  Dirig- 
ibles in  the  present  war  have  been  used  both  over  land  and  sea.  At 
sea  th^y  have  carried  out  reconnaissance,  have  acted  offensively 
against  hostile  submarines,  have  accompanied  transports  in  order  to 
observe  the  approach  of  hostile  craft,  have  been  used  in  mine  laying, 
stopping  and  examining  hostile  merchant  vessels  at  sea,  and  for 
bombarding  hostile  localities.  The  airships  which  have  made  the 
longest  trips  and  developed  the  greatest  efficiency  thus  far  are  the 
German  "  Zeppelin  ■'  rigid-frame  type.  These  have  repeatedly  flown 
over  England  at  a  distance  of  at  least  ^0  miles  from  their  base,  and 
have  nearly  always  returned  in  safety.  Some  have  been  lost,  how- 
ever. Aeroplanes  appear  to  be  unable  to  cope  with  them  at  night. 
While  dirigibles  have  not  proved  themselves  to  be  a  determining 
factor  in  combat,  either  on  land  or  sea,  they  are  being  developed  to 
the  greatest  extent  possible,  especially  by  the  Germans,  who  have 
dirigibles  of  very  great  size.  The  principal  features  of  this  type 
are  a  rigid  framework  of  aluminum,  a  number  of  drum-shaped  gas 
bags,  and  a  thin  outer  cover.  Although  the  details  of  construction 
are  not  definitely  known  up  to  date,  their  length  is  about  485  feet, 
their  volume  about  900,000  cubic  feet,  their  total  lift  over  20  tons, 
and  their  useful  lift  about  5  tons.  They  are  driven  by  four  motors 
of  a  total  horsepower  of  about  800,  which  is  applied  to  four  pro- 
pellers. Their  speed  is  from  50  to  60  or  more  miles  per  hour  and  a 
full-speed  endurance  of  over  100  hours,  or  more  than  4  days.  It  is 
therefore  evident  that  in  good  weather  these  airships  have  a  radius 
of  action  of  from  5,000  to  6,000  miles.  Moreover,  they  are  being 
constantly  improved,  and  are  probably  capable  of  crossing  the  Atlan- 
tic Ocean.  Crews  of  from  10  to  20  men  are  required  for  their  opera- 
tion; they  are  armed  with  bombs  of  various  sorts,  light  guns,  and 
are  equipped  with  searchlights.  They  carry  very  efficient  radio  ap- 
parati,  which  have  equipments  for  determining  the  directions  from 
which  radio  impulses  are  being  sent.  In  this  way  they  are  able  to 
locate  themselves  at  night  or  in  foggy  weather  when  the  ground  is 
invisible.  They  require  very  large  and  expensive  hangars,  gas  plants, 
and  equipments  for  their  operation.  When  forced  to  make  landings 
outside  of  their  hangars,  on  account  of  their  bulk,  they  are  very  diffi- 
cult to  handle  in  hard  winds,  and  are  liable  to  destruction  thereby. 

The  best  of  the  nonrigid  and  semirigid  airships  have  a  capacit}^ 
f)f  more  than  800,000  cubic  feet,  a  maximum  speed  of  50  miles  per 
liour  or  less,  and  a  full  speed  endurance  of  about  24  hours.  As  men- 
tioned above,  their  great  asset  is  extreme  portability  and  cheapness 
as  compared  with  the  rigid  type. 
30669°— No.  515—16 2 


10 

6.  AEROPLANES. 

Heavier- than- air  craft  made  their  appearance  as  military  agencies 
in  1908,  when  the  Wright  brothers  demonstrated  thoroughlj'  their 
possibilities  in  this  respect.  While  many  of  the  salient  features  of 
heavier-than-air  machines  had  been  worked  out  years  before,  it  re- 
mained for  the  internal-combustion  engine  to  really  make  mechanical 
flight  possible.  The  military  possibilities  of  aircraft  of  this  descrip- 
tion were  appreciated  immediately  by  the  great  nations.  Large  ap- 
propriations were  made  at  once,  notably  by  France  and  Germany, 
1'or  their  development.  At  first  England  was  slow  to  take  up  the 
matter,  but  in  1912  had  gone  at  it  thoroughly  and  was  spending  large 
amounts  of  money  for  their  development.  Italy,  Russia,  Japan, 
and  the  smaller  nations  of  Europe  and  South  America  made  liberal 
appropriations  for  obtaining  the  material  and  developing  the  person- 
nel. Aeroplanes  were  used  in  a  small  way  during  the  Italian  cam- 
paign in  Africa  during  the  Balkan-Turkish  War,  and  during  the 
Balkan  War.  These  nations  had  very  little  equipment  and  very  few 
trained  flj^ers.  Wherever  the  aeroplanes  were  given  the  opportunity, 
under  average  conditions  they  rendered  efficient  service  in  recon- 
naissance. 

7.  TYPES  OF  AEROPLANES. 

We  now  find  aeroplanes  consisting  of  three  principal  classes:  (a) 
Scout  or  speed  machines;  (b)  reconnaissance  aeroplanes;  (c)  battle 
machines.  The  first  are  used  for  distant  reconnaissance  and  com- 
bating the  enemy's  aircraft,  the  second  for  ordinary  reconnaissance 
and  the  observation  of  fire  of  artillery,  and  the  third  for  the  de- 
struction of  enemy's  material,  personnel,  or  equipment. 

8.  REQUIREMENTS  OF  VARIOUS  TYPES  OF  MACHINES. 

Great  advances  have  been  made  since  the  war  began  in  all  these 
machines,  all  the  details  of  which  are  not  yet  available.  The  fol- 
lowing table,  which  appeared  in  the  London  Times  of  February  19, 
1914,  gives  the  approximate  requirements  of  each  type  of  machine 
at  the  beginning  of  the  war.  These  general  characteristics  are  still 
desired,  but  the  radius  of  action  and  the  speed  have  been  con- 
siderably increased: 

616 


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9.  AEROPLANE  ENGINES. 

As  to  material,  the  most  important  consideration  in  aeroplane  con- 
struction has  been  the  engine.  Without  excellent  engines  the  best 
aeroplanes  otherwise  are  of  no  service;  in  fact,  may  be  a  source  of 
danger.  In  the  countries  where  aeroplane  development  has  made  the 
most  progress  large  prizes  have  been  given  for  the  development  of 
suitable  engines.  At  the  same  time,  research  and  experimentation 
have  gone  on  along  this  line  at  Government  plants.  Engines  re- 
quire frequent  replacement.  In  fact,  it  is  reported  that  after  100 
hours  in  the  air  engines  are  "  scrapped "  and  new  ones  installed. 
The  plan  found  to  give  excellent  results  for  the  development  of 
material  is  for  the  Government  to  have  stations  where  experimenta- 
tion along  all  lines  is  carried  on.  On  the  data  furnished  by  these 
establishments  specifications  are  made  up  for  the  construction  of 
aircraft  by  private  individuals  and  civil  manufactories.  If  any 
parts,  such  as  the  engines  mentioned  above,  need  additional  develop- 
ment, prizes  are  offered  to  stimulate  construction  and  progress. 

ni.   FUNCTIONS   OF  AIRCRAFT. 

10.  HEIGHT  AT  WHICH  AEROPLANES  MUST  FLY. 

It  was  soon  found  out  that  to  escape  the  fire  of  small  arms  a 
height  of  about  4,000  feet  above  the  ground  had  to  be  maintained. 
As  soon  as  balloon  guns  were  created  this  height  had  to  be  increased 
to  6,000  feet,  at  which  height  it  is  now  necessary  to  fly  in  order  to  be 
reasonably  safe  from  being  hit  by  hostile  projectiles  sufficient  to 
bring  the  machine  down.  At  this  height,  6,000  feet,  small  details  of 
the  terrain  and  small  detachments  of  troops  or  material  are  very 
difficult  to  distinguish.  On  the  other  hand,  large  columns  of  troops, 
trains,  raihvays,  bridges,  artillery  firing,  and  sometimes  in  position, 
defensive  positions  of  large  extent,  and  things  of  that  nature  can  be 
readily  distinguished.  Whenever  it  becomes  necessary  for  the  air- 
craft to  fly  at  a  lower  altitude  than  6,000  feet  the  chance  of  destruc- 
tion by  gunfire  must  be  considered. 

11.  STRATEGICAL  RECONNAISSANCE.  1 

Reconnaissance  of  this  kind  is  strategical  in  its  nature,  the  tactical 
reconnaissance  of  particular  localities  is  still  carried  out  by  troops 
or  captive  balloons.  In  fact,  it  may  be  said  that  all  strategical  recon- 
naissance is  now  carried  on  by  aircraft.  The  reconnaissance  is  car- 
ried out  by  an  officer  who  requires  considerable  experience  in  order  to 
be  able  to  distinguish  objects  on  the  earth  and  assign  to  them  their 
true  military  value.  The  pilot  is  either  an  officer  or  noncommissioned 
officer.  The  observer  is  always  a  trained  tactical  officer,  because  in 
reconnaissance  of  this  nature  an  untrained  person  can  not  interpret 
the  military  significance  of  what  he  sees. 

515 


13 

12.  PHOTOGRAPHY  FROM  AEROPLANES. 

Photography  is  utilized  to  the  greatest  extent  possible  in  aerial 
reconnaissance.  The  devices  are  so  arranged  that  they  are  capable 
of  taking  one  or  a  series  ofvie"STs  of  a  particular  locality.  The  plates 
or  films  thus  made  are  rapidly  developed  and  are  thrown  on  a  screen 
by  means  of  a  stereopticon,  when  all  details  are  magnified  to  any 
extent  desired  and  details  invisible  to  the  naked  eye  are  brought  out 
plainly.  These  details  are  then  entered  on  the  maps  of  the  officers 
concerned.  As  the  height  at  which  an  aeroplane  is  flying  can  be 
taken  from  the  barograph,  and  as  the  focal  angle  of  the  lens  of  the 
camera  is  known,  a  scale  can  easily  be  worked  out  and  the  views  form 
good  maps  of  the  terrain  photographed. 

13.  AEROPLANES  AND  ARTILLERY. 

In  addition  to  reconnaissance  in  general,  aeroplanes  have  taken 
their  place  as  a  fixture  for  observing  the  fire  of  artillery.  Due  to 
the  degree  of  concealment  which  artillery  is  now  given,  it  is  im- 
possible to  determine  its  location  from  the  ground.  The  aeroplanes 
first  pick  up  the  targets,  report  their  location  to  the  field  artillery, 
and  then  observe  the  fire  of  the  batteries.  By  means  of  prearranged 
visual  signals  or  radiotelegraphy  the  aeroplanes  are  able  to  indicate 
to  the  artillery  where  their  fire  is  making  itself  felt.  If  artillery 
is  insufficiently  provided  with  aeroplanes,  it  is  well  established  that 
an  enemy  so  provided  has  an  overwhelming  advantage. 

14.  CONTROL  OF  THE  AIR. 

For  this  reason,  among  others,  attempts  to  gain  "  control  of  the 
air"  are  made  by  belligerents  at  the  inception  of  hostilities.  This 
takes  the  form  of  offensive  action  by  aeroplane  against  aeroplane. 
For  this  purpose  machines  known  as  "speed  scouts"  and  "battle 
aeroplanes  "  have  been  developed.  All  the  great  European  nations 
are  now  equipped  with  them.  The  only  way  in  which  enemy  aero- 
planes can  be  effectively  dealt  with  is  by  aeroplanes,  because  they 
are  difficult  targets  for  gunfire  from  the  ground.  To  gain  control 
of  the  air  a  great  preponderance  in  number  and  efficiency  of  air- 
craft is  necessary.  So  far  in  the  European  war,  unless  one  side  had 
a  greatly  preponderating  number  and  quality  of  aeroplanes,  they 
have  been  unable  to  obtain  and  keep  control  of  the  air.  An  excellent 
instance  of  obtaining  control  of  the  air  seems  to  be  furnished  by  the 
Austro-Germans  when  they  initiated  the  campaign  against  the  Rus- 
sians in  May,  1915.  In  this  instance  complete  control  of  the  air 
appears  to  have  been  obtained.  The  results  to  the  Russians  were 
disastrous  because  the  Austro-Germans  were  able  to  fly  at  will  wher- 
ever they  wanted  to,  could  pick  up  the  location  of  the  Russian 

516 


14 

masses,  and  make  their  movements  accordingly,  entirely  unobserved 
by  the  Russians.  In  the  fire  of  their  artillery  they  had  the  advantage 
of  being  able  to  locate  the  Russian  guns  and  observe  their  own  fire, 
•while  the  Russians  were  powerless  to  do  so. 

In  an  article  on  "  Recent  progress  in  military  aeronautics,"  pub- 
lished in  the  Journal  of  the  Franklin  Institute  for  October,  1915, 
Lieut.  Col.  Samuel  Reber,  Signal  Corps,  United  States  Army,  sums 
up  the  question  of  machines  for  control  of  the  air  as  follows: 

Experience  has  developed  three  types  of  aeroplanes  for  military  purposes: 
The  first,  the  speed  scout,  for  strategical  reconnaissance,  a  one  seater,  with  a 
speed  up  to  85  miles  per  hour  and  radius  of  action  of  300  miles  and  a  fast 
climber,  about  700  feet  per  minute;  the  second  for  general  reconnaissance  pur- 
poses with  the  same  radius  of  action,  carrying  both  pilot  and  observer  and 
equipped  with  radiotelegraphy,  slower  in  speed,  about  70  miles  per  hour,  and 
climbing  about  500  feet  per  minute,  and  in  some  cases  protected  by  armor ;  the 
third,  or  fighting  craft,  armored,  and  carries  in  addition  to  the  pilot  a  rapid- 
fire  gun  and  ammunition  and  so  arranged  as  to  have  a  clear  field  of  view  and 
fire  in  either  direction  up  to  30  degrees  from  the  line  of  flight,  the  speed  to 
run  from  45  to  G5  miles  per  hour,  and  the  machine  to  climb  about  350  feet 
per  minute. 

15.  SURPRISE  MOVEMENTS. 

It  is  often  said  that  due  to  the  use  of  aeroplanes  surprises  are  no 
longer  possible.  Generally  speaking,  this  is  so,  providing  both 
sides  are  equally  well  equipped  with  machines  and  weather  con- 
ditions are  favorable.  If,  however,  complete  "command  of  the  air" 
is  obtained  by  one  side,  the  chances  of  surprising  the  enemy  are 
greater  than  they  have  ever  been  before. 

16.  BOMB  DROPPING. 

In  addition  to  their  functions  of  reconnaissance,  the  observation 
of  the  fire  of  artillery,  and  the  combat  of  hostile  machines,  both 
heavier  and  lighter  than  air,  much  time,  thought,  and  ingenuity  have 
been  given  to  the  subject  of  dropping  projectiles.  Bombs  of  various 
sorts  weighing  from  a  couple  of  pounds  to  50  pounds  have  been 
tried.  The  most  common  ones  weigh  from  15  to  35  pounds.  At  the 
height  at  which  aeroplanes  are  required  to  fly  it  is  extremely  diffi- 
cult to  hit  an  object  with  any  certainty.  Various  devices  have  been 
used  and  tried  for  this  purpose.  The  factors  of  height,  speed,  and 
wind,  are  almost  impossible  to  compensate  for  entirely,  up  to  the 
present  time,  so  that  consequently  bomb  dropping  in  general  or  the 
launching  of  projectiles  of  all  kinds  from  aeroplanes  has  not  at- 
tained great  results  in  so  far  as  the  actual  destruction  of  material 
or  personnel  is  concerned.  Advances  along  this  line  are  constantly 
being  made,  however,  but  progress  is  slow.  A  special  type  of  aero- 
plane has  been  developed  for  dropping  bombs  and  battle  purposes. 

515 


15 

For  bomb  attacks  on  any  locality  these  machines  are  sent  in  flotillas 
of  from  30  to  60  machines,  each  of  which  is  provided  with  from 
5  to  10  bombs.  They  go  to  the  locality  and  circle  over  it,  dropping 
their  projectiles.  Against  railways,  roads,  bridges,  and  hostile  parks 
of  various  kinds,  this  method  of  attack  has  given  considerable 
success. 

IV.   ORGANIZATION   OF  AEROPLANE   UNITS. 

17.  TACTICS  OF  AEROPLANES. 

As  to  tactical  use  aeroplanes  seem  to  be  approaching  methods  simi- 
lar to  those  used  by  a  navy.  That  is,  first  the  speed  machines  re- 
connoiter  to  the  front;  they  are  followed  by  the  battle  machines, 
which  in  their  turn  clear  the  way  for  the  reconnaissance  aeroplanes; 
those  assigned  to  the  artillery  stay  right  with  their  guns.  Fortresses, 
harbor-defense  works,  and  naval  formations  require  special  organi- 
zations of  aeroplanes,  some  or  all  of  which  may  be  operated  from 
the  water.  The  organization,  kind,  and  number  of  the  machines  and 
personnel  required  for  this  particular  service  depend  on  the  special 
locality  and  mission  of  whatever  formation  the  aircraft  are  to  be 
attached  to. 

18.  DEVELOPMENT  DURING  EUROPEAN  WAR, 

The  use  of  aeroplanes  is  gradually  being  developed  from  expe- 
rience in  the  European  war.  Organization  has  been  found  to  be  one 
of  the  most  important  considerations;  in  general  the  organization 
has  been  into  squadrons.  The  squadron  is  a  tactical  and  adminis- 
trative unit.  It  has  a  personnel  consisting  of  pilots,  observers, 
bomb  droppers,  mechanicians,  chauffeurs,  and  drivers.  Flying  per- 
sonnel has  to  be  developed  in  the  military  service.  Unlike  chauffeurs, 
for  instance,  there  are  few  in  the  civil  population  w^ho  can  be  drawn 
on.  The  few  who  fly  are  demonstrators,  exhibition  flyers,  or  sports- 
men. They  are  very  few  in  number  and  scarcely  a  military  asset. 
In  France  the  squadrons  usually  have  six  machines  and  two  spares. 
They  have  the  same  organization  of  depots  of  resupply  that  other 
units  of  the  armies  possess.  The  squadrons  usually  consist  of  com- 
plete units  of  one  kind  of  machine;  that  is,  speed,  reconnaissance,  or 
fighting.  These  squadrons  are  usually  assigned  to  an  army,  or  more 
if  the  machines  and  personnel  are  available. 

In  general  an  aeroplane  requires  for  its  operation  a  personnel  of 
1  pilot,  1  observer,  and  2  enlisted  men,  mechanicians,  chauffeurs,  etc. 

In  England  12  machines  of  different  classes  are  assigned  to  a 
squadron. 

615 


16 

19.  ASSIGNMENT  OF  AEROPLANES  TO  ARTILLERY. 

Many  are  of  the  opinion  that  machines  with  the  personnel  to  op- 
erate them  should  be  assigned  permanently  to  artillery  regiments, 
so  that  they  would  be  immediately  available  whenever  action  is  re- 
quired by  the  artillery.  If  they  have  to  be  obtained  from  a  higher 
headquarters  valuable  time  is  often  lost.  It  is  believed  that  before 
long  aeroplanes  will  be  assigned  permanently  to  regiments  of  artil- 
lery. 

V.   DEVELOPMENT  OF    AERONAUTIC  PERSONNEL. 

20.  GENERAL  LINE  OF  DEVELOPMENT  IN  EUROPE. 

In  the  development  of  their  aeronautical  personnel  all  nations 
have  worked  more  or  less  along  similar  lines.  At  first  these  detach- 
ments were  attached  to  the  engineers.  All  the  pilots  and  observers 
were  officers,  while  the  mechanicians  and  others  were  enlisted  men. 
As  the  science  developed  and  more  and  more  machines  becames  nec- 
essary the  importance  of  this  branch  constantly  increased  until  even- 
tually it  formed  a  separate  arm  of  the  service. 

Instead  of  officers  only  being  employed  in  the  flying  of  the  ma- 
chines noncommissioned  officers  began  to  be  used  as  the  pilots. 

21.  OFFICER-OBSERVERS  AND  NONCOMMISSIONED  OFFICER- 

PILOTS. 

The  observers  were  either  trained  staff  officers  or  officers  of  par- 
ticular branches  when  the  reconnaissance  being  made  especially  con- 
cerned a  certain  branch.  For  instance,  in  the  observation  of  artil- 
lery fire  an  artillery  officer,  for  the  inspection  of  a  demolished  bridge 
over  a  great  river  an  engineer  officer,  or  for  the  observation  of  the 
tactical  or  strategical  dispositions  of  an  enemy's  troops  a  staff  officer. 
Noncommissioned  officers  are  now  very  generally  used  as  pilots. 
All  countries  now  at  war  have  found  that  they  have  places  for  all 
the  trained  pilots  they  can  possibly  obtain.  In  general  the  units  are 
commanded  by  officers  and  a  certain  number  of  the  pilots  are  officers, 
but  the  bulk  of  the  piloting  is  done  by  enlisted  men  while  the  officers 
are  carried  as  observers. 

22.  LOSSES  TO  AERO  PERSONNEL  IN  WAR. 

The  losses  to  the  flying  personnel  in  war,  when  equipped  with 
proper  machines,  seems  to  be  less  than  that  of  infantry,  cavalry,  and 
artillery  in  the  order  named. 

615 


17 

23.  DEVELOPMENT  OF  AERONAUTIC  PERSONNEL  IN  THE  UNITED 

STATES. 

In  the  United  States  the  development  has  been  along  similar  lines 
to  those  employed  in  Europe,  with  the  difference  that  here  a  branch 
of  the  service  existed  that  did  not  formerly  exist  in  the  European 
armies.  It  was  a  development  of  the  Civil  War,  i.  e.,  the  Signal 
Corps.  This  corps  is  charged  with  the  transmission  of  information 
between  the  various  units  of  an  army;  the  captive  balloons  had 
formerly  been  assigned  to  it,  and  when  the  aeroplanes  made  their 
appearance  they  naturally  fitted  in.  In  this  way  all  the  agencies 
for  the  transmission  of  information  are  kept  under  one  head,  which 
should  give  not  only  the  maximum  amount  of  efficiency  in  such  trans- 
mission but  also  obviate  the  necessity  of  creating  a  new  arm  of  the 
service.  The  development  of  aero  units  in  the  United  States  has  been 
slow  for  various  reasons:  First,  on  account  of  the  fact  that  very 
little  money  has  been  appropriated  compared  to  the  sums  appropri- 
ated in  Europe.  Second,  the  selection  of  the  flying  personnel  has 
been  limited  to  lieutenants  of  the  Regular  Army,  unmarried,  and 
below  30  years  of  age.  This  reduces  the  number  of  eligibles  to  a 
very  small  compass  and  does  not  give  the  results  that  are  necessary. 
In  the  development  of  a  flying  personnel  it  is  thought  that,  in  addi- 
tion to  a  certain  number  of  officers  obtained  from  the  Eegular  Army 
as  now  provided  for  by  law,  pilots  should  be  obtained  both  from  among 
the  enlisted  men  and  from  suitable  civilians  who  enlist  for  that  pur- 
pose. When  they  have  proved  their  ability  to  be  efficient  pilots  they 
should  be  placed  in  a  special  grade  to  be  designated  by  a  suitable 
name,  such  as  "  aero  pilot.  Signal  Corps,"  for  instance.  This  grade 
should  be  analogous  to  the  grade  of  warrant  officer  in  the  Navy. 
When  such  men  leave  the  service  for  any  cause  which  does  not  inter- 
fere with  the  performance  of  the  duties  of  pilot,  arrangements  should 
be  made  to  obtain  their  services  at  once  at  the  outbreak  of  war. 
The  observers  should  be  tactical  officers  who  have  received  training. 
The  present  organization  authorized  for  the  aero  squadrons  in  the 
United  States  provides  that  each  one  have  12  aeroplanes — 8  of  the 
reconnaissance  type,  2  of  the  speed  type,  and  2  of  the  battle  type. 
The  personnel  numbers  20  officers,  18  of  whom  are  pilots.  It  is 
intended  that  staff  and  Artillery  officers  be  used  as  observers.  The 
United  States  squadron  appears  to  be  a  well-balanced  unit  for  work 
in  this  country,  judging  by  the  experiences  obtained  in  Europe.  It 
should  be  perfected  as  soon  as  possible  and  every  effort  made  to  give 
our  Army  the  aircraft  of  all  types  needed  for  its  use.  Lieut.  Col. 
Reber,  in  this  connection,  says: 

We  who  in  the  beginning  started  the  movement  are  now  at  the  tail  of  the  pro- 
cession.   We  have  no  dirigibles,  but  very  few  trained  men,  and  fewer  macliines. 
516 


18 

The  manufacturing  industry  is  moribund  from  tlie  lack  of  business,  and  there 
is  no  future  for  it.  We  have  no  aerodj^namical  laboratories  in  which  to  study 
tlie  problems,  and  no  engineering  courses,  except  one,  in  which  to  develop  our 
constructors.  The  Government  has  not  stimulated  any  advance  in  the  design 
of  machines  or  motors  by  competition  for  substantial  reward.  We  have  no 
national  league,  as  in  France  and  Germany,  to  assist  the  Government  by  pri- 
vate subscription  and  by  public  demand  for  the  development  of  air  power. 
The  interest  of  our  people  in  aeronautics  at  large  is  dead,  and  has  been  per- 
haps so  lulled  by  a  sense  of  false  security  and  the  belief  that  war  will  not  come 
to  such  a  vast  and  powerful  Nation  as  ours ;  that  it  will  not  heed  an  oft-quoted 
maxim  of  the  Father  of  our  Country,  "  In  time  of  peace  prepare  for  war."  In 
no  particular  is  it  more  impossible  to  make  up  deficiencies  after  the  outbreak 
of  hostilities  than  in  aeronautics.    What  is  to  be  done? 

Evidently  a  strong  appeal  should  be  made  to  Congress  for  suitable 
legislation. 

24.  SCOPE  OF  NEEDED  LEGISLATION. 

What  is  needed  is  legislation  that  will  give  means  of  obtaining 
a  sufficient  personnel  of  pilots,  enough  money  to  buy  suitable  ma- 
chines including  excellent  engines,  and  the  training  of  a  suitable 
number  of  officer-observers.  Provision  should  be  made  for  the  cre- 
ation of  captive-balloon  units,  and  dirigibles  of  various  types  should 
be  developed. 

615 

o 


I 


THE  MILITIA  AS  ORGANIZED  UNDER  THE  CONSTI- 
TUTION AND  ITS  VALUE  TO  THE  NATION 
AS  A  MILITARY  ASSET 


I 


f 


PREPARED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION,  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

AS  A  SUPPLEMENT  TO  THE  STATEMENT  OF  A  PROPER  MILITARY 

POLICY  FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES 


WCD  7835-9 


I 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE  :  WASHINGTON 

NOVEMBER,  1915 


516 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 

1916 


War  Department, 

Document  No.  516. 

OjSke  of  the  Chief  of  Staff, 


SYNOPSIS, 


Page. 

1.  Constitutional  provisions  relating  to  power  of  Congress  to  raise  troops 5 

2.  Militia  law  of  1792 5 

3.  Militia  laws  of  1808  and  1820 5 

4.  Failure  of  the  system 6 

5.  Worthlessness  of  militia 6 

6.  Act  of  1898 6 

7.  The  Organized  Militia  as  an  asset  in  preparing  war  plans 7 

8.  Failure  or  refusal  of  troops  to  serve 7 

9.  Lack  of  physical  fitness 8 

10.  Time  for  concentrating 9 

11.  Character  of  force  assembled 9 

12.  Time  this  force  may  be  held  for  service 10 

13.  How  this  force  may  be  used 10 

14.  Wastefulness  of  the  system 10 

15.  As  cause  for  delay  in  raising  a  volunteer  force 11 

16.  Number  of  Organized  Militia  and  amount  of  training  of  those  secured  by  the 

call 11 

17.  The  organizations  of  Organized  Militia  and  training  of  personnel  as  an  asset.  11 

18.  How  present  Organized  Militia  has  improved 12 

19.  Conclusions 12 

30669°— No.  516—16  (3) 


THE    MILITIA    AS    ORGANIZED    UNDER    THE    CONSTITU- 
TION AND  ITS  VALUE  TO  THE  NATION  AS  A  MILITARY 

ASSET. 


1.  UNDER  THE  CONSTITUTION  THERE  ARE  lAVO  WAYS  OF  RAISING 

TROOPS. 

(a)  Directly  under  the  power  of  Congress  "  to  raise  and  support 
armies."     (Art.  1,  sec.  8,  par.  11.) 

(5)  Indirectly  under  (art.  1,  sec.  8,  par.  14)  the  power  "to  pro- 
vide for  calling  forth  the  militia  to  execute  the  laws  of  the  Union, 
suppress  insurrections,  and  repel  invasions." 

(A.  W.  C.  Serial  25,  Part  I,  p.  45)  But  for  the  valuelessness  of  the 
militia  (and  other  short-term  troops),  the  provision  of  the  Constitu- 
tion which  authorizes  the  Federal  Government  "  to  raise  and  support 
armies"  w^ould  probably  never  have  been  adopted,  because  of  the 
traditional  fear  of  a  standing  army.  As  it  was,  this  provision  was 
bitterly  opposed  and  barely  received  enough  votes  to  be  carried. 

The  omission  of  the  clause  would  have  resulted  in  a  dependence 
upon  militia  alone. 

2.  THE  FIRST  IMPORTANT  MILITIA  ACT  WAS  THAT  OF  1792. 

This  act  provided  for  compulsory  enlistment  and  the  performance 
of  military  duty  by  every  able-bodied  male  between  18  and  45,  and 
required  their  enrollment  as  State  militia;  hence,  for  the  United 
States  to  raise  Regulars  or  Volunteers  under  this  act  w  ould  be  an  en- 
croachment upon  a  body  already  subject  to  the  State  as  militia. 

As  this  act  carried  no  appropriation  for  arms,  equipment,  enroll- 
ment, etc.,  and  as  there  was  no  penalty  for  failure  to  carry  out  its 
provisions,  and  as  there  was  no  way  to  coerce  the  governors  of  States, 
it  resulted  that  the  States  gradually  assumed  the  power  of  legislating 
for  the  militia — the  war  power  was  practically  turned  over  to  the 
governors. 

3.  MILITIA  LAWS  OF  1808  (1661)  AND  1820. 

In  1808  Congress  appropriated  an  annual  sum  for  arms  and  equip- 
ment ;  in  1820  it  passed  an  act  requiring  that  field  exercises  and  dis- 
cipline in  the  militia  should  be  as  observed  in  the  Regular  Army. 
516  (5) 


6 

4.  FAILURE  OF  THE  SYSTEM. 

The  failure  of  the  system  in  use  during  the  Revolution  and  subse- 
quently was  largely  due  to  short  enlistments,  method  of  securing 
officers,  and  lack  of  control  by  the  Federal  Government. 

The  system  was  a  failure  during  the  Revolution  and  in  every  suc- 
ceeding war.  This  \\as  particularly  true  of  militia  (and  it  was  true 
for  other  classes  of  troops  where  the  Federal  Government  failed  to 
assert  its  power  or  relinquished  it) . 

5.  WORTHLESSNESS  OF  THE  MILITIA. 

To  show  its  lack  of  value  as  a  military  asset  the  following  state- 
ments are  quoted  from  the  writings  of  George  Washington : 

(A.  W.  C.  Serial  25,  Part  I,  p.  42)  Certain  I  am  that  it  would  be  cheaper  to 
keep  50,000  or  100,000  in  constant  pay  than  to  depend  upon  one  half  the  number 
and  supply  the  other  half  occasionally  by  militia. 

The  time  the  latter  are  in  pay  before  and  after  they  are  in  camp,  assembling 
and  marching,  the  waste  of  ammunition,  the  consumption  of  stores  which 
*  *  *  they  must  be  furnished  with  or  sent  home,  added  to  the  other  inci- 
dental expenses  consequent  upon  their  coming  and  conduct  in  camp,  surpass 
all  idea  and  destroy  every  kind  of  regularity  and  economy  which  you  could 
establish  among  fixed  and  settled  troops  and  will  in  my  opinion  prove,  if  the 
scheme  is  adhered  to,  the  ruin  of  our  cause  *  ♦  *.  For  if  I  was  called  upon 
to  declare  upon  oath  whether  the  militia  have  been  more  serviceable  or  hurtful, 
I  should  subscribe  to  the  latter     *     *     *. 

(A.  W.  C.  Serial  25,  Part  I,  p.  43)  That  an  annual  army  raised  on  the  spur  of 
the  occasion,  besides  being  unqualified  for  the  end  designed,  is  *  *  *  ten 
times  more  expensive     *     *     *. 

(A.  W.  C.  Serial  25,  Part  I,  p.  44)  The  only  things  that  counted  for  efficiency 
were  length  of  service  and  military  experience  of  the  officers. 

The  above  quotations  are  just  as  true  to-day  as  they  were  nearly 
140  years  ago. 

6.  VOLUNTEER  ACT  OF  1898  AND  LATER  MILITIA  ACTS. 

The  volunteer  act  of  1898  was  based  on  the  Constitution.  It  pro- 
vided for  a  force  that  could  be  used  at  home  or  abroad  and  for  gen- 
eral military  purposes,  and  did  not  attempt  to  use  a  force  that  the 
Constitution  restricted  to  three  specific  purposes.  Legislation  since 
then  has  gone  backward  and  makes  the  attempt  to  use  what  the  ex- 
perience of  140  years  has  shown  to  be  not  a  dependable  force  on 
account  of  constitutional  limitations.  The  latest  militia  laws  are 
those  of  January  21, 1903,  May  27, 1908,  April  21,  1910,  and  April  25, 
1914  (volunteer  law). 

These  laws  do  not  correct  known  defects  in  the  militia,  even  those 
that,  the  Constitution  not  preventing,  might  be  corrected. 

616 


"  The  laws  governing  the  transition  from  the  service  orf  the 
State  to  the  service  of  the  United  States  are  more  indefinite  and  more 
liable  to  lead  to  confusion  and  embarrassment  than  they  ever  were 
before."     (3702  Congressional  Record,  1911.) 

7.  THE  MILITIA  AS  AN  ASSET  IN  CARRYING  OUT  PLANS  FOR  THE 
NATIONAL  DEFENSE. 

To  be  of  real  value  as  an  asset  in  preparing  war  plans  it  should 
be  possible  to  answer  the  question,  What  percentage  of  the  present 
personnel  of  the  Organized  Militia,  or  as  it  would  be  at  the  time  the 
President  issues  his  call,  will  be  available  ? 

This  question  can  not  be  answered  even  approximately. 

The  last  report  of  the  Chief  of  Staff  (1911)  gave  the  strength  of 
the  Organized  Militia  (mobile)  as  113,929,  but  this  does  not  repre- 
sent the  number  available  in  preparing  war  plans. 

In  the  first  place  there  is  a  dual  responsibility,  the  governor  and 
the  President,  and  there  may  be  conflict. 

The  President  would  issue  his  call  through  the  governors  of  States. 
(Sec.  4,  act  of  1908.)  He  can  not  issue  the  call  directly  to  the 
Organized  Militia  officers  as  was  possible  before  (under  the  act  of 
1903). 

If  certain  governors  were  not  in  sympathy  with  the  war.  (In 
1812  the  governors  of  Massachusetts  and  Connecticut  and  later  the 
governors  of  Vermont,  Virginia,  North  Carolina,  Kentucky,  Ten- 
nessee, Arkansas,  and  Missouri  refused  to  call  forth  the  militia  in 
response  to  the  President's  call.) 

If  their  c6nstituents  fear  their  own  section  will  be  attacked; 

If  great  political  pressure  is  exerted  to  prevent  militia  of  certain 
States  being  sent  to  the  place  designated  by  the  President ; 

If  certain  governors  should  disband  the  Organized  Militia  in  their 
States  (West  Virginia,  South  Carolina,  Nevada,  and  Kansas  gov- 
ernors have  done  this)  ;  then  the  President's  action  would  be  in  part 
nullified,  and  from  this  cause  alone  the  resultant  force  might  easily 
be  considerably  less  than  the  existing  Organized  Militia. 

8.  FAILURE  OR  REFUSAL  OF  TROOPS  TO  SERVE. 

(A.  W.  C.  Serial  25,  Part  IV,  p.  37)  "  The  response  to  the  call  for 
volunteers  under  the  act  of  April  22,  1898,  at  once  illustrated  the 
worthlessness  of  the  existing  militia  as  an  auxiliary  to  the  Regular 
Army.     *     *     * " 

"  Of  the  militia  borne  on  the  company  rolls,  many  refused  to  vol- 
unteer upon  reasonable  grounds,  25  per  cent  were  rejected  prior  to 
muster,  and  25  per  cent  were  rejected  on  physical  examination  after 
muster." 

616 


8 

The  Organized  Militia  is  better  trained,  officered,  equipped,  and 
disciplined  than  in  1898,  but  men  are  about  the  same  now  as  always, 
and  if  they  are  not  inclined  to  serve  in  war  they  will  find  a  way  to 
avoid  service. 

Section  7,  act  of  1908,  provides : 

That  any  officer  or  enlisted  man  of  the  Organized  Militia  who  shall  refuse  or 
neglect  to  present  himself  for  such  muster,  upon  being  called  forth  as  herein 
prescribed,  shall  be  subject  to  trial  by  court-martial  and  shall  be  punished  as 
such  court-martial  may  direct. 

Under  this  provision  it  is  not  believed  to  be  practicable  to  try 
and  punish  such  offenders.  It  might  be  used  as  a  threat,  but  it  is 
not  believed  that  it  will  deter  many  who  do  not  wish  to  serve. 

9.  LACK  OF  PHYSICAL  FITNESS. 

Section  7  of  act  of  1908  further  provides : 

And  without  further  medical  examination  previous  to  such  muster,  except 
for  those  States  and  Territories  which  have  not  adopted  the  standard  of  medi- 
cal examination  prescribed  for  the  Regular  Army. 

Because  the  standard  for  medical  examination  prescribed  for  the 
Regular  Army  has  been  adopted  by  the  States  it  does  not  follow 
that  they  conform.  Those  who  have  inspected  the  Organized  Militia 
know  this,  and  men  not  qualified  physically  would  shortly  have  to 
be  discharged  and  might  later  become  unworthy  pension  claimants. 
(457  A.  E.  (b).) 

The  Report  of  the  Chief  of  Militia  Division,  page  33  (1914), 
under  the  column  headed  "  Not  apparently  conforming,  etc.,  *  *  *" 
a  total  of  3,218  is  shown ;  the  last  column  of  table  on  page  33  shows 
720  discharged  for  physical  unfitness. 

If  the  necessarily  superficial  examination  showed  3,218  unfit,  it 
is  believed  a  searching  examination  would  reveal  several  times  such 
number  unfit. 

Page  206  of  the  report  above  mentioned  shows  that  the  Organized 
Militia  is  16,000  short  of  the  (old)  minimum,  and  further  states: 

In  no  State  is  the  prescribed  peace  strength  of  all  organizations  of  the  Organ- 
ized Militia  maintained  and  that  in  many  instances  the  deficiency  has  reached 
such  a  figure  as  to  leave  the  corresponding  organizations  such  in  name  only — 
organizations  of  no  value  as  a  military  asset  to  the  Federal  Government. 

It  is  believed  that  many  organization  commanders  are  very  lax 
as  to  physical  qualifications  in  order  to  secure  the  prescribed  mini- 
mum. 

If  all  of  the  organizations  of  the  Organized  Militia  could  be  kept 
up  to  the  prescribed  minimum  with  men  qualified  physically,  the 
situation  would  not  be  so  bad,  but  it  seems  to  have  been  demonstrated 
that,  due  to   (a)   labor  opposition,   (b)  objections  of  employers  to 

616 


absence  of  employees,  (<?)  lack  of  inclination,  interest,  incentive,  etc., 
it  can  not  be  done.  So  that  for  reasons  enumerated  above  it  is  doubt- 
ful if  as  many  as  75,000  of  the  existing  would  actually  be  obtained. 

10.  TIME  FOR  CONCENTRATING. 

Due  to  variations  in  distance  from  the  point  of  concentration, 
the  varying  promptness  of  the  various  governors  in  acting,  the  vary- 
ing degrees  of  readiness  to  move,  of  the  organizations  themselves, 
there  will  result  an  assembling  of  a  percentage  (unknown)  of  the 
Organized  Militia  by  driblets  over  a  considerable  period  of  time 
(not  determinable). 

11.  CHARACTER  OF  THE  FORCE  ASSEMBLED. 

Section  18  of  the  act  of  1903  requires,  for  participating  in  certain 
funds  distributed  by  the  Federal  Government,  participation  in  five 
days'  camp  or  march  and  24  periods  of  instruction. 

Assuming  that  a  man  attended  five  days'  camp  and  24  drills  of 
1^  hours  each,  he  would  have  received  about  60  hours  instruction  in 
a  year. 

The  last  report  of  the  Chief  of  Staff  (p.  7)  states  that  "over  30 
per  cent  failed  to  attend  24  drills "  and  that  "  it  is  believed  to  be  a 
safe  conclusion  that  not  a  single  unit  at  its  maximum  strength 
marched  a  -distance  of  10  miles  fully  equipped  and  armed." 

The  personnel  of  the  Organized  Militia  is  constantly  changing. 
Table,  page  33,  Report  of  Chief  of  Militia  Division  (1914),  shows 
over  35  per  cent  of  the  enlisted  men  served  less  than  one  year;  over 
74  per  cent  less  than  three  years. 

In  three  years  the  maximum  amount  of  instruction  received  by  any 
man  would  probably  never  exceed  180  hours — this  would  be  an  ex- 
ceptional case.  The  instruction  would  vary  during  a  three  years' 
period  from  180  hours  to  0,  with  average  instruction  of,  say,  90  hours. 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  the  man  with  approximately  180  hours 
instruction  has  almost  reached  the  end  of  his  enlistment  and  no 
sooner  will  he  reach  the  concentration  camp  than  the  question  of  his 
discharge  must  be  considered. 

The  lowest  estimate  of  any  competent  authority  as  to  the  time 
necessary  to  train  a  man  to  be  an  efficient  soldier,  with  intensive 
training,  under  experienced  officers  and  noncommissioned  officers  is 
1,500  hours.  It  is  apparent  how  far  the  average  enlisted  man  in  the 
Organized  Militia  with  under  90  hours  (15  days)  instruction,  and 
even  the  man  with  the  maximum  training,  falls  short. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  the  entire  personnel  might  have  been  replaced 
by  raw  material  and  the  average  instruction  reduced  to  zero,  with 
nothing  as  an  asset  left  but  the  organization,  if  that  be  an  asset. 

616 


10 

There  may  have  been  enough  raw  material  added  to  bring  existing 
organizations  up  to  "  war  strength,"  but  in  this  case  the  average 
instruction  would  thereby  be  reduced  to  about  40  hours  or,  say,  the 
equivalent  of  seven  days. 

12.  TIME  THIS  FORCE  MAY  BE  HELD  FOR  SERVICE. 

Section  4  of  the  act  of  1908  (amending  sec.  5  of  1903)  states — 

He  may  specify  in  his  call  the  period  for  which  such  service  is  required 
*     *     *  • 

And— 
no  commissioned  officer,  etc.,    •    *    •    shall  be  held  to  service  beyond  the  term 
of  his  existing  commission  or  enlistment     *     *     *. 

Thus  it  is  apparent  that  the  best  trained  men  would  soon  begin  to 

drop  out. 

13.  HOW  THIS  FORCE  MAY  BE  USED. 

The  Constitution  and  laws  based  thereon  provide  that  it  may  be 
used  "  to  execute  the  laws  of  the  Union,  suppress  insurrections,  and 
repel  invasions." 

Section  4  of  act  of  1908  (amending  sec.  5,  1903)  provides:  "shall 
continue  to  serve  *  *  *  either  within  or  without  the  territory 
of  the  United  States    *     *    *." 

But  the  Attorney  General  held,  February  17,  1912 — 

I  think  that  the  constitutional  provision  here  considered  not  only  affords  no 
warrant  for  the  use  of  the  militia  by  the  General  Government,  except  to  sup- 
press insurrection,  repel  invasions,  or  execute  the  laws  of  the  Union,  but,  by 
its  careful  enumeration  of  the  three  occasions  or  purposes  for  which  the  militia 
may  be  used,  it  forbids  such  use  for  any  other  purpose. 

14.  WASTEFULNESS  OF  SYSTEM. 

The  Secretary  of  War  states  on  page  7  in  his  "  Outline  of  Proposed 
Military  Palicy,"  November  1,  1915 — 

Federal  Government  appropriates  .$6,614,532.13  annually  for  or  on  behalf  of 
the  National  Guard. 

The  States  individually  appropriate  for  their  respective  guards  an  aggregate 
of  $6,244,214.98  annually— 

or  a  total  of  $12,858,747.11. 

This  sum,  at  a  cost  per  man  of  $914,  would  support  14,068  trained 
men  constantly  in  service. 

Or  figuring  the  entire  cost  of  supporting  a  reserve  at  one-fifth 
the  cost  of  troops  with  the  colors,  the  above  sum  would  support 
70,340  men,  trained  and  ready  for  immediate  service. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  this  sum  might  better  be  used  to 
support  such  trained  reserve  as  against  a  possible  75,000  Organized 

516 


11 

Militia  with  an  average  of  90  hours'  training — for  limited  uses  only — 
with  inexperienced  officers  available  as  first-line  troops  at  some 
distant  date,  probably  six  to  nine  months. 

The  Canadian  militia,  with,  possibly,  training  equal  to  that  of  our 
average  Organized  Militia,  was  not  considered  fit  for  duty  on  the 
Continent  until  more  than  six  months  after  their  arrival  in  England. 
Many  (10  per  cent)  of  the  Canadian  Militia  had  to  be  returned  as 
unfit  for  military  service. 

15.  AS  DETERRING  THE  RAISING  OF  VOLUNTEERS. 

Section  4  of  act  of  1908,  amending  section  5  of  act  of  1903,  pro- 
vides : 

The  Organized  Jlilitia  shnll  be  called  into  service  of  the  United  States  in 
advance  of  any  volunteer  force  which  it  may  be  determined  to  raise. 

Section  3  of  the  act  of  1914  provides  that  when  three-fourths  of 
the  minimum  strength  of  each  organization  volunteers  *  *  *  it 
may  be  received  into  the  volunteer  forces  in  advance  of  other  organ- 
izations, etc.     *     *     * 

It  is  believed  that  these  sections  will  have  the  effect  of  holding  up 
volunteering  until  it  is  known  what  the  Organized  Militia  is  going 
to  do  and  how  many  are  coming  into  the  service  as  militia  or  as 
volunteers. 

16.  NUMBER  OF  ORGANIZED  MILITIA  AND  AMOUNT  OF  TRAINING 

OF  THOSE  SECURED  BY  THE  CALL. 

When  the  Organized  Militia  is  concentrated  in  response  to  the 
President's  call,  we  will  have  of  the  existing  Organized  Militia  per- 
sonnel, as  militia  called  into  the  service  of  the  United  States,  a  force 
certainly  not  exceeding  75,000,  with  average  instruction  not  exceeding 
90  hours,  with  officers  appointed  by  the  governors,  trained  by  the 
States,  with  constitutional  limitations  as  to  the  purposes  for  which 
it  may  be  used.  As  to  those  organizations  which  decide  to  volunteer, 
the  same  defects  would  exist  except  the  last. 

17.  THE  ORGANIZATIONS  OF  ORGANIZED  MILITIA  AND  TRAINING 

OF  PERSONNEL  AS  AN  ASSET. 

Reorganization  of  the  Land  Forces  (p.  58)  states: 

*  *  *  is  a  force  actually  in  being  and  one  composed  largely  of  officers  and 
men  who  have  volunteered  for  military  training  because  they  desire  to  serve  as 
soldiers  in  the  event  of  war.  The  Organized  Militia,  in  short,  constitutes  an 
existing  organization. 

It  has  been  stated  further: 

Aside  from  the  Regular  Army,  it  is  the  only  organized  military  force  in  the 
United  States.  *  *  i-  Except  the  military  department  in  certain  schools, 
It  has  been  the  only  source  of  instruction  in  military  matters  for  the  citizen 

W6 


12 

who  does  not  devote  his  whole  time  to  the  military  profession.     It  may  be 

fully  admitted  that  the  training  received  has  not  been  an  adequate  return  for 

the  money  expended,  but  that  training  has  not  been  entirely  without  value. 
*     *     * 

Many  of  the  officers  of  the  Organized  Militia  have  been  enthusiastic  students 
of  military  subjects  and  have  acquired  a  theoretical  and  practical  knowledge 
which  would  be  of  value  to  the  Government  in  time  of  war.     *     *     * 

It  has  been  alleged  also  that — 

even  skeleton  organizations  are  of  value  to  build  on  in  an  emergency. 

18.  HOW  PRESENT  ORGANIZED  MILITIA  HAS  IMPROVED. 

The  militia  laws  now  in  force  are  not  an  improvement,  generally, 
over  the  earliest,  and  do  not  improve  the  system  that  has  always 
obtained. 

More  attention  has  been  given  to  the  Organized  Militia  by  the 
Federal  Government.  Money  has  been  appropriated  in  larger  sums 
for  various  purposes.  Officers  and  enlisted  men  of  the  Regular  Army 
have  been  designated  to  assist.  Improvement  has  been  made  in  con- 
sequence, but  the  system  itself  is  bad,  and  a  really  dependable  force 
can  not  be  produced  without  the  correction  of  well-known  defects. 

There  should  be  complete  Federal  control  as  to  appointment  of 
officers,  amount  of  training,  as  to  when  and  where  it  may  be  used 
(constitutional  amendment  necessary  to  make  the  militia  such  a 
force). 

Enlistments  should  be  long  or  for  the  war. 

Should  be  a  reserve,  supply  depots,  etc. 

19.  CONCLUSIONS. 

What  is  required  is  to  secure  quickly  at  the  outbreak  of  war  a 
force  of  trained  men.  This  can  only  be  done  by  making  the  neces- 
sary preparations  before  war  comes.  The  Organized  Militia  will 
not  produce  such  a  force.  It  can  be  provided  by  a  S3^stem  based  on  a 
combination  of  volunteering  and  conscription  with  Federal  control. 

As  "continued  reliance  upon  the  Organized  Militia  has  actually 
stood  in  the  way  of  our  getting  anything  better,"  it  would  seem  the 
wisest  policy  to  place  no  dependence  upon  such  a  questionable  asset 
as  the  Organized  Militia  and  to  replace  it  at  the  earliest  practicable 
moment  by  a  proper  Federal  force. 

It  is  not  believed  that  the  military  instruction  possessed  by  officers 
and  enlisted  men  of  the  Organized  Militia  should  be  wasted,  but 
their  training  and  military  knowledge  should  be  utilized  to  the 
utmost  in  the  preparation  of  the  Federal  force  above  mentioned. 

616 

o 


MOBILIZATION  OF  INDUSTRIES  AND  UTILIZATION  OF 

THE  COMMERCIAL  AND  INDUSTRIAL  RESOURCES 

OF  THE  COUNTRY  FOR  WAR  PURPOSES 

IN  EMERGENCY 


PREPARED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION,  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

AS    A    SUPPLEMENT   TO   THE    STATEMENT    OF   A   PROPER   MILITARY 

POLICY  FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES 


WCD  8121-45 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE  :  WASHINGTON 

NOVEMBER.  1915 


I 


617 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 

1916 


L 


War  Department, 

Document  No.  517. 

0£ice  of  the  Chief  of  Staff. 


SYNOPSIS. 


Page. 

1.  Action  taken  by  other  countries 5 

2.  Necessity  for  action  in  the  United  States 6 

3.  Reports  from  the  general  staff  and  bureau  chiefs 6 

4.  Suggested  plans  from  other  sources 9 

5.  Recommendations  for  necessary  legislation 11 

30fl68*— No.  617 16  (3) 


MOBILIZATION  OF  INDUSTRIES  AND  UTILIZATION  OF 
THE  COMMERCIAL  AND  INDUSTRIAL  RESOURCES  OF 
THE  COUNTRY  FOR  WAR  PURPOSES  IN  EMERGENCY. 


1.  ACTION  TAKEN  BY  OTHER  COUNTRIES. 

The  mobilization  of  industries  has  been  undertaken  in  all  the  coun- 
tries that  are  at  present  at  war.  Reports  from  abroad  are  incomplete 
on  this  subject,  but  all  indicate  that  a  more  or  less  perfected  scheme 
has  been  adopted  in  all  countries.  An  enabling  act  is  the  first 
requisite,  and  the  details  of  its  exercise  vary  in  each  of  the  countries. 

In  Russia  a  committee  was  appointed  to  supervise  the  manufac- 
ture and  supply  of  war  munitions,  making  use  of  all  civilian  plants. 
The  president  of  the  Duma,  an  ex-minister  of  commerce,  and  two 
prominent  army  officials  were  also  made  members  of  this  committee 
for  purposes  of  consultation  in  regard  to  technical  matters. 

In  England  the  Government  control  of  all  engineering  industries 
was  taken  over  under  an  act  called  the  "  mobilization  of  industry  act." 
This  was  passed  with  ease  and  rapidity  by  the  House  of  Commons. 
The  original  act  provided  for  the  taking  over  and  control  of  any 
works  where  war  munitions  were  being  made.  Later,  the  act  was 
amended  to  include  all  industries  that  could  be  utilized  if  modified. 
Power  to  cancel  existing  contracts  with  private  parties  was  also  made 
a  part  of  the  law. 

In  France  an  act  called  the  "  Dalbiez  Act "  was  passed,  under 
which  all  commercial  manufacturing  plants,  used  in  whole  or  in 
part  for  making  supplies  for  the  Army,  were  taken  over  by  the  Gov- 
ernment. Originally  all  skilled  workmen,  heads  of  departments,  and 
superintendents  were  excused  from  military  service.  It  was  found 
that  this  exemption  was  abused  and  a  large  number  of  men  suitable 
for  military  services,  but  not  absolutely  necessary  in  the  manufac- 
turing plants,  avoided  military  service.  The  civilian  superintendents 
of  the  works  taken  over  report  that  they  have  no  trouble  with  strikes 
or  labor  disorders  while  under  military  control,  for  as  soon  as  a 
workman  by  his  act  shows  that  he  is  not  necessary  in  the  plant  itself 
he  is  available  to  go  to  military  service  in  the  field,  which  acts  as  a 
deterrent  against  strikes. 

517  (5) 


6 

In  Italy  all  the  larger  automobile  factories  or  garages  have  been 
taken  over  for  the  manufacture  of  war  munitions. 

Similar  provisions  have  been  made  in  Austria  and  Germany.  In 
most  of  these  countries  this  mobilization  of  industries  is  carried 
down  to  the  smaller  industries  in  minute  detail.  For  example,  in 
both  Austria  and  France  all  the  horses  and  wagons  suitable  for 
military  service  are  listed,  and  the  record  is  kept  by  area  officers  so 
that  the  Government  at  any  time  can  ascertain  how  many  horses  and 
wagons  are  available,  and  their  condition,  in  any  stated  district. 
There  is  a  price  fixed  by  law  at  which  owners  shall  be  reimbursed 
for  their  teams  and  wagons  used  for  military  purposes. 

2.  NECESSITY    FOR   ACTION    IN    THE    UNITED     STATES. 

The  subject  of  the  mobilization  of  the  industries  in  this  country 
has  been  discussed,  but  no  definite  action  has  as  yet  been  recom- 
mended or  undertaken.  The  desirability  of  taking  steps  to  acquaint 
our  larger  manufacturing  establishments  with  the  necessary  details 
to  enable  them  to  fill  a  Government  contract  has  received  careful 
consideration.  A  number  of  representatives  of  the  larger  manufac- 
turing establishments  have  expressed  their  willingness  to  undertake 
this  preparation.  It  has  been  proposed  that  the  Chief  of  Ordnance 
send  the  necessary  plans  and  specifications  for  types  of  gims  and 
ammunition  to  manufacturing  establishments  presumably  capable 
of  making  these  munitions,  each  company  to  be  awarded  a  small 
contract  and  given  the  necessary  Government  inspectors  and  super- 
intendents to  advise  and  supervise,  so  that  when  this  small  contract 
was  filled  the  templets,  plans,  and  dies  could  be  retained  at  the  fac- 
tory, and  from  the  experience  gained  in  filling  this  small  contract 
they  would  be  able,  without  delay,  to  undertake  larger  contracts  in 
case  of  necessity.  It  was  found  that  this  plan  was  not  in  accordance 
with  the  law  or  with  the  desire  of  Congress.  This  year,  however, 
legislation  permitting  this  method  of  procedure  for  the  preparation 
of  large  manufacturing  plants  for  Government  use  has  been 
recommended. 

3.  REPORTS   FROM   THE    GENERAL,  STAFF  AND  BUREAU 

CHIEFS. 

On  September  13,  1915,  in  a  memorandum  for  the  Chief  of  Staff 
by  the  Chief  of  the  War  College  Division,  on  the  subject  of  a  pro- 
l)osed  plan  to  enable  private  manufacturers  to  promptly  furnish  war 
material  in  case  of  emergency,  the  question  is  considered  in  detail 
and  heads  of  bureaus  were  called  on  for  recommendation  as  to  the 
additional  legislation  necessary  to  enable  their  department  to  pur- 
chase war  material  from  private  manufacturers. 

517 


Septembeb  13,  1915. 

memorandum  fob  the  chief  of  staff. 

Subject :  Proposed  plan  to  enable  private  manufacturers  to  promptly  furnish 
war  material  in  case  of  emergency. 

1.  Herewith  is  a  memorandum  from  the  Acting  Chief  of  Ordnance,  accom- 
panying memorandum  for  the  Chief  of  Staff  (WCD  8121-19),  August  17,  1915. 

2.  The  Acting  Chief  of  Ordnance  enumerates  obstacles  to  be  encountered  as 
follows : 

"  The  furnishing  of  drawings  and  specifications  *  *  *  would  involve 
considerable  expense,  and  it  is  a  question  whether  the  present  wording  of  the 
appropriations  would  permit  of  such  expenditures.  *  *  *  the  furnishing  of 
such  information  at  this  time  would  be  contrary  to  the  instructions  of  the  Sec- 
retary of  War,  as  quoted  in  paragraph  3  of  the  memorandum  of  the  Chief  of 
the  War  College  Division     *     *     *. 

"  *  *  *  the  number  of  such  manufacturei's  is  large,  and  that  the  ability 
of  the  department  to  give  orders  for  material  is  limited  to  the  appropriations 
available,  which,  at  present,  are  limited  by  congressional  action  to  but  a  small 
part  of  the  appropriations  for  the  various  purposes     *     *     *. 

"  *  *  "  such  orders  could  be  but  limited,  and  unless  occasional  orders 
could  be  placed  with  each  of  the  firms  selected  it  is  anticipated  that  they 
would  soon  lose  interest     *     *     * 

•'  *  *  *  under  existing  laws  when  purchases  are  to  be  made  orders  must 
be  placed  with  the  lowest  responsible  bidder  for  the  best  and  most  suitable 
article.  As  long  as  this  restriction  is  imposed  the  majority  of  the  orders 
would  be  .secui'ed  by  a  limited  number  of  manufacturers  who  are  in  a  position 
to  underbid  those  with  less  satisfactory  equipment  and  higher  operating  ex- 
penses    *     *     *." 

3.  The  Acting  Chief  of  Ordnance  recommends  that  now,  if  the  instructions  of 
the  Secretary  of  War  are  modified,  if  not,  then  after  the  close  of  the  present 
war — 

•<  *  *  *  a  carfully  selected  list  be  prepared  of  private  manufacturers  for 
each  class  of  ordnance  material,  and  that  drawings  and  specifications  of  the 
material  they  could  manufacture  be  furnished  them  in  order  that  in  renewing 
or  increasing  their  plant  it  may  be  further  adapted  to  the  manufacture  of  the 
particular  ordnance  material  in  question,  and  that  the  management  may  make  a 
study  of  the  manufacture  of  such  material     *     *     *." 

4.  The  War  College  Division  is  aware  of  the  obstacles  due  to  limited  appro- 
priations, restrictive  legislation,  instructions  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  etc. 

Also,  that  some  concerns  will  lose  interest  if  they  can  not  see  a  profit,  but 
believes — and  the  belief  is  largely  based  on  the  character  of  the  many  letters 
received  by  the  Secretary  of  War  during  the  past  year  from  railroad  officials, 
corporations,  engineer  societies,  manufacturers,  etc. — that  a  large  percentage  of 
manufacturers  would  willingly  cooperate,  through  patriotic  motives,  in  prepar- 
ing to  manufacture  supplies  required  in  war. 

5.  The  War  College  Division  concurs  in  the  method  of  procedure  recom- 
mended by  the  Acting  Chief  of  Ordnance,  and  further  recommends  that  in  the 
next  estimate  of  funds  a  suitable  sum  be  included  for  the  specific  purpose  of 
covering  necessary  expenses  for  furnishing  private  manufacturers  with  draw- 
ings and  specifications  of  the  material  they  could  manufacture  and  for  trial 
orders  to  demonstrate  their  capacity  and  the  suitability  of  their  equipment. 

M.  M.  Macomb, 
Brigadier  General,  Chief  of  War  College  Division. 
817 


8 

As  a  result  of  the  above  memorandum  the  following  was  received 
at  the  War  College  Division  October  1, 1915 : 

DBAFT  OF  MEMOBANDUIC.  WCD  8121-27 

From :  The  Chief  of  Staff. 

To :  The  Chief  of  the  War  College  Division. 

Referring  to  the  accompanying  proposed  memorandum  relative  to  the  en- 
couragement of  reputable  and  competent  private  manufacturing  establishments 
to  equip  themselves  for  furnishing  war  material  of  the  class  needed  by  the 
Government,  and  to  maintain  themselves  in  condition  for  manufacturing  such 
material,  the  Secretary  of  War  has  directed  that  the  chiefs  of  the  staff  de- 
partments give  this  subject  consideration  and  submit,  in  connection  with  their 
annual  estimates,  such  proposed  legislation  as  may  be  necessary  to  free  them 
from  the  statutory  restrictions  which  now  prevent  the  inauguration  of  such  a 
policy.  In  so  far  as  the  restrictions  imposed  by  the  War  Department,  with 
reference  to  the  neutrality  of  the  United  States  or  other  circumstances,  are 
concerned,  the  chiefs  of  the  staff  departments  are  also  instructed  to  bring  to  the 
attention  of  the  Secretary  of  War  any  case  in  which  it  appears  to  be  appro- 
priate to  modifj'  the  restrictions  thus  imposed. 

(Copies  to  the  chiefs  of  the  staff  departments  for  their  information  and 
guidance.) 

Approved : 

LiNDiJrr  M.  Gaerison, 

Secretary  of  War. 

Approval  recommended: 

H.  L.  Scott, 
Major  General,  Chief  of  Staff. 

Received  Office  Chief  of  Staff  September  30,  1915. 

Received  War  College  Division  October  1,  1915. 

The  following  is  a  brief  of  the  reports  made  by  bureau  chiefs : 

The  Chief  of  Ordnance  reported  that  a  draft  of  legislation  au- 
thorizing such  purchase  in  time  of  emergency  had  been  incorporated 
in  the  estimate  submitted  by  the  Ordnance  Department  for  the  en- 
suing fiscal  year. 

The  Quartermaster  General  reported  that  Eevised  Statutes  No. 
8709  in  the  act  of  July  5,  1884,  give  ample  authority  for  the  pur- 
chase without  advertising  when  immediate  delivery  is  required  by 
the  public  exigency,  stating  further  that  this  would  seem  to  permit 
any  purchase  at  any  time  in  the  event  of  war. 

The  Chief  of  Engineers  quoted  that  he  had  included  the  following 
provision  in  the  estimates  of  appropriations  in  the  Army  appropria- 
tion bill  now  being  prepared  in  his  office : 

The  Secretary  of  War  may,  when  in  his  opinion  to  the  manifest  interest  of 
the  United  States,  authorize  the  procurement  of  engineer  equipment  required 
for  military  purposes  from  such  private  establishments  as  he  may  select. 

The  Surgeon  General  reported  that  in  his  opinion  the  only  way  to 
establish  the  war  reserve  is  to  procure  beforehand  a  reasonable  re- 
serve in  actual  possession  of  all  articles  not  perishable  which  are  not 

617 


ordinarily  to  be  found  in  the  markets,  but  which  must  be  made  to 
conform  to  especial  desire. 

4.   SUGGESTED  PLANS  FROM    OTHER   SOURCES. 

In  addition  to  the  reports  from  bureau  chiefs  just  quoted,  sug- 
gestions have  been  received  from  various  outside  sources  as  to  meth- 
ods of  organizing  various  commercial  industries.  Most  of  these 
plans  suggest  methods  more  or  less  elaborate,  but  all  are  based  on 
voluntary  response  of  individuals  and  service  of  industries,  and  for 
this  reason  it  is  believed  they  will  prove  unsatisfactory  and  inefficient. 

Under  the  present  limited  or  lack  of  control  of  the  United  States 
Government  over  manufacturing  industries  no  real  progress  can  be 
assured  without  further  legislation.  Many  prominent  industries 
indicate  their  willingness  to  act  with  the  Government  through  pa- 
triotic motives,  but  unless  there  is  some  actual  obligation  existing 
between  the  two  little  can  be  accomplished. 

An  excellent  example  of  a  plan  of  this  nature  is  one  proposed, 
and  copyrighted,  by  Mr.  Martin  J.  Gillen,  of  the  Mitchell  Wagon 
Co.,  of  Eaoine,  Wis.,  who  states: 

The  original  plan  was  sent  to  all  the  executive  officers  of  this  Government, 
United  States  Senators  and  Congressmen,  the  Governors  of  the  several  States, 
the  presidents  of  universities,  the  Army  and  Navy  officers  ranking  from 
captains  upward,  the  retired  officers  of  the  Army  and  Navy,  the  officers  of 
the  Grand  Army  of  the  Republic,  400  of  the  principal  newspapers  and  periodi- 
cals of  the  land,  and  about  200  business  men.  Out  of  600  replies  only  3  con- 
sidered the  idea  of  no  value,  the  remainder  considered  the  plan  meritorious, 
and  some  offered  most  valuable  suggestions  which  have  been  incorporated. 
The  plan  revised  is  now  submitted  anew. 

This  plan  was  referred  to  the  War  College  Division  of  the  General 
Staff  for  report  and  based  on  a  favorable  recommendation  for  con- 
siderations made  by  the  Chief  of  Engineers  in  a  letter  dated  Septem- 
ber 16,  1915  (AGO  2322644-A),  reports  were  called  for  from  the 
Quartermaster  General,  the  Surgeon  General,  the  Chief  of  Ordnance, 
the  Chief  of  Engineers,  and  the  Chief  Signal  Officer. 

The  reports  in  general  make  favorable  comment  on  certain  features 
of  the  plan,  and  in  some  cases  suggest  minor  objections,  but  all  agree 
that  additional  legislation  must  be  obtained  to  put  such  a  plan 
into  effect. 

Mr.  Gillen  states  in  closing: 

This  plan  is  submitted  in  the  hope  that  it  will  draw  forth  from  the  executive 
officers  of  this  Government,  the  United  States  Senators,  the  Congressmen,  the 
executive  officers  of  the  several  States  of  this  Union,  our  Army  and  Navy 
officers,  our  editors,  business  men,  farmers,  and  working  men,  such  publicity 
and  welcome  criticisms  to  the  writer  to  the  end  that  a  final  legal  plan  may  be 
adopted  by  this  Government  which  will  be  so  broadly  elastic  and  comprehensive 
as  to  embrace  any  and  all  conditions  that  may  arise  in  preparing  this  Nation 
thnt  right  and  Justice  may  be  enforced  if  needed. 
617 


10 

Instances  are  daily  occurring  where  efforts  and  plans  of  the  Gov- 
ernment in  experimentation  and  development  work  are  being  ham- 
pered, delayed,  and  even  thwarted  from  lack  of  authority  to  demand 
reasonable  and  certain  response  on  the  part  of  commercial  industries. 

A  comparatively  unimportant  example  pertaining  to  experimental 
work  in  the  development  of  a  field  searchlight  outfit  is  quoted  below 
simply  as  an  illustration  of  delay  and  obstructions  frequently  being 
met  even  where  important  interests  of  the  General  Government  are 
concerned.  Similar  action  can  be  expected  from  any  industry  under 
our  present  laws : 

On  June  14,  1915,  the  Engineer  depot  wrote  to  the  *  *  *  company, 
stating  that  the  depot  desired  to  purchase  a  standard  *  *  *  truck  with 
generator  mounted  on  the  truck  body  and  driven  by  silent  chain  from 
transmission  shaft.  Asked  if  the  *  *  *  company  could  supply  such  a 
truck  and,  if  so,  to  quote  on  one.  Between  this  date  and  June  28,  1915,  cor- 
respondence was  carried  on  between  the  depot  and  the  *  *  *  company  and 
although  the  latter  company  appeared  reluctant  at  first  to  take  up  the  proposi- 
tion, on  June  28,  1915,  they  replied,  stating  they  would  take  up  the  proposition 
and  would  have  their  chief  engineer  investigate  the  electrical  installation.  On 
July  23,  1915,  the  *  *  ♦  company  quoted  a  price  on  the  outfit  as  requested 
by  the  Engineer  depot. 

On  July  28,  1915,  the  Engineer  Depot  wrote  to  the  Chief  of  Engineers, 
United  States  Army,  requesting  allotment  to  purchase  this  truck.  The  lettei- 
was  returned  asking  for  details  of  installation  and  on  August  21,  1915,  the 
Engineer  Depot  returned  the  letter  again  by  indorsement,  giving  the  details 
requested.  No  reply  having  been  received  by  the  Engineer  Depot  to  this 
letter,  the  entire  matter  was  dropped  at  that  time. 

October  16.  1915,  commanding  officer,  First  Battalion  of  Engineers,  received 
a  letter  from  the  Chief  of  Engineers  advising  that  the  allotment  requested 
by  the  Engineer  Depot  in  letter  of  July  28,  1915,  for  the  purchase  of  *  *  * 
truck  had  been  made  and  directing  that  design  and  purchase  be  accomplished 
by  officers  of  the  battalion  with  the  assistance  of  the  Engineer  Depot. 

October  28,  1915.  Letter  from  one  of  the  officers  of  the  Engineer  Battalion 
to  the  *  *  *  company,  stating  that  he  had  been  detailed  to  attend  to 
the  purchase  of  the  above  truck  and  explaining  that  the  Engineer  Depot  had 
dropped  the  matter  in  July,  because  of  the  failure  in  obtaining  the  allotment 
at  that  time.  Asked  the  *  ♦  *  company  if  they  would  still  take  up  the 
proposition. 

November  2,  1915.  Reply  from  the  ♦  *  ♦  company  stating  that  the  re- 
quirements were  rather  severe  and  they  would  rather  not  take  the  order ;  that 
they  would  be  glad  to  build  the  special  car,  but  at  that  time  they  were  crowded 
with  work  working  day  and  night,  and  would  not  be  able  to  get  the  job  out  in 
short  notice.  They  were  very  sorry  that  they  could  not  undertake  the  proposi- 
tion at  that  time. 

November  4,  1915.  Engineer  depot  received  by  indorsement  their  letter  in- 
dorsed to  the  office,  Chief  of  Engineers,  August  21,  1915,  stating  that  the 
allotment  therein  requested  had  been  granted. 

November  5,  1915.  Letter  from  officer  of  the  engineer  battalion  to  the 
•  *  ♦  company,  explaining  that  the  truck  in  question  was  a  step  in  the 
development  of  field  searchlights  for  the  mobile  Army  and  of  particular  im- 
portance at  that  time  and  urging  them  to  reconsider  their  decision. 

617 


11 

November  22,  1915.  Letter  from  the  chief  engineer,  *  *  *  company,  say- 
ing he  had  been  trying  to  persuade  the  factory  to  build  the  special  car,  but,  as 
work  was  still  rushing  and  the  factory  was  running  day  and  night,  they  could 
not  possibly  afford  to  build  this  special  model  at  the  present  time,  but  hoped  in 
the  future  they  would  be  able  to  do  so.  In  the  meantime  they  would  lay  out 
plans  in  accordance  with  our  requirements  and  as  soon  as  they  were  able  to 
build  the  car  they  would  submit  plans  for  our  approval. 

During  the  Spanish-American  War  in  1898  the  sidings  and  often 
the  main  lines  of  the  railroads  leading  to  Tampa,  Fla.,  were  choked 
and  blocked  even  way  back  into  Georgia.  Ammunition,  guns,  and 
even  troops  were  held  up  and  delayed.  Perishable  supplies  were 
rotting  on  the  tracks;  and  with  all  this  the  railroads  insisted  and 
persisted  in  maintaining  and  giving  preference  to  its  local  passenger 
and  freight  service.  This  condition  existed  in  an  aggravated  form 
even  between  Tampa  and  Port  Tampa,  the  port  of  embarkation,  and 
the  Government  either  failed  or  was  helpless  under  the  law  to  compel 
preference  in  service. 

The  act  of  January  31,  1862,  authorized  the  President  (during 
the  rebellion  only)  to  take  possession  of  railroads  and  telegraph 
lines  for  military  purposes. 

Chapter  3591,  act  to  amend  an  act  entitled  "An  act  to  regulate 
commerce,"  approved  February  4,  1887  (United  States  Statutes  at 
Large,  Fifty-ninth  Congress,  1905-1907,  vol.  34,  p.  587,  Pt.  I,  Public 
Laws),  provides: 

That  in  time  of  war  or  threatened  war  preference  and  precedence  shall,  upon 
the  demand  of  the  President  of  the  United  States,  be  given,  over  all  other 
traffic,  to  the  transportation  of  troops  and  material  of  war,  and  carriers  shall 
adopt  every  means  within  their  control  to  facilitate  and  expedite  the  military 
traffic :  And  provided.  That  whenever  the  word  "  carrier  "  occurs  in  this  act 
it  shall  be  held  to  mean  "  common  carrier." 

Even  with  this  law  on  the  statute  books,  headquarters  and  one 
battery — Third  Field  Artillery — left  San  Antonio,  Tex.,  under 
emergency  orders  for  El  Paso  to  meet  a  reported  hostile  movement 
in  force  on  that  city  from  Mexico,  and  for  no  apparent  reason  the 
train  was  sidetracked  for  the  regular  traffic  and  arrived  at  destina- 
tion over  12  hours  late  on  the  regular  passenger  schedule. 

5.  RECOMMENDATIONS  FOR  NECESSARY  LEGISLATION. 

In  conclusion  it  may  be  stated  that  three  considerations  and  con- 
ditions appear  especially  important  and  necessary : 

First.  Authority  to  place  an  order. 

Second.  Obligation  to  fill  an  order. 

Third.  Coordination  between  departments  of  the  Government  and 
agencies,  and  regulations  governing  procedure. 

517 


12 

It  is  therefore  recommended  that  the  necessary  steps  be  taken  to 
secure  legislation  to  authorize  the  following  provisions: 

1.  That  the  President  be  empowered,  through  any  head  of  de- 
partment or  bureau  of  the  Government  in  addition  to  the  present 
authorized  methods  of  purchase  or  procurement  in  time  of  war  or 
when  war  is  imminent  or  whenever  in  his  opinion  the  exigencies  of 
the  service  and  the  interest  of  the  Government  demand,  to  place  an 
order  with  any  individual,  firm,  corporation,  company,  or  organized 
manufacturing  industry  for  such  product  or  material  as  may  be  re- 
quired, and  which  is  of  the  nature  and  kind  usually  produced  or 
capable  of  being  produced  by  such  firm  or  company. 

2.  That  compliance  with  all  such  orders  or  demands  for  service 
shall  be  obligatory  on  the  part  of  industries  concerned,  and  shall 
take  precedence  over  all  other  orders  and  contracts  when  in  the 
opinion  of  the  President  the  conditions  warrant. 

3.  That  the  compensation  shall  be  fair  and  just  and  shall  result  in 
a  reasonable  profit  to  the  industry  concerned,  as  shown  by  bill  of 
expenses. 

4.  That  there  shall  be  authorized  and  established  a  board  or  com- 
mission on  mobilization  of  industries  essential  for  military  pre- 
paredness, nonpolitical  in  nature,  and  including  in  its  membership 
representatives  of  the  Government  selected  by  the  President,  and 
skilled  representatives  of  industries,  either  permanent  or  advisory, 
to  be  selected  by  the  industries  concerned,  and  the  necessary  secre- 
taries and  clerical  assistants  whose  duty  it  shall  be  to  organize  and 
coordinate  the  work  to  fully  meet  all  requirements  of  the  Govern- 
ment service. 

617  _ 


A  MODERN  ORGANIZATION  FOR  THE  REGULAR  ARMY 

AND  ITS  USE  AS  A  MODEL  IN  ORGANIZING 

OTHER  FORCES 


PREPARED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION.  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

AS   A    SUPPLEMENT   TO    THE    STATEMENT    OF   A    PROPER   MILITARY 

POLICY  FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES 


WCD  9302-1 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE  :  WASHINGTON 

NOVEMBER.   1915 


518 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 

1916 


Wah  Department, 

Document  No.  518. 

Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff, 


I 


SYNOPSIS. 


I.  Introduction. 

Page. 

1.  Statutory  lawn  governing  Army  organization 5 

2.  Defects  in  the  present  laws 6 

II.  Higher  Units  Than  Regiments. 

3.  Staff  departments  and  auxiliary  troops 8 

4.  The  tactical  division 6 

5.  Defect  of  present  system  illustrated 7 

6.  Function  of  tactical  divisions 8 

7.  Proportion  and  strength  of  mobile  forces 8 

III.  Regiments  and  Lesser  Units. 

8.  Infantry 9 

9 .  Cavab-y 9 

10.  Field  Artillery 10 

11.  Coast  Artillery  Corps 10 

12.  Engineer  troops 11 

13.  Signal  troops 11 

14.  Sanitary  troops 12 

»•— No.  618 — 16  (3) 


A  MODERN  ORGANIZATION  FOR  THE  REGULAR  ARMY 
AND  ITS  USE  AS  A  MODEL  IN  ORGANIZING  OTHER 
FORCES.  

I.   INTRODUCTION. 

1.  STATUTORY  LAWS  GOVERNING  ARMY  ORGANIZATION. 

The  present  statutory  laws  concerning  the  organization  of  the 
Regular  Army  of  the  United  States  may  be  briefed  as  follows : 

(a)  Brigades  and  divisions  to  be  composed  of  a  certain  number 
of  regiments  of  Infantry  or  Cavalry  in  "  the  ordinary  arrangement 
of  the  Army."     (Sec.  1114,  R.  S.) 

(b)  Brigades,  divisions,  and  Army  corps  composed  of  a  specified 
number  of  regiments  required  to  be  organized  in  time  of  war,  or 
when  war  is  imminent.     (30  Stat.  L.) 

{c)  The  several  staff  departments,  composition  of,  as  authorized 
for  service  in  peace  and  without  reference  to  their  functioning  with 
tactical  organizations  (bureau's  personnel),  except  in  the  case  of  the 
Engineer  Department,  the  Signal  Department,  and  the  Medical  De- 
partment, where  a  limited  personnel  is  provided  for  service  with 
the  troops. 

(d)  Troops  of  the  line — regimental  organization  of  Infantry, 
Cavalry,  and  Field  Artillery.  The  Coast  Artillery  Corps,  organized 
into  companies. 

2.  DEFECTS  IN  THE  PRESENT  LAWS. 

The  defects  in  the  present  statutory  laws  that  prevent  a  modern, 
scientific,  and  efficient  organization  of  our  Army  may  be  briefly 
summarized  as  follows: 

(a)  The  prescribed  regimental  organization  of  the  three  arms, 
not  modern — lacking  certain  fighting  units,  as  well  as  important 
administrative  units. 

(b)  No  provision  for  the  personnel  of  the  headquarters  and  staff 
of  any  units  higher  than  a  regiment. 

(c)  No  provision  for  a  permanent  peace  organization  of  higher 
units — brigades  and  divisions. 

(d)  No  provision  for  necessary  divisional  train  units. 

(e)  Auxiliary  troops  not  organized  with  relation  to  the  primary 
arms  of  the  service, 

(/)  Enlisted  specialists  needed  to  meet  modern  requirements. 
The  effect  of  these  defects  upon  attempts  to  provide  a  scientific 
organization  for  our  Army  is  explained  in  the  following  pages. 

618 

(6) 


n.  HIGHER  UNITS  THAN  REGIMENTS. 
8.  STAFF  DEPARTMENTS  AND  AUXILIARY  TROOPS. 

The  organization  of  all  modern  armies  is  based  upon  the  principle 
that  the  primary  fighting  force  is  well-trained  infantry.  This  pri- 
mary fighting  force  must,  however,  be  aided  by  proper  and  accepted 
proportions  of  cavalry,  field  artillery,  engineer,  signal,  sanitary,  and 
supply  troops  to  make  a  complete  mobile  fighting  machine.  The 
smallest  independent  unit  in  which  all  the  various  arms  are  found 
represented  in  modern  armies  is  one  of  approximately  20,000  men, 
called  the  Infantry  Division  in  our  Field  Service  Regulations.  For 
the  proper  and  efficient  strategical,  tactical,  and  administrative  han- 
dling of  divisions  and  larger  units,  including  their  supply,  certain 
General  Staff  officers,  and  a  technical  and  administrative  staff,  ad- 
jutant, inspectors,  judge  advocate,  quartermaster,  and  ordnance  of- 
ficer are  added  to  assist  the  commanding  general.  All  these  various 
staff  officers  are  necessary  cogs  in  the  wheel. 

Just  as  an  operating  division  of  a  railroad  system  requires  direct- 
ing officials  to  give  train  orders,  a  switching  personnel,  signal  oper- 
ators, and  telegraphers,  in  order  to  keep  the  several  trains  running 
safely  and  without  confusion  for  the  purpose  of  moving  the  traffic, 
the  object  for  which  railroads  are  maintained,  so  also,  in  modern 
armies  the  function  of  all  staff  officers  and  auxiliary  arms  is  to  con- 
tribute to  the  main  object  of  the  Army — to  assist  the  Infantry  in 
defeating  the  enemy. 

4.  THE  TACTICAL  DIVISION. 

The  latest  enactment  of  law  concerning  the  formation  of  higher 
units  than  regiments  is  that  contained  in  the  volunteer  law  of  April 
25,  1914,  as  follows: 

Sec.  4.  *  *  *  Povided  further,  That  when  military  conditions  so  require, 
the  President  may  organize  the  land  forces  of  the  United  States  into  brigades 
and  divisions  and  such  higher  units  as  he  may  deem  necessary,  and  the  com- 
position of  units  higher  than  the  regiment  shall  be  as  he  may  prescribe. 

Here  is  authority  for  organizing  these  higher  units  and  the  com- 
position may  be  such  as  the  President  shall  prescribe,  but  with  this 
restriction : 

Sec.  3.  *  *  *  Provided,  That  the  power  to  organize  volunteer  forces  shall 
include  the  power  to  provide,  tvithin  such  limits  as  are  or  may  be  prescribed 
by  law,  the  officers  and  enlisted  men  of  all  grades  and  classes,  and  the  trained 
nurses,  male  and  female,  that  may  be  necessary  in  the  various  arms,  corps,  and 
departments. 

And  further: 

Sec.  5.  *  *  *  to  appoint  all  volunteer  officers  required  by  this  act,  but 
the  number  and  grade  of  such  officers  shall  tiot  exceed  the  number  and  grade 
of  like  officers  provided  for  a  like  force  of  the  Regular  Army. 

518 


In  other  words,  the  organization  of  volunteers  must  be  patterned 
after  the  organization  of  the  Regular  Army. 

Under  the  present  law  the  headquarters  of  these  higher  units  in 
the  Regular  Army  can  only  be  improvised  by  detailing  the  technical 
and  administrative  staff,  commissioned  personnel,  from  the  War 
Department  bureaus  and  their  departmental  branches,  thus  crip- 
pling these  bureaus  when  these  higher  units  take  the  field.  The  en- 
listed combatant  personnel  required  for  these  headquarters  can  be 
obtained  onl}'^  by  denuding  the  tactical  organizations  composing  these 
higher  units.  This  is  the  case  in  both  peace  and  war,  for  under  the 
volunteer  law  only  regiments  and  lesser  tactical  organizations  are 
provided  from  which  to  organize  the  higher  units.  While  it  is  true 
that  these  are  the  bone  and  sinew  of  the  higher  units,  still  they  can 
not  function  as  a  complete  machine  without  a  directing  and  super- 
vising headquarters,  for  which  no  provision  has  been  made.  Our 
present  peace-time  organization  provides  staff-department  commis- 
sioned personnel  only  with  a  view  to  the  necessar}^  operation  of  the 
War  Department  bureaus  and  their  departmental  branches.  For 
time  of  war  the  volunteer  law  provides  for  increasing  this  staff 
personnel  in  proportion  to  its  present  strength  and  the  number  of 
volunteer  troops  raised,  which  simply  expands  the  bureau  personnel 
without  reference  to  the  requirements  of  technical  and  administra- 
tive staff  personnel  for  the  higher  tactical  units. 

5.  DEFECT  OF  PRESENT  SYSTEM  ILLUSTRATED. 

The  defect  of  this  system  is  illustrated  by  the  attempt  to  organize 
brigades  and  divisions  as  prescribed  in  General  Orders,  No.  9,  War 
Department,  1913,  in  which  these  higher  units  were  formed,  as  far 
as  practicable,  from  the  tactical  organizations  and  staff  personnel  of 
the  containing  geographical  departments.  It  will  be  noted  that  the 
departmental  staff  was  assigned  the  dual  function  of  department 
and  tactical  division  staff  duty,  which  was  practicable  only  so  long 
as  the  divisions  remained  demobilized.  When  the  Second  Division 
was  mobilized  at  Texas  City  in  1913  the  Central  Department  was 
denuded  of  its  bureau  staff,  which  had  to  be  replaced  from  other  de- 
partments or  from  the  central  bureaus.  In  time  of  war  the  geo- 
graphical departments  must  be  maintained,  and  are  an  important 
part  of  the  military  establishment  in  the  service  of  the  interior. 
(F.  S.  R.,  247.)  The  department  commander  is  charged  with  the 
recruitment,  training,  and  equipment  of  all  military  forces  not 
specially  excepted  within  the  limits  of  his  department,  and  for  their 
mobilization  and  dispatch  to  concentration  camps.     (F.  S.  R.,  252.) 

Other  difficulties  are  forcibly  brought  out  in  the  Tables  of  Organi- 
zation, 1914,  which  show  that  in  order  to  provide  the  necessary 
combatant  personnel    (enlisted)    for   brigade    and   division   head- 

B18 


8 

quarters  this  personnel  has  to  be  detailed  from  the  statutory  strength 
of  regiments  of  the  division. 

Finally,  there  are  certain  much-needed  subsidiary  units  for  the 
complete  organization  of  a  division  for  which  personnel  is  not  pro- 
vided under  the  present  laws — ammunition  train,  supply  train,  engi- 
neer train,  and  sanitary  train.  These  trains  could  not  even  be  im- 
provised in  the  attempted  mobilization  of  the  Second  Division  at 
Texas  City,  ordered  in  February,  1913. 

6.  FUNCTION  OF  TACTICAL  DIVISIONS. 

The  tactical  division  is,  as  stated  in  Field  Service  Eegulations,  the 
great  administrative  unit  which  forms  the  model  for  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  administrative  service  of  smaller  units  operating  inde- 
pendently. (F.  S.  R.,  264.)  All  armies  of  first-class  powers  are 
organized  on  the  division  as  the  basic  tactical  unit.  All  increments 
of  armies  are  considered  in  terms  of  the  division  unit.  The  founda- 
tion of  an  army  considered  as  a  fighting  force  is  the  division.  Hence, 
one  of  the  first  steps  in  any  plan  for  effecting  a  modern  organization 
for  our  Army  should  be  to  establish  the  complete  organization  for 
a  tactical  division,  and  to  build  the  superstructure  on  the  foundation 
of  the  number  of  division  units  to  be  provided.  At  least  one  such 
division  should  be  fully  organized,  manned,  and  equipped  in  time 
of  peace  to  serve  as  a  model  for  the  organization  of  the  Army  in 
time  of  war. 

7.  PROPORTION  AND  STRENGTH  OF  MOBILE  FORCES. 

All  of  the  mobile  regular  forces  maintained  in  the  United  States 
proper  should  be  proportioned  and  organized  as  complete  tactical 
divisions,  not  only  to  be  ready  for  instant  service  for  any  emergency, 
as  the  only  first-line  troops  on  which  the  Nation  can  depend,  but  also  to 
serve  as  models  for  the  organization  and  training  of  other  forces  in 
peace  as  well  as  in  war.  Furthermore,  it  is  necessary  that  all  of 
the  small  Regular  Army  be  maintained  at  statutory  maximum 
strength  for  the  same  reasons.  At  present  Infantry  regiments  in 
the  United  States  proper  are  maintained  at  only  47.2  per  cent  of  the 
maximum  strength;  Cavalry  at  75.7  per  cent;  Field  Artillery  at  77.7 
per  cent ;  and  field  battalions  of  Signal  troops  at  58.9  per  cent.  This 
reduced  strength  impairs  training,  absolutely  precludes  efficiency, 
and  creates  a  false  model  for  the  organization  of  other  forces.  These 
organizations  in  time  of  war  would  be  filled  up  with  recruits,  and  for 
a  considerable  time  thereafter  even  the  peace-strength  efficiency  of 
these  organizations  would  be  seriously  lowered  by  the  introduction 
of  such  large  percentages  of  raw  materiaL 

618 


m.  REGIMENTS  AND  IjESSER  UNITS. 

8.  INFANTRY. 

The  organization  of  the  Infantry  regiment,  which  is  the  main 
component  of  any  complete  fighting  unit,  has  not  been  materially 
revised  since  the  act  of  March  2,  1899.  Since  that  time  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War,  the  Balkan  wars,  and  the  present  European  war 
have  given  practical  experience  showing  the  necessity  for  certain 
subsidiary  units  for  Infantry  regiments  in  order  to  develop  their 
full  fighting  efficiency,  particularly  with  reference  to  the  addition  of 
a  machine-gun  unit  as  an  integral  part  of  the  regiment.  No  organ- 
ization nor  personnel  has  been  provided  for  such  units.  Likewise 
it  has  been  found  necessary  to  add  mounted  orderlies  to  care  for  the 
horses  of  the  increased  number  of  mounted  field  and  staff  officers 
(also  used  for  scouting  and  reconnaissance  work)  and  enlisted  per- 
sonnel for  supply  and  transportation  purposes.  These  subsidiary 
units  for  the  regiment  are  at  present  necessarily  only  improvised 
by  details  of  enlisted  personnel  from  the  12  statutory  companies. 
This  provisional  organization  had  to  be  resorted  to  for  instructional 
purposes  in  time  of  peace,  so  as  to  be  prepared  for  duties  that 
would  certainly  be  required  in  time  of  war.  For  necessary  and 
efficient  administration  these  new  subsidiary  units,  together  with  the 
former  detachment  of  noncommissioned  staff  and  band,  have  been 
organized  provisionally  as  a  headquarters  company,  a  machine-gun 
company,  and  a  supply  company.  In  order  that  this  personnel  may 
have  the  proper  grades  corresponding  to  equivalent  duties  per- 
formed by  the  personnel  of  statutory  companies,  and  that  the  full 
fighting  strength  of  the  12  statutory  companies  may  not  be  weak- 
ened by  detachment  therefrom  in  time  of  war,  modern  organization 
requires  that  these  subsidiary  companies  be  sanctioned  hy  law  as 
additional  units  for  the  Infantry  regiment.  The  number  of  cooks 
authorized  for  a  statutory  company  at  maximum  strength,  150  men. 
is  two,  the  same  as  at  minimum  strength,  65  men.  Three  cooks 
should  be  provided  for  150  men. 

9.  CAVALRY. 

The  organization  of  the  Cavalry  regiment  has  not  been  materially 
revised  since  the  two  skeletonized  troops  were  reestablished  by 
General  Orders,  No.  27,  Adjutant  General's  Office,  1898,  and  the 
commissioned  and  noncommissioned  staff  was  increased  by  the  act  of 
February  2,  1901.  Provisional  subsidiary  units  similar  to  those 
described  above  for  the  Infantry  regiment  have  been  found  equally 
necessary  for  the  Cavalry  regiment.  These  subsidiary  units  should 
be  sanctioned  hy  law  as  additional  units  for  the  Cavalry  regiment 
and  for  the  same  reasons.     Some  adjustment  of  grades  of  enlisted 

618 


10 

specialists,  such  as  stable  sergeants,  horseshoers,  farrier,  saddlers, 
mechanics,  wagoners,  etc.,  is  necessary  to  place  them  on  an  equal 
footing  in  the  several  mounted  branches. 

10.  FIELD  ARTILLERY. 

The  organization  of  the  Field  Artillery  regiments  dates  from  the 
act  of  January  25,  1907,  separating  the  coast  and  field  artillery. 
This  organization  is  not  sufficiently  flexible  for  adaptation  to  the 
present  development  of  the  Field  Artillery  arm,  as  demonstrated  in 
the  present  European  war.  Regiments  of  two  battalions  only  are 
provided,  whereas  experience  shows  that  the  heavier  type  of  arma- 
ment calls  for  a  battalion  of  fewer  batteries  and  more  battalions 
to  the  regiment.  The  organization  of  the  Field  Artillery  regiment 
should  consist  of  such  number  of  gun  and  howitzer  battalions  as 
the  President  may  direct.  The  organization  of  ammunition  bat- 
teries and  battalions  and  the  artillery  park  should  be  prescribed, 
but  the  personnel  need  be  provided  only  in  time  of  war,  threatened 
invasion,  or  when  war  is  imminent. 

Provisional  subsidiary  units,  similar  to  those  described  above 
for  the  infantry  regiment  (except  the  machine-gun  unit),  appear 
to  be  equally  advisable  for  the  Field  Artillery  regiment,  i.  e.,  a  head- 
quarters company  and  a  supply  company.  These  subsidiary  units 
should  be  sanctioned  hy  law  as  additional  units  for  the  Field  Artillery 
regiment,  and  for  the  same  reasons. 

Some  adjustment  of  grades  of  enlisted  specialists,  such  as  stable 
sergeants,  horseshoers,  farriers,  saddlers,  mechanics,  wagoners,  etc., 
is  necessary  to  place  them  on  an  equal  footing  in  all  mounted 
branches. 

11.  COAST  ARTILLERY  CORPS. 

The  present  organization  of  the  Coast  Artillery  Corps  dates  from 
the  act  of  January  25,  1907,  separating  the  coast  and  field  artillery. 
While  the  regimental  organization  for  coast  artillery  was  discon- 
tinued by  the  act  of  February  2, 1901,  the  personnel  provided  is  based 
on  the  proportion  and  equivalent  of  14  regiments.  This  regimental 
proportion  for  personnel,  both  commissioned  and  enlisted,  bears  no 
relation  to  the  assignment  of  the  personnel  for  the  duties  required 
thereof  at  the  several  fixed  fortifications  to  be  manned.  Modem 
organization  for  coast  artillery  calls  for  personnel  to  fit  the  needs  of 
the  different  types  of  fortifications  and  their  auxiliary  defenses. 
This  should  be  determined  by  the  proper  military  experts  in  accord- 
ance with  the  plans  for  armament  of  existing  fortifications  which  are 
to  be  manned,  and  for  approved  projects  under  construction.  In  the 
case  of  future  extensions  of  fixed  fortifications  the  personnel  should 
be  provided  for  at  the  same  time  as  the  fortifications  and  their 
armament,  in  accordance  with  their  particular  needs. 

B18 


11 

For  the  present  enlisted  personnel,  Coast  Artillery  Corps,  some 
adjustment  of  the  grades  of  enlisted  specialists  is  necessary  in  order 
to  offer  inducements  for  the  retention  of  skilled  mechanics  in  compe- 
tition with  corresponding  commercial  positions. 

12.  ENGINEER  TROOPS. 

The  organization  of  Engineer  troops  as  part  of  the  line  of  the 
Army,  consisting  of  three  battalions  of  four  companies  each,  dates 
from  the  act  of  February  2,  1901.  This  organization  was  prescribed 
without  any  reference  to  their  function  and  relation  to  the  basic 
tactical  unit  of  the  mobile  forces — the  tactical  division.  Modern 
organization,  as  demonstrated  by  recent  wars,  calls  for  a  larger  pro- 
portion of  Engineer  troops  and  a  different  organization  than  can 
be  provided  under  the  present  statutory  battalion  of  four  companies. 
In  the  Tables  of  Organization,  1914,  by  constituting  provisional 
battalions  of  three  companies  each,  an  attempt  was  made  to  fit  these 
statutory  battalions  and  companies  to  the  needs  on  an  Infantry 
division  and  a  Cavalry  division,  and  of  field  army  troops,  as  pioneer 
battalions,  pioneer  battalions  (mounted),  and  pontoon  battalions. 
But  the  12  companies  now  authorized  by  law  are  altogether  inade- 
quate for  the  needs  of  even  the  three  Infantry  divisions  and  one 
Cavalry  division  organized  by  direction  of  the  President,  as  pre- 
scribed in  General  Orders,  No.  9,  War  Department,  1913.  The 
report  of  the  Board  on  Engineer  Troops,  as  approved  by  the  Sec- 
retary of  War,  January  19,  1914,  represents  the  modern  organiza- 
tion of  Engineer  troops  for  our  Army,  which  calls  for  a  regiment 
of  two  battalions  of  three  pioneer  companies  for  an  Infantry  divi- 
sion; a  pioneer  battalion  (mounted)  of  three  companies  for  a 
Cavalry  division;  and  a  pontoon  battalion  of  three  companies  (one 
light  and  two  heavy)  for  assignment  as  part  of  field  army  troops. 

For  the  present  enlisted  personnel,  Engineer  troops,  some  adjust- 
ment of  the  gi-ades  of  enlisted  specialists  is  necessary  in  order  to 
offer  inducements  for  the  retention  of  skilled  mechanics  in  compe- 
tition with  corresponding  commercial  positions. 

13.  SIGNAL  TROOPS. 

The  present  organization  of  Signal  troops  dates  from  the  act  of 
February  2,  1901,  as  amended  by  the  act  of  June  30,  1902,  and  the 
increase  in  time  of  war  prescribed  by  the  act  of  April  26,  1898,  to- 
gether with  the  Aviation  Section  of  the  Signal  Corps  authorized  by 
the  act  of  July  18, 1914.  This  branch  of  the  Army  is  undergoing  such 
changes  to  meet  the  advances  in  electrical  communication,  and  espe- 
cially in  the  science  of  aeronautics,  that  the  law  providing  the  neces- 
sary personnel  should  be  very  elastic.  The  enlisted  strength  of  the 
Signal  Corps  should  be  limited  and  fixed  by  the  President  in  accord- 
sis 


12 

ance  with  the  needs  of  the  Army.  The  numbers  in  the  several  grades 
of  enlisted  men  should  be  fixed  only  by  percentages  that  they  should 
bear  to  the  total  enlisted  strength  as  authorized  by  the  President. 
The  number  of  companies,  field  battalions,  and  aero  squadrons,  and 
the  composition  of  each,  should  be  such  as  the  President  may  pre- 
scribe, in  order  that  they  may  be  adjusted  to  changing  needs. 

14.  SANITARY  TROOPS. 

While  the  present  law  (act  of  Mar.  1,  1887)  does  not  count  the 
enlisted  men  of  the  Medical  Department  (Hospital  Corps)  as  part 
of  the  strength  of  the  Army,  and  the  Secretary  of  War  is  empow- 
ered to  enlist  as  many  privates  of  the  Hospital  Corps  as  the  service 
may  require;  and  he  is  authorized  (act  of  Mar.  2,  1903)  to  organ- 
ize ambulance  companies,  field  hospital  companies,  and  other  detach- 
ments of  the  Hospital  Corps  as  the  necessities  of  the  service  may  re- 
quire, the  numbers  in  certain  grades  of  noncommissioned  officers  are 
fixed  by  law.  Limited  appropriations  have  further  hampered  the 
organization  of  the  proper  number  of  sanitary  units  required  for  the 
present  organized  tactical  divisions. 

In  order  to  meet  the  needs  of  the  service  in  providing  its  part  of  a 
modern  organization  for  the  Army,  the  law  governing  enlisted  men 
of  the  Medical  Department  should  provide  the  requisite  number  of 
noncommissioned  officers  based  on  a  percentage  that  the  several 
grades  shall  bear  to  the  total  enlisted  strength  as  authorized  by  the 
Secretary  of  War,  thus  providing  a  wholly  flexible  law.  The  title, 
Medical  Corps,  which  now  embraces  only  commissioned  personnel, 
should  include  the  enlisted  personnel  as  well,  thus  domg  away  with 
the  title,  Hospital  Corps,  as  an  unnecessary  separate  corps,  and  sim- 
plifying the  military  laws  governing  the  Medical  Department. 

Some  adjustment  of  grades  of  enlisted  personnel  is  necessary  and 
advisable  in  order  to  meet  the  complaint  and  opposition  of  commer- 
cial pharmacist  associations  which  have  been  appealing  to  Congress 
with  bills  for  the  amelioration  of  the  Hospital  Corps  personnel. 

618 

o 


MOTOR  TRANSPORT  IN  CAMPAIGN 


PREPARED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION,  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

AS    A    SUPPLEMENT    TO    THE    STATEMENT    OF    A    PROPER   MILITARY 

POLICY  FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES 


WCD  9318-1 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE  :  WASHINGTON 

NOVEMBER.  1915 


519 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFPIOEl 

1816 


War  Department, 

Document  No.  519. 

Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff. 


SYNOPSIS. 


I.  Introduction. 

Page. 

1.  General  conditions  of  employment 5 

2.  Various  types  employed 6 

3.  Motor  trucks — uses,  capacity,  personnel 6 

4.  Automobile  parks 9 

5.  The  armored  car 11 

6.  The  motorcycle 11 

7.  Use  in  countries  having  few  roads 12 

8.  Ambulances 12 

9.  Fuel 13 

10.  Defects  in  construction  brought  out  under  the  strain  of  active  service  con- 

ditions   14 

Wheels 14 

Lighting  system 14 

Bridges 14 

Transport  of  heavy  ordnance 15 

11.  Results  of  the  war 15 

12.  Conclusions 15 

13.  Organization 16 

14.  Collection  of  this  transport , „ 16 

519  (3) 


MOTOR  TRANSPORT  IN  CAMPAIGN . 


I.   INTRODUCTION. 

The  past  15  months  of  war  have  resulted  in  verifying  in  every 
respect  the  predictions  of  military  writers  of  late  years.  All  pointed 
out  that  nature  and  science  would  be  called  upon  to  serve  mankind 
in  many  practical  ways,  and  that  achievements  then  (at  the  time  of 
writing)  in  their  infancy  would,  under  the  stress  of  war,  develop 
into  aids  which  would  be  found  to  be  of  far-reaching  importance. 

Such  of  these  predictions  as  relate  to  the  use  and  application  of 
motor  transport  have  been  found  to  be  correct,  and  this  is  shown  pri- 
marily through  its  improvement  and  development,  but  lastly  by  the 
fact  that  it  has  become  absolutely  essential  to  the  efficient  prosecu- 
tion of  a  campaign. 

1.  GENERAL  CONDITIONS  OF  EMPLOYMENT. 

Modern  weapons  of  offense  and  defense,  such  as  large-caliber 
mobile  artillery,  the  machine  gun,  and  the  aeroplane,  have  exercised  a 
marked  and  direct  influence  on  combat  in  general.  Strategy  has  been 
affected  by  the  altered  conditions  affecting  the  battle,  and  even  the 
conduct  of  an  action  has  been  influenced.  Along  with  the  use  of 
motor  transport,  which  altered  the  aspect  of  warfare,  both  in  coun- 
tries with  good  highways  and  in  those  which  lack  them,  comes  a 
speeding  up  of  the  rate  at  which  military  operations  can  be  conducted. 
The  strategic  mobility  of  troops  has  been  increased,  and  this  fact 
will  bring  about  greater  ease  in  the  grouping  of  forces  for  the 
battle. 

Indirectly  they  promote  "  the  independence  of  the  troops  of  their 
lines  of  communication,  by  facilitating  the  bringing  up  of  supplies 
and  by  creating  possibilities  for  concentration  and  movements  which 
did  not  formerly  exist.  Commanders  acquire  thereby  greater  free- 
dom of  action." 

It  must  not  be  assumed,  however,  that  the  methods  of  warfare 
have  been  revolutionized  through  the  use  of  motor  transport.  When 
the  war  is  over  and  the  newspapers  have  ceased  to  announce  in  big 
headlines  the  wonderful  achievements  of  this  type  of  transport,  we 
shall  undoubtedly  find  there  are  many  limitations  to  be  placed  on  its 
use.  However,  there  is  no  doubt  that  it  has  aided  in  a  remarkable 
way  the  supply  and  transport  of  troops. 

519 

(5) 


What  may  have  been  found  feasible  on  the  western  front  might 
not  have  been  found  possible  in  the  plains  of  Galicia  and  Poland. 
Difficulties  connected  with  the  repair  and  supply  of  fuel  have  limited 
the  use  of  this  transport  in  a  number  of  cases,  but  no  definite  rule  can 
as  yet  be  deduced  from  the  special  cases  which  are  set  forth  in  the 
press  and  in  the  popular  magazines. 

2.  VARIOUS  TYPES  EMPLOYED. 

The  history  of  the  present  war  indicates  conclusively  that  all  at- 
tempts to  employ  a  special  type  of  car  or  truck  for  service  have 
ceased.  The  type  of  truck  or  car  ordinarily  in  use  in  the  particular 
theater  of  operations  before  hostilities  offers  the  most  adaptable  and 
suitable  transport  for  war  in  that  theater. 

In  France  no  attempt  has  been  made  to  use  any  particular  type 
of  either  automobiles  or  motor  trucks,  but  the  Government  has  taken 
what  it  could  get  from  the  principal  manufacturers.  As  far  as 
possible,  endeavor  is  made  to  have  all  the  motor  trucks  of  each  army 
the  same  make. 

Various  American  trucks  have  been  found  excellent  in  every  way, 
and  a  light  chassis  for  ambulances  is  rendering  the  best  service. 
These  can  go  where  heavier  vehicles  in  many  cases  could  not  pass, 
and  where  they  would  only  encumber  the  road. 

It  seems  to  be  generally  conceded  abroad  that  the  trains  corre- 
sponding to  our  field  and  combat  trains  should  be  horse  drawn,  while 
the  division,  corps,  and  army  trains  are  best  constituted  of  motor 
transport.  There  are  to  be  found  some  exceptions  to  this  rule,  but, 
generally  speaking,  the  official  reports  are  a  unit  in  this  respect. 

3.  MOTOR  TRUCKS— USES,  CAPACITY,  PERSONNEL. 

The  corps  trains,  for  instance,  in  the  French  organization  corre- 
spond to  our  divisional  trains  (supply,  ammunition,  sanitary,  and  en- 
gineers' trains),  have  in  part  been  replaced  by  motor  vehicles.  The 
supply  train  still  remains  animal  drawn,  with  the  exception  of  that 
part  of  it  engaged  in  taking  forward  beef  from  the  slaughtering 
points  to  the  regimental  train  (their  meat  wagons).  The  ammuni- 
tion train  remains  equipped  with  animal-drawn  caissons.  As  pre- 
viously explained,  these  caissons  must  often  pass  off  of  the  metaled 
roads  and  travel  through  fields  so  as  to  supply  combatant  units. 
Ammunition  is  pushed  up  much  closer  to  troops  by  auto  trucks  than 
was  the  case  in  previous  wars.  The  etape  or  link  therefore  to  be 
covered  by  the  caisson  is  not  as  great  as  it  used  to  be.  However, 
the  expenditure  of  artillery  ammunition  is  much  greater  than  was 
ever  contemplated,  and  the  saving  of  the  road  space  in  the  length 
of  the  etape  or  link  has  been  more  than  compensated  for  in  the 

519 


additional  number  of  trips  these  vehicles  must  make.    The  very  large 

caliber  guns  are  not  assigned  to  the  corps,  but  are  part  of  the  army 
artillery.  The  size  and  weight  of  the  ammunition  of  some  of  these 
guns  make  it  practically  necessary  to  replace  their  ammunition  by 
motor  trucks.  These  guns  themselves  are  so  heavy  as  to  make  it 
necessary  to  carefully  pick  out  the  ground  over  which  they  are  taken 
into  position.  They  are  not  mobMe  in  the  sense  of  the  guns  with  the 
corps  and  some  of  the  lighter  type  of  heavy  guns  with  the  army. 
Their  position  is  also  such  as  to  make  their  resupply  in  ammunition 
much  simpler  than  the  smaller  guns. 

The  sanitary  trains  have  been  greatly  supplemented  by  the  at- 
taching of  automobile  ambulances  directly  to  these  trains,  in  addi- 
tion to  the  animal-drawn  units.  Although  not  known  definitely,  it 
is  believed  that  some  of  the  animal-drawn  elements  of  this  train  have 
been  suppressed.  The  more  rapid  evacuation  of  the  wounded  by 
automobiles  and  the  distance  the  automobile  can  cover  has  cut  down 
considerably  the  number  of  "ambulance  immobilize"  (field  hospi- 
tals) with  the  corps. 

It  has  been  ascertained  that  to-day  the  number  of  automobiles  of 
different  classes  with  the  different  armies  varied  somewhere  betweea 
2,500  and  4,000  with  each  army.  Aside  from  the  touring  cars 
assigned  permanently  to  different  headquarters  and  the  auto  trucks 
and  ambulances  assigned  to  the  corps  and  those  assigned  to  special 
service,  such  as  the  aviation  service,  etc.,  the  balance  are  attached 
to  the  army.  They  form  what  might  be  called  the  automobile  con- 
voy of  the  army,  and  they  are  either  temporarily  assigned  for  cer- 
tain specific  work  to  corps  and  divisions  or  are  used  in  pushing 
supplies  and  material  forward  to  troops  from  railheads.  The  forma- 
tions of  the  different  "  parks  "  attached  directly  to  the  army  corre- 
spond generally  to  the  formation  laid  down  in  our  Field  Service 
Regulations  for  Columns.  It  is  believed  that  after  the  war  is  over 
and  as  the  auto  truck  develops  in  efficiency  that  the  effort  will  be 
made  to  reduce  the  size  of  trains  with  the  divisions  and  corps,  and 
by  means  of  what  we  call  "  columns  "  to  push  supply  and  evacuating 
points  closer  up  to  the  troops.  The  English  have  perhaps  gone 
further  in  this  particular  to-day  than  the  French,  but  it  is  thought 
that,  wdth  a  well-trained  personnel  and  efficient  direction,  the  re- 
sults that  would  obtain  under  this  system  would  be  better  than 
the  old. 

Any  intelligent  person  can  foresee  that  at  some  future  time  animal- 
drawn  vehicles  with  an  army  will  disappear.  However,  to-day, 
when  roads  are  not  good  and  when  from  one  reason  or  another 
certain  vehicles  supplying  troops  must  pass  off  these  roads  into  the 
field,  the  animal-drawn  vehicle  still  has  its  advantage  and  must  of 
necessity  be  retained. 

519 


8 

In  France  the  roads  are  excellent  and  are  well  kept  up.  In  the 
Vosges  a  number  of  new  roads  are  being  constructed.  These  latter 
roads  are  all  permanent  and  beautifully  installed. 

Notwithstanding  these  fine  roads  in  France,  the  combat  and  field 
train  of  combatant  units  in  their  entirety,  as  well  as  a  large  portion 
of  their  corps  train   (our  division  trains),  remain  animal-drawn. 

There  seems  to  be  no  doubt  that  when  we  consider  the  road  condi- 
tions in  our  possible  theater  of  operations  we  will  not  be  able  to 
change  to  the  motor  truck  until  a  much  later  date  than  the  European 
army.  This  will  undoubtedly  be  the  case,  unless  a  great  advance  is 
made  in  automobile  construction.  While  the  authorities  always  have 
been  great  believers  in  auto  trucks  and  are  satisfied  that  in  time  of 
war  we  will  have  need  for  them  in  the  thousands,  it  is  believed  that 
the  development  of  an  efficient  auto  truck  for  combat  and  field  train 
purposes  goes  hand  in  hand  with  the  development  of  an  efficient 
farming  auto  truck.  When  an  auto  truck  has  been  developed  that 
will  bring  in  the  average  farmer's  crop  from  his  fields  we  will  have 
an  efficient  auto  truck  for  combat  and  field  train  purposes. 

One  of  a  great  number  of  uses  of  auto  trucks  to-day  is  to  move 
troops  promptly  into  a  threatened  sector  of  the  line  of  trenches.  In 
one  operation  each  division  had  temporarily  under  its  orders  50  auto 
trucks  for  moving  troops.  These  trucks  were  kept  with  the  reserves. 
Each  truck  could  carry  20  equipped  infantrymen.  By  the  use  of 
these  trucks  and  within  a  very  few  minutes  1,000  men  could  be  loaded 
and  moved  to  the  threatened  point.  With  this  load  and  moving  at 
the  rate  of  about  12  kilometers  an  hour,  it  would  not  take  long  to 
commence  throwing  in  reserves.  These  were  only  a  few  of  the  auto 
trucks  that  the  army  had.  If  the  situation  became  more  serious,  then 
additional  trucks  could  also  be  used  for  the  same  purpose. 

There  is  no  question  but  that  in  other  theaters  of  war,  when  a  war 
of  maneuver  has  been  carried  on,  these  trucks  have  been  used  to  carry 
troops  on  raids  accompanying  cavalry.  The  supply  trains  with  cav- 
alry have  also  been  made  up  of  the  transport. 

The  animal-drawn  army  trains  or  grand  parks,  except  certain 
vehicles  of  the  artillery  and  engineers,  have  been  entirely  done  away 
with  and  their  work  done  by  the  army  automobile  convoy. 

On  the  line  of  communication  and  in  the  zone  of  the  interior  prac- 
tically all  the  transportation  in  general  use  is  motor-drawn. 

The  escort  wagon  has  somewhat  the  same  drawbacks  as  an  auto 
truck  when  it  comes  to  moving  off  the  roads  and  in  the  fields.  Dur- 
ing this  war  ceitain  troops  could  not  have  held  positions  had  they 
not  a  vehicle  of  resupply  that  was  capable  of  getting  off  a  road  cov- 
ered l)y  hostile  artillery  fire  and  passing  through  fields  under  cover 
to  near  the  troops.     It  is  believed  that  we  should  give  some  serious 

519 


9 

study  to  the  working  out  practically  of  this  question  of  a  suitable 
type  of  combat  train  wagon. 

The  heavy  auto-truck  companies  are  often  supplied  with  trailers, 
the  trailer  having  the  same  carrying  capacity  as  the  truck.  This  type 
usually  carries  3  tons,  but  for  all-round  service  a  l|-ton  truck  has  been 
found  most  acceptable.  The  use  of  trailers,  however,  must  depend 
upon  road  conditions,  and  where  good  road  conditions  do  not  exist 
the  strain  on  the  truck  is  so  great  as  to  render  the  use  of  the  trailers 
with  the  truck  not  advisable. 

The  number  of  auto  trucks  is  usually  fixed  by  the  number  of 
vehicles  required  to  transport  either  one  day's  rations  for  a  corps 
(125  tons)  or  two  "lots"  of  ammunition,  infantry  and  artillery  (160 
tons).  The  trucks  are  expected  to  make  12  miles  an  hour  and  to  be 
able  to  travel  about  100  miles  a  day. 

The  personnel  with  an  auto-truck  company  varies,  but  it  is  not  far 
from  the  organization  prescribed  for  our  motor-truck  companies. 
(See  Tables  of  Organization.) 

The  use  of  motor  transport  has  reduced,  by  many  men,  the  per- 
sonnel of  the  service  of  supply,  thus  releasing  a  greater  number  of 
men  for  the  firing  line.  In  the  past,  during  some  wars,  the  number 
of  men  required  behind  the  lines  was  equal,  if  it  did  not  exceed,  the 
number  of  fighting  men. 

4.  AUTOMOBILE  PARKS. 

The  extended  use  of  automobiles  of  every  type  in  the  present  war 
has  created  some  new  problems,  one  of  the  most  important  being 
the  maintenance  of  the  various  motor  wagons  in  a  condition  for 
service.  Although  the  reliability  of  motor  cars  has  been  enormously 
improved  in  recent  years,  they,  more  than  most  machines,  are  sub- 
ject to  many  ills  and  troubles. 

Motor-car  troubles  may  be  conveniently  grouped  under  three 
heads :  Ordinary  road  troubles,  such  as  can  be  repaired  by  chauffeurs 
or  mechanicians  with  the  simple  tools  and  repair  parts  carried  for 
this  purpose ;  second,  more  serious  troubles,  which  call  for  shopwork ; 
third,  very  serious  troubles,  which  call  for  factory  work. 

In  order  to  meet  satisfactorily  the  second  class  of  troubles,  those 
calling  for  shopwork,  recourse  is  had  to  the  organization  of  so-called 
automobile  parks,  one  for  each  field  army.  Like  many  other  fea- 
tures of  the  present  war,  the  automobile  park  is  a  new  creation 
called  for  by  the  emergency  of  the  situation.  The  number  of  auto- 
mobiles of  all  kinds  assigned  to  the  field  armies  varies  according 
to  the  conditions,  such  as  size  and  extent  of  front  of  the  army, 
character  of  country  as  regards  available  roads  and  railroads,  etc. 
The  automobiles  assigned  to  each  army  are  numbered  serially,  and 
30(iGi/^     No.  519— lU 2 


10 

by  observing  the  numbers  noted  at  different  times  and  places  a  fair 
idea  of  the  number  of  machines  belonging  to  a  field  army  may  be 
obtained.  This  number  averages  not  less  than  2,500  per  field  army, 
including  both  passenger  and  freight  autos.  It  is  evident  that  with 
so  large  a  number  of  machines  constantly  doing  hard  service  there 
will  be  need  for  some  organized  and  controlled  scheme  for  repairs. 
This  is  the  task  of  the  automobile  park. 

In  a  populous  region  where  position  warfare  has  obtained  for 
some  time  the  problem  is  easy.  Existing  garages  or  machine  shops 
in  conveniently  located  towns  afford  all  necessary  requisites  for  an 
automobile  park  and  permit  of  undertaking  repairs  on  a  large  scale. 
On  the  other  hand,  where  field  warfare  has  been  the  rule  and  where 
large  industrial  towns  and  villages  are  lacking,  the  problem  is  more 
difficult,  requiring,  in  the  first  place,  that  the  repair  park  have  a 
certain  amount  of  mobility  and  also  that  it  carry  along  its  equip- 
ment and  appliances.  Under  these  conditions  the  repairs  that  can 
be  undertaken  in  the  field  are  more  limited. 

Supposing  a  field  army  to  be  established  in  some  garrison  camp, 
its  personnel  would  be  housed  in  the  barracks  of  the  peace  garrison. 
If  no  suitable  buildings  were  available  for  shops  and  garages,  suit- 
able light-frame  structures  are  erected,  arranging  the  buildings  by 
centering  the  repair  departments  around  the  sides  of  a  rectangle, 
with  open  sheds  in  the  center  for  housing  machines  repaired  and 
awaiting  repairs. 

The  various  shops  are  a  carpenter  shop,  painting  and  glazing 
shop,  machine  shop  equipped  with  powei"  lathe,  shaper,  emery  wheel, 
drill  press,  etc.,  a  vulcanizing  shop,  a  blacksmith  shop,  and  an  oxy- 
acetylene  welding  outfit.  The  latter  is  a  most  useful  affair,  enabling 
broken  parts  of  steel,  brass,  and  even  aluminum  to  be  welded  to- 
gether. There  is  also  a  small  printing  shop  for  printing  various 
blank  forms  used  by  chauffeurs  in  recording  car  performances.  A 
large  stock  room  containing  spare  parts  of  all  usual  makes  of  auto- 
mobiles forms  part  of  the  park  and  enables  repairs  to  be  made  very 
quickly. 

About  200  cars  are  usually  on  hand  at  the  park,  some  pretty  bad 
cases  among  them,  including  several  which  had  suffered  from  shell 
fire.  With  appliances  available  quite  serious  repairs  can  be  under- 
taken without  returning  cars  to  factory.  A  supply  of  repaired 
cars  in  running  order  is  maintained  from  which  issues  can  be  made 
in  exchange  for  cars  turned  in  for  repairs. 

The  personnel  of  the  park  consists  of  one  captain,  taken  from  the 
railway  regiments;  two  lieutenants,  one  from  the  cavalry  and  one 
from  the  artillery;  and  about  400  men  drawn  from  recruit  depots, 
and  most  of  them  skilled  workmen. 

519 


11 

5.  THE  ARMORED  CAR. 

The  weak  point  in  the  comparatively  heavy  armored  car  lies  in  its 
dependence  on  the  condition  of  the  road  and  its  helplessness  before 
ordinary  obstacles,  such  as  ruts  and  ditches.  It  has  its  uses,  how- 
ever, under  the  conditions  noted  in  the  following  remarks : 

In  the  German  invasion  of  Belgium  *  *  *  motor  vehicles  apparently 
played  an  enormously  important  part  in  enabling  the  enemy  to  push  forward 
more  rapidly  than  he  could  have  done  had  he  had  to  depend  entirely  on  his 
cavalry.  The  armored  car  early  proved  its  value  for  this  sort  of  patrol  work. 
It  exercised  another  influence  on  the  cavalry  arm,  in  that,  by  expediting  the 
rate  at  which  it  was  possible  for  the  invader  to  push  forward,  it  placed  corre- 
spondingly a  greater  strain  on  the  mobility  of  cavalry,  and  to  that  extent  used 
up  the  horses  of  the  enemy  at  an  additional  rate,  as  instance  the  extremely 
ill  condition  into  which  they  got  last  autumn. 

Thus  in  this  connection  the  advent  of  the  motor  vehicle  to  modern  warfare 
made  possible  operations  beyond  the  scope  of  cavalry  unaided,  and  at  the  same 
time  put  a  greater  strain  on  that  arm.  It  has  also  speeded  up  the  movement 
of  the  main  armies,  because,  unlike  horses,  motor  vehicles  do  not  tire  during 
the  spells  in  which  it  is  possible  for  men  to  work  them. 

6.  MOTORCYCLES. 

These  have  generally  proved  unsatisfactory,  and  for  messenger 
and  orderly  service  they  have  been  replaced  by  the  light  motor  car. 
Light  4  or  5-liorsepower,  two-passenger  cars,  like  the  Bebe  Peugeot 
and  the  Zebre,  can  go  almost  anywhere. 

In  some  newspaper  reports  and  in  letters  from  the  front  rumors 
of  the  use  of  a  large  number  of  motorcycles  to  move  troops  occur, 
but  no  verification  of  this  has  ever  been  received  through  official 
channels. 

Based  on  these  reports  an  organization  of  a  large  number  of  motor- 
cyclists has  been  proposed,  with  a  view  to  their  use  in  place  of  cav- 
alry. Notwithstanding  the  comparative  invisibility  of  the  motorcycle 
and  its  individual  adaptability  to  a  varied  terrain  such  a  plan  ap- 
pears unfeasible.  In  the  first  place  the  men  would  have  to  be  trained 
as  soldiers  before  they  can  become  military  cyclists,  and,  in  the 
second  place,  no  teamwork  of  the  mass  could  be  assured  without  some 
training  of  the  whole  as  a  body. 

Companies  for  duty  at  Army  corps  or  division  headquarters  are 
feasible,  but  it  is  not  believed  that  large  bodies  can  operate  with  the 
same  ease  as  cavalry.  It  is  safe  to  assert  that  during  operations  in 
Courland  a  motorcycle  corps  of  60,000  could  not  have  replaced  that 
amount  of  cavalry  or  have  done  the  work  expected  of  them. 

519 


12 

7.  USE  IN  COUNTRIES  HAVING  FEW  ROADS. 

Perhaps  the  phase  Avhich  has  most  vividly  brought  home  the 
change  wrought  by  the  advent  of  the  motor  in  the  conduct  of  military 
operations  has  been  its  employment  during  the  campaign  against 
De  Wet. 

The  average  mind  can  here  appreciate  the  advance  made  by  the 
present-day  methods  of  warfare,  as  the  scene  was  identical  in  nature 
with  that  of  15  years  ago,  when  something  in  the  neighborhood  of  a 
quarter  of  a  million  British  soldiers  were  engaged  in  rounding 
up  De  Wet  and  his  Boers.  There  is,  however,  this  difference,  that, 
while  the  numbers  concerned  were  much  smaller  than  in  the  cam- 
paign referred  to  above,  the  uprising  led  by  De  Wet  was  in  the 
nature  of  a  surprise,  which  made  the  mobilization  of  the  necessary 
troops  and  the  accumulation  of  supplies  impossible  in  advance  of  the 
emergency.  The  hostile  Boers  in  this  instance  had  precisely  the  same 
mobility  which  enabled  them  to  elude  the  British  troops  so  easily  15 
years  ago. 

The  difference  in  the  later  campaign  is  shown  by  the  fact  that 
motors  were  employed  instead  of  horses  and  horse-drawn  transport. 

But  these  cars  were  not  built  for  military  use,  being  merely  machines  owned 
by  members  of  the  Johannesburg  Automobile  Club,  many  designed  for  use  only 
on  roads  as  we  understand  them  in  Europe.  The  work  in  hand,  however,  re- 
quired that  the  cars  should  be  driven  across  country  in  all  manner  of  direc- 
tions, over  the  veldt  where  there  chanced  to  be  neither  road  nor  track,  and 
across  the  beds  of  rivers. 

Moreover,  the  vehicles  usually  carried  something  more  than  the  normal  load. 
Scarcely  two  cars  were  of  a  kind  or  model.  Thus,  from  the  point  of  view  of 
military  service,  it  would  have  been  ifupossible  to  select  anything  in  the  way 
of  motor  vehicles  less  suitable  for  the  task.  Of  course,  many  of  the  cars 
broke  down,  as  they  are  breaking  down  every  day  in  the  war  area  in  Europe. 
But  the  thing  that  counted  was  that  more  cars  got  through  than  fell  out  of  the 
running,  while  of  those  that  failed  it  must  be  observed  that  up  to  the  point 
at  which  it  broke  down  each  assisted  to  keep  the  enemy  on  the  run.  To  that 
extent  it  did  its  work  toward  rounding  him  up. 

8.  AMBULANCES. 

Motor  traction  has  worked  wonders  in  this  war  with  the  food  and 
ammunition  supply,  yet  in  each  one  of  these  services  the  final  stage 
is  still  made  by  horse-drawn  vehicles.  However,  under  the  existing 
conditions  of  trench  warfare  the  sanitary  service  has  gone  even 
further  and  have  supplanted  all  slow-moving  horse-drawn  vehicles 
by  light  and  efficient  motor  ambulances. 

The  motor  ambulance  is  the  machine  for  which  the  ordinary  pleasure  car 
chassis,  unaltered,  has  proved  most  suitable.  The  provision  of  these  ambu- 
lances has  undoubtedly  contributed  enormously  to  the  saving  of  life  and  suffer- 
ing. But  the  best  of  them  scarcely  begins  to  realize  the  possibilities  of  a 
motor  vehicle  for  this  service  in  regions  in  which  roads  are  either  lacking  or 
619 


13 

are  torn  up  as  a  result  of  warfare.  They  are  no  longer  using  ambulances 
having  tlie  excessive  overhang  so  common  among  those  presented  at  the 
beginning  of  tlie  war.  But  that  Is  only  a  slight  improvement,  for  even  to-day 
the  driver  of  the  average  motor  ambulance  sits  in  the  best  swung  position. 
At  least  part  of  the  patient's  body  as  he  lies  flat — usually  the  feet  and  the 
lower  part  of  the  legs — projects  behind  the  bacli  axle. 

Nor  should  motor  ambulances  have  too  long  wheel  bases,  because  it  is  often 
necessary  to  turn  them  In  brief  compass.  Obviously  the  driver  should  not  be 
placed  where  he  sits  in  an  ordinary  touring  car  or  town  carriage.  If  the  motor 
must  be  accommodated  in  the  same  part  of  the  chassis,  then  the  ambulance 
driver  and  the  attendant  seated  beside  him  should  be  placed  above  the  engine, 
as  they  are  in  certain  types  of  French  and  German  motor  buses. 

This  arrangement  would  enable  the  best  part  of  the  chassis  ordinarily  occu- 
pied by  the  driver  to  be  used  by  the  patient,  the  whole  of  whose  body  could 
accordingly  be  brought  well  between  the  two  axles.  There  is  nothing  to  the 
speed  at  which  these  ambulances  have  to  be  driven  that  would  render  it  unde- 
sirable to  accommodate  driver  and  attendant  above  the  motor.  Nor  is  this  all, 
for  the  present  system  of  springing  is  at  best  a  mere  combination  of  make- 
shifts, in  that  all  springs  are  the  result  of  building  up  laminations  of  steel 
plates. 

Each  spring  so  built  up  can  give  the  smoothest  riding  only  at  certain  vibra- 
tions and  certain  loads,  whereas  the  whole  point  of  having  a  motor  vehicle 
for  any  sort  of  service  is  that  you  can  use  it  either  with  full  load,  with  part 
load,  or  without  any  load ;  also  that  you  can  drive  it  over  any  sort  of  surface 
at  any  speed  of  which  it  is  capable,  from  the  slowest  to  the  fastest.  No  form 
of  laminated  steel  spring  can  therefore  be  quite  suitable  for  the  purpose.  Pos- 
sibly pneumatic  suspension  will  prove  a  successful  solution  of  the  problem. 

These  motor  ambulances,  under  cover  of  darkness,  come  right  up 
to  the  dressing  stations  and  evacuate  direct  to  the  clearing  sta- 
tions, which  are  back  at  corps  headquarters  in  some  suitable  build- 
ing. It  is  due  altogether  to  these  swiftly  moving  ambulances  that 
wounded  can  be  forwarded  to  the  base  and  finally  to  England.  A 
man  if  wounded  in  the  forenoon  is  out  of  luck,  but  the  man  wounded 
in  the  afternoon  may  reach  a  hospital  in  England  before  his  name 
reaches  his  corps  headquarters  as  among  the  wounded. 

9.  FUEL. 

Sufficient  data  do  not  yet  exist  from  which  we  can  state  definitely 
the  various  kinds  of  fuel  employed.  Among  those  mentioned  are 
alcohol,  benzol,  kerosene,  and  gasoline.  Shortage  in  gasoline  and 
increase  in  the  price  will  undoubtedly  cause  a  search  for  a  new  fuel. 
Its  arrival  is  certain,  as  there  has  never  been  a  crying  demand  for 
any  improvement  without  an  answer  from  the  engineers  and  in- 
ventors. Improved  carbureters  and  lighter  cars  show,  in  a  way,  the 
line  of  advance  of  improvements. 

With  the  export  demand,  the  war,  and  the  domestic  demand,  there 
does  not  seem  to  be  much  thought  of  lower  prices  for  gaoline.  While 
kerosene  could  be  used  and  would  be  cheap,  it  has,  up  to  this  time, 
exhibited  a  tendency  to  give  off  an  odor  when  burned  and  it  also 

619 


14 

leaves  an  excess  of  carbon  in  the  cylinders.  The  low  grade  of  gaso- 
line is  a  little  more  difficult  to  start  on,  but  it  supplies  more  heat  and 
is  a  better  fuel  for  general  work  after  the  motor  is  under  way. 

Some  moderately  successful  attempts  have  been  made  in  this  re- 
spect, but,  although  the  cost  has  been  reduced  to  7  cents  per  mile, 
a  great  deal  of  trouble  exists  because  of  the  sediment  left  in  the 
carbureter.  This  may,  however,  be  remedied  by  study,  and  we  may 
have  a  new  less  expensive  fuel  before  long. 

Thus  the  war  has  speeded  up  the  development  of  the  motor  car, 
permanent  improvements  will  result  and,  perhaps,  a  new  fuel. 

10.  DEFECTS  IN  CONSTRUCTION  BROUGHT  OUT   UNDER  THE 
STRAIN  OF  ACTIVE-SERVICE  CONDITIONS. 

Lack  of  standardization  of  parts  and  the  continual  breaking  of 
radiators  are  mentioned  as  being  the  main  troubles  encountered  in 
handling  this  kind  of  transport.  The  last  trouble  undoubtedly 
comes  from  the  shock  due  to  bad  roads  and  to  continued  use  without 
an  opportunity  for  repairs  or  rest. 

For  the  student  who  has  studied  carefully  the  development  of 
this  transport  the  most  gratifying  thing  about  remodeling  the  propo- 
sition of  modern  warfare,  made  possible  by  the  arrival  of  the  motor 
vehicle,  is  the  fact  that  every  accomplishment  and  every  success,  up 
to  date,  stands  to  the  credit  of  machines  neither  specially  designed 
nor  produced  for  war  purposes. 

WHEELS. 

The  wheels  giving  the  most  satisfaction  are  those  in  which  a  steel 
plate  replaces  the  spokes,  and  where  the  dual  tire  is  of  solid  rubber. 
This  has  been  tried  out  in  several  trucks  and  found  serviceable. 

LIGHTING   SYSTEM. 

The  "  Prestolite  "  system  was  not  serviceable  nor  satisfactory,  and 
electric  lighting  found  much  better  in  every  way.  The  feature  re- 
ported on  as  being  successful  in  every  way  was  the  movable  head- 
light. It  is  of  great  use  when  loading  and  unloading  at  night  and 
while  off  the  main  road  and  parking  the  machines.  A  good  electric 
headlight  arranged  on  a  universal  joint  and  within  reach  of  the 
driver  has  been  spoken  of  as  an  ideal  arrangement. 

BRIDGES. 

Closely  connected  with  the  use  of  motor  transport  comes  the  im- 
portance of  good  roads,  and  next  the  question  of  bridges  and  a  study 
of  the  means  to  be  taken  to  strengthen  the  highway  bridge  ordi- 

619 


15 

narily  encountered  in  this  country.  Heavy  ordnance,  together  with  a 
continual  stream  of  motor  transport,  will  without  doubt  test  the 
average  highway  bridge  in  many  probable  areas  jf  operations.  The 
development  of  heavy  ordnance  has  called  for  the  use  of  the  motor 
in  its  transportation.  There  is  plenty  of  information  on  hand  to 
show  that  the  transport  of  heavy  ordnance,  away  from  the  railroad 
lines,  has  been  accomplished  by  special  motor  vehicles. 

11.  RESULTS  OF  THE  WAR. 

The  export  of  motor  vehicles  in  the  past  two  years  has  moved 
forward  with  a  great  bound.  In  1915  it  amounted  to  $100,000,000, 
while  in  1914  it  was  $28,507,464,  an  increase  of  250  per  cent.  The 
estimated  value  of  commercial  vehicles  exported  was  $63,000,000  of 
the  total.  England  has  been  the  best  buyer  of  automobiles  from  the 
United  States.  Her  purchases  amounted,  for  the  fiscal  year  ending 
June  30,  to  5,306  trucks.  France  and  Russia  also  were  heavy  pur- 
chasers. When  the  war  ends  there  must  needs  be  an  immediate  re- 
adjustment of  the  great  industries  of  the  belligerent  countries.  Hence 
it  is  believed  that  there  will  be  left  in  the  hands  of  many  of  our 
manufacturers  trucks  of  the  latest  pattern.  Why  should  we  not  use 
them  to  form  the  cadres  for  our  divisional  and  Army  transport,  and 
accustom  not  only  the  troops  but  a  number  of  officers  and  men  with 
the  use,  handling,  and  repair  of  motor  vehicles  ? 

The  following  quotation,  taken  from  a  foreign  motor  publication, 
shows  that  this  question  has  already  been  agitated  in  France: 

Among  the  problems  that  are  apt  to  come  up  at  the  close  of  the  war  in 
Europe  is  the  means  to  be  taken  by  the  belligerent  nations  in  disposing  of  the 
motor  trucks  now  in  use  by  the  armies.  Prance  apparently  has  formed  an 
answer  to  the  question  already.  At  an  auction  held  recently,  740  of  the  Paris 
internal-gear  drive  omnibuses  mobilized  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  were  sold, 
to  be  replaced  by  an  equal  number  of  similar  chassis  for  work  at  the  front. 
By  selling  these  chassis  at  this  time  to  private  owners  it  was  possible  to  fore- 
stall the  purchase  of  that  many  chassis  from  neutral  nations. 

Another  benefit  to  France  is  that  this  method  of  selling  French  trucks  that 
have  seen  service  prevents  the  beginning  of  an  installation  of  foi-eign  chassis  by 
large  owners  who  might  after  the  war,  in  the  interest  of  standardization,  con- 
tinue their  purchases  of  trucks  made  outside  of  France. 

The  foreign  trucks  now  used  by  the  French  Army  are  run  until  they  are 
useless  and  can  not  be  overhauled  advantageously,  and  are  then  replaced  by 
French-made  chassis,  the  latest  advices  from  France  being  that  the  factories 
there  are  now  in  a  position  to  care  for  the  army's  needs. 

12.  CONCLUSIONS. 

The  question  is  at  once  asked  whether  or  not  we  have  taken  steps 
to  use  this  transport  and  to  avail  ourselves  of  the  large  amount  of 
suitable  material  existing  to-day  in  the  United  States. 

519 


The  answer  is  made  that  this  has  been  done  as  far  as  existing 
appropriations  will  allow.  However,  most  of  these  vehicles  are 
operating  singly  or  in  pairs,  and  at  no  one  place  are  there  sufficient 
for  one  company. 

13.  ORGANIZATION. 

The  organization  proposed  for  a  motor-truck  company  conforms 
to  the  experience  of  officers  abroad,  but  as  yet  no  attempt  has  been 
made  to  collect  the  material  of  automobile  parks  or  for  repair  shops 
and  these  are  shown  by  the  experience  of  all  to  be  badly  needed  in 
field  operations. 

The  assignment  of  this  transport  to  the  divisional  trains  is  correct 
and  conforms  with  the  practice  abroad. 

There  should  be  organized  in  each  division  a  motor-truck  com- 
pany, and  attached  thereto  a  repair  shop.  This  organization  will 
form  a  cadre  as  well  as  a  place  where  chauffeurs  and  mechanicians 
can  be  trained.  It  is  true  we  can  recruit  plenty  of  men  from  this 
class  when  war  is  imminent,  but  it  is  one  thing  to  be  a  chauffeur  and 
another  to  be  a  military  chauffeur. 

Abroad  this  defect  does  not  exist,  but  with  us  something  should 
be  done  to  remedy  the  lack  of  disciplined  material.  The  experience 
of  certain  of  the  belligerents  in  this  respect  will  be  ours  if  we  become 
involved  in  war. 

14.  COLLECTION  OF  THIS  TRANSPORT. 

Based  on  the  type  of  vehicle  in  use  in  the  cadre  in  each  division, 
attempt  ought  to  be  made  to  arrange  for  a  large  number  of  vehicles 
of  a  similar  type.  The  same  type  of  vehicle,  as  far  as  possible,  should 
be  used  within  a  division  or  even  a  field  army  if  such  can  be  accom- 
plished. 

The  Federal  Trade  Commission  could  under  the  law  obtain  the 
data,  in  each  divisional  district,  necessary  for  listing  suitable  trans- 
port. The  Quartermaster  General's  Office  has  prepared  a  pro- 
visional plan  for  utilizing  motor  transport,  under  existing  laws,  and 
this  plan  includes  a  contract  system  which  will  take  the  place  of 
the  prizes  and  subsidies  that  have  been  found  so  efficacious  abroad. 

All  these  steps  are  in  the  right  direction,  and  we  have  conserved 
the  underlying  principle  for  the  use  of  mechanical-driven  transport, 
and  this  is  that  it  is  a  transportation  unit  pure  and  simple.  It  picks 
up  a  load  at  one  place  and  discharges  this  load  upon  arrival  at 
destination.  It  is  not  employed  in  transporting  mobile  reserves. 
The  animal-drawn  vehicle  transports  the  rolling  reserve.  Animal- 
drawn  vehicles  are  still  being  purchased  in  great  numbers  by  the 
French,  A  recent  order  has  been  placed  for  over  4,000  of  these 
wagons.     The  French  have  not  as  yet  replaced  the  animal-drawn 

519 


17 

transport  of  combat  and  field  trains  with  autotrucks,  nor  do  they 
apparently  intend  to  do  so.  The  corps  supply,  ammunition,  and 
sanitary  trains  remain  animal-drawn,  except  that  automobile  ambu- 
lance sections  form  part  of  the  sanitary  train,  and  fresh-meat  auto- 
mobile sections  form  part  of  the  supply  train. 

The  foregoing  facts  are  striking  Avhen  we  consider  the  excellent 
roads  being  maintained  in  the  theater  of  operations.  The  animal- 
drawn  vehicle  will  undoubtedly  be  eventually  replaced  by  mechan- 
ical-driven transport.  However,  before  this  can  be  done,  even  in 
Europe,  many  mechanical  imperfections  at  present  existing  in  the 
autotruck  must  be  overcome.  Our  problem  in  this  particular  is 
more  difficult  than  the  European,  when  we  consider  the  roads  and 
bridges  in  our  probable  theater  of  military  operations,  and  it  is 
A^ery  possible  that  we  will  not  be  able  to  make  the  chansre  until  some 
time  after  it  has  been  effected  in  Europe.  Notwithstanding  the  fact 
that  it  may  be  some  years  before  we  can  use  autotrucks  in  our  first 
and  second  lines  of  transportation,  the  fact  remains  that,  in  the 
event  of  a  war,  we  will  have  need  for  this  kind  of  transportation 
in  great  quantities  behind  our  second-line  transportation. 

619 

o 


ORGANIZATION  AND  ADMINISTRATION  OF  THE  WAR 

DEPARTMENT  ADAPTED  TO  A  CHANGE  FROM 

PEACE  CONDITIONS  TO  A  STATE  OF  WAR 


PREPARED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION.  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

AS    A    SUPPLEMENT    TO    THE    STATEMENT    OF    A    PROPER    MILITARY 

POLICY  FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES 


WCD  9262-14 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE  :  WASHINGTON 

NOVEMBER,   1915 


520 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 

1916 


War  Department, 

Document  No.  520. 

Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff. 


SYNOPSIS. 


Page. 

1.  Importance  of  staff  organization 5 

2.  Staff  organization  should  be  capable  of  expansion 5 

3.  Expansion  requires  use  of  detail  system  and  uncomplicated  staff  service...  5 

4.  More  important  to  prepare  staff  organizations  for  war  than  for  peace 6 

5.  War  experience  condemns  merging  staff  duties 6 

6.  Part  of  the  work  done  in  the  Judge  Advocate  General's  Office  should  be 

done  in  the  Attorney  General 's  Office 7 

7.  The  Army  should  have  a  chief  of  Infantry,  a  chief  of  Cavalry,  and  a  chief  of  8 

Field  Artillery 8 

8.  Necessity  for  a  General  Staff 8 

9.  Organization  and  administration  of  the  General  Staff 8 

10.  Organization  and  administration  of  other  parts  of  the  War  Department.  ...  8 

520  (3) 


ORGANIZATION  AND  ADIVIINISTRATION  OF  THE  WAR 
DEPARTMENT  ADAPTED  TO  A  CHANGE  FROM  PEACE 
CONDITIONS  TO  A  STATE  OF  WAR. 


1.  IMPORTANCE  OF  STAFF  ORGANIZATION. 

Report  No.  74,  House  of  Representatives,  third  session  Forty- 
second  Congress,  contains  the  following : 

To  adjust  and  perfect  the  subtle  and  intricate  machinery  by  which  great 
masses  of  soldiers  are  to  be  fed,  clothed,  armed,  moved,  inspired  with  confi- 
dence, and  carried  through  victorious  battle  is,  after  all,  wrapped  up  in  the 
perfection  of  staff  organization. 

2.  STAFF  ORGANIZATION  SHOULD  BE  CAPABLE  OF  EXPANSION. 

The  classification  of  staff  duties  should  be  such  that  those  of  any  branch 
can  be  promptly  and  efficiently  discharged  in  time  of  war  on  a  large  scale. 
And  unless  we  have  an  organization  capable  of  expansion  to  an  ahnost  unlim- 
ited extent  we  may  well  question  whether  it  rests  upon  a  safe  basis. 

3.  EXPANSION  REQUIRES  USE  OF  DETAIL  SYSTEM  AND  UNCOM-' 

PLICATED  STAFF  SERVICE. 

In  order  that  we  may  make  the  great  expansion  referred  to,  which 
is  especially  necessary  in  this  country,  we  must  have  available  in 
addition  to  the  authorized  number  of  staff  officers  a  large  number 
who  have  had  some  experience  in  staff  duties,  and  should  have  a 
staff  system  which  is  not  unnecessarily  complicated. 

The  number  of  officers  trained  for  staff  service,  except  in  the  Medi- 
cal Corps,  should  be  made  as  large  as  practicable  by  the  detail  sys- 
tem. Besides  this  being  necessary  for  the  required  expansion  of  our 
staff  service  in  case  of  war,  it  is  otherwise  beneficial  to  the  service. 
In  a  hearing  before  a  committee  of  Congress  Gen.  Sherman  approv- 
ingly quoted  Van  Moltke's  statement  to  the  effect  that  in  the  German 
Army  "  every  staff  officer  is  required  for  a  considerable  period  of  his 
life  to  serve  with  soldiers."  (P.  ix,  H.  Rept.  No.  74,  42d  Cong.,  3d 
sess.)  This  would  increase  the  number  of  officers  trained  in  staff 
service  and  diminish  the  number  without  experience  with  troops. 

520  (6) 


4.  MORE  IMPORTANT  TO  PREPARE  STAFF  ORGANIZATIONS  FOR 
WAR  THAN  FOR  PEACE. 

It  is  more  important  that  we  have  good  staff  service  in  vear  than 
in  peace.  If  keeping  officers  continuously  in  staff  departments  pro- 
motes efficiency  of  staff  service  in  time  of  peace,  it  might  do  so  at  the 
expense  of  efficiency  of  staff  service  when  war  comes.  This  especially 
applies  in  this  country,  Avhere  staff  officers  sometimes  leave  their 
departments  for  line  service  in  time  of  war.  During  the  War  with 
Spain  the  President  appointed  40  per  cent  of  the  officers  of  one  staff 
department  general  officers  of  Volunteers.  (P.  122,  S.  Doc.  No.  221. 
56th  Cong.,  1st  sess.)  Even  if  it  should  require  some  additional  staff 
officers  in  time  of  peace,  the  organization  and  administration  of 
staff  departments  should  be  such  as  to  insure  efficient  staff  service 
during  war.  The  less  complicated  our  staff  service  the  more  practi- 
cable it  would  be  to  expand  the  staff  departments  with  officers  of 
little  previous  service  therein. 

5.  WAR  EXPERIENCE  CONDEMNS  MERGING  STAFF  DUTIES. 

It  was  stated  by  the  commander  of  the  forces  that  British  staff 
service  was  less  efficient  in  the  Boer  War  because  of  merging  the 
duties  of  different  staff  departments.  (London  Times,  Sept.  11, 
1906.)  In  Gen.  Longstreet's  testimonj  for  a  committee  of  Congress, 
March  4,  1872,  he  stated : 

The  pay  and  quartermaster's  duties  were  united  in  the  same  department  in 
the  Confederate  service.  It  was  not  a  success  *  *  *.  The  duties  and  dis- 
bursements of  the  Quartermaster's,  Commissary,  Pay,  and  Medical  Departments 
are  sufficiently  burdensome  and  complicated  when  kept  as  separate  depart- 
ments.    (V.  34,  H.  Rept.  74,  42d  Cong.,  3d  sess.) 

The  Inspector  General  of  the  Army,  March  5,  1872,  testified  for  a 
committee  of  Congress : 

The  consolidation  of  the  Quartermaster's,  Subsistence,  and  Pay  Departments 
into  one  supply  department  can  not,  in  my  opinion,  be  effected  without  mani- 
fest detriment  to  the  efficiency  and  economy  of  all.  (P.  23,  H.  Rept.  No.  74, 
42d  Cong.,  3d  sess.) 

The  Committee  on  Military  Affairs,  House  of  Representatives, 
after  extensive  inquiry  of  many  officers  of  great  experience  in  the 
Civil  War,  reported  that  in  view  of — 

the  testimony  adduced  from  the  most  respectable  authority,  it  is  fair  to  con- 
clude that  the  consolidation  of  any  of  the  different  stafC  corps  and  departments 
with  another  is  inexpedient.  Whatever  might  be  gained  in  expense  in  time  of 
peace  would  possibly  and  probably  be  lost  in  war.  when  a  divided  responsibility, 
as  at  present,  would  become  necessary,  and  might  devolve  upon  inexperience<l 
hands.  (P.  iv,  H.  Rept.  No.  74,  42d  Cong.,  3d  sess.) 
620 


Referring  to  the  Quartermaster's  Department,  the  report  of  the 
commission  appointed  by  the  President  to  investigate  the  conduct  of 
the  War  Department  in  the  War  with  Spain  contains  the  following: 

There  appears  to  have  been  a  lack  of  system  \\iierel).v.  even  as  late  as  October 
(1898),  troops  in  camp  and  in  the  field  were  lacking  in  some  articles  of  clothing, 
camp  and  garrison  equipage ;  and  hospitals,  at  least  at  two  important  localities 
in  the  Soutli — Fort  Monroe,  Va.,  and  Huntsville.  Ala.— lacked  stores,  while  at 
Huntsville  fuel  was  wanting. 

Tliere  appears  to  have  been  a  lack  of  executive  or  administrative  al)ility. 
either  on  the  part  of  the  Quartermaster's  Department  or  the  railroad  officials, 
in  preventing  the  great  congestion  of  cars  at  Tampa  and  Chickamauga  when 
these  camps  were  first  established,  which  congestion  caused  delay,  annoyance, 
and  discomfort  to  the  large  bodies  of  troops  concentrating  at  those  places. 

Tliere  appears  to  have  been  a  lack  of  foresight  in  preparing  and  promptlj- 
having  available  at  some  central  locality  on  the  seacoast  the  necesssry  fleet 
of  transports  which  it  seemed  evident  would  he  required  for  the  movement  of 
troops  to  a  foreign  shore,  and,  finally,  when  the  call  came  suddeidy  and  the 
emergency  was  supreme,  the  department  appears  not  to  have  fully  compre- 
liended  the  capacity  of  the  fleet  under  its  command ;  not  to  have  supplied  it 
with  a  complete  outfit  of  lighters  for  the  immediate  disembarkation  of  troops 
and  supplies ;  to  have  accepted  without  full  investigation,  the  statement  that  the 
vessels  were  capable  of  transporting  25,000  men,  while  really  they  could  not 
and  did  not  tran.sport  more  than  17,000  with  their  artillery,  equipments,  am- 
munition, and  supplies,  and  lacked  sufficient  storage  room  for  the  necessary 
amount  of  wagon  transportation — that  very  important  element  in  the  move- 
ment of  an  army  in  the  face  of  an  enemy. 

*  *  :!:  H:  4:  :»  # 

Finally,  in  the  opinion  of  this  commission,  there  should  be  a  division  of  the 
labor  now  devolving  upon  the  Quartermaster's  Department.     *     *     *. 

Experience — war  experience — has  thus  shown  that  a  consolidation 
of  the  Quartermaster's  Department,  Pay  Department,  and  Subsis- 
tence Department  into  one  department — the  Quartermaster  Corps — 
is  not  an  organization  adapted  to  a  change  from  peace  conditions  to 
a  state  of  war. 

6.  PART  OF  THE  WORK  DONE  IN  THE  JUDGE  ADVOCATE  GEN- 
ERAL'S OFFICE  SHOULD  BE  DONE  IN  THE  ATTORNEY  GENERAL'S 
OFFICE. 

The  official  report  of  the  conduct  of  the  AVar  of  1898  states  with 
reference  to  the  Judge  Advocate  General's  Department: 

About  one-half  of  the  time  of  this  office  was  occupied  in  civil  matters  such  as 
preparing  contracts,  examining  titles,  etc.  (S.  Doc.  No.  221,  56th  Cong..  1st 
sess. ) 

The  Attorney  General's  Office  should  attend  to  the  legal  work  per 
taining  to  civil  matters. 

520 


7.  THE  ARMY  SHOULD  HAVE  A  CHIEF  OF  INFANTRY,  A  CHIEF  OF 
CAVALRY,  AND  A  CHIEF  OF  FIELD  ARTILLERY. 

After  receiving  testimony  from  officers  of  great  experience  in  the 
Civil  War,  the  Committee  on  Military  Affairs,  House  of  Kepresent- 
atives,  stated: 

A  suggestion,  not  without  weight,  is  made  that  there  should  be  three  addi- 
tional staff  officers  at  Army  lieadquarters  or  with  the  Secretary  of  War.  These 
are  a  chief  of  Artillery,  a  chief  of  Cavalry,  and  a  chief  of  Infantry,  whose 
specialties  shall  be  to  look  after  the  interests  of  eacli  particular  arm,  whose 
knowledge  and  skill  would  inspire  confidence,  and  whose  character  would  give 
authority  to  his  declarations  upon  the  subject  intrusted  to  his  care.  (P.  iv, 
H.  Kept.  No.  74,  42d  Cong.,  3d  sess.) 

Under  modern  conditions  it  is  necessary  to  efficiency  that  every 
arm  of  the  service  have  a  chief  at  the  War  Department.  This  was 
advocated  in  War  College  Division  memorandum  639-103,  1915. 

8.  NECESSITY  FOR  A  GENERAL  STAFF. 

The  commission  on  the  conduct  of  the  War  with  Spain  reported : 

In  the  judgment  of  the  commission  there  was  lacking  in  the  general  adminis- 
tration of  the  War  Department  during  the  continuance  of  the  War  with  Spain 
that  complete  grasp  of  the  situation  which  was  essential  to  the  highest  effi- 
ciency and  discipline  of  the  Army.  (P.  116,  S.  Doc.  No.  221,  56th  Cong.,  1st 
sess. ) 

The  remedy  Congress  applied  was  to  establish  a  General  Staff, 
which  the  experience  of  all  military  countries  has  shown  to  be  neces- 
sary to  prevent  such  inefficiency. 

9.  ORGANIZATION  AND  ADMINISTRATION  OF  THE  GENERAL  STAFF. 

The  opinion  of  the  majority  of  the  War  College  division  as  to 
the  proper  organization  and  administration  of  the  War  Department 
adapted  to  a  change  from  peace  conditions  to  a  state  of  war,  so  far  as 
the  General  Staff  is  concerned,  is  shown  in  Appendix  L;  the  opinion 
of  a  minority  in  Appendix  M. 

10.  ORGANIZATION   AND   ADMINISTRATION   OF  OTHER   PARTS   OF 

THE  WAR  DEPARTMENT. 

Subject  to  what  has  been  stated  in  the  preceding  part  of  this 
memorandum,  the  organization  and  administration  of  the  other 
parts  of  the  War  Department  adapted  to  a  change  from  peace  con- 
ditions to  a  state  of  war  are  shown  in  Appendixes  A  to  K,  inclusive. 

520 


9 

APPENDIX  A. 
2338208.  W.  C.  D.  92G2-2. 

Wab  Department, 
The  Adjutant  General's  Office, 

Washington,  November  12,  1915. 
F'rom :  The  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army. 
T»:  The  Secretary  of  War. 
Subject :  Organization  and  administration  of  The  Adjutant  General's  Office. 

Tlie  following  is  submitted  in  compliance  with  a  memorandum  of  the  Chief 
of  Staff,  dated  November  2,  1915,  conveying  your  direction  that,  for  use  in 
considering  organization  and  administration  of  the  War  Department,  adapted 
to  a  change  from  peace  conditions  to  a  state  of  war,  there  be  submitted  the 
following  regarding  the  War  Department  organization  and  administration : 

(a)  A  statement  of  the  present  War  Department  organization  and  adminis- 
tration of  the  respective  bureaus,  corps,  or  departments  of  the  War  De- 
partment. 

(6)  A  statement  of  the  peace  organization  and  administration  of  the  re- 
spective bureaus,  corps,  or  departments  of  the  War  Department  considered 
best  adapted  to  a  change  fj'om  peace  conditions  to  a  state  of  war. 

In  addition  to  The  Adjutant  General  there  are  five  officers  of  The  Adjutant 
General's  Department  on  duty  in  this  office. 

Tlie  number  of  civilian  employees  now  authorized  by  law  for  The  Adjutant 
General's  Office  is  579.  Of  these,  483  are  clerical  and  96  subclerical  employees. 
Their  distribution  by  grades  is  shown  in  the  following  table : 


Grade. 

Annual 
salary. 

Number. 

Grade. 

Annual 

salary. 

Number. 

Chief  Clerk 

$2,250 
2,000 

1,S00 
1,600 
1,400 
1,200 
1,000 
1,400 
900 

1 

10 

48 

64 

94 

231 

35 

1 

1 

Firemen 

$720 
1,000 
840 
720 
720 
660 
360 

2 

Chiefs  of  division 

Skilled  mechanic 

1 

Clerks: 

10 

Class  IV 

Assistant  messengers 

54 

Class  III . 

Watchmen 

g 

Class  II 

18 

Class  I 

Messenger  bov  .... 

I 

At  SI  000 

Total 

Engineer 

579 

Assistant  engineer 

The  clerical  force  of  the  office  is  distributed  as  follows : 

General  office  administration,  including  Military  Academy  business   (Administrative 

Division) 13 

Recording,   indexing,   and   dispatching   correspondence  an;l   searching  and   reporting 

from  correspondence  files,  1800  to  date  (Mail  and  Record  Division) 98 

Business  relating  to  commissioned  officers,  examining,  recording  and  furnishing  in- 
formation from  Army  returns  ;  preparing  Monthly  Army  List  and  Directory,  and 

leave  lists    (Officers'   Division) 42 

Business  relating  to  enlisted  men   (Enlisted  Men's  Division) ; 14 

Business  relating  to  the  recruiting  service   (Recruiting  Division) 14 

Miscellaneous  Army  correspondence    (Miscellaneous  Division) 22 

Publishing  Army  orders,  changes,  and  bulletins  ;  distributing  Army  blanks,  orders, 
changes,  bulletins,  Army  List  and  Directory,  etc.  (Orders  and  Distribution  Di- 
vision)        21 

Examining,  furnishing  information  from,  and  conducting  correspondence  relating  to, 
Army  rolls,  enlistment  papers,  descriptive  and  assignment  cards,  and  other  papers 
relating  to  enlisted  men  of  the  Regular  Army  ;  classifying  and  searching  identifi- 
cation records  of  enlisted  men  of  the  Regwlar  Army  (Rolls  Division) 63 

Business  relating  to  the  disbanded  armies  of  all  wars,  to  the  organizations,  officers 
and  enlisted  men  composing  those  armies,  and  to  former  officers  and  enlisted  men 
of  the  Regular  Army  (Correspondence  and  Examining  Division) 41 

30669°— No.  520—16 2 


10 

Searching  and  furnishing  Information  from  the  medical  records,  Regulars  and  Vol- 
unteers, 1814  to  date,  and  from  the  volunteer  regimental  records,  1776  to  1901 ; 
repairing  records,  and  custody  of  duplicate  records  and  records  rarely  consulted 
(Medical  and  Volunteer  Regimental  Records  Division) 88 

Searching  and  furnishing  information  from  records  of  discontinued  geographical 
commands,  armies,  corps,  divisions,  etc. ;  from  the  records  of  the  Provost  Marshal 
General's  Bureau,  OfQce  of  Commissary  General  of  Prisoners,  Bureau  of  Refugees, 
Freedmen  and  Abandoned  Lands,  and  other  discontinued  bureaus  and  oltices  of 
the  Civil  War  period,  and  from  the  Confederate  archives ;  preparing  a  compilation 
showing  the  geographical  and  tactical  organizations,  engagements,  and  casualties 
of  the  Union  and  Confederate  Armies  (Archives  Division) 32 

Carding  records  of  the  Confederate  Army  in  the  process  of  compilation  of  the  Com- 
plete Roster  of  the  Officers  and  Enlisted  Men  of  the  Union  and  Confederate 
Armies,  authorized  by  act  of  Feb.  23,  1903  (32  Stat.  L.,  884)  ;  searching  and  fur- 
nishing information  from  the  military  card  flies  of  the  War  with  Spain  and  the 
PhlMppine  insurrection  (Tenth  Street  Division) 85 

Total   clerical 483 

Subclerical  employees 96 

Aggregate c79 

The  present  organization  of  the  office  is  sucli  that  it  can  be  expanded  readily 
from  peace  conditions  to  a  state  of  war  by  the  addition  of  a  sufficient  number 
of  clerlis  and  tlie  provision  of  any  additional  room  needed.  In  case  of  war  or 
other  disturbance  requiring  tlie  use  of  an  increased  military  force  it  would  be 
necessary  to  suspend,  as  far  as  practicable,  nonciu-rent  work,  using  tlie  clerlvs 
engaged  thereon  for  current  work  until  such  additional  force  as  miglit  be 
needed  were  authorized  and  obtained.  It  probably  would  be  necessary  to 
divide  the  force  into  two  "  shifts,"  each  composed  in  part  of  trained  men,  with 
a  view  to  use  the  limited  office  space  available  for  one  "  shift "  during  the  day- 
time and  for  the  other  during  the  evening  or  niglit.  This  is  believed  to  be  the 
best  plan  to  place  and  handle  an  additional  force  of  at  least  300  employees,  the 
lowest  number  it  is  thought  will  be  needed  in  case  of  war. 

It  is  thought  that  the  needs  of  the  office  in  the  way  of  additional  employees 
that  may  be  rendered  necessary  by  Army  legislation,  now  under  consideration 
in  the  War  Department,  should  be  also  considered  at  this  time.  If  the  pro- 
posed plan  of  Army  reorganization,  including  the  establishment  of  a  continental 
army,  is  enacted  into  law,  the  work  of  The  Adjutant  General's  Office  will  be 
materially  increased,  and  it  will  be  impossible  for  the  force  now  provided  by 
law  to  do  that  work.  The  matter  of  detail  of  more  officers  of  The  Adjutant 
General's  Department  for  duty  in  The  Adjutant  General's  Office  can  be  dis- 
posed of  without  further  legislation,  but  provision  should  be  made  by  law  for  a 
sufficient  clerical  force  to  dispose  of  any  increase  in  clerical  work  resulting  from 
Army  legislation. 

It  is  impossible  to  make  any  estimate  in  advance  of  legislative  action  that 
will  be  at  all  reliable  with  regard  to  the  volume  of  work  that  will  result  from 
Army  legislation.  It  is  believed,  however,  that  at  least  100  additional  clerks 
will  be  needed  as  soon  as — and  some  of  them  before — that  legislation  is  com- 
pleted. Applications  for  appointment  as  officers  and  requests  for  information 
on  all  subjects  relating  to  the  Army  will  begin  to  pour  into  the  office  as  soon 
as  congressional  consideration  of  that  legislation  is  begun,  and  immediately 
upon  its  passage  measures  must  need  be  taken  for  carrying  it  into  effect  by 
establishing  such  new  organizations  as  may  be  provided — obtaining  the  addi- 
tional enlisted  men  by  recruiting,  commissioning  officers  provided  for,  and  such 
other  work  as  may  be  necessary. 

Under  the  present  legal  allowance  of  clerks  for  The  Adjutant  General's 
Office  only  2.3  per  cent  of  the  clerical  employees  receive  salaries  of  $2,000  and 

620 


u 

over,  while  In  the  rest  of  the  department  5.1  per  cent  are  paid  $2,000  or  more. 
Of  the  clerical  employees  at  salaries  of  $1,000  or  less  The  Adjutant  General's 
Oflce  has  55.1  per  cent,  as  compared  with  53.9  for  the  rest  of  the  department. 
Clerljs  of  Class  I  ($1,200)  constitute  47.9  per  cent  of  The  Adjutant  General's 
clerical  force,  while  that  grade  has  only  32.2  per  cent  in  the  balance  of  the 
department. 

The  large  percentage  in  the  $1,200  grade  in  The  Adjutant  General's  OfBce  has 
constituted  a  "  block  "  to  promotions,  so  that  a  service  of  many  years  is  neces- 
sary before  a  clerlj  can  look  for  promotion  to  the  next  higher  grade  ($1,400). 
This  leads  many  clerks  that  have  been  trained  in  the  work  of  the  office  to  seek 
transfers  to  other  bureaus  or  offices  where  promotions  are  more  rapid,  or  to 
leave  the  Government  service  entirely.  To  avoid  this  block  in  the  line  of  pro- 
motions and  to  provide  salaries  commensurate  with  the  responsibility  of  those 
in  supervisory  positions  and  to  more  nearly  equalize  the  percentage  of  higher 
grades  in  this  office  with  those  in  the  other  bureaus  in  the  War  Department,  it 
is  suggested  that  the  following  classification  of  employees,  which  includes  the 
100  proposed  to  be  added,  be  recommended  for  legislative  consideration : 


I 


Grade. 

Number. 

Salary. 

Remarks. 

1 

1 
7 
15 

58 
68 
116 
257 
60 

$2,7.^0 
2,500 
2,200 
2,000 

1,800 
1,600 
1,400 
1,200 
1,000 

Increase  of  $500  submitted. 

Assistant  chief  clerk 

In  lieu  of  1  chief  of  division  at  $2,000. 
In  I  ieu  of  7  chiefs  of  d i  vision  at  $2,000. 
In  lieu  of  2  chiefs  of  division  at  $2,000  and  13 
clerks,  Class  IV. 

Increase  of  10  submitted 

Chiefs  of  division 

Clerks  at  $2,000     

Clerks: 

Class  4 

Class  3 

Increase  of  4  submitted. 

Class  2 

Class  1 

Class  *1,000 

Increase  of  15  submitted. 

Total  clerical 

583 

The  foregoing  proposition,  if  adopted,  will  add  $140,150  to  the  amount  to  be 
appropriated  for  salaries  for  The  Adjutant  General's  Office.  This  will  make  the 
total  appropriation  for  salaries  for  that  office  $865,020,  instead  of  $724,870, 
as  at  present 

H.  P.  McCain. 
620 


12 

The  present  organization  of  the  office  ia  shown  graphically  in  the  following 
diagram: 

THE  ADJUTANT  GENERAL 


^-'^ 

\    CHIEF  CLERK 

ADJUTANT  GENERAL 

Administrative  Division 

Mail  and  Record  Division 

Officers'  Division 

ADJUTANT  GENERAL 

Miscellaneous  Division 

ADJUTANT  GENERAL 

Enlisted  Men's  Division 

ADJUTANT  GENERAL 

Recruiting  Division 

ADJUTANT  GENERAL/ 

Correspondence  and  Examining 
Division 

Rolls  Division 

\ 

\ 

\ 

Orders  and  Distribution  Division 

Archives  Division 

Medical  and  Volunteer  Regimental 
Records  Division 

Tenth  Street  Division 

Subclerlcal  Employees 

13 

APPENDIX  B. 
182-G-l.  WCD  9262-3. 

Wab  Depabtment,  Office  of  the  Inspectob  Genebal, 

Washington,  November  5,  1915. 
fFrom :  The  Inspector  General  of  the  Army. 
To  :  The  Adjutant  General. 
Subject :  Organization  and  administration  of  the  Inspector's  General's  Office. 

1.  In  reply  to  letter  from  The  Adjutant  General's  Office  of  November  3,  1915 
(2338208),  the  following  is  submitted: 

(a)  The  present  organization  and  administration  of  this  bureau  is  shown  in 
statement  inclosed  herewith  (incl.  1). 

( 6 )  Under  war  conditions  the  character  of  the  duties  performed  in  this  office 
would  not  change.     The  present  organization  is  adaptable  to  war  conditions. 

The  only  difference  in  war  would  be  the  increase  in  volume  of  work  incident 
to  having  more  troops  in  the  field  to  be  inspected  and  thereby  increasing  the 
number  of  reports  coming  into  the  office. 

This  increase  of  paper  work  would  require  an  increase  in  the  clerical  force 
and  might  require,  in  addition,  commissioned  assistants  for  each  of  the  officers 
now  in  the  office. 

The  number  of  additional  officers  and  clerks  can  not  be  determined  definitely, 
in  the  absence  of  definite  knowledge  of  the  character  and  extent  of  operations 
to  be  undertaken  and  the  size  of  the  force  to  be  employed. 

In  the  Spanish-American  War  the  clerical  force  was  temporarily  increased 
from  8  to  16. 

A.  W.  Beewsteb, 
Acting  Inspector  General. 

OBQANIZATION  AND  ADMINISTEATION  OF  THE  OFFICE  OF  THE  INSPECTOB  GENEBAL  OF 

THE   ARMY. 


THE  SECRETARY  OF  WAR 

Inspector  General  of  the  Army.' 

3  commissioned  assistants^  to  the 
Inspector  General  of  the  Army, 

1   expert  accountant,' 

1  chief  clerk.« 

6  clerks  and  3  messengers.* 

*  His  duties  are  advisory  as  regards  the  Secretary  of  War  and  the  Chief  of  Staflf,  and 
supervisory  as  regards  tlie  Inspector  General's  Department,  of  which  he  is  the  head. 

-They  examined  all  reports  of  inspections  and  miscellaneous  papers  received  in  the  office 
of  thelnspectorCieneral  of  the  Army,  and  sus?gest  the  action  to  be  taken  thereon  by  this  ofHce, 
In  addition  to  the  above,  the  assistants  to  the  Inspector  General  perform  the  following 
duties  outside  of  the  office  : 

'^  ile  examines  inspections  of  money  accounts,  and  matters  pertaining  to  the  funds,  etc 

*  He  supervises  the  clerical  work  of  the  office. 

*  Correspondence  and  record  work. 

620 


14 

Inspection. — Of  money  accounts  and  property  in  Washington,  D.  C. ;  the  National  Home 
for  Disabled  Volunteer  Soldiers  ;  certain  depots,  arsenals,  armories,  schools,  hospitals,  etc., 
not  under  department  commanders ;  the  tactical  inspection  of  the  Field  Artillery  through- 
out the  Army  are  specially  made  by  the  Field  Artillery  inspector  on  duty  in  this  office, 
who  is  included  in  the  three  commissioned  assistants  mentioned  above. 

Special  investigations.- — These  officers  are  required  to  make  such  investigations  as  are 
ordered  by  the  Secretary  of  War  and  the  Chief  of  Staff. 


APPENDIX  O. 
AGO  2338208.  WCD  9262-5. 

[First  indorsement.) 

Wab  Depaetment, 
Judge  Advocate  General's  Office, 

Washington,  November  10,  1915. 
To  the  Adjutant  General: 

1.  Returned.  In  the  foregoing  letter  of  the  3d  instant  The  Adjutant  General 
requests  (o)  a  statement  of  the  present  organization  and  administration  of  tliis 
bureau,  and  (b)  a  statement  of  the  peace  organization  and  administration  of 
this  bureau  considered  best  adapted  to  a  change  from  peace  conditions  to  u 
state  of  war,  by  November  15,  1915,  for  consideration  in  connection  with  the 
organization  and  administration  of  the  War  Department. 

2.  As  to  (a)  the  organization  of  the  Judge  Advocate  General's  office  is  as 
follows : 

(c)  Judge  Advocate  General,  with  the  rank  of  brigadier  generaL 

(6)  1  assistant,  with  the  rank  of  lieutenant  colonel. 

(c)  2  assistants,  with  the  rank  of  major. 

(d)  3  assistants,  with  the  rank  of  captain — detailed. 

(e)  1  law  student  with  the  rank  of  lieutenant. 
(/)  1  chief  clerk  and  solicitor. 

{g)  2  law  clerks. 

{h)  1  clerk,  class  IV. 

(i)  2  clerks,  class  III. 

(i)  3  clerks,  class  II. 

(fc)  6  clerks,  class  I. 

(i)  1  copyist  at  $900. 

(m)  2  messengers. 

(n)   1  assistant  messenger. 

On  account  of  the  character  of  the  legal  work  of  the  Bureau  of  Insular  Affairs, 
the  law  officer  of  that  bureau,  with  a  clerk  and  an  assistant  messenger,  have 
desk  room  and  perform  their  duties  in  this  office  and  under  the  supervision  of 
the  Judge  Advocate  General. 

3.  With  respect  to  (6),  it  is  believed  that  the  present  organization  of  the 
bureau  is  best  adapted  to  a  change  from  "  peace  conditions  to  a  state  of  war," 
as  it  can  readily  absorb  such  additional  force  as  may  be  necessary  to  perform 
its  increased  duties  incident  to  such  a  change,  and  the  amount  of  such  additional 
force  that  would  be  necessary  in  the  event  of  said  change  would  depend  upon  the 
size  of  the  Army  engaged  in  the  war. 

E.  H.  Ceovvdeb,  Judge  Advocate  General. 

620 


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15 

APPENDIX  D. 
A,G.O.  2338208-H.  W.C.D.  9262-10. 

War  Department, 
Office  of  the  Quartermaster  General  of  the  .\j{my, 

Washington,  November  13,  1915. 
No.:  022.1-Ad. 

From :  Quartermaster  General. 
To:  The  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army. 
Subject:  War  Department  organization  and  administration. 

1.  Referring  to  letter  from  The  Adjutant  General  of  November  3,  1915  (No. 
233S208),  on  subject  as  above,  the  following  report  is  submitted: 

(a)  Graphic  chart  submitted  herewith  shows  organization  of  the  Office  of 
the  Quartermaster  General  in  detail. 

(6)  The  organization  as  shown  in  the  chart  is  the  present  organization  and 
would  remain  the  same,  except  that  in  the  event  of  war  it  would  be  necessary 
to  assign  additional  officers  as  assistants  to  officers  in  charge  of  the  Supplies 
and  Transportation  Divisions  of  the  office  to  handle  the  work  of  these  divi- 
sions, which  would  of  necessity  be  materially  increased.  It  would  also  be 
necessary,  in  the  event  of  hostilities,  to  increase  the  clerical  force  of  the  office. 

2.  With  the  exception  of  the  addition  of  a  limited  number  of  officers  and 
an  increase  of  the  clerical  force  as  set  forth  above,  the  organization  as  shown 
in  the  accompanying  chart  is,  in  the  judgment  of  the  undersigned,  adapted  to 
both  peace  and  war  conditions. 

J.  B.  Alseshire, 
Quarterma.ster  General. 


APPENDIX  E. 
145136,  4a.  W.C.D.  9262-9. 

A.G.O.  233820S-a. 

War  Department, 
Office  of  the  Surgeon  General, 

Washington,  November  13,  1915. 
From :  Surgeon  General. 
To:  The  Adjutant  General. 
Subject :  War  Department  organization  and  administration. 

1.  Replying  to  your  call  of  the  3d  instant  for  information  as  to  organi^-atiou 
and  administration  of  the  War  Department  adapted  to  a  change  from  peace 
conditions  to  a  state  of  war,  I  would  report  as  follows : 

(c)  A  chart  is  inclosed  showing  the  present  organization  and  administration 
in  this  bureau.  The  clerical  force  of  the  office,  at  this  time  consisting  of  chief 
clerk,  law  clerk,  and  93  clerks  of  classes  IV,  III,  II,  I,  $1,000  and  $900,  are 
distributed  among  the  several  divisions  as  conditions  of  business  require.  (In 
the  event  of  an  increase  in  the  authorized  strength  of  the  Army,  the  present 
clerical  force  will  not  be  sufficient  to  efficiently  and  expeditiously  handle  the 
increased  business  consequent  thereupon,  and  while  the  present  organization 
of  the  office  need  not  be  changed,  it  is  estimated  that  the  clerical  force  will 
have  to  be  increased  25  per  cent  to  insure  accuracy  and  promptness  in  the 
dispatch  of  business.) 

(b)  The  present   organization   and   administration   of   the   bureau    is   well 
adapted  to  a  change  from  peace  conditions  to  a  state  of  war,  and  no  change 
620 


16 

therein  can  now  be  foreseen ;  all  that  would  seem  to  be  necessary  in  the  event 
of  war  would  be  to  increase  the  number  of  officers  and  employees  eventually 
to  about  double  the  number  provided  for  when  the  changed  conditions  occur. 

H.  C  Fisher, 
Lieutenant  Colonel,  Medical  Corps,  Acting  Surgeon  General. 


APPENDIX  F. 
99380  AGO  2338208-J  WCD  9262-12 

War  Department, 
Office  of  the  Chief  of  Engineers, 

Washington,  November  13,  1915. 
From :  The  Chief  of  Engineers. 
To :  Tlie  Adjutant  General. 
Subject :   War  Department  organization  and  administration. 

1.  In  compliance  with  letter  from  The  Adjutant  General,  dated  November  3, 
1915,  upon  the  above  subject  (A.  G.  O.  233S208),  I  submit  herewith  a  state- 
ment of  the  present  organization  of  the  Engineer  Bureau,  witli  suggested 
clianges  to  prepare  it  better  for  war  conditions.  It  is  assumed  that  the  inquiry 
relates  not  only  to  the  organization  of  the  Engineer  Bureau. in  the  War  De- 
partment proper,  but  is  intended  to  include  also  the  Engineer  Department  at 
Large,  which  is  an  essential  portion  of  the  Engineer  Bureau  in  war  as  well  as 
in  peace. 

2.  Table  1  gives  the  organization  of  the  Engineer  Bureau  of  the  War  Depart- 
ment proper,  including  the  Board  of  Engineers  for  Rivers  and  Harbors,  which 
by  law  is  a  part  of  the  Office  of  the  Chief  of  Engineers,  but  which  has  offices 
elsewhere  in  Washington  than  in  the  War  Department  Building. 

3.  Table  2  gives  in  a  brief  outline  the  organization  of  the  Engineer  Depart- 
ment at  Large,  which  carries  on  fortification  construction  work,  river  and 
harbor  work,  and  other  miscellaneous  civil  work. 

4.  Table  3  gives  the  organization  of  certain  matters  connected  with  military 
affairs  or  furnishing  military  supplies  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Chief  of 
Engineers,  outside  the  War  Department  proper,  and  yet  not  connected  with  the 
construction  or  supervisory  work  of  the  Engineer  Department  at  Large. 

5.  There  is  omitted  from  these  tables  all  reference  to  Engineer  troops  and 
to  the  Department  of  Engineers,  the  control  of  which  comes  within  the  juris- 
diction of  the  commanding  generals  of  the  military  departments. 

6.  It  is  believed  that  in  general,  and  except  for  the  minor  changes  noted 
below,  the  organization  above  referred  to  is  fairly  well  suited  to  a  state  of  war 
or  a  transition  from  a  state  of  peace  to  a  state  of  war. 

7.  As  far  as  the  organization  of  the  Engineer  Bureau  within  the  War 
Department  is  concerned,  no  change  is  suggested  as  necessary  to  prepare  for 
a  state  of  war  other  than  the  probable  necessity  of  an  increase  in  personnel  in 
the  Office  of  the  Chief  of  Engineers  in  the  division  connected  with  military 
affairs.  The  services  of  an  additional  officer  and  additional  clerical  assistants 
would  be  absolutely  necessary  during  the  stages  of  war  or  immediately  pre- 
ceding, and  will  not  improbably  become  necessary  in  any  event  in  case  of  the 
adoption  by  Congress  of  the  proposed  reorganization  of  the  Army,  involving 
an  increase  in  the  number  of  Engineer  troops  and,  more  important  still,  a 
large  increase  in  the  amount  of  Engineer  material  to  be  supplied  to  troops  of 
the  line  and  to  be  kept  in  reserve.  This  increase  in  personnel  will  require 
additional  office  space. 

520 


17 

8.  In  so  far  as  concerns  the  orsanlzation  of  the  Engineer  Department  at 
Large,  no  change  is  considered  desirable  or  advisable.  In  time  of  war  or  in 
the  period  immediately  preceding  it  is  probable  that  a  considerable  portion  of 
the  trained  oflice  and  field  forces  now  engaged  in  the  construction  of  river  and 
harbor  and  other  civil  works  could  and  would  be,  with  more  or  less  complete 
organizations,  transferred  to  work  of  a  military  character  where  needed,  such 
as  seacoast  and  land  fortifications  and  purchase  and  inspection  of  engineer 
equipment  and  supplies  for  mobile  and  seacoast  purposes.  The  availability  for 
such  military  work  in  time  of  war  of  such  a  trained  construction  force  already 
organized  and  at  work  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Chief  of  Engineers  is  con- 
sidered of  inestimable  value. 

9.  As  I  have  stated  above,  I  consider  no  change  necessary  in  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  Engineer  Department  at  Large  in  so  far  as  it  relates  to  duties  per- 
formed under  the  Chief  of  Engineers,  but  all  division  Engineers  and  district 
Engineer  officers  are  for  certain  purposes  placed  l)y  Army  Regulations  or  War 
Department  instructions  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  department  commanders, 
and  for  most  of  these  purposes  it  is  believed  that  such  regulations  are  just, 
right,  and  proper.  However,  amongst  the  subjects  placed  within  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  department  commanders  is  that  of  the  preparation  of  plans  for  tlie 
construction  of  land  foritfications  and  the  complete  control  of  the  preparation 
for  the  construction  of  such  land  defenses. 

10.  It  is  understood  that  the  district  Engineer  officers  are  expected  to  have 
in  their  offices  complete  plans  of  all  these  defensive  works,  with  the  detailed 
scheme  for  carrying  them  out,  and  that  this  arrangement  is  to  be  carried  to 
the  extent  of  providing  a  separate  envelope  for  each  foreman  or  overseer,  con- 
taining plans  of  the  work  to  be  done  by  him  and  directions  for  carrying  out 
these  plans.  The  district  Engineer  officers  are  supposed  to  Iceep  in  touch  with 
the  question  of  local  supply  of  labor  and  materials,  etc.,  all  outside  of  the  juris- 
diction of  the  Chief  of  Engineers  and  without  any  coordination  with  tlieir  pri- 
mary duties  or  with  other  Engineer  districts. 

11.  It  is  believed  that  the  above  arrangement,  in  so  far  as  it  separates  the 
construction  end  of  such  work  from  the  observation  and  supervision  of  the 
Chief  of  Engineers,  is  a  serious  mistake.  The  amount  of  work  of  this  character 
to  be  done  in  the  early  stages  of  war  is,  according  to  existing  plans,  enormous. 
The  length  of  time  in  which  it  is  supposed  to  be  done  is  very  small,  and  any 
attempt  to  accomplish  this  requires  the  most  complete  organization.  At  such 
times  the  district  Engineer  officers  having  charge  of  these  land  fortifications 
would  probably  in  every  case  have  charge  also  of  emergency  seacoast  fortifica- 
tion work,  made  possible  by  sudden  availability  of  long-needed  funds,  and  the 
capacity  of  their  offices,  both  as  regards  the  office  and  field  forces,  would  be 
overtaxed  and  the  local  labor  markets  would  probably,  in  some  cases  at  least, 
be  exhausted. 

12.  On  the  other  hand  there  are  a  number  of  inland  Engineer  offices  engaged 
entirely  in  civil  work,  and  it  would  be  entirely  practicable,  in  the  early  part  of 
a  war,  to  transfer  portions  of  the  trained  office  and  field  forces  of  such  inland 
offices  to  the  works  of  seacoast  fortifications  and  land  fortification  of  the  sea- 
cast  liarbors.  Such  transfers  are  considered  absolutely  es.sential  to  pi"event  sea- 
coast Engineer  districts  being  swamped  with  work. 

13.  Were  all  matters  connected  with  the  construction  of  such  land  fortifica- 
tions for  the  protection  of  seacoast  forts  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Chief  of 
Engineers,  as  is  the  case  with  all  other  construction  work  of  a  civil  or  military 
character,  the  office  of  the  Chief  of  Engineers  would  be  able  in  time  of  peace 
to  make  definite  plans  and  arrangements  for  the  transfer  of  sucli  working  forces 
and  for  the  coordination  of  all  work  under  the  Engineer  Department. 

520 


18 

14.  It  is  therefore  considered  essential  to  a  proper  preparation  for  such  emer- 
gency work  that  the  Chief  of  Engineers  should  have  jurisdiction  over  tlie  con- 
struction of  sucli  land-fortification  worlv,  and  that  not  only  should  he  be  per- 
mitted but  he  should  be  required  to  lieep  in  his  office  copies  of  all  plans  con- 
nected with  the  construction  of  the  land  defense  of  seacoast  fortifications,  and 
that  all  communications  from  the  War  Department  to  district  engineer  officers 
on  such  matters  should  pass  through  his  hands.  It  is  considered  advisable  also 
that  he  be  furnished  with  copies  at  least  of  papers  passing  between  department 
commanders  and  the  local  district  officers. 

15.  It  is  not  intended  by  these  suggestions  to  interfere  with  the  initiative 
of  the  department  commanders,  either  in  designing  or  in  modifying  plans  for 
these  defenses,  but  merely  to  suggest  that  on  account  of  the  great  magnitude 
of  the  worli  required  in  the  early  stages  of  a  war  and  of  the  rapidity  with 
which  it  must  be  done  a  complete  cooperation  between  all  branches  of  the 
Engineer  Department  is  essential  and  can  not  be  assured  unless  the  Cliief  of 
Engineers  is  given  jurisdiction  over  such  matters  as  recommended  above. 

16.  In  so  far  as  it  relates  to  the  organization  of  the  Engineer  School  and 
Engineer  depots,  no  general  modifications  are  suggested  for  preparation  in  time 
of  war,  except  that,  if  the  new  scheme  of  Army  reorganization  is  accepted  by 
Congress,  the  purchase  and  storage  of  the  large  stocli  of  reserve  material  con- 
templated thereby  maizes  essential  an  increase  in  the  number  of  Engineer 
officers  now  engaged  in  Engineer  depot  worlj,  and  that  such  of  these  officers 
as  are  now  performing  other  functions  in  addition  to  depot  worli  will  probably 
have  to  be  relieved  of  those  other  functions  by  other  ofl[icers. 

17.  No  change  is  proposed  in  the  organization  of  the  Engineer  School,  as  it 
is  not  improbable  that,  at  least  in  the  early  stages  of  the  war,  the  functions  of 
the  Engineer  School  will  practically  cease,  and  the  instructors  and  student 
officers  pertaining  to  the  school  will  be  available  for  other  details. 

Dan  C.  Kingman, 
Cliief  of  Engineers,  United  States  Army. 

Table  I. — Organization  of  the  Engineer  Bureau  of  the  War  Department. 


Commis- 
sioned 

per- 
sonnel. 

Assist- 
ant 
engi- 
.  neers. 

Blue- 
print 
opera- 
tors. 

Draft- 
men. 

Junior 
engi- 
neers. 

Law 
officer. 

Cler- 
ical 
force. 

Mes- 
sengers 
and 
labor- 
ers. 

Chief  of  Engineers 

1 

1.  General  administration, 
Office  Chief  of  Engi- 
neers: 
1.  Chief  clerk 

40 

11 

9 
5 

21 

1 

2 

18 

2.  Military  section 
(including  per- 

2 
2 

1 
2 

1 
2 

1 

8.  Rivers  and  harbors 

6 

4.  Miscellaneous  civil 

1 

6.  Accounts  and  con- 

1 
1 

2 

2 

1 

2 

7,  Board  of  Engineers 
for    Rivers  and 
Harbors     (com- 
prises 7  officers  of 
the  Corps  of  En- 
gineers, of  whom 
all  but  1  are  ac- 
counted for  else- 

1 

1 

Total 

9 

6 

2 

9 

2 

1 

89 

14 

620 


19 


Table  II. — Organisation  of  the  Engineer  Department  at  Large. 


Fortifications,  rivers  and  harbors,  and  miscellaneous  civil  works : 
Engineer  Department  at  Large — 

9  divisions   (5  of  the  division  engineers  have  also  district  duties). 
57  districts,  49  district  officers  (3  of  whom  now  have  2  districts  each). 
25  military  assistants. 
Civilian  employees,  approximately  25,000. 

Table  HI. — Engineer  School,  Engineer  depots,  etc. 


Commissioned 
force. 

Civilian 
employ- 
ees. 

In  charge. 

Assist- 
ants. 

2 

1 

10 

2.  Engineer  depots: 

45 

2.  Fort  LeavenwortJi  (oIHcer  in  charge  also  director  Army  Field  En- 

2 

3.  Vancouver  Barracks  (officer  in  charge  also  in  command  of  Com- 

45 

6.  Manila  (officer  in  charge  also  department  Engineer  Philippine 

48 

Total  under  "Miscellaneous  duties  exclusively  military" 

5 

3 

150 

APPENDIX  G. 


AGO  2338208 


WCD  9262-11 


Wab  Department, 
Office  of  the  Chief  of  Ordnance, 

Washington,  November  12,  1915. 
From:  The  Ordnance  Office. 
To :  The  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army. 
Subject :  War  Department  organization  and  administration. 

1.  Replying  to  your  letter  of  November  3,  1915,  A.  G.  O.  2338208  (O.  O. 
321.8-1),  concerning  the  War  Department  organization  and  administration 
of  the  Ordnance  Department,  the  following  is  submitted : 

2.  The  present  War  Department  organization  and  administration  of  the 
Ordnance  Office  is  as  follows: 

I.  Administration : 

(c)   General  correspondence. 

(b)  Arsenal  administration  and  personnel. 

(c)  Civil-service  matters;  appointments  and  changes  of  status  of  em- 

ployees. 
II.  Finance  and  property  division: 

(o)  Financial  transactions  affecting  the  entire  department,  and  also  the 

militia  in  so  far  as  ordnance  supplies  are  concerned, 
(b)  Property  accountability. 
(Note. — Supply   is  handled   by   the  divisions  enumerated  below,  each  con- 
trolling the  material  whose  manufacture  it  directs.) 
III.  Small  arms  and  equipment  division: 

(a)  Small  arms. 

(b)  Personal  and  horse  equipment. 

(c)  Small-arms  and  machine-gun  target  practice. 

(d)  Supply  of  rifle  clubs  and  schools. 

•80 


20 

IV.  Gun  division: 

(a)   Seacoast  cannon. 

(6)  Mobile  artillery  cannon. 

(c)  Ammunition — 

1.  Powder. 

2.  Primers. 

3.  Fuses. 

4.  Projectiles. 

5.  High  explosives. 
id)   Grenades,  serial  bombs. 

(e)   Miscellaneous  cannon  and  projectiles  for  special  uses. 
(/)   Seacoast  artillery  target  practice. 
(g)  Mobile  artillery  target  practice. 
V.  Carriage  division : 

(a)  Seacoast  gun  carriages  and  the  optical  and  fire-control  instruments 

pertaining  thereto. 

(b)  Mobile  artillery  carriages  and  vehicles,   and   the  optical  and  fire- 

control  iustriTments  pertaining  thereto. 

(c)  Machine  guns. 

(d)  Pack  outfits — mountain  and  machine. 

(e)  Tractors  and  armored  automobiles. 

(/)  Maintenance  of  installed  and  mobile  artillery  material. 
3.  The  organization  given  in  the  preceding  paragraph  is  considered  satis- 
factory for  the  peace  organization  and  administration  of  this  office,  and  best 
adapted  to  pass  from  peace  to  war  conditions.  No  change  in  this  organization 
would  be  required  to  pass  from  peace  to  war  conditions,  it  being  simply  a 
question  of  expansion. 

William  Crozier, 
Brigadier  General,  Chief  of  Ordnance,  United  States  Army. 


i 


APPENDIX  H. 

40726. 

[First  indorsement.] 

War  Department, 
Office  of  Chief  Signal  Officer, 

Washington,  November  6,  1915. 
To  The  Adjutant  General,  United  States  Army  : 

Inclosing  diagram  showing  present  organization  and  administration  of  this 
bureau.  This  organization  and  administration  is  considered  adapted  to  a 
change  from  peace  conditions  to  a  state  of  war  by  the  addition  of  one  division 
to  handle  matters  of  personnel  and  a  reasonable  increase  of  the  clerical  force, 
depending  on  the  size  of  the  military  forces  to  be  organized. 

Charles  S.  Wallace. 
Captain,  Signal  Corps,  in  charge  of  Office. 
620 


Engineering  Division 


Duties 

e, Inspection, and  Issue  of  Supplies  ;Esti- 
horities,  and  Requisitions  for  Funds ;Mon- 
ts ;De sign, Construction, and  Installation 
_cal  Equipment {Supply  Depots, Lab orator- 
hone  and  Telegraph  Systems ;Cableship8 ; 
on  of  Kteinuals, Printing  Requisitions  and 

1718, 


3066J 


ef  eignQi  orri 


AdBlnUtimtlon  SItIbIo 


Duties 


Personnel ;Insulnr  Possessions  cuid  Panama ;Mobile 
Army  Unite  ;Service  Schools ;  Compilation  of  Coiies  ; 
Distribution, Accounting, Codes  and  ManuRla ;Exami- 
ncition  Property  Returiia  lExtuninations  ,Nonconmle- 
eioned  OfficerBjPhotographlc  Experimental  Work. 


Duties 

Purchase, Inspection, and  Issue  of  Supplies jEsti- 
matea, Authorities,  and  Requisitions  for  Funds ; Mon- 
ey A':counts;DeElgn, Construction, 8ind  Installation 

of  Technical  Equipment ;Supply  Depots, Laborator- 
ies,Telephone  and  Teleernph  Systems jCableshlpB ; 
Preparation  of  Hanutils, Printing  Reciuleitions  and 
Blank  Forms. 


c 


21 

APPENDIX  I. 
AGO  2338208.  WCD  9262-7. 

Was  Depabtment, 
BuKEAtr  OF  Insulab  Affairs, 

Washington,  November  12,  1915. 
B'rom :  Bureau  of  Insular  Affairs. 
To :  The  Adjutant  General  of  the  Army. 
Subject :  War  Department  organization  and  administration. 

1.  In  compliance  with  the  request  contained  in  letter  from  your  oflice  of  the 
3d  instant  (No.  233S20S),  the  following  information  is  submitted: 

(a)  As  at  present  organized,  the  Bureau  of  Insular  Affairs  consists  of  the 
Correspondence  and  Administrative  Division ;  Purchasing,  Disbursing,  and  Ac- 
counts Division ;  Record  Division ;  Miscellaneous  Division ;  and  Statistical  Divi- 
sion. The  chief  clerk  of  the  bureau,  under  the  immediate  direction  of  the  chief 
and  assistants  to  the  chief  of  bureau,  has  direct  supervision  over  the  Cor- 
respondence and  Administrative  Division,  which  handles  all  current  business 
and  correspondence.  Through  the  Purchasing,  Disbursing,  and  Accounts  Divi- 
sion all  supplies  bought  in  the  United  States  for  the  governments  of  the 
Philippine  Islands  and  Porto  Rico  are  purchased,  and  accounts  therefor  audited 
and  paid.  The  Record  Division  is  the  depository  of  the  official  records  and  cor- 
respondence of  the  bureau.  The  IMiscellaneous  Division  collects  and  compiles 
information  of  all  kinds  obtainable  relating  to  matters  under  the  supervision 
of  the  bureau.  The  Statistical  Division  collects  and  prepares  for  publication 
commercial  and  trade  statistics  of  the  insular  possessions  whose  affairs  are  ad- 
ministered under  the  supervision  of  the  bureau. 

(b)  The  present  organization  and  administration  of  the  bureau  is  fully 
adapted  to  a  change  from  peace  conditions  to  a  state  of  war. 

Frank  McIntyre,  Chief  of  Bureau. 


APPENDIX   J. 

C  A  5871  /568-A.  WCD  9262-8. 

AGO  2338208-F. 

War  Department, 
Office  of  Chief  of  Staff, 
Washington,  November  12,  1915. 
From :  Acting  Chief  of  Coast  Artillery. 
To:  The  Adjutant  General. 
Subject :  Organization  of  the  Coast  Artillery  Division. 

1.  The  following  diagrammatic  statement  shows  the  organization  and   ad- 
ministration of  this  division : 

Chief  of  Coast  Artillery — senior  assistant — charged  with  supervision  and  co- 
ordination of  office,  administration,  mine  material,  boats,  general  subjects: 

1.  Assistant    (1)  :  Subjects    relating   to    fire    control,    fortifications,    light 
and  power,  and  searchlights. 

2.  Assistant    (1)  :  Subjects  relating  to  personnel,  barracks  and  quarters, 
miscellaneous. 

620 


22 

3.  Assistant  (1)  :  Subjects  relating  to  target  practice,  ammunition,  instruc- 
tion, inspection  reports. 

4.  Assistants   (2)  :  Subjects  pertaining  to  estimates,  expenditures,  requisi- 
tions, new  fortifioation  projects,  armament  materiel  data. 

2.  The  present  organization  of  this  division  is  considered  well  adapted  for 
the  accomplishment  of  the  functions  of  this  division  under  both  peace  and 
war  conditions. 

Richmond  P.  Davis, 
Colonel,  Coast  Artillery  Corps,  Assistant  to  Chief  of  Coast  Artillery, 

In  charge  Coast  Artillery  Division 


APPENDIX  K. 
WCD  9262-6. 
AGO  2338208-D. 

Wab  Depaetment,  Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff, 

Division  of  Militia  Affairs, 
Washington,  November  J2,  1915. 
From :  The  Acting  Chief,  Division  of  Militia  Affairs. 
To:  The  Adjutant  General. 
Subject :  War  Department  organization  and  administration. 

1.  Referring  to  communication  of  the  6th  instant,  the  following  is  submitted : 
"(o)  A  statement  of  tlie  present  War  Department  organization  and  admin- 
istration of  your  bureau." 

There  is  attached  a  diagram  showing  the  organization  and  administration  of 
the  Division  of  Militia  Affairs  existing  at  this  date.  The  normal  organization, 
however,  provides  for  three  additional  clerlis  and  provision  therefor  is  made 
in  the  estimates  for  the  fiscal  year  1917. 

"(&)  A  statement  of  the  peace  organization  and  administration  of  your 
bureau,  considered  best  adapted  to  a  change  from  peace  conditions  to  a  state 
of  war." 

The  peace  organization  of  the  ofhce  is  that  shown  in  the  diagram  under  (a), 
witli  the  following  additional  officers  which  it  is  contemplated  will  be 
required  as  the  divisional  organization  of  the  Organized  Militia  is  perfected, 
and  the  12  divisions  are  completely  organized : 

One  officer  (captain.  Field  Artillei'y),  as  assistant  to  the  officer  in  charge 
of  matters  pertaining  to  the  organization  and  instruction  of  the  Field  Artillery 
personnel  of  the  Organized  Militia. 

One  officer  (captain  of  Infantry),  in  charge  of  matters  pertaining  to  the 
organization  and  instruction  of  machine-gun  units  of  the  Organized  Militia. 

It  is  not  contemplated  that  the  peace  organization  and  administration  will 
be  changed  in  the  event  of  war  except  that  12  additional  stenographers  would 
be  required. 

2.  The  following  is  submitted  in  this  connection : 

On  the  outbreak  of  war  the  office  will  be  flooded  and  business  interfered 
with  by  a  stream  of  applicants  for  commissions. 

Numerous  telegrams,  letters,  and  personal  inquiries  will  be  received  concern- 
ing the  actual  procedure  in  connection  with  mobilization.  These  communica- 
tions can  be  greatly  reduced  in  number,  if  not  anticipated  entirely,  by  the  issue 
beforehand  of  comprehensive  instructions  for  mobilization,  and  the  solving 

520 


11 

f  coisps 

Dns  of 

jlatlene, 

the 

on  be- 

rtalolng 


Assietnnt  to   the  Chie^ 
of  Division 
Lieut en.-jit  Color.el, 
Infantry, 
In  chnrge  of  masters 
portainihg  to  the  or-  c- 
ganiiation  (vnd  ins", rue 
tion  of  the  Infantry 
personnel  of  the 
Orr^anized  i'dlitia. 


AoBistant  to  the  Chief 

of  Divieion 
Captain, Infantry (Signol 
Corps.) 

In  charge  of  matters 
pertaining  to  the  or- 
SPJiization  and  instruc- 
tion of  signal  corps  emd' 
nachane-gun  organi-a- 
tions  of  the  Organized 
1'j.lltia  and  matters  of 
personnel  relating  to 
sergeant-Instructors . 


Assistant  to  the  Chief 

of  Division 
First  Lieutenant,  In^^ 
far.try. 

Assistant  to  the  offi- 
cer In  oha-rge  of  matters 
pertaining  to  the  organ- 
isation and  instruction 
of  the  Infantry  personnel 
and  in  charge  of  matters 
pertaining  to  target 
practice  of  the  Organized 
lilitia. 


I 


Cor£iS.^^°^^   Section 

One  chiP^  section  and  five 
Chief  CI?  examine  reports   of 
perform  a  °^  BnaH-arms  firing 
the  busiif*"™^  "^  strength; 
nr.nd  unda  statistical  tnattar 

chief  of  ?-^  "P"""*  °^  '^^^  ^^'■^^• 
Lon  on  the  Organized 

5  requiEitions   for 
the  Division,  and  ex- 

;  on  survey  proceedings 
accounts  and  returns. 


30669°- 


Blasik   Roo:-, 

One  clerk  ejid  one 
raessencer,   who  *ail 
mp.ke  distribution  of  , 
general  orders,  bul- 
letins,   circul?rs, 
blo.nk   for.-Tis,   etc.,  to 
the  Organized  i-lili- 
tia. 


23 

of  mobilization  problems  In  each   State  as  a  part  of  the  armory  course  of 
instruction. 

Circular  No.  19,  this  office,  1914,  provides  a  normal  organization  of  the 
Organized  Militia  called  into  the  United  States  service.  As  each  special  emer- 
gency for  which  troops  are  needed  will  present  its  own  special  features,  con- 
stituting in  itself  a  new  problem,  it  is  practically  certain  that  the  normal 
organization  will  have  to  be  extensively  raodilied.  In  addition  to  the  actual 
making  out  of  a  modified  organization  schedule,  it  will  be  necessary  to  consider 
the  political  claims  of  applicants  for  commissions  as  well  as  their  just  claims 
in  view  of  their  efficiency  records. 

The  activities  referred  to  above  will  furnish  employment  at  first  for  12 
additional  stenographers.  After  the  first  month  the  amount  of  work  should 
fall  off  rapidly.  At  the  end  of  the  second  month  the  work  should  be  reduced 
to  about  that  handled  in  time  of  peace. 

Subsequent  to  this  period,  while  the  woi-k  of  this  division  will  not  entirely 
cease,  nevertheless,  assuming  that  the  status  of  the  greater  part  of  the  Organ- 
ized Militia  will  have  been  changed  to  that  of  United  States  Volunteers,  all 
matters  relating  to  the  organization,  instruction,  training,  and  equipment  of 
the  organizations  so  converted  which  are  now  the  principal  peace  activities 
of  this  division  will  be  handled  by  the  General  Staff  and  the  several  supply 
bureaus  of  the  War  Department  concerned.  Under  this  assumption  it  is 
thought  that  the  division  could  then  be  administered  by  a  chief  of  division  and 
three  assistants,  and  50  per  cent  of  the  number  of  clerks  required  for  the 
peace-time  administration.  The  assistants  could  very  well  be  officers  detailed 
from  the  retired  list  of  the  Army.  The  clerks  rendered  surplus  by  the  i-educ- 
tion  in  the  volume  of  work  would  be  available  for  transfer  to  other  bureaus  of 
the  War  Department. 

G.  W.  Mcl\  Jtu,  Colonel,  Infantry. 
520 


24 


APPENDIX  L. 

Proposed  organization  of  the  General  Staff  on  duty  at  tire  War  Department. 


"3 
a 

•Si 

to 

1 

a 

1 
2 

1 
§ 

5" 

a 

ex 

'-3 

"3 
1 
o 

1 
"3 

O 

"S 

03 
® 

3 

o 

"S 

'3 

"ca 
o 

Chief  of  Staff 

1 

1 
1 

Secretary  to  Chief  of  Staff                                  

1 

Assistant  Chief  of  Staff,  chief  of  division 

2 

2 

Secretary  of  division 

4 

4 

First  division: 

I.  Section  on  operations 

1 

1 

2 

1 

Total  for  section 

1 

1 

2 

1 

5 

n.  Section  on  organization  and  equipment- 
Chief  of  section 

1 

Infantry  committee 

1 
1 
1 
1 
...... 

Field  Artillery  committee 

Cavalry  comrhittee 

Coast  Artillery  committee 

2 

Technical  troops  committee 

1 

Conimimication  and  supply 

\ 

Total  for  section 

1 

5 

5 

in.  Section  on  mobilization- 
Chief  of  section 

1 

1 

Re^lar  Army  committee 

1 

...... 

1 
2 

2 

Citizen  soldiery  committee 

. 

3 

Total  for  section 

1 

1 

1 

3 

6 

. 

IV.  Section  on  training- 
Chief  of  section 

1 

1 

Infantry  committee 

1 
1 

1 
1 
1 

1 

1 
1 
1 
1 

2 

Field  Artillery  committee 

2 

Cavalry  committee 

2 

Coast  Artillery  committee 



2 

Technical  troops  committee 

2 

Total  for  section 

1 

5 

5 

11 

V.  Information  section- 
Chief  of  section 

1 

1 

Committee  on  France,  Italy,   Switzerland, 
Spain,  Portugal,  and  Belgium 

1 

1 

1 
...... 

1 

1 

Committee  on  Germany,  Austria,  Holland, 
Turkey,  and  Balkan  States 

1 

Committee  on  Russia,  Norway,  Sweden,  and 
Deimiark 

1 

Committee  on  China  and  Japan 

1 

1 

Committee  on  South  America 

1 

Committee  on  England  and  her  colonies 

1 

Total  for  section 

1 

1 

5 

7 

Total  for  first  division 

3 

4 

14 

19 

40 

Second  division: 

VI.  Financial  section- 
Chief  of  section 

1 

1 

Regular  Army  committee 

1 
1 

1 

1 

1 
1 

2 

Citizen  soldiery 

2 

Reserve  supplies •.  . 

2 

Total  for  section 

1 

3 

3 

7 

VII.  Section  on  transportation- 
Chief  of  section 

1 

1 

Atlantic  coast  committee 

1 
1 

1 
1 

1 

1 

1 
1 
1 
1 

2 

Mexican  border  committee 

2 

Pacific  coast  committee 

2 

Central  States  committee 

2 

Over-sea  transportation 

2 

Total  for  section 

1 

5 

5 

11 

Total  for  second  division 

2 

8 

8 

18 

520 


25 


Proposed  organization  of  the  General  Staff  on  duty  at  the  War  Department — Continued. 


1 

1 

1 

3 
o 

3 

1 

0 

a 

o 

'5" 

a 

§ 

'-3 

to 

n 

"3 

1 
"o 

"3 

s 

"3 

o 

a 
a 
2 

1 
1-1 

o 

■3" 

a 

B 

3 

Eh 

Third  division: 

VIII.  Section— Survey— 

1 

1 

1 

1 
1 

1 

1 
1 
1 
1 

2 

2 



2 

2 

1 

4 

4 

9 

IX.  Section  on  printing  and  issue — 

Map-printing  committee          

1 
1 

1 

1 

Total  for  section 

2 

2 

X.  Section  on  foreign  maps 

1 

1 

1 

2 

i 

Total  for  section 

1 

1 

2 

1 

5 

7 

13 

Fourth  division: 

XI.  Section— Educational- 
Education  of  general  staff  officers 

2 

2 
1 

4 

4 

Military   schools,  colleges,  and    universities 

5 

Total  for  section 

2 

3 

4 

9 

Xn.  Section — Historical 

1 

2 

3 

Total  for  section 

1 

2 

3 



Total  for  fourth  division ■. 

2 

4 

6 

12 

Total  General  Staff  (War  Department) 

1 

2 

2 

...... 

2 
1 

1 
4 

...... 

4 

14 
8 
5 
4 

"'ig' 

8 
7 
6 

10 

First  di vLsion 

40 

Second  division 

18 

Third  division 

13 

Fourth  division 

12 

Total  War  Department  General  Staff 

1 

2 

2 

6 

7 

35 

40 

93 

General  Staff  with  troops: 

For  each  Infantrv  division,  Regtilar  Army 

1 
1 
1 

1 
1 
1 
1 
1 

1 

1 
2 
1 

1 

3 

For  each  Cavalry  division,  Regular  Army 

3 

For  each  Infantrv  division,  continental  army 

1 
1 

3 

For  each  Calvalrv  division,  continental  army 

3 

For  each  geographical  department ". 

1 

For  the  Philippine  department 

1 
1 

1 

1 

1 
1 

1 
1 
1 

4 

For  the  Hawaiian  department 

4 

For  Panama 

4 

Obganization  of  the  General  Staff  as  Listed  in  Appendix  L. 

This  organization  contemplates  that  five  general  officers,  namely,  one  Chief 
of  Staff  and  four  Assistant  Chiefs  of  Staff,  be  assigned  to  duty  with  the  General 
StalT  in  Washington. 

The  Assistant  Chiefs  of  Staff  are  respectively  in  charge  of  the  first,  second, 
third,  and  fourth  divisions  into  which  the  General  Staff  is  divided.  The  Chief 
of  Staff  and  the  four  Assistant  Chiefs  of  Staff  to  form  a  board  of  direction  for 
the  General  Staff. 

FIRST  division. 

The  First  Division  consists  of  five  sections,   namely,   section  of  operations 
(war  plans),  section  of  organization  and  equipment,  section  of  mobilization, 
520 


26 

section  of  training,  and  section  of  military  information  (study  of  foreign 
armies). 

Tlie  section  on  operations  would  talie  the  place  of  the  present  war-plans 
committee  of  the  General  Staff  and  would  have  general  charge  of  preparing 
plans  of  offense  and  plans  of  defense  to  be  used  in  event  of  hostilities.  It 
would  also  be  charged  with  determining  the  number  of  troops  required  to 
properly  defend  the  United  States  from  foreign  invasion. 

The  second  section — section  on  organization  and  equipment — would  have 
general  supervision  and  the  drawing  up  of  plans  for  the  organization  and 
equipment  of  the  armies  found  necessary  by  the  section  on  operations  for  the 
proper  defense  of  this  coiuitry.  This  section  is  divided  up  into  subconnnittees. 
each  one  of  which  is  to  handle  the  questions  affecting  the  organization  and 
equipment  of  their  respective  arms.  The  committee  on  communication  ami 
supply  would  handle  all  questions  pertaining  to  organization  and  equipujent  of 
the  troops  of  the  lines  of  communication  and  supply. 

The  third  section — section  on  mobilization — is  divided  into  two  committees, 
one  of  which  would  have  charge  of  drawing  up  the  plans  of  mobilization  in 
accordance  with  the  general  principles  enunciated  by  the  section  on  operations 
of  the  Regular  Army  or  first-line  troops ;  another  committee  would  have  charge 
of  the  details  of  mobilization  of  the  citizen  soldiery  (continental  army  ami 
militia),  or  second-line  troops. 

The  fourth  section — section  on  training — would  consider  all  questions  affect- 
ing the  training  of  the  individual  arms  of  the  service  independently,  as  well  as 
of  joint  training.  It  would  also  have  general  supervision  over  the  drill  regu- 
lations and  other  pamphlets  of  instruction  pertaining  to  the  general  training 
of  the  Army. 

The  fifth  section — section  on  military  information — will  study  organization, 
tactics,  drill  regulations,  equipment,  and  everything  pertaining  to  foreign 
armies  and  should  be  in  position  at  all  times  to  give  any  information  needed  by 
any  of  the  other  sections  of  tlie  General  Staff  on  foreign  armies. 

Owing  to  shortage  of  General  Staff  officers  it  is  at  the  present  time  practi- 
cally impossible  to  compile  the  mass  of  information  that  has  been  sent  to  the 
AVar  College  Division  by  om*  observers  abroad,  so  that  we  are  not  in  a  position 
to  take  full  advantage  of  the  lessons  to  be  derived  from  tlie  present  European 
war,  and  the  reason  for  this  is  lack  of  personnel. 

SECOND    DIVISION. 

The  Second  Division  consists  of  the  finance  section  and  the  transportation 
section. 

Finance  section.  Based  upon  a  preliminary  general  investigation  of  the  ad- 
ministration and  methods  of  estimating  for  funds  of  the  several  departments  of 
the  Government  the  President  in  a  message  to  Congress,  dated  March  3,  1911. 
said: 

^|c  4:  !t:  *  if  t  * 

"  Estimates  of  departmental  needs  have  not  been  the  subject  of  thorough 
analysis  and  revision  before  submission ;  budgets  of  receipts  and  expenditures 
have  been  prepared  and  presented  for  consideration  of  Congress  in  aa  unscien- 
tific and  unsystematic  manner;  appropriation  bills  have  been  without  uniform- 
ity or  common  principle  governing  them;  *  *  *  uppropriatio)is  httvc  been 
ovorencumhered  loithout  the  facts  hcing  knotrn;  *  *  *  functions  and  estab- 
lishments have  been  duplicated,  even  multiplied,  causing  conflict  and  unneces- 
sary expense:     *     *     *." 

The  finance  section  will  be  the  means  by  which  the  Chief  of  Staff  will  exer- 
cise intelligent  supervision  over  the  preparation  of  the  annual  estimates.  This 
620 


27 

section  will  analyze  and  systematize  the  estimates  of  the  bui-eau  and  depart- 
ments, thus  enabling  the  Chief  of  Staff  to  submit  to  the  Secretary  of  War  well- 
balanced  estimates,  calculated  to  secure  the  maximum  military  efficiency  at 
the  least  possible  expenditure  of  public  funds.  In  the  i>erformance  of  this 
duty  the  section  will  eliminate  from  the  estimates  any  items  not  essential  for 
military  effectiveness,  and  will  incorporate  therein  any  additional  items  neces- 
sary to  effect  the  desired  results.  This  analysis  and  revision  will  insure  against 
duplication  of  either  funds  or  functions  and  will  result  in  estimates  being  sub- 
mitted for  only  those  articles  which,  with  parts  on  hand  or  provided  for  in  the 
same  estimates,  will  constitute  complete  units  of  equipment  or  armament. 

When,  as  is  usually  the  case,  the  amount  that  will  be  appropriated  is  less 
than  the  total  of  the  estimates,  this  section  will  be  prepared  to  indicate  where 
the  necessary  reductions  can  be  made  with  the  least  loss  of  efficiency. 

The  personnel  indicated  in  Appendix  L  for  this  section  is  the  mininuini  that 
can  perform  the  work  efficiently. 

Transportation  section.  It  will  be  the  duty  of  the  transportation  section  to 
prepare  plans  for  the  orderly  transportation  in  the  least  possible  time  of  troops 
and  supplies  from  mobilization  points  to  all  possible  theaters  of  operation. 
The  section  will  have  to  prepare  accurate  data  with  respect  to  all  transi)orta- 
tion  systems  in,  or  having  a  terminus  in  the  United  States,  that  is  at  all  likely 
to  be  used  in  war  and  must  take  measures  to  insure  that  this  data  are  at  all 
t.lv\es  kept  up  to  date. 

The  section  must  at  all  times  be  prepared  to  state  just  how  long  it  will  take 
to  concentrate  any  given  number  of  troops  at  any  critical  point,  the  transporta- 
tion equipment  necessary  for  the  movement,  and  the  routing  that  should  be 
adopted  to  accomplish  the  movement  most  efficiently  and  with  the  least  amount 
of  hardship  to  the  troops  concerned. 

Most  of  the  work  of  this  section  will  of  necessity  have  to  be  performed  in 
time  of  peace  when  opportunity  for  careful  and  intensive  study  is  present, 
but  its  activities  would  continue  in  time  of  war  when  the  rapidly  changing  con- 
ditions would  render  its  services  indi-spensable.  The  general  staff  of  practically 
every  nation  of  Europe  contains  such  a  section  and  the  relatively  larger  terri- 
torial extent  of  the  United  States  renders  the  section  of  even  greater  importance 
in  our  Army.  The  number  of  officers  indicated  in  Appendix  L  is  believed  to  be 
the  minimum  that  can  perform  the  duties  of  the  section  in  a  satisfactory 
manner. 

THIRD    DIVISION. 

Survey  and  Map  Division.  This  division  is  divided  into  three  committees. 
At  the  present  time  we  have  not  on  file  up-to-date  maps  of  a  great  portion  of  this 
country,  and  in  fact  a  great  deal  of  it  has  not  been  mapped  at  all.  We  are 
dependent  for  our  war  maps  more  or  less  upon  the  Coast  and  Geodetic  Survey 
and  the  Geological  Survey.  From  a  military  point  of  view  the.se  maps  are  not 
as  accurate  and  efficient  as  they  should  be,  and  the  method  of  determining  what 
areas  shall  be  mapped  has  never  been  made  to  accord  with  any  set  military 
policy. 

At  the  present  time  if  a  State  does  not  choose  to  appropriate  money  for  the 
purpose  of  paying  part  of  the  expense  of  having  its  area  mapped,  the  Geological 
Survey  will  not  map  it.  In  other  words,  the  question  of  whether  or  not  an 
area  shall  be  mapped  is  determined  by  financial  considerations  and  not  from 
any  military  necessity. 

Not  to  have  efficient  maps  is  an  extremely  great  handicap  to  any  army,  and 
although  a  State  may  not  appropriate  money  to  enable  its  area  to  be  mapped, 
still,  from  a  military  point  of  view,  It  may  be  essential  for  us  to  have  good  maps 

020 


28 

of  that  State  not  only  for  the  salvation  of  that  State  its^f  but  also  for  the 
protection  of  the  States  whicli  surround  it. 

rOUKTH    DIVISION. 

This  division  broadly  corresponds  to  the  present  War  College  and  the  educa- 
tional section  of  the  General  Staff  as  they  exist  at  present. 

It  is  divided  into  two  committees,  one  of  wliicli  is  charged  with  the  super- 
vision of  the  policy  to  be  followed  in  the  education  of  General  Staff  officers, 
the  other  committee  has  general  supervision  and  determination  of  the  policy 
to  be  followed  in  the  military  schools,  colleges,  and  universities  of  the  country. 

The  historical  section  of  the  General  Staff  is  also  attached  to  this  division. 


APPENDIX  M. 

[OflBcers  not  at)ove  grade  of  colonel  to  be  attached  as  necessary.    The  attached  ofllcers  are  not  to  be  members 

of  the  General  Stafl  Corps.] 

General  Staff  Corps. 


<u 

"3 
3 

.S,tc 

SX2 

a 

O 

o 

8 

"S 
3 

o 

a 

& 

o 

Chiefof  staff                                      

1 

1 

Assistant  Chiefs  of  Staff            

2 

2 

1 

1 

Assistant  secretary   General  Stafl                     

■  ■ 

1 

1 

Executive  officers  of  General  Stafl  divisions    

2 

1 

1 
1 

2 

First  division: 

I    Section — Organization  training  and  equipment .. . 

6 
2 
1 

6 
4 
2 

1 

2 
4 

1 
1 

12 
8 
5 
4 

5 
8 
2 
4 

■25 

15 

9 

IV    Section — Miscellaneous    

5 

Second  division: 

2 
2 

9 

II.  Section — Information ' 

1 

15 

3 

5 

Total  War  Department  General  Stafl 

1  1        2 

7 

IS   1        22  1        48 

93 

I 

General  Stafl  serving  with  troops: 

For  the  three  existine  divisions 

3 
1 
4 
1 
1 
1 

i          .-? 

3 
2 

=  9 

For  the  existing  cavalrv  division 

23 

For  our  four  territorial  departments  in  United  States 

4 

1 
1 
1 

1 

1 
1 

1 
1 

1 

34 

For  Hawaiian  department 

34 

For  Panama  garrison 

34 

Total  General  Stafl  serving  with  troops ........... 

11 

3 

6 

8 

28 

[ 

Total  General  Stafl  Corps 

1 

2 

18 

16  1      28 

56 

121 

>  The  committees  of  Section  I,  First  Division,  might  be: 


Chief  of  section 

Infantry  committee 

Cavalry  committee 

Fif'ld   .\rtill('ry  committee 

Coast  Arlillrry  committee 

Technic  al  troops  committee 

Communication  and  supply  committee. 


Colonel. 


Lieuten-  ' 

ant       i   Majors, 
colonels,  i 


Captains. 


2  These  figures  are  in  accord  with  the  tables  of  organization. 

'  There  is  and  should  be  the  additional  General  Stalf  officer  included  here  for  the  information  bureau  in 
each  foreign  command.  During  peace,  General  Stall  officers  serving  with  troops  should  be  utilized,  as  far 
as  they  can  be  spared,  to  assist  in  organizing  and  training  citizen  soldiers. 


520 


o 


1.  ORGANIZATION,  TRAINING,  AND  MOBILIZATION  OF 

A  FORCE  OF  CITIZEN  SOLDIERY 

2.  METHOD   OF  TRAINING  A  CITIZEN  ARMY  ON  THE 

OUTBREAK  OF  WAR  TO  INSURE  ITS  PREPARED- 
NESS FOR  FIELD  SERVICE 


PREPARED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION.  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

AS    A    SUPPLEMENT    TO    THE    STATEMENT    OF    A    PROPER    MILITARY 

POLICY   FOR  THE  UNITED   STATES 


WCD  7541-12 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE  :  WASHINGTON 

NOVEMBER,   1915 


521 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 

1916 


War  Department, 

Document  No.  521. 

Office  of  the  Chief  of  Stuff. 


SYNOPSIS. 


Page. 

1 .  Relation  of  the  two  subjects 5 

2.  Guide  for  the  study  of  the  subjects 5 

3.  Organization 6 

4.  Table  A — Estimates  of  numbers 6 

5.  Table  B — Organizations  for  first  three  years 7 

6.  Table  C — Officers  for  first  three  years 8 

7.  Table  D— Officers  and  enlisted  men  fourth  to  eighth  years 9 

8.  Piinciples  governing  distribution 10 

9.  Di\'isional  areas 10 

10.  Table  E — Organizations  in  Infantry  divisional  areas 12 

11 .  Table  F — Organizations  in  Cavalry  divisional  areas 14 

12.  Training 15 

13.  Training  of  officers 17 

14.  Mobilization 18 

15.  Method  of  training  a  citizen  army  on  the  outbreak  of  war  to  insure  its  pre- 

paredness for  field  ser\dce 19 

Sketch  map  showing  divisional  areas Face  p.  20 

521  (3) 


1.  ORGANIZATION,  TRAINING,  AND  MOBILIZATION  OF  A 
FORCE  OF  CITIZEN  SOLDIERY.— 2.  METHOD  OF  TRAIN- 
ING A  CITIZEN  ARMY  ON  THE  OUTBREAK  OF  WAR  TO 
INSURE  ITS  PREPAREDNESS  FOR  FIELD  SERVICE. 

1.  RELATION  OF  THE  TWO  SUBJECTS. 

In  the  Statement  of  a  Proper  Military  Policy  for  the  United 
States,  prei^ared  in  the  War  College  Division  of  the  General  Staff 
(par.  42),  it  is  asserted  that  the  force  of  citizen  soldiers  "should  be 
prepared  to  take  the  field  immediately  on  the  outbreak  of  war,  and 
should  have  had  sufficient  previous  military  training  to  enable  it  to 
meet  a  trained  enemy  within  three  months.  Twelve  months*  inten- 
sive training  is  the  minimum  that  will  prepare  troops  for  war 
service.  Therefore,  the  500,000  partly  trained  troops  require  nine 
months'  military  training  before  war  begins."  The  first  subject 
covers  the  organization,  the  nine  months'  training  and  the  mobiliza- 
tion of  these  troops  prior  to  the  outbreak  of  war.  The  second  sub- 
ject refers  to  the  continuation  of  this  training  for  three  months  after 
the  outbreak  of  war  to  fit  the  partially  trained  troops  to  meet  a 
trained  enemy.  The  two  subjects  are  so  closely  related  that  it  is 
thought  best  to  consider  them  together  in  one  paper. 

2.  GUIDE  FOR  THE  STUDY  OF  THE  SUBJECTS. 

The  Statement  of  Military  Policy,  dated  September,  1915,  has 
been  taken  as  a  guide  in  considering  length  of  enlistment,  numbers, 
organization  by  years,  etc.  Modifications  made  in  other  reports  to 
the  Secretary  of  W^ar  have  been  disregarded.  The  enlistment  period 
has  therefore  been  taken  as  eight  years,  three  with  the  colors  and 
five  on  furlough,  and  the  enlisted  strength  required  as  500,000  men. 
If  it  should  be  considered  desirable  to  reduce  the  enlistment  period 
to  six  years,  it  would  only  be  necessary  to  cut  the  time  on  furlough 
from  five  to  three  years.  If  it  should  be  decided  to  have  but  400,000 
men  in  this  force,  a  20  per  cent  reduction  in  numbers  will  be  neces- 
sary. 

The  war  strength  of  units,  as  given  in  the  Tables  of  Organization, 
1914,  has  been  used  in  all  calculations,  except  that  for  the  first  year 
the  legal  maximum  of  150  men  for  Infantry  companies  and  100  men 
for  Cavalry  troops  has  been  allowed  to  provide  for  the  men  later 
taken  for  machine-gun  and  headquarters  companies.  It  is  recog- 
nized that  changes  in  the  Tables  of  Organization  are  desirable,  and 
will  probably  be  made  as  a  result  of  legislation  recommended.  For 
instance,  the  War  College  Division  has  recommended,  and  the  Sec- 
retary of  War,  it  is  understood,  has  approved  the  addition  of  a 
machine-gun  company  to  each  regiment  of  Infantry  and  Cavalry, 
a  headquarters  company,  and  a  supply  company  to  each  regiment  of 
Infantry,   Cavalry,   and   Field   Artillery,   and   three   regiments  of 

521  (5) 


Field  Artillery,  a  regiment  of  Engineers,  and  an  aero  squadron  for  a 
division ;  but,  as  these  changes  have  not  yet  been  confirmed  by  law, 
or  the  issue  of  orders,  it  is  thought  best  at  present  to  base  calcula- 
tions on  the  only  authoritative  publication  we  have,  the  Tables  of 
Organization.  When  the  continental  army  is  authorized  by  law,  the 
figures  will  have  to  be  changed  to  conform  to  the  numbers  and 
organization  therein  prescribed. 

3.  ORGANIZATION. 

In  the  study  of  the  organization  of  this  force,  the  numbers  given 
in  the  table  in  the  Epitome,  Military  Policy,  dated  July  10,  1915, 
have  been  taken  as  a  basis,  viz,  185,000  recruits  required  each  year; 
strength  of  continental  army,  185,000  the  first  year,  351,500  the 
second  year,  500,000  the  third  and  subsequent  years. 

In  deciding  on  the  apportionment  of  the  given  strength  each  year 
among  the  dillerent  branches  of  the  service,  a  field  army  consisting 
of  three  Infantry  divisions,  one  Cavalry  division,  one  brigade  (two 
regiments)  of  Heavy  Field  Artillery,  one  pontoon  battalion  of  Engi- 
neers, and  one  aero  squadron  of  the  Signal  Corps  was  taken  as  a 
basis.  In  such  a  force  the  percentage  of  different  arms  of  the  sei'vice 
are  nearly  as  follows :  Infantry,  63 ;  Cavalry,  14 ;  Field  Artillery,  13 
(divided  proportionally  into  light,  horse,  and  heavy  field  artillery)  ; 
Engineers,  3 ;  Signal  Corps,  1 ;  Quartermaster  Corps,  2 ;  Hospital 
Corps,  4. 

As  recommended  in  the  Statement  of  a  Proper  Military  Policy, 
companies  only  have  been  organized  the  first  year,  battalions  the 
second  year,  and  regiments  the  third  year. 

No  attempt  has  been  made  to  organize  the  part  of  the  continental 
army  on  furlough.  This  can  easily  be  done  later,  if  a  law  authoriz- 
ing a  continental  army  is  passed,  and  the  experiment  proves  a 
success  during  its  first  three  years  of  trial. 

The  result  of  the  study  on  organization  is  shown  in  Tables  A,  B, 
C,  D,  which  with  their  notes  are  believed  to  be  self-explanatory. 

4.  Table  A. — Estimates  of  numbers. 


Recruits 
required. 


First  year 

Second  year.. 
Third  year . . . 
Fourth  year.. 

Fifth  year 

Sixth  year... 
Seventh  year. 
Eighth  year.. 


1  185, 000 
185, 000 
185,000 
185,000 
185,000 
185,000 
185,000 
185,000 


Number 
organized 
at  begin- 
ning of 
training 
season. 


185,000 
351, 500 
500, 000 
500,000 
500, 000 
500,000 
500,000 
500,000 


Number 
on  fur- 
lough at 
beginning 
of  year. 


134,865 
256, 244 
365.485 
464,802 
553, 287 


Reserve 
officers 
with  con- 
tinental 
army. 


2  4,625 
<  9, 842 
6 16, 000 
6  18,000 
18.000 
18.000 
18,000 
18, 000 


Extra  Reg- 
ular offi- 
cers for 

continental 
army. 


3  462 
879 
1,250 
1,250 
1,250 
1,250 
1,250 
1,250 


Total  re- 
serve offi- 
cers if  men 

on  fur- 
lough are 
organized. 

4,625 
9,842 
16,000 
3  22, 855 
27,225 
30,077 
34, 733 
37,918 


521 


1  Allows  for  a  loss  of  10  per  cent  each  year. 

'  2.5  per  cent  of  enlisted  strength  for  company  officers. 

'Taken  from  table  in  Epitome  of  Military  Policy. 

« 2.8  per  cent  of  enlisted  strength  for  battalion  oliicers. 

■''3.2  per  cent  of  enlisted  strength  for  regimental  officers. 

6  3.6  p«ir  cent  of  enlisted  strength  for  organization  Into  divisions,  etc. 


5.  Table  B. — Orffanization  far  first  three  yean. 


Recruits  required  for  continental  army 

Numbers  in  contmental  army  beginning  training 


First 
year. 


185,000 
185,000 


Second 
year. 


185,000 
351.500 


Infantry,  63  per  cent  of  total  strength. 

Infantry  companies ' 

Infantry  battalions ' 

Infantry  regiments 


116,550 
793 


221,445 
395 


Cavalry,  14  per  cent  of  total  strength . 

Cavalry  troops ' 

Cavalry  squadrons ' 

Cavalry  regiments 


25,900 
265 


49,210 
*""'i36 


Field  Artillery,  13  percent  total  strength. 

Light  artillery  batteries  ' 

Horse  artillery  batteries 

Heavy  field  artillery  batteries 

Light  artillery  battalions 

Horse  artillery  battalions 

Heavy  field  artillery  battalions 

Light  artillery  reeiments  2 

Horse  artillery  ret'iments 

Heavy  field  artillery  regiments 


23,050 


45,695 


Endneers,  3  percent  of  total 

Pioneer  companies 

Pioneer  companies,  mounted 

Ponton  companies,  light  equipment.. 
Ponton  companies,  heavy  equipment. 

Pioneer  battalions  2    

Pioneer  battalions,  mounted 

Pontoon  battalions 


5,550 
22 


10,545 


Signal  Corps.  1  percent  of  total 

Wire  companies 

Radio  companies 

Headquarters  companies  (Cavalry  Signal  battalion). 

Radio  companies  (Cavalry  Signal  battalion) 

Aero  companies 

Field  battalions » 

Field  battalions,  cavalry , 

Aero  squadrons 


1,860 


3,515 


Hospital  Corps,  4  per  cent  of  total . .  . . 
Instruction  companies,  74  men  each  3. 

On  duty  with  other  troops 

Ambulance  companies 

Field  Hospital  companies 


7,400 
100 


14,060 

121 

5,071 


Quartermaster  Corps,  2  per  cent  of  total  i . 

A&sipned  to  duty  with  organizations 

Under  instruction  in  quartermaster  work. 


7,030 


'  For  the  first  two  jrears  the  allowance  of  Quartermaster  Corps  men  are  trained  as  additional  infantry, 
cavalry,  and  field  artillery  units,  with  a  view  to  haviui;  men  with  some  trainin,'  and  disciplme  for  transfer 
to  the"Quarterma.ster  Corps  when  they  are  needed  for  attaching  to  larger  organizations. 

*  In  the  third  year  the  numbers  of  res-iments  of  field  artillery  and  battalions'of  engineers  and  signal  corps 
are  apportioned  with  a  view  to  assignment  to  infantry  and  cavalry  divisions  and  field  armies. 

3  In  the  apportionment  of  the  Hospital  Corps,  the  "allowance  is  divided  the  first  year  into  instruction 
companies:  the  second  year,  proportional  parts  of  regimental  allowances  are  attached  to  battalions  and  the 
remainder  divided  into  instruction  companies:  in  the  tliird  year  the  number  of  ambulance  companies  and 
field  hospital  companies  needed  for  future  divisions  are  organized, 

521 


6.  Table  C— Officers  first  three  years. 


a 

"o 

O 

c 

03    K 

■>-'  o 
3  O 

13 

a 
'3 

o 

3 
S 

& 
o 

1 

3     . 

.2  " 

~  p 

3 

o 

FIRST  TEAB. 

793 
265 

793 
265 

793 
265 

2,379 

795 



89 

178 
28 
50 

178 
28 
50 

445 

14 
25 

70 

25  batteries  heavy  field  artillery 

125 

Total  field  artillery 

128 

256 

256 

640 

Engineers: 

22 
8 
3 
6 

44 
8 
6 

12 

22 
8 
3 
6 

88 

24 

12 

6  ponton  companies,  heavy  equipment 

24 

Total  engineers 

39 

70 

39 

148 

Signal  Corps: 

8 
8 
3 
3 
15 

16 

16 

6 

6 

30 

24 

24 

9 

9 

45 

37 

74 

111 

Medical  Corps: 

100 
92 

200 

300 

Quartermaster  Corps: 

92 

Total 

1,454 

1,654 

1,353 

4,461 

SECOND  YEAE. 

395 
136 

1,580 
544 

1,580 
544 

1,580 
680 

4,135 

1,904 

57 
9 
25 

228 
36 
75 

342 

54 

100 

399 

63 

125 

1,026 

325 

91 

14 
5 
5 

339 

496 

587 

1,513 

56 
25 
20 

98 
20 
35 

42 
15 
15 

Engineers: 

210 

65 

6  ponton  battalions 

75 

Total  Engineers. 

24 

101 

153 

72 

350 

Signal  Corps: 

14 
5 
5 

28 
10 
30 

70 
25 
65 

112 

100 

Total  Signal  Corps 

24 

68 

160 

252 

121 
214 

242    

93    

363 

With  troops 

Total  Medical  Corps 

335  !    335  | 

670 

Total 

1 1 

670   2,967   3,268   2,919 

9,824 

THIRD  YEAR. 

.      171 

.       56 

171 

56 

171 
56 

513   2,565   2,565   2,565 
168  1     840  i     840       840 

8,721 
2,856 

56  Cavalry  Regiments 

.       38 
6 
12 

38 
6 
12 

38 
6 
12 

76 
12 
36 

418       494 
66         78 
144       156 

494 
78 
168 

1,596 
252 
540 

12  Regiments  Heavy  Field  Artillery 

Total  Field  Artillery 

.       56 

56  1      56 

124 

628       728  1    740 

2,388 

521 


6.  Table  C. — Officers  first  three  years — Continued. 


1 

"3 

o 

a 

.2<3 

ft 
o 

1 

'c8 

a 

o 

3 

.2 

^  a 

3 

•2 

li 

s 

o 

THIRD  YEAR— continued. 

Engineers: 

19  pioneer  battalions 

19 
6 

8 

76 
30 
32 

133 
24 
56 

60 
18 
24 

288 

6  pioneer  battalions,  mounted 

78 

8  ponton  battalions 

1 

120 

1 

Total  Engineers 

1 

33 

138 

213 

102 

486 

Signal  Corps: 

19  field  battalions 

19 
6 
10 

38 
12 
60 

95 
30 
130 

152 

6  field  battalions,  cavalry ' 1 

48 

10  aero  squadrons 1 

200 

Total  Signal  Corps 

35 

110 

255 



400 



Medical  Corps: 

Duty  with  other  troops 

283 

343 

461 

1  087 

Total 

283 

283 

283 

1,156 

4,651 

5,116 

4,247 

16,019 

Medical  Corps  for  duty  with  Divisional  Troops— 94 
Ambulance  Companies  and  63  Field  Hospital  Com- 
panies  

107 

220 

565 

Note.— Quartermaster  Corps  officers  under  instruction  not  counted  in  totals  in  second  and  third  years. 
7.  Table  D. — Fourth  to  eighth  years. 


Organizations. 


19  Infantry  divisions 

6  Cavalry  divisions 

Available  for  field  armies: 

1  regiment  Cavahy 

12  regiments  Heavy  Field  Artillery.. 

8  ponton  battalijns,  Engineers 

10  aero  squadrons.  Signal  Corps 

Total 


Officers. 


Combat- 
ant. 


11,780 
2,898 

50 
528 
120 
200 


15,576 


Medical. 


1,786 
306 


10 
2,149 


Chap- 
lains. 


228 
42 


283 


Totals. 


13, 794 
3,246 

54 
576 
128 
210 


18, 008 


Enlisted  men. 


Infantry.   Cavalry 


313,956 


313, 956 


23, 484 
44, 496 


1,236 


69. 216 


Organizations. 


Enlisted  men. 


Field  Ar- 
tillery. 


Engi- 
neers. 


Signal 
Corps. 


Hospital 
Corps. 


Quarter- 
master 
Corps. 


Totals. 


19  Infantry  divisions 

6  Cavalry  divisiins 

Available  for  field  armies: 

1  regiment  Cavalry 

12  regiments  Heavy  Field  Artillery... 

8  pontan  battali  ins.  Engineers 

10  aero  squadrons.  Signal  Corps 


42,864 
6,768 


9,386 
1,620 


3,097 


14,640 


3,952 


15, 694 
2, 688 

16 
228 
32 
30 


10, 602 
■  1,998 

32 

300 

72 

10 


Total. 


64, 272 


14,958 


4,975 


18, 688 


13, 014 


419,08:j 
58, 548 

1,284 

15, 168 

4,056 

940 

499, 079 


Note  1.— With  full  allowance  of  Quartermaster  Corps  men  with  orgnuizations  its  numbers  amount  to 
2.6  per  cent  of  total,  while  for  other  arms  the  numbers  are  a  little  below  the  percentages  heretofore  given. 

30669°— No.  521—16 2 


10 

8.  PRINCIPLES  GOVERNING  DISTRIBUTION. 

Being  closely  connected  with  organization  and  a  necessary  prelimi- 
nary to  recruiting,  training,  and  mobilization,  the  distribution  of  the 
force  must  be  decided  upon.  The  distribution  here  recommended  is 
made  in  accordance  with  the  following  principles : 

1.  The  units  of  each  Infantry  and  Cavalry  division  should,  in  order 
to  facilitate  mobilization  and  supervision  of  training,  be  located  in 
contiguous  territory.  This  idea  is  carried  out  by  dividing  the  coun- 
try into  25  divisional  areas,  of  which  19  are  assigned  for  Infantry 
divisions  and  6  for  Cavalry  divisions. 

2.  The  troops  should  be  distributed  approximately  in  proportion 
to  poulation.  The  only  political  or  geographical  subdivisions  within 
the  United  States  made  on  the  basis  of  population  are  congressional 
districts.  These  districts  can,  therefore,  be  used  as  a  convenient  unit 
in  forming  divisional  areas.  There  are  414  such  districts  in  the 
United  States,  an  average  of  between  16  and  17  districts  per  area.  In 
the  following  grouping  all  areas  are  given  16  or  17  districts,  except 
one  each  of  15,  18,  and  19. 

3.  The  population  within  each  divisional  area  should  be  of  such 
a  character  as  to  furnish  suitable  men  for  the  different  branches  of 
the  service.  This  is  accomplished  by  having  within  each  area  urban 
sections,  rural  sections,  colleges  with  technical  courses,  and  by  assign- 
ing to  the  Cavalry  divisions  sections  where  horses  can  be  obtained 
and  the  population  is  accustomed  to  their  use. 

9.  DIVISIONAL  AREAS. 

First  Infantry  divisional  area. — All  of  Maine,  New  Hampshire, 
and  Vermont  and  the  sixth,  seventh,  eighth,  ninth,  tenth,  eleventh, 
twelfth,  and  fourteenth  congressional  districts  of  Massachusetts. 
Total,  16  districts.    Headquarters,  Boston,  Mass. 

Second  Infantry  divisional  area. — The  first,  second,  third,  fourth, 
fifth,  thirteenth,  fifteenth,  and  sixteenth  congressional  districts  of 
Massachusetts;  all  of  Rhode  Island  and  Connecticut.  Total,  16  dis- 
tricts.   Headquarters,  Providence,  R.  I. 

Third  Infantry  divisional  area. — The  first  to  seventeenth  congres- 
sional districts  of  New  York.  Total,  17  districts.  Headquarters, 
New  York  City. 

Fourth  Infantry  divisional  area. — The  eighteenth  to  thirty-fourth 
congressional  districts  of  New  York.  Total,  17  districts.  Headquar- 
ters, Albany,  N.  Y. 

Fifth  Infantry  divisional  area. — The  thirty-fifth  to  forty-third  dis- 
tricts of  New  York  and  the  tenth,  eleventh,  fourteenth,  fifteenth,  six- 
teenth, twenty-first,  twenty-sixth,  and  twenty-eighth  districts  of 
Pennsylvania.    Total,  17  districts.    Headquarters,  Buffalo,  N.  Y. 

521 


11 

Sixth  Infantry  divisional  area. — The  sixth,  seventh,  eighth,  ninth, 
twelfth,  thirteenth,  seventeenth,  eighteenth,  nineteenth,  twentieth, 
twenty-second,  twenty-third,  twenty-seventh,  twentj'^-ninth,  thirtieth, 
thirty-first,  and  thirty-second  districts  of  Pennsylvania.  Total,  17 
districts.    Headquarters,  Pittsburg,  Pa. 

Seventh  Infantry  divisional  area. — The  first  to  fifth  districts  of 
Pennsylvania ;  all  of  New  Jersey.  Total,  17  districts.  Headquarters, 
Philadelphia,  Pa. 

Eighth  Infantry  divisional  area. — All  of  North  Carolina  and  South 
Carolina.    Total,  17  districts.    Headquarters,  Charleston,  S.  C 

Ninth  Infantry  divisional  area. — All  of  Florida,  Georgia,  and  the 
third  district  of  Tennessee.  Total,  16  districts.  Headquarters,  At- 
lanta, Ga. 

Tenth  Infantry  divisional  area. — All  of  Alabama  and  Mississippi. 
Total,  17  districts.    Headquarters,  Birmingham,  Ala. 

Eleventh  Infantry  divisional  area. — The  twenty-fourth  and 
twenty-fifth  districts  of  Pennsylvania ;  the  seventh,  eighth,  tenth  to 
twenty-first  districts  of  Ohio.  Total,  16  districts.  Headquarters, 
Cleveland,  Ohio. 

Tioelfth  Infantry  divisional  area. — The  first  to  sixth  and  the 
ninth  districts  of  Ohio ;  the  first  to  ninth  districts  of  Indiana.  Total, 
16  districts.    Headquarters,  Cincinnati,  Ohio. 

Thirteenth  Infantry  divisional  area. — The  tenth  to  thirteenth  dis- 
tricts of  Indiana;  all  of  Michigan.  Total,  16  districts.  Head- 
quarters, Detroit,  Mich. 

Fourteenth  Infantry  divisional  area. — All  of  Wisconsin  and  the 
first,  tenth,  eleventh,  twelfth,  and  thirteenth  districts  of  Illinois. 
Total,  16  districts.    Headquarters,  Milwaukee,  Wis. 

Fifteenth  Infantry  divisional  area. — The  first  to  sixth,  eighth, 
nratb,  seventeenth,  eighteenth,  nineteenth,  twenty-second  to  twenty- 
fifth  districts  of  Illinois.  Total,  15  districts.  Headquarters,  Chi- 
cago, 111. 

Sixteenth  Infantry  divisional  area. — All  of  Minnesota,  North  Da- 
kota, South  Dakota,  and  Montana.  Total,  17  districts.  Head- 
quarters, Minneapolis,  Minn. 

Seventeenth  Infantry  divisional  area. — All  of  Louisiana,  Okla- 
homa, and  the  first,  second,  third,  and  fourth  districts  of  Texas. 
Total,  17  districts.    Headquarters,  New  Orleans,  La. 

Eighteenth  Infantry  divisional  area. — The  fifth  to  sixteenth  dis- 
tricts of  Texas,  all  of  New  Mexico,  Arizona,  Utah,  and  Nevada. 
Total,  17  districts.    Headquarters,  San  Antonio,  Tex. 

Nineteenth  Infantry  divisional  area. — All  of  California,  Oregon, 
Idaho,  and  Washington.  Total,  19  districts.  Headquarters,  San 
Francisco,  Cal. 

521 


12 

First  Cavalry  divisional  area. — All  of  Delaware,  Maryland,  and 
Virginia.    Total,  17  districts.    Headquarters,  Baltimore,  Md. 

Second  Cavalry  divisional  area. — All  of  West  Virginia  and  Ken- 
tucky.   Total,  16  districts.    Headquarters,  Louisville,  Ky. 

Third  Cavalry  divisional  area. — All  of  Tennessee,  except  the  third 
district;  all  of  Arkansas.  Total,  16  districts.  Headquarters,  Mem- 
phis, Tenn. 

Fourth  Cavalry  divisional  area. — All  of  Iowa,  the  fourteenth, 
fifteenth,  sixteenth,  twentieth,  and  twenty-first  districts  of  Illinois. 
Total,  16  districts.    Headquarters,  Des  Moines,  Iowa. 

Fifth  Cavalry  divisional  area. — All  of  Missouri.  Total,  16  dis- 
tricts.   Headquarters,  St.  Louis,  Mo. 

Sixth  Cavalry  divisional  area. — All  of  Kansas,  Nebraska,  Colo- 
rado, and  Wyoming.  Total,  17  districts.  Headquarters,  Omaha, 
Nebr. 

10.  Table  E. 


Organisations  in  Infantry 
divisional  areas. 


First  Infantry  divi- 
sional area. 


First 
year, 
com- 
panies. 


Second 
year, 

battal- 
ions. 


Third 
year, 
regi- 
ments. 


Second  Infantry  divi- 
sional area. 


First 
year, 
com- 
panies. 


Second 
year, 

battal- 
ions. 


Third 
year, 
regi- 
ments. 


Third  Infantry  divi- 
sional area. 


First 
year, 
com- 
panies. 


Second 
year, 

battal- 
ions. 


Third 
year, 
regi- 
ments. 


In  fan  try 

Cavalry 

Artillery: 

Light 

Heavy 

Engineers: 

Pioneer 

Ponton 

Signal  (  orps: 

Field 

Aero 

Hospital  Corps: 

Instruction  companies. . . 
Ambulance  companies. . . 
Field-hospital  companies 


Organizations  in  Infantry 
divisional  areas. 


Fourth  Infantry  divi- 
sional area. 


First 
year, 
com- 
panies. 


Second 
year, 

battal- 
ions. 


Third 
year, 
regi- 
ments. 


Fifth  Infantry  divi- 
sional area. 


First 
year, 
com- 
panies. 


Second 
year, 

battal- 
ions. 


Third 
year, 
regi- 
ments. 


Sixth  Infantry  divi- 
sional area. 


First 
year, 
com- 
panies. 


Second 
year, 

battal- 
ions. 


Third 
year, 
regi- 
ments. 


Infantry 

Cavalry 

Artillery: 

Light 

Heavy 

Engineers: 

Pioneer 

Ponton 

Signal  Corps: 

Field 

Aero 

Hospital  Corps: 

Instruction  companies. . . 

Ambulance  companies... 

Field-hospital  companies 


521 


13 


10.  Table  E — Continued. 


Organizations  in  Infantry 
divisional  areas. 


Seventh  Infantry  divi- 
sioniil  area. 


First 
year, 
com- 
panies. 


Second 
year. 

battal- 
ions. 


Third 

year, 

resi- 

raents. 


Eighth  Infantry  divi- 
sional area. 


First 
year, 
com- 
panies. 


Second 

year, 

battal- 


Third 
year, 
regi- 
ments. 


Ninth  Infantry  divi- 
sional area. 


First 
year, 
com- 
panies. 


Second 
year, 

battal- 
ions. 


Third 
year, 
regi- 
ments. 


Infantry 

Cavalry 

Artilleny: 

Light 

Heavy 

Engineers: 

Pioneer 

Ponton 

Signal  c  orps: 

Field 

Aero 

Hospital  Corps: 

Instruction  companies. . . 

Ambulance  companies. . . 

Field-hospital  companies 


Tenth  Infantry 
di\Tsional  area. 

Ele-enth  Infantry 
divisional  area. 

Twelfth  Infantry 
divisional  area. 

Organizations  in  Infantry 
divisional  areas. 

First 
year, 
com- 
panies. 

Second 
rear, 
bat- 

taUons. 

Third 
year, 
regi- 
ment*. 

First 
year, 
com- 
panies. 

Second 
year, 
bat- 
talions. 

Third 
year, 
regi- 
ments. 

First 
year, 
com- 
panies. 

Stecond 
vear, 
bat- 
talions. 

Third 
year, 
regi- 
ments. 

44 
5 

5 
2 

21 
3 

3 
2 

9 

1 

2 

1 

1 

41 

5 

5 

20 
3 

3 

9 
1 

2 

42 

5 

5 

21 
3 

3 

9 

1 

Artillery: 

Light 

2 

Heavy 

Engineers: 

2 

1 

1 

2 

1 

1 

Pontcn 

Signal  Corps: 

Field  

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

Aero 

Hospital  Corps: 

Instruction  companies . . . 
Ambulance  companies.. . 

4 

5 

1 

4 
3 

4 

5 

1 

4 
3 

4 

5 

1 
4 

Field  Hospital  companies 

3 

Thirteenth  Infantry 
di\  isional  area. 

Fourteenth  Infantry 
divisional  area. 

Fifteenth  Infantry 
divisional  area. 

Organizations  in  Infantry 
divisional  areas. 

First 
jeai, 
com- 
panies. 

Second 
year, 
bat- 
talions. 

Third 

year, 

re','i- 

ments. 

First 
year, 
com- 
panies. 

Second 
year, 
bat- 
talions. 

Third 
year, 
regi- 
ments. 

First 
year, 
com- 
panies. 

Second 
vear, 
bat- 
talions. 

Third 

year, 
regi- 
ments. 

Infantry 

42 

6 

4 

21 
3 

3 

9 
1 

2 

42 

5 

4 

21 
3 

3 

9 

1 

2 

41 

5 

4 

21 
2 

3 

9 

Cavalry 

1 

Artillery: 

Light 

2 

Heavy 

Engineers: 

Pioneer 

2 

1 

1 

2 

1 

1 

2 
2 

1 
1 

Ponton 

Signal  Corps: 

Field 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

Aero 

Hospital  Corps: 

Instruction  companies . . . 
Ambulance  companies. . . 

4 

S 

1 
4 
3 

4 

5 

1 
4 
3 

4 

5 

Field  Hospital  companies 

3 

521 


14 


10.  Table  E— Continued. 


Sixteenth  Infantry 
divisional  area. 

Seventeenth  Infantry 
divisional  area. 

Organizations  in  Infantry  divisional  areas. 

First 
year, 
com- 
panies. 

Second 
year, 

battal- 
ions. 

Third 
year, 
regi- 
ments. 

First 
year, 
com- 
panies. 

Second 
vear, 

battal- 
ions. 

Third 
year, 
regi- 
ments. 

Infantry 

42 
5 

4 
2 

21 
2 

3 

2 

9 

1 

2 
1 

1 

42 
6 

4 
2 

21 

3 

3 
2 

9 

Cavalry 

1 

Artillerv: 

Light 

2 

1 

Engineers: 

Pioneer 

1 

Pon  ton 

2 

1 

1 

Signal  ("orps: 

Field 

1 
1 

1 
4 
3 

1 

Aero 

Hospital  Corps: 

4 

5 

4 

6 

1 

Ambulance  companies 

4 

Field  Hospital  companies 

3 

Organizations  in  Infantry  divisional  areas. 


Eighteenth  Infantry 
divisional  area. 


First 
year, 
com- 
panies. 


Second 
year, 

battal- 
ions. 


Third 
year, 
regi- 
ments. 


Nineteenth  Infantry 
divisional  area. 


First 
year, 
com- 
panies. 


Second 
year, 
battal- 


Third 
year, 
regi- 
ments. 


Infantry 

Cavalry 

Artillery: 

Light 

Heavy 

Engineers: 

Pioneer 

Ponton 

Signal  Corps: 

Field 

Aero 

Hospital  Corps: 

Instruction  companies 

Ambulance  companies 

Field  Hospital  companies. 


11.  Table  F. — Organizations  in  Cavalry  divisional  areas. 


First  Cavalry  divisional 
area. 

Second  Cavalry  divi- 
sional area. 

Third  Cavalry  divisional 
area. 

Organizations  in  Cavalry 
divisional  areas. 

First 
year, 
troops. 

Second 
year, 

squad- 
rons. 

Third 
year, 
regi- 
ments. 

First 

year, 

troops. 

Second 
year, 

squad- 
rons. 

Third 
year, 
regi- 
ments. 

First 

year, 

troops. 

Second 
year, 

squad- 
rons. 

Third 
year, 
regi- 
ments. 

29 
3 

1 

15 
2 

1 

6 
1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

3' 

1 

28 
2 

2 

14 
1 

1 

6 

1 

1 

28 
2 

14 
1 

6 

1 

Engineers: 

Pioneer,  mounted 

1 

2 

1 

1 

Signal  Corps: 

2 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

Hospital  Corps: 

Instruction  companies... 

4 

5 

4 

4 

3' 

1 

4 

4 

3 

1 

621 


15 

11.  Table  F. — Organizations  in  Cavalry  divisional  areas — Continued. 


Fourth  Cavalry  divi- 
sional area. 

Fifth  Cavalry  divisional 
area. 

Sixth  Cavalry  divisional 
area. 

Organizations  in  Cavalry 
divisional  areas. 

First 

year, 

troops. 

Second 
year, 

squad- 
rons. 

Third 

year , 
regi- 
ments. 

First 

year, 

troops. 

Second 
year, 

squad- 
rons. 

Third 
year, 
regi- 
ments. 

First 

year, 

troops. 

Second 
year, 

squad- 
rons. 

Third 
year, 
regi- 
ments. 

28 
2 

2 

14 
2 

1 

6 

1 

1 

28 
2 

2 

15 
1 

1 

6 
1 

1 

29 
3 

1 

15 
2 

1 

6 

1 

Engineers: 

Pioneer,  mounted 

1 

Signal  Corps: 

I 

1 

1 

1 

3' 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 
1 

4 

1 
1 

4 

1 

Aero  companies 

1 

Hospital  Corps: 

Instruction  companies... 

4 

4 

4 

4 

3" 

1 

3 

Field  hospital  companies . 

1 

12.  TRAINING. 

The  War  College  Division  of  the  General  Staff  has  recommended 
that  the  nine  months'  training  of  the  continental  army  be  given  in 
three  yearly  periods  of  three  months  each.  It  has  also  recommended 
that  companies  only  be  organized  the  first  year,  battalions  the  second 
year,  and  regiments  the  third  5^ear.  Following  these  ideas  the 
following  apportionment  of  time  is  suggested : 


First  month. 

Second  month. 

Third  month. 

First  year 

Recruit  training 

Company  training 

Company  and  battal- 
ion training. 

Company  training 

Battalion  training 

do 

Company  training. 

Second  year 

Battalion  training. 

Regimental  trainmg. 

This  division  is  based  on  these  considerations :  Training  of  troops, 
like  all  other  training,  consists  of  two  elements — instruction  and 
practice.  Generally  speaking,  the  instruction  takes  comparatively 
little  time.  Practice  to  the  point  of  proficiency  takes  much  longer. 
In  part  of  the  troop  training,  such  as  drill,  the  instruction  consists 
in  teaching  certain  mechanical  movements,  and  the  practice  is  but 
a  repetition  of  such  movements,  either  individually  or  collectively. 
In  other  training,  such  as  field  work,  the  instruction  consists  in  the 
demonstration  of  the  best  methods  to  accomplish  certain  ends,  and 
the  practice  consists  of  exercises  which  illustrate  the  application  of 
these  methods  under  varying  conditions.  The  recruit  period  is  de- 
voted to  instruction  and  some  practice  in  the  duties  of  individuals 
and  small  units.  In  the  company  period  individual  and  small  unit 
instruction  are  continued  to  some  extent,  and  their  practice  is  kept 
up  throughout  the  company  training.  In  like  manner,  in  battalion 
and  regimental  movements,  while  the  instruction  is  largely  for  offi- 
cers, the  practice  of  what  has  previously  been  learned  by  indi^^duals, 

521 


16 

squads,  and  companies  continues  throughout.  The  time  allotted  to 
each  kind  of  training,  therefore,  is  not  to  be  taken  as  a  measure  of 
its  importance.  Individual  training,  for  instance,  is  considered  of 
the  greatest  importance,  and,  as  pointed  out  above,  it  is  not  con- 
fined to  the  month  allotted  to  recruit  training,  but  continuous 
throughout  the  entire  period. 

During  the  first  two  years — that  is,  during  the  periods  of  com- 
pany and  battalion  training — it  is  not  essential  that  large  bodies  of 
troops  should  be  assembled  in  one  place.  The  extent  of  concentration 
should  depend  on  getting  suitable  grounds  for  camping  and  train- 
ing, transportation  costs,  and  the  number  of  regular  officers  avail- 
able to  take  charge.  Military  reservations,  either  National  or  State, 
should  be  used  where  available.  To  reduce  the  number  of  regular 
officers  required  organizations  equal  at  least  to  the  strength  of  a 
regiment  should  be  assembled  in  each  place  the  first  two  years. 
Each  one  would  not  be  required  to  travel  a  great  distance,  and  the 
transportation  cost  could  be  kept  within  reasonable  limits.  The 
third  year,  in  order  to  have  proper  supervision  and  let  regiments 
have  the  benefit  of  contact  and  association  with  others,  several  regi- 
ments should  be  ordered  to  the  same  place. 

The  time  to  be  devoted  to  training  each  day  is  a  subject  that  re- 
quires careful  consideration.  On  the  one  hand  we  realize  that  the 
period  available  is  all  too  short  for  the  desired  end  to  be  accom- 
plished, and  that  no  time  should  be  wasted.  On  the  other,  experi- 
enced officers  know  that  when  kept  at  a  given  task  too  long  men 
lose  interest  in  their  work  and  become  stale.  A  recent  report  by 
Capt.  J.  W.  Barker,  Third  Infantry,  now  in  France,  quotes  a  circu- 
lar on  intensive  infantry  training  in  the  French  Army.  There  the 
schedules  provide  for  a  course  of  3  hours  in  the  morning,  divided 
into  6  periods  of  25  minutes  each,  and  of  4  hours  in  the  afternoon. 
The  latter  time  is  devoted  to  the  different  phases  of  field  training. 
This  is  believed  to  be  a  very  good  allotment  of  time.  In  the  morn- 
ing the  drills  are  so  short  that  interest  can  be  maintained;  there  is 
a  short  rest  between  the  periods ;  there  is  a  space  of  about  two  hours 
which  can  be  used  for  theoretical  instruction  of  officers  and  neces- 
sary administrative  work.  The  evenings  are  left  free  for  rest, 
recreation,  or  social  intercourse. 

In  this  paper  it  is  not  considered  practicable  to  go  into  the  details 
of  training — that  is,  to  prepare  programs  and  schedules  of  instruc- 
tion. These  should  be  prepared  for  each  arm  of  the  service  by  com- 
petent officers  of  that  arm.  While  an  exact  uniformity  of  training 
of  the  units  of  the  continental  army  can  not  be  expected  from  troops 
scattered  all  over  the  United  States,  with  its  great  variety  of  terrain 
and  climate,  as  great  a  degree  of  uniformity  as  possible  should  be 
attempted.    To  this  end  programs  of  instruction  should  be  issued  by 

621 


17 

a  central  authority,  setting  forth  the  subjects  in  which  training  is  to 
be  given  and  the  approximate  time  to  be  devoted  to  each.  The  weekly 
and  daily  schedules  based  on  these  programs  should  be  prepared  bj' 
the  Regular  officers  detailed  as  instructors  in  each  locality,  and  will 
necessarily  be  varied,  within  the  prescribed  limits,  according  to 
local  conditions.  These  programs  and  schedules  should  keep  in  view 
the  end  for  which  these  men  are  being  trained — to  prepare  them  for 
field  service  in  war.  Too  much  time  should  not  be  devoted  to  close- 
order  drills,  though  these  should  not  be  neglected.  They  are  valuable 
in  teaching  men  instant  and  unquestioned  obedience  to  the  orders  of 
their  superiors,  and  their  frequent  practice  will  tend  to  make  this  a 
habit.  For  this  reason  they  are  an  important  auxiliary  in  inculcating 
discipline.  After  a  reasonable  degree  of  proficiency — not  the  preci- 
sion approaching  perfection — is  attained  these  drills  should  be  held 
for  only  a  short  period  each  day,  but  to  prevent  the  accjuisition  of 
loose  habits  there  should  be  some  close-order  drill  every  day  during 
the  period  of  company,  battalion,  and  regimental  training.  The 
greater  portion  of  the  time  should  be  devoted  to  training  in  the  duties 
pertaining  to  fieldwork,  including  target  practice  and  combat  firing. 
In  the  third  year  all  troops  should  have  their  full  equipment.  The 
proper  training  of  regiments  requires  that  they  should  take  the 
field  with  their  allowance  of  transportation,  etc.,  and  the  training  of 
engineer,  signal,  and  sanitary  troops  will  be  ineffective  if  not  prop- 
erly equipped. 

13.  TRAINING  OF  OFFICERS. 

The  selection  of  officers  does  not  come  within  the  scope  of  this 
paper.  It  is  assumed  that  they  will  be  chosen,  after  examination, 
from  persons  who  have  had  some  military  training,  such  as  former 
officers  of  the  Regular  Army  and  the  militia,  noncommissioned  officers 
of  the  Regular  Army  and  the  militia,  graduates  of  schools  with  a 
military  department  having  a  Regular  officer  as  instructor,  etc.  The 
first  year  it  will  be  necessary  to  appoint  company  officers  only.  The 
previous  training  of  these  men  will  necessarily  be  somewhat  varied, 
but  the  examination  before  appointment  should  set  a  standard  of 
military  knowledge  on  which  to  base  courses  of  theoretical  and  prac- 
tical instruction.  The  officers  should  be  appointed  at  least  six  months 
before  the  time  set  for  the  training  season  of  troops.  During  this 
period  the  best  method  of  training  them  would  be  to  attach  them  to 
organizations  of  Regular  troops,  when  they  could  receive  both  the- 
oretical instruction  in  garrison  schools  and  practical  instruction  in 
administration,  garrison,  and  fieldwork.  This  practical  course 
should  include  opportunity  to  act  as  instructors  and  to  exercise  com- 
mand.    (Many  schemes  of  instruction  minimize  the  importance  of 

621 


18 

administration  and  provide  for  the  least  possible  time  being  given 
to  work  of  that  character,  but  for  a  company  officer  especially  a 
thorough  knowledge  of  such  duties  is  essential  to  proper  command. 
Upon  it  depend  largely  the  discipline,  proper  equipment,  and  feeding 
of  his  company.)  If  it  is  found  not  to  be  practicable  to  attach 
officers  to  Regular  organizations  as  recommended,  the  next  best 
thing  is  a  theoretical  course  conducted  by  the  correspondence  method. 
This  would  necessarily  defer  the  practical  instruction  of  officers  to 
the  period  of  training  of  troops,  and  would  increase  very  materially 
the  work  of  the  Regular  officers  during  that  period.  The  reserve 
officers  will  have  such  a  knowledge  of  close  and  extended  order  drill 
and  target  practice  that  their  services  can  be  utilized  under  super- 
vision in  the  instruction  of  their  men  in  these  respects  up  to  include 
the  school  of  the  company.  The  instruction  in  care  of  equipment 
and  men  and  in  all  matters  pertaining  to  fieldwork  will  be  given  by 
the  Regular  officers  to  officers  and  men  together.  This  should  be 
supplemented  for  the  officers  by  lectures  before  the  exercises  and  by 
conferences  afterwards.  As  the  officers,  either  from  previous  train- 
ing or  special  aptitude,  show  proficiency,  they  should  be  selected  and 
utilized  as  instructors.  In  the  second  and  third  years  the  theoretical 
instruction  of  officers  should  be  continued  outside  the  training  period, 
and  during  this  period  the  exercises  will  be  devised  to  give  both 
instruction  and  practice  in  the  duties  of  officers  in  battalions  and 
regiments. 

14.  MOBILIZATION. 

During  the  first  three  years  there  will  be  ample  time  for  a  careful 
examination  of  the  terrain  and  transportation  facilities  of  each 
divisional  area,  with  a  view  to  the  selection  of  the  most  suitable 
places  for  the  assembly  of  divisions  in  subsequent  years.  The  selec- 
tion of  such  sites  should  be  determined  by  their  accessibility,  facili- 
ties for  camping  and  supply,  and  suitable  terrain  for  the  training  of 
all  the  elements  of  the  division  and  the  field  army  troops  tempo- 
rarily attached  thereto  and  for  exercises  involving  the  movements 
of  the  entire  division.  It  is  probable  that  in  the  more  thickly  settled 
portions  of  the  country  it  will  be  necessary  to  make  use  of  private 
property  and  in  many  cases  of  land  which  is  ordinarily  under  cul- 
tivation. By  having  the  mobilization  in  the  fall  after  crops  are 
gathered,  arrangements  with  property  owners  can  be  made  which 
will  throw  open  for  military  use  much  land  of  the  character  desired. 

General  and  staff  officers  for  brigades  and  divisions  should  be 
selected  and  assigned  during  the  first  three  years.  They  should  be 
utilized  in  selecting  the  divisional  mobilization  places,  and  in  study- 
ing out,  within  their  respective  spheres,  all  matters  pertaining  to  the 

521 


19 

mobilization  of  the  organizations  to  which  they  belong.  This  would 
include  arrangements  for  transportation  and  supply,  preparation  of 
orders  for  movements  and  a  program  of  duties  and  exercises  cover- 
ing the  entire  period  of  the  encampment. 

The  assembly  of  divisions  gives  the  only  opportunity  for  general 
officers  and  the  higher  staff  officers  to  practice  some  of  the  duties  they 
would  be  called  on  to  perform  in  war.  It  is  also  of  value  to  other 
officers  and  men  in  showing  them  the  relation  of  their  own  smaller 
units  to  others  in  the  general  scheme  of  organization  and  in  teach- 
ing the  necessity  for  teamwork  in  any  exercises  involving  the  use  of 
large  numbers  of  troops.  The  mobilization  should  take  place  at  least 
every  third  year  in  order  that  the  officers  should  have  the  necessary 
practice,  and  all  men  should  have  the  experience  of  association  with 
troops  of  all  branches  of  the  service  during  the  period  of  their  train- 
ing. The  mobilization  of  the  division  gives  an  opportunity  for  in- 
spections which  will  show  the  results  of  the  training  in  smaller 
camps  and  the  fitness  and  sufficiency  of  all  kinds  of  equipment. 
Based  on  these  inspections,  measures  can  be  taken  to  correct  defects, 
or,  if  found  necessary,  to  change  plans  and  policies. 

15.  METHOD  OF  TRAINING  A  CITIZEN  ARMY  ON  THE  OUTBREAK 
OF  WAR  TO  INSURE  ITS  PREPAREDNESS  FOR  FIELD  SERVICE. 

In  the  preceding  portion  of  this  paper  there  has  been  no  provision 
made  for  the  organization  of  field  armies,  because  their  composition 
will  depend  on  the  particular  work  they  may  be  called  on  to  do. 
This  will  be  determined  by  the  war  plans.  In  consequence  they  will 
not  be  organized  until  war  is  imminent  and  mobilization  ordered. 

The  war  plans  will  also  decide  the  question  of  the  numbers  of  the 
continental  army  on  furlough  to  be  called  into  active  service.  Unless 
the  full  force  available  is  required  it  may  be  assumed  that  they  will 
be  called  according  to  their  nearness  to  active  training— that  is, 
those  last  furloughed  to  be  called  first.  They  will  be  organized 
according  to  their  previous  training  and  to  the  needs  of  the  Gov- 
ernment. 

When  mobilization  is  ordered  the  units  of  the  continental  army, 
both  those  then  with  the  colors  and  those  organized  from  furloughed 
men,  may  be  ordered  to  their  divisional  places  of  assembly  to  get 
their  three  months'  training  in  whole  or  in  part  before  proceeding 
to  the  field  army  concentration  camps,  or  the  exigencies  of  the  occasion 
may  require  the  concentration  of  field  armies  without  delay,  in 
which  case  troops  will  be  ordered  direct  from  their  home  stations  to 
such  concentration  camps.  In  either  event  the  character  of  the  ad- 
ditional training  should  be  the  same.  As  soon  as  the  troops  are 
assembled,  a  thorough  field  inspection  should  be  made  by  brigade 

521 


20 

commanders  of  Infantry,  Cavalry  and  Field  Artillery,  and  by  the 
heads  of  the  engineer,  signal,  quartermaster,  and  medical  depart- 
ments to  ascertain  first  the  condition  and  adequacy  of  all  equipment 
and  second  any  defects  of  previous  training  that  need  special  cor- 
rection. Such  an  inspection  will  take  at  least  a  week,  but  the  time 
will  be  well  spent.  After  it  is  finished,  a  course  of  training  can  be 
laid  out.  It  will  consist  of  a  series  of  exercises,  beginning  with  as 
small  units  as  companies  and  progressing  through  the  larger  units 
and  the  combination  of  different  arms  until  all  the  troops  are  used. 
One  important  purpose  and  result  of  these  exercises  will  be  the 
physical  training  of  the  men.  The  object  should  not  be,  as  in 
athletic  contests,  to  prepare  men  for  a  supreme  effort — a  condition 
which  can  not  be  sustained — but  to  bring  them  up  to  a  state  of 
physical  hardness  and  power  of  endurance  which  can  be  retained 
for  an  indefinite  period.  Special  exercises  for  this  purpose  will  not 
in  general  be  needed — they  may  be  for  some  individuals — but  the  out- 
<ioor  life,  regular  habits,  substantial  food,  and  physical  exertion  inci- 
dent to  the  military  exercises  should  accomplish  the  desired  end.  The 
exercises  should  also  be  devised  with  a  view  to  obtaining  these  other 
effects  on  the  individual ;  to  increase  his  knowledge  of  the  technique 
of  his  work ;  to  improve  his  facility  in  handling  his  arms  and  tools ; 
to  acquire  the  best  methods  of  caring  for  himself  and  conserving 
his  health  and  strength  under  varying  conditions;  to  increase  his 
morale  by  inspiring  confidence  in  himself,  his  leaders,  and  his  organi- 
zation; to  inculcate  discipline.  The  above  applies  to  both  officers 
and  enlisted  men.  The  course  should  give  line  officers  additional  in- 
struction and  practice  in  administrative  duties,  in  caring  for  their 
men  in  camp  and  on  the  march,  and  in  the  principles  of  leadership 
before  and  during  combat.  The  officers  of  higher  grades  should 
have  practice  in  the  direction  of  the  movements  of  large  bodies  of 
troops,  which  will  also  give  the  staff  officers  the  desired  practice  in 
their  various  duties.  Particular  care  should  be  taken,  in  all  the 
larger  exercises,  that  transportation  and  supply  should  simulate  war 
conditions  as  nearly  as  practicable,  as  the  results  of  campaigns  are 
often  dependent  on  them. 

It  is  believed  that  a  carefully  prepared  and  executed  three  months' 
course  of  field  exercises,  with  a  previous  nine  months'  training  as  a 
foundation,  will  go  far  to  give  the  training  indicated  above  as  de- 
sirable to  insure  the  preparedness  of  a  citizen  army  for  field  service. 

521 

o 


I 
I 


ORGANIZATION,  TRAINING,  AND  MOBILIZATION  OF 
A  RESERVE  FOR  THE  REGULAR  ARMY 


PREPARED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION,  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

AS   A   SUPPLEMENT    TO    THE    STATEMENT    OF   A   PROPER   MILITARY 

POLICY  FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES 


WCD  8106-15 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE  :  WASHINGTON 

NOVEMBER,   1915 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 

1816 


522 


War  Department, 

Document  No.  522. 

Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff . 


SYNOPSIS. 


Page. 

1.  PrincipleB  governing  brochure 5 

2.  Character  of  reserve  discussed 5 

3.  The  present  '  'Army  reserve  " 6 

4.  Regulations  for  "Army  reserv^e  " 6 

5.  Defects  of  present  law 7 

6.  Necessity  for  change  in  law 9 

7.  Development  of  reserve 10 

8.  Composition  of  each  unit,  Regular  Army 11 

9.  Period  with  the  colors  should  be  definite 11 

10.  Degree  of  readiness  of  regular  reserve 11 

11.  Organization  of  units 12 

12.  Mobile  troops  alone  required 12 

13.  Distribution  in  arms  of  the  service 13 

14.  Estimate  of  strength  after  three  years 13 

15.  Organization  under  department  commanders 14 

16.  Officers  for  regiments  and  smaller  units 14 

17.  Officers  for  divisions  and  brigades 15 

18.  Arms  and  equipment 15 

19.  Annual  training  of  reserve 15 

20.  Elimination  of  the  unfit 15 

21.  Should  pay  be  given  for  service  in  reserve? 16 

22.  Pay  due  for  annual  training 16 

23.  Advantages  of  annual  assembly  of  reserve 17 

24.  Mobilization  of  reserve 17 

25.  Notice  of  mobilization 18 

26.  Transportation  and  subsistence  of  reservists 18 

27.  Record  of  assembly  and  physical  examination 18 

28.  Clothing  for  reservists 19 

29.  Advantages  of  policy  outlined 19 

622  (3) 


ORGANIZATION,   TRAINING,    AND   MOBILIZATION   OF   A 
RESERVE  FOR  THE  REGULAR  ARMY. 


[A  brochure  based  upon  and  explanatory  of  a  Statement  of  a  Proper  Military  Policy  for 
the  United  States,  Sept.  11,  1915.] 

1.  PRINCIPLES  GOVERNING  BROCHURE. 

A  Statement  of  a  Proper  Military  Policy  for  the  United  States, 
submitted  September  11,  1915,  contains  in  Chapter  III,  Reserves, 
the  following  paragraph: 

41.  The  regular  reserve. — As  the  United  States  should  have  a  mobile  force 
of  500,000  soldiers  available  at  home  at  the  outbreak  of  war,  the  Army,  with 
the  regular  reserve,  should  amount  to  this  strength.  In  order  to  develop  the 
necessary  regular  reserve  with  the  Army  at  the  strength  advocated  in  this 
policy,  enlistments  would  have  to  be  for  about  eight  years — two  with  the 
colors  and  six  in  reserve.  That  would,  in  eight  years,  result  in  approximately 
the  following  mobile  forces  at  home  available  at  the  outbreak  of  war: 

(1)  Mobile  regular  troops  (combatant)  with  the  colors 121,  000 

(2)  The  regular  reserve 379,  000 

Total 500,  000 

During  the  first  weeks  of  war  in  this  country  the  military  situation  will 
probably  be  critical.  At  that  time  every  fully  trained  soldier  should  be  put 
in  the  field.  To  do  that  with  the  small  military  establishment  herein  advocated 
it  is  necessary  that  during  peace  the  Army  be  kept  at  war  strength  and  that 
the  regular  reserve  be  organized  and  not  kept  back  to  replace  losses  expected 
duribg  war.     Such  losses  should  be  replaced  from  depot  units. 

2.  CHARACTER  OF  RESERVE  DISCUSSED. 

Generally  speaking,  any  troops  not  incorporated  in  the  Regular 
Army,  but  intended  for  reenforcement  thereof,  constitute  a  reserve 
of  such  Army.  This  paper  deals  only  with  that  portion  of  such  a 
reserve  force  as  is  developed  through  the  ranks  of  the  Regular 
Army  and  is  intended  for  use  jointly  Avith  the  Regular  Army;  that 
which  consists  of  trained  and  organized  mobile  troops,  ready  for 
use  at  the  outbreak  of  war  under  conditions  stated  in  paragraph  6 
of  the  "  Statement  of  a  proper  military  policy." 

The  estimate  of  379.000  men  in  reserve,  stated  in  the  policy, 
(W.  C.  D.,  9053-90)  is  based  on  the  experience  that  while  serving 
with  the  colors,  about  20  per  cent  per  year  of  our  soldiers  are  lost 
otherwise  than  by  expiration  of  enlistment  (W.  C.  D.  9053-43),  and 
on  the  assumption  that  such  loss  while  men  are  furloughed  to  the 

622  (5) 


reserve  will  be  at  about  half  this  rate  and  that  about  28  per  cent 
of  the  Army  will  be  enlisted  men  with  special  qualifications  needed 
continuously  with  the  colors.  The  strength  being  231,166  (omitting 
Philippine  Scouts  and  Porto  Rican  Regiment),  72  per  cent  thereof, 
or  166,500,  will  develop  approximately  379,000  reserves  at  the  end 
of  eight  years. 

3.  THE  PRESENT  "ARMY  RESERVE." 

It  is  well,  in  consideration  of  this  subject,  to  study  the  existing 
law  and  ascertain  whether  it  will  furnish  the  number  of  reservists 
required. 

Section  2  of  the  act  of  August  24,  1912  (37  Stat.,  590,  591;  pp. 
36  and  37,  Bulletin  No.  15,  War  Department,  1912),  provided  for  the 
Army  reserve  consisting  of: 

(1)  Class  A. — Soldiers  furloughed  and  transferred  at  the  expira- 
tion of  three  years'  service  and  soldiers  furloughed  at  the  expira- 
tion of  four  years'  service,  unless  they  apply  to  remain  with  their 
organizations  until  completion  of  the  seven-years'  period  of  enlist- 
ment, made  eflfective  on  November  1,  1912,  by  the  act. 

(2)  Class  B. — Soldiers  who  reenlist  in  the  Army  reserve  for  a 
term  of  three  years  at  the  expiration  of  a  seven-years'  period  of 
enlistment,  and  persons  honorably  discharged  from  the  Regular 
Army  who  may  enlist  in  the  Army  reserve  for  a  term  of  three  years. 
No  restriction  is  placed  upon  reenlistment  of  any  soldier. 

The  same  act  provided  an  "  auxiliary  to  the  Army  reserve  "  con- 
sisting of  honorably  discharged  soldiers  of  the  Regular  Army  not 
over  45  years  of  age  with  character  reported  at  least  good,  who,  when 
called  by  proclamation  of  the  President  in  time  of  war  or  when  war 
is  imminent,  present  themselves  for  reenlistment  within  a  specified 
period  and  are  found  physically  qualified  for  the  duties  of  a  soldier. 

4.  REGULATIONS  FOR  "ARMY  RESERVE." 

Members  of  the  Army  reserve  not  in  active  service  are  not  entitled 
to  pay  or  allowances.  If  summoned  by  the  President  to  active  service 
when  so  authorized  by  Congress,  in  event  of  threatened  or  actual 
hostilities,  reservists  of  class  A  receive  during  continuance  of  their 
service  pay  and  allowances  authorized  by  law  for  soldiers  serving 
in  their  organizations  and  a  sum  equal  to  $5  per  month  for  each 
month  they  have  belonged  to  the  reserve,  as  well  as  actual  cost 
of  transportation  and  subsistence  from  their  homes  to  the  places 
at  which  they  may  be  ordered  to  report  for  duty.  They  revert  to 
the  grade  of  private  on  date  of  reporting  for  duty.  Reservists  of 
class  B  receive  the  same,  including  additional  pay  for  second  en- 
listment. 

Each  honorably  discharged  soldier  summoned  by  the  President 
as  part  of  the  "  auxiliary  to  the  Army  reserve "  found  physically 

S22 


qualified  and  reenlisted  in  the  line  of  the  Army  or  Hospital  Corps 
receives  on  reenlisting  a  hounti/  computed  at  rates  from  $8  to  $2 
per  month,  according  to  the  period  which  has  elapsed  since  his  last 
discharge,  and  not  to  exceed  $300  for  any  member  of  such  auxiliary. 

Doubtless,  because  of  language  employed  in  the  last  proviso  of 
section  2,  viz,  "  may  summon  all  furloughed  soldiers  who  belong 
to  the  Army  reserve  to  rejoin  their  respective  organizations,"  and 
because  of  the  opinion  of  the  Judge  Advocate  General  of  the  Army, 
October  1,  1912  (pp.  34-31),  Bulletin  No.  22,  AVar  Department,  1012), 
the  Regulations  for  the  Army  Reserve,  General  Orders  No.  11,  War 
Department,  1913,  as  amended,  prescribe  that  the  records  of  class 
A  reservists  and  of  such  class  B  reservists  as  have  been  assigned 
to  organizations  be  kept  by  the  commanders  of  organizations  or 
chiefs  of  bureaus,  the  numbers  thereof  being  noted  on  monthly 
returns  and  the  names  on  December  muster  rolls,  or  reported  monthly 
by  number,  and  December  31  by  name  in  letters  to  The  Adjutant 
General. 

The  custodians  of  such  records  furnish  each  reservist  whose  record 
is  held  a  postal  card  once  each  quarter,  on  which  the  reservist 
reports  any  change  of  address  or  change  in  name  and  address  of 
nearest  relative.  This  represents  the  only  measure  by  which  the 
number  of  reservists  still  alive  may  be  estimated.  No  measure 
provides  verification  of  physical  condition  of  reservists. 

5.  DEFECTS  OF  PRESENT  LAW. 

This  law  is  defective  in  the  following  respects: 

(a)  It  will  not  develop  an  adequate  reserve.  On  May  8,  1915,  The 
Adjutant  General  submitted  an  estimate  of  the  approximate  num- 
ber of  men  who  under  this  law  will  be  furloughed  or  transferred  to 
the  Army  Reserve.  Basing  his  estimate  upon  the  percentage  of  men 
enlisted  or  reenlisted  who  did  not  from  1908  to  1914  reenlist  after 
completing  their  periods  of  enlistment,  he  reported  that  by  Novem- 
ber 1,  1919,  seven  years  after  the  seven-years'  period  became  effective, 
the  Army  Reserve  may  amount  to  25,624  enlisted  men,  the  number 
thereafter  furloughed  to  the  reserve  being  approximately  equal  to 
those  discharged  from  the  reserve.  He  reported  that  if  all  men  who 
did  not  intend  to  reenlist  be  furloughed  to  the  reserve  at  the  expira- 
tion of  three  years'  service  the  reserve  by  November  1,  1919,  may 
amount  to  34,000  men.  Even  if  no  casualties  occur  among  members 
of  the  reserve,  its  strength  will  never  be  sufficient  to  raise  units  from 
peace  to  war  strength  if  such  step  be  desirable.  The  Regular  Army, 
including  reserve,  will  never  exceed  134,000  men  under  this  law. 

(b)  No  reliable  estimate  can  be  made  of  the  number  of  reservists 
to  be  anticipated. 

522 


8 

The  estimate  given  in  (a)  is  confessedly  only  a  guess.  As  re- 
enlistment  is  not  limited,  and  men  have  the  option  of  serving  three, 
four,  or  seven  years  of  the  period  for  which  enlisted,  the  reserve  de- 
veloped, as  well  as  the  actual  strength  of  the  Army,  depends  upon 
the  business  conditions  of  the  country.  If  labor  commands  a  high 
price,  men  who  do  not  desert  will  seek  purchase  of  discharge  after 
one  year's  service  or  furlough  to  the  reserve  after  three  years'  service. 
If  times  are  hard  and  their  station  agreeable,  they  may  decide  to 
remain  seven  years  and  then  reenlist,  or  may  reenlist  at  expiration  of 
four  years  rather  than  pass  to  the  reserve.  Their  decision  may  be 
influenced  by  conditions  prevailing  at  their  stations  or  their  satisfac- 
tion or  dissatisfaction  with  their  commanders  or  associates. 

(c)  The  law  by  providing  that  reservists  shall,  when  summoned, 
^^  rejoin  their  respective  organizations"  countenances  the  expensive 
and  inefficient  system  of  reduced  strength  of  units  in  peace. 

In  a  country  of  as  great  area  as  the  United  States  reservists  could 
not  always  or  usually  join  "their  respective  organizations"  in  time 
to  participate  in  employment  of  such  organizations  when  war  comes 
without  warning.  Even  if,  after  long  and  expensive  journeys,  these 
reservists  join  the  companies  from  which  furloughed,  they  would  not 
find  arms  and  equipment  on  hand  for  issue.  If  such  are  kept  always 
with  companies,  much  expense  for  transportation  will  result.  Officers 
lor  a  company  of  Infantry  of  150  men  cost  no  more  than  for  a  com- 
pany of  65  men.  The  same  officers  can  command  and  administer 
150  men  in  war  efficiently  only  if  required  to  command  and  administer 
approximately  the  same  sized  organization  in  peace. 

(d)  Mobilization  must  be  delayed,  even  when  hostilities  are  actual, 
until  authority  can  be  obtained  from  Congress. 

If  Congress  be  not  in  session,  or  if,  being  in  session,  the  question 
be  debated,  the  transportation,  equipment,  and  training  of  the  Army 
Reserve  may  be  delayed  until  a  hostile  force  has  effected  a  landing 
or  crossed  our  international  border. 

(e)  Absence  of  any  authority  to  mobilize,  inspect,  or  train  re- 
servists, except  "in  event  of  actual  or  threatened  hostilities"  and 
"  when  so  authorized  by  Congress,"  renders  uncertain  how  many 
reservists  may  be  relied  upon  and  "  found  physically  fit  for  service." 

Freed  from  the  restraints  of  discipline  and  separated  from  the 
sanitary  conditions  surrounding  them  when  with  the  colors,  fur- 
loughed soldiers  may  contract  vicious  habits  or  incurable  diseases, 
may  lose  eyesight,  hearing,  or  a  limb,  and  yet  be  borne  on  the  rolls 
of  "their  respective  organizations"  as  potential  soldiers  when  sum- 
moned. 

(/)  Payment  of  bounties  to  members  of  the  "  auxiliary  to  the 
Army  reserve"  and  of  sums  not  thus  called,  but  equivalent  to 
bounties  to  members  of  the  Army  reserve,  gives  legislative  sanction 

522 


9 

to  a  pernicious  system  of  purchasing  compliance  with  his  duty  by 
a  citizen  in  the  first  case  and  with  the  obligation  voluntarily  assumed 
by  a  soldier  in  the  second. 

Any  ex-soldier  whose  services  are  desirable  in  war  will  appear 
somewhere,  either  as  an  officer  or  enlisted  man  of  volunteers,  or  as 
an  enlisted  regular,  whether  or  not  it  be  possible  for  him  to  collect 
a  bounty  "  not  to  exceed  $300."  A  soldier  who  has  been  away  from 
the  colors  six  years  and  six  months  will  receive  the  total  of  $300, 
as  will  another  who,  having  been  discharged  at  21  (after  three 
years'  enlistment  under  former  laws),  offers  to  enlist  23  years  later, 
or  before  he  is  45.  Is  either  worth  more  than  a  young,  healthful 
college  graduate  with  four  years'  attendance  at  such  an  institution 
as  Cornell  and  two  or  three  summers  at  a  students'  camp?  No 
"  bounty  "  is  payable  to  the  latter. 

A  member  of  the  Army  reserve,  sworn  to  serve  seven  years,  but 
furloughed  during  the  latter  four,  may  be  paid  at  the  rate  of  $5 
per  month  for  the  entire  period  spent  in  the  Army  reserve.  No 
limit  of  $300  is  prescribed  in  determining  the  total  of  such  sums 
payable.  If  a  soldier  has  served  as  a  reservist  more  than  five  years 
in  various  enlistments,  he  receives  more  than  $300  (pp.  4  and  5, 
Bulletins  33,  War  Department,  1913).  \^niy  should  a  soldier  be  paid 
for  complying  with  his  oath  of  enlistment  ? 

Reports  of  The  Adjutant  General  show  that  about  61,033  ex-sol- 
diers who  left  the  service  from  June  30,  1910,  to  June  30,  1914,  are 
now  in  civil  life.  Should  the  President  call  upon  them  to  present 
themselves  for  reenlistment  under  this  Act  about  June  30,  1916, 
the  possible  bounties  payable,  ranging  from  $192  to  $300  (2  years  to 
6  years,  6  months  out  of  service),  amount  to  $15,000,000.  Other 
ex-soldiers,  discharged  fiscal  years  1891-1909,  inclusive,  amount  to 
83,000,  and  their  bounties  to  $25,000,000,  a  total  of  $40,000,000  for 
the  "  auxiliary  to  the  Army  reserve."  At  the  average  rate  of  annual 
pay  of  infantry  soldiers  in  a  peace  strength  company  ($213  about) 
this  sum,  offered  to  purchase  enlistment  of  83,000  men,  would  furnish 
more  than  the  pay  of  10  divisions  for  one  year.  If  the  possible 
Army  reserve  after  1919  be  estimated  at  34,000  men,  and  the  average 
period  of  each  of  these  in  the  reserve  be  considered  two  years  (half 
the  possible  period  in  reserve  during  one  enlistment),  return  of 
these  to  the  colors  would  cost  over  $4,000,000 — a  little  more  than  the 
pay  of  one  division  for  a  year. 

6.  NECESSITY  FOR  CHANGE  IN  LAW. 

As  this  legislation  represents  our  first  effort  to  provide  by  law 
for  a  reserve  of  the  Regular  Army,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the 
result  is  disappointing. 

30669°— No.  522—16 2 


10 

It  was  stated  in  the  Report  of  the  Organization  of  the  Land 
Forces,  1912  (p.  31) : 

In  adopting  a  new  policy  in  our  Army  it  is  important  that  present  conditions 
should  not  be  disturbed  more  violently  than  necessary. 

*  *  *  The  important  thing  is  to  take  a  step  toward  the  new  policy,  leav- 
ing its  perfection  to  the  experience  of  the  future. 

After  the  experience  of  the  past  three  years  it  is  necessary  that 
we  so  change  the  legislation  governing  a  reserve  that  such  force  may 
be  developed  regardless  of  business  conditions,  developed  to  an  ex- 
tent sufficient  for  adequate  defense  and  capable  of  immediate  mobili- 
zation in  organized  units  composed  of  men  physically  fit  and  prop- 
erly armed  and  equipped  without  the  necessity  and  expense  of 
purchasing  compliance  with  military  obligations  by  payment  of 
bounties. 

7.  DEVELOPMENT  OF  RESERVE. 

If  the  country  can  afford  the  expense,  the  500,000  men  found  neces- 
sary for  immediate  use  against  trained  troops  of  a  possible  invader 
should  all  be  continuously  with  the  colors,  and  continued  reenlist- 
ment  of  every  desirable  soldier  should  be  encouraged.  The  profes- 
sional soldier  should  be  encouraged  to  remain  permanently  in  the 
ranks,  and  the  only  reserve  required  can  be  gradually  absorbed  from 
depot  units  as  casualties  occur  in  war. 

The  expense  for  the  Army  under  this  plan  would  be  prohibitive; 
but,  if  we  do  not  have  reserves,  we  are  committed  to  a  policy  of  maxi- 
mum cost. 

If  the  country  can  not  afford  to  adopt  a  system  involving  maximum 
cost,  it  is  equally  necessary  to  have  ready  for  immediate  mobiliza- 
tion a  force  equal  in  size  and  as  nearly  as  possible  equal  in  training. 

The  military  problem  is  not  affected  by  the  financial  ability  of  this 
country  to  meet  the  bill.  If  the  500,000  men  required  are  not  main- 
tained always  with  the  colors  they  should  at  least  have  served  with 
the  colors  in  the  ranks  of  the  Regular  Army  a  period  sufficient  to 
receive  training  that  will  render  each  member  continuously  efficient 
during  his  period  in  the  reserve.  This  period  is  fixed  at  two  years  in 
the  Statement  of  a  Proper  Military  Policy.  The  period  each  such 
trained  soldier  must  remain  in  the  reserve  depends  upon  the  relation 
of  the  strength  with  the  colors  to  the  total  force  required  and  the 
percentage  of  each  unit  which,  because  permitted  to  reenlist,  does  not 
contribute  toward  development  of  a  reserve.  In  this  policy  such 
period  is  six  years,  based  upon  figures  shown  in  paragraph  2  above. 

The  economic  effect  of  a  reserve  system  is  to  reduce  the  per  capita 
cost  of  an  army  of  the  size  demanded  by  the  military  situation. 
Economy  suggests  designation  of  a  large  fraction  of  the  500,000 
required  as  reserves.     Effective   action  in  emergency   limits  such 

522 


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expansion  of  the  reserve  portion  to  that  fraction  which  can  retain 
efficiency  and  jointly  with  the  peace  nucleus  satisfy  the  demands  of 
the  military  problem. 

The  provision  of  a  reserve  is  a  purely  business  proposition. 

8.  COMPOSITION  OF  EACH  UNIT,  REGULAR  ARMY. 

The  enlisted  strength  of  every  unit  of  the  Army  should  consist 
of  two  portions: 

(a)  A  permanent  personnel  composed  of  those  men  essential  to 
the  continued  discharge  by  such  unit  of  its  function  as  a  training 
school  for  reservists. 

(6)  A  temporary  personnel  composed  of  those  citizens  who  are 
passed  through  this  training  school  and  prepared  for  possible  serv- 
ice as  members  of  other  (reserve)  units  of  the  same  or  of  a  similar 
arm  of  the  service. 

9.  PERIOD  WITH  THE  COLORS  SHOULD  BE  DEFINITE. 

While  deserving  soldiers,  who  apply  and  are  recommended  by 
their  commanders  as  sufficiently  trained,  should  be  granted  furloughs 
to  the  reserve  after  a  period  of  less  than  two  years,  provided  the 
military  situation  warrants  the  grant  of  such  privilege,  it  must  not 
be  optional,  as  now,  for  a  soldier  to  remain  with  the  colors  longer 
than  two  years,  unless  he  be  a  noncommissioned  officer  or  a  man  of 
other  technical  training  essential  as  a  member  of  the  permanent  per- 
sonnel of  his  organization  for  the  training  of  other  soldiers  or  the 
administration  of  the  organization.  To  permit  soldiers  generally 
an  option  as  to  length  of  service  with  the  colors,  is  to  continue  the 
present  uncertainty  as  to  the  size  of  reserve  that  may  be  developed. 
The  privilege  of  discharge  by  purchase  should  be  repealed.  Not  to 
exceed  28  per  cent  of  each  unit  should  be  permitted  to  reenlist. 

No  soldier,  whether  with  the  colors  or  with  the  reserve,  should  be 
discharged  except  for  expiration  of  period  of  enlistment,  by  sentence 
of  court-martial,  or  for  physical  disability  or  other  unfitness  for 
military  service. 

10.  DEGREE  OF  READINESS  OF  REGULAR  RESERVE. 

Reserve  units  supplied  with  trained  personnel  should  not  be  con- 
fused with  the  force  of  citizen  soldiers  discussed  in  the  first  section 
of  paragraph  42  of  the  Statement  of  a  Proper  Military  Policy.  The 
latter  force  will  probably  not  have  received,  in  time  of  peace,  suffi- 
cient training  to  render  it  fit  for  immediate  employment  against  the 
enemy  at  the  outbreak  of  war,  but  the  reserve  of  the  Regular  Army 
must  be  ready  for  such  employment,  and  hence  its  members  must 

622 


12 

have  had  such  training  as  will  fit  it  for  immediate  service  jointly 
with  that  portion  of  the  Regular  Army  serving  with  the  colors.  For 
the  same  reason  it  must  have  in  peace  such  organization  and  equip- 
ment as  will  render  possible  its  instantaneous  mobilization  and  trans- 
portation to  the  places  at  which  its  action  is  desirable  when  war 
becomes  imminent. 

11.  ORGANIZATION  OF  UNITS. 

Section  4  of  the  act  of  Congress  approved  April  25,  1914,  contains 
this  proviso: 

Provided  further,  That  when  military  conditions  so  require,  the  President 
may  organize  the  land  forces  of  the  United  States  into  brigades  and  divisions 
and  such  higher  units  as  he  may  deem  necessary,  and  the  composition  of  units 
higher  than  the  regiment  shall  be  as  he  may  prescribe. 

The  reserve  of  the  Army  being  a  part  of  the  Regular  Army,  and 
therefore  of  the  "  land  forces  of  the  United  States,"  according  to 
the  act  cited  above,  this  proviso  authorizes  the  organization  of 
reserve  units  higher  than  the  regiment  by  Executive  orders  of  the 
President.  Organization  of  other  units — regiments  and  lesser — has 
been  provided  by  various  acts  of  Congress.  Because  of  development 
of  armament  and  function  of  certain  branches  of  the  service,  this 
legislation  requires  changes.  The  organization  of  various  units  of 
the  Regular  Army  reserve  should  be  the  same  as  the  organization 
of  similar  units  of  the  Regular  Army. 

12.  MOBILE  TROOPS  ALONE  REQUIRED. 

The  military  problem  requiring  a  force  of  500,000  men  available 
at  home  as  a  mobile  force,  that  portion  designated  as  a  regular 
reserve,  must  be  composed  of  mobile  troops. 

As  stated  in  paragraph  32  of  a  Statement  of  a  Proper  Military 
Policy,  all  mine  fields  and  over-sea  guns  and  one-half  the  guns  at 
home  are  manned  from  the  Regular  Army.  The  remainder  of  the 
guns  at  home  are  to  be  manned  by  Coast  Artillery  units  of  the 
Organized  Militia. 

This  arrangement  suggests  the  propriety  of  assigning  enlisted  men 
of  the  reserve  who  have  received  training  as  members  of  the  Coast 
Artillery  Corps  units  of  the  Regular  Army  to  reserve  units  of  Field 
Artillery.  This  is  especially  desirable,  as  the  quota  of  reservists 
developed  by  units  of  Field  Artillery  recommended  will  not  be 
sufficient  to  furnish  personnel  for  the  corps  or  field  army  artillery 
required  as  a  portion  of  the  mobile  artillery  of  the  reserve. 

522 


13 

13.  DISTRIBUTION  IN  ARMS  OF  THE  SERVICE. 

Based  upon  the  enlisted  strength  of  various  units  of  the  Regular 
Army  shown  in  Tables  of  Organization,  1914,  the  3.79,000  enlisted 
members  of  the  reserve  would  furnish  mobile  reserve  units  approxi- 
mately as  follows: 


No. 


UnU& 


Enlisted  strength. 


Combatant. 


Sanitary. 


Quarter- 
master 
Corps. 


Total. 


Divisions,  Infantry 

Divisions,  Cavalry 

Repiments,  Heavy  Field  Artillerv... 
Refiments,  Mountain  Field  Artillery 

Ponton  bittilions.  Engineers 

Field  battalions,  Signal  (.  orps 

Aero  squadrons,  Signal  Corps 

Corps,  or  field  armies 


310,095 

26, 931 

10,980 

3,297 

4,940 

815 

1,350 


12,390 
1,344 


358, 408 


13, 734 


6,315 
810 


328,800 
29,085 
10, 980 
3,297 
4,940 
815 
1,350 


379, 267 


No  sanitary  nor  supply  units  for  corps  or  field  army  troops  nor 
line  of  communications  troops  need  be  organized  in  this  reserve. 
Sufficient  sanitary  and  supply  units  as  composite  parts  of  divisions 
are  shown  above  for  units  which  may  anticipate  contact  with  the 
enemy.  Such  troops  for  corps  or  field  army  troops  and  all  troops 
for  the  line  of  communications  may  be  supplied  by  citizen  soldiers 
not  necessarily  possessing  so  great  a  degree  of  training. 

14.  ESTIMATE  OF  STRENGTH  AFTER  THREE  YEARS. 

Upon  the  adoption  of  a  policy  such  as  is  recommended,  the  mem- 
bers of  the  present  Army  reserve  and  such  men  as  have  enlisted 
under  the  present  law  will,  as  furloughs  become  due,  constitute  the 
only  reservists  until  two  years  from  the  date  the  new  law  becomes 
effective.  As  seen  in  the  discussion  of  the  act  of  August  24,  1912, 
the  size  of  the  reserve  during  such  period  will  not  until  November 
1,  1919,  exceed  34,000,  if  men  generally  are  furloughed  at  expira- 
tion of  three  years'  service,  or  25,000  if  furloughed  generally  at  the 
expiration  of  four  years'  service. 

If  legislation  pursuant  to  this  policy  be  adopted  so  as  to  give 
effect  thereto  July  1,  1916,  the  Army  reserve  should  by  July  1,  1918, 
equal  about  20,000  men.  By  July  1,  1919,  the  increment  received 
by  the  reserve  under  the  new  law  should  be  112,000  (86  per  cent  of 
131,000,  the  added  strength  of  the  Regular  Army),  which,  with  what 
then  remains  of  the  "Army  reserve,"  should  furnish  a  reserve  of 
about  135,000  men. 

622 


14 

15.  ORGANIZATION  UNDER  DEPARTMENT  COMMANDERS. 

Until  such  time  members  of  the  reserve,  being  dispersed  by  resi- 
dence throughout  the  country  and  being  comparatively  small  in 
number,  could  not  well  be  organized  into  units  larger  than  com- 
panies, troops,  batteries,  etc.  Records  of  reservists  should  be  kept 
at  each  department  headquarters  until  administrative  units  (regi- 
ments, separate  battalions,  etc.)  can  be  organized.  A  soldier  fur- 
loughed  to  the  reserve  should,  on  designation  of  the  place  of  his 
intended  residence,  be  directed  to  report  (on  blank  form  prepared 
for  him  by  his  organization  commander)  to  the  department  com- 
mander or  administrative  unit  commander  of  his  branch  of  the 
service  for  the  area  including  his  selected  place  of  residence.  Regu- 
lations governing  his  duties  and  rights  should  be  given  him  for  his 
guidance.  Subsequent  instructions  should  be  sent  to  him,  at  the 
address  reported  by  him,  from  department  headquarters  or  from 
the  headquarters  of  the  administrative  unit  to  which  he  may  be 
assigned.  An  officer  of  the  General  Staff,  under  direction  of  the 
department  commander,  should  have  charge  of  assignment  of  all 
furloughed  soldiers  coming  within  the  department  until  adminis- 
trative units  shall  have  been  organized.  Thereafter  the  same  officer 
should  care  for  correspondence  concerning  assignment  of  personnel 
to  and  supply  and  mobilization  of  administrative  units  organized 
within  the  department. 

16.  OFFICERS  FOR  REGIMENTS  AND  SMALLER  UNITS. 

No  officers  for  this  reserve  of  higher  grade  than  captain  need  be 
appointed  or  assigned  until  the  numerical  strength  of  the  reserve  of 
any  branch  of  the  service  residing  within  a  definite  area  is  sufficient 
to  warrant  organization  of  units  larger  than  companies,  troops, 
batteries,  etc. 

The  supply  of  officers  for  the  reserve  is  the  subject  of  another 
brochure. 

An  excellent  source  of  supply  of  company  officers  during  the  early 
stages  of  this  organization  will  be  found  among  retired  noncommis- 
sioned officers  and  ex-noncommissioned  officers  of  the  Regular  Army 
living  now  at  various  places  throughout  the  country.  These  should 
all  be  given  opportunity  to  compete  by  examination  for  appointment 
to  the  grades  of  company  officers.  Field  officers  for  the  reserve 
should  be  selected  after  examination  from  among  retired  officers  and 
ex-officers  of  the  Regular  Army  living  within  the  proper  departments 
of  administrative  unit  areas. 

622 


15 

17.  OFFICERS  FOR  DIVISIONS  AND  BRIGADES. 

Divisions  and  brigades  when  organized  should  be  commanded  by 
officers  of  the  Regular  Army,  detailed  in  peace  for  such  duty,  ap- 
pointments as  general  officers  becoming  effective  only  on  mobiliza- 
tion because  of  actual  or  threatened  hostilities. 

Such  appointments  should  create  temporary  vacancies  in  the 
grades  held  by  such  appointees,  to  be  filled  in  a  manner  provided  for 
similar  temporary  vacancies  caused  by  appointments  to  higher  vol- 
unteer rank  under  section  8  of  the  act  approved  April  25,  1914. 

18.  ARMS  AND  EQUIPMENT. 

Deposits  of  arms  and  equipment  for  this  reserve  should  be  placed 
in  storage  at  Army  posts,  in  Government  buildings,  and  at  rifle 
ranges  of  the  Organized  Militia.  Where  such  facilities  are  not 
available,  at  storehouses  erected  for  the  purpose. 

At  each  such  location  an  officer  of  the  reserve,  placed  on  active 
duty  throughout  the  year,  should  be  custodian  of  and  accountable 
for  the  arms  and  equipment. 

Sites  for  these  deposits,  as  they  are  to  become  mobilization  points 
for  the  reserve,  should  be  places  from  which  railway  communication 
facilitates  prompt  dispatch  of  mobilized  units  toward  camps  of  con- 
centration or  mobilization. 

19.  ANNUAL  TRAINING  OF  RESERVE. 

While  every  enlisted  member  of  the  reserve  will  have  had  training 
sufficient  to  establish  his  efficiency  before  furlough  to  the  reserve, 
maintenance  of  that  degree  of  efficiency  and  demonstration  that  he 
is  still  physically  and  morally  fit  for  service  suggest  the  propriety 
of  an  annual  period  of  inspection  and  training. 

In  the  report  of  the  Organization  of  the  Land  Forces,  1912,  the 
period  recommended  for  such  training  was  10  days  each  year. 

Without  this  opportunity  to  determine  the  physical  and  moral 
state  of  each  reservist  and  his  dependability  as  a  possible  soldier  in 
war,  the  country  may  find,  when  actual  or  threatened  hostilities 
cause  mobilization  of  the  reserve,  that  its  personnel  is  not  dependable 
to  the  extent  shown  by  records  of  its  strength. 

20.  ELIMINATION  OF  THE  UNFIT. 

Until  mobilization  places  or  camps  can  be  designated  for  assembly 
of  units  as  large  as  regiments,  the  reserve  should  have  its  training  at 
the  nearest  Army  stations.  Until  units  as  large  as  companies,  troops, 
and  batteries  are  organized,  individual  reservists  joining  at  the 
nearest  Army  stations  should  be  attached  to  regular  organizations 

622 


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of  the  arm  of  service  appropriate.  During  the  assembly  for  training 
each  reservist  should  be  physically  examined  and  his  conduct  and 
habits  observed  closely.  If  he  should  have  developed  disease  such 
as  to  render  him  probably  unfit  for  service  in  war,  or  if  his  character 
be  such  as  to  render  him  undesirable  as  a  soldier,  he  should  be  dis- 
charged. Having  been  examined  physically  at  the  time  of  furlough 
to  the  reserve,  no  right  to  pension  for  disability  incurred  during 
such  status  of  furlough  should  be  recognized. 

For  failure  to  comply  with  orders  to  report  for  training,  a  reservist 
can  be  tried  and  punished,  if  arrested.  Whether  such  disciplinary 
action  should  be  undertaken  or  the  delinquent  discharged  for  the  con- 
venience of  the  Government  is  a  question  that  can  be  best  determined 
after  experience  with  a  reserve  system.  The  controlling  policy 
should  be  to  count  upon  no  strength  of  the  reserve  that  is  not  depend- 
able in  case  of  war. 

21.  SHOULD  PAY  BE  GIVEN  FOR  SERVICE  IN  RESERVE? 

A  wise  means  of  insuring  presence  of  reservists  at  the  annual 
training  is  to  postpone  the  delivery  to  him  of  any  payment  author- 
ized until  he  has  appeared  at  the  designated  assembly  point  and 
completed  the  training  prescribed.  This  leads  to  the  question  of 
remuneration  for  service  while  on  furlough  as  a  member  of  the 
reserve. 

Under  a  system  of  compulsory  service  no  pay  is  necessary  or  wise. 
The  furloughed  soldier  is  a  citizen  and  his  annual  training  is  a 
compliance  with  the  law  which  specifies  the  duties  demanded  of  him 
in  return  for  rights  and  privileges  enjoyed. 

Under  a  system  of  voluntary  enlistment,  some  pay,  monthly  or 
annual,  may  be  necessary,  or  citizens  will  not  enlist  in  sufficient 
numbers  to  enable  the  troops  with  the  colors  to  develop  sufficient 
reserves.  Whatever  be  the  amount  found  necessary  and  desirable, 
payment  thereof  is  for  having  been  ready  and  dependable  as  a  re- 
servist for  the  time  for  which  payment  is  to  be  made.  To  pay  by 
mail  on  mere  report  by  the  reservist  that  he  is  alive  and  residing  at 
his  proper  address  is  to  pay  possibly  for  one  who  would  not  be 
acceptable  as  a  soldier  if  called  to  the  colors. 

22.  PAY  DUE  FOR  ANNUAL  TRAINING. 

Full  pay  of  grade  held  on  furlough,  for  the  period  spent  in  train- 
ing, and  traveling  allowances  to  place  of  assembly  and  return  to  his 
home  should  be  paid  whether  any  reserve  pay  be  authorized  or  not. 

Men  furloughed  as  noncommissioned  officers  should  hold  such 
grades  during  training,  subject  to  reduction  if  their  conduct  or  lack 
of  efficiency  warrant. 

622 


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When  the  training  is  to  be  had  at  a  point  distant  from  the  assembly 
point  or  deposit  of  arms  and  equipment,  transportation  should  be 
by  organization. 

Transportation  from  homes  to  the  assembly  points  should  be  issued 
by  the  reserve  officers  on  active  duty  at  assembly  point,  or  by  any  post- 
master to  whom  transportation  requests  can  be  issued  as  an  acting 
quartermaster.  Subsistence  for  individuals  should  be  provided  by 
reimbursement  at  reasonable  rate  per  meal  instead  of  by  advance  of 
funds. 

23.  ADVANTAGES  OF  ANNUAL  ASSEMBLY  RESERVE. 

The  character  of  training  deemed  necessary  will  be  demonstrated 
only  by  experience. 
The  main  purposes  of  assembly  for  training  will  be : 

(1)  Opportunity  of  reserve  ofl&cers  to  acquire  some  knowledge  of 
their  subordinates ; 

(2)  Opportunity  to  eliminate  the  undesirable  and  promote  the 
eflScient ; 

(3)  Opportunity  to  insure  continued  acquaintance  of  men  with 
arms  and  equipment,  the  models  of  which  may  have  changed  during 
their  furloughs ; 

(4)  Opportunity  through  joint  maneuvers  with  the  troops  with 
the  colors  to  preserve  acquaintance  with  modern  and  possibly  chang- 
ing methods  of  tactical  training ;  and 

(5)  Opportunity  to  verify  the  number  and  inspect  the  condition  of 
men  shown  by  the  returns  to  belong  to  the  reserve. 

Any  one  of  these  purposes  should  prove  sufficient  warrant  for  the 
expense  incurred  through  such  periodical  opportunity  to  make  an 
inventory  of  our  reserve  and  determine  its  value  as  a  military  asset. 

24.  MOBILIZATION  OF  RESERVE. 

The  mobilization  of  a  reserve  should  be  subject  to  orders  of  the 
President.  Solution  of  our  military  problem  demands  that  the  re- 
serve be  as  ready  for  prompt  action  as  troops  with  the  colors.  It 
will  not  be  as  near  the  scene  of  its  intended  action,  but  no  delay  in 
calling  its  members  to  the  colors  should  result  through  necessity,  as 
under  the  present  law,  of  waiting  for  authority  of  Congress. 

Having  been  directed  by  the  President,  mobilization  should  pro- 
ceed under  control  by  department  commanders. 

Units  having  assembled  at  the  points  previously  designated  and 
used  for  deposit  of  arms  and  equipment  for  each  annual  training 
should  be  moved  by  department  commanders,  according  to  instruc- 
tions received  by  them,  either  to  designated  points  in  the  theater  of 

622 


18 

operations  or  to  mobilization  or  concentration  camps.  Whether 
organizations  should  be  held  in  the  areas  pertaining  thereto  for  de- 
livery of  animals  and  motor  or  wagon  transportation  or  should  be 
sent  to  camps  of  mobilization  and  there  supplied  with  transportation 
of  this  kind  will  depend  upon  the  military  situation.  Usually  the 
latter  course  will  be  preferable,  as  wagons,  harness,  etc.,  from  gen- 
eral supply  depots  and  animals  purchased  or  requisitioned  may  be 
more  economically  and  promptly  delivered  to  organizations  at  camps 
of  mobilization. 

25.  NOTICE  OF  MOBILIZATION. 

Notice  of  orders  for  mobilization,  however  received,  should  charge 
each  officer  and  man  of  the  reserve  with  the  duty  of  reporting  at  the 
place  where  arms  and  equipment  are  deposited  for  his  organization. 
A  proper  way  of  serving  such  notice  would  be  by  posting  a  copy  of 
the  proclamation  of  the  President  at  every  post  office,  railroad  station, 
and  telegraph  office  in  the  country.  This  duty  could  be  assigned  to 
postmasters.  In  addition,  written  notice  should  be  mailed  by  the 
reserve  officers  on  active  duty  at  all  the  assembly  points  at  Avhich  arms 
and  equipment  are  deposited  to  each  member  of  the  organization  re- 
quired to  assemble  at  such  points.  These,  in  blank  forms,  should  be 
addressed  in  time  of  peace,  only  the  date  of  mobilization  being  entered 
before  mailing.    Addresses  should  be  changed  as  residences  change. 

26,  TRANSPORTATION  AND  SUBSISTENCE  OF  RESERVISTS. 

Postmasters,  designated  as  acting  quartermasters,  should  be  given 
blank  transportation  requests  with  which  to  furnish  reservists  trans- 
portation to  places  of  assembly.  After  the  reserve  has  been  de- 
veloped to  the  strength  above  shown  possible,  places  of  assembly  will 
be  so  numerous  and  well  distributed  that,  except  in  the  case  of  mem- 
bers of  Signal  Corps,  engineers,  and  possibly  certain  field  artillery 
organizations,  no  reservist  need  travel  more  than  a  few  hours  in 
order  to  join.  Reimbursement  for  expense  of  meals  en  route,  at  a 
rate  of  25  cents  per  meal,  should  be  made  after  reporting  at  the 
assembly  point.  Officers  joining,  on  mobilization,  should  receive 
mileage  from  homes  to  places  designated  for  commencement  of  their 
duties. 

27.  RECORD  OF  ASSEMBLY  AND  PHYSICAL  EXAMINATION. 

No  muster  will  be  necessary.  Organization  rolls  should  be  kept 
up  to  date  in  peace  so  that  notation  on  such  rolls  of  the  date  each 
reservist  joins  need  be  the  only  official  record  of  the  date  when  his 
service  under  mobilization  is  commenced.  Physical  examination  by 
a  surgeon  of  the  reserve  should  be  made  as  soon  as  practicable  after 

622 


19 

joining  to  determine  whether  his  condition  warrants  service  either 
(1)  with  his  organization  or  (2)  in  some  less  active  status  with  tlie 
line  of  communications  troops  or  at  a  regimental  depot.  In  some 
cases  physical  disability  for  any  use  in  war  may  warrant  discharge. 
No  soldier  should  be  forwarded  with  his  organization  who  is  not 
physically  fit  for  service  in  the  field  and  free  from  communicable 
disease. 

28.  CLOTHING  FOR  RESERVISTS. 

Whether  each  member  of  the  reserve  be  required  to  keep  himself 
supplied  in  peace  with  one  serviceable  service  uniform,  to  be  worn 
to  place  of  assembly  on  mobilization,  or  the  clothing  for  each  organi- 
zation be  deposited  with  arms  and  equipment  and  issued  for  each 
training  period  and  on  mobilization,  can  be  determined  only  by  ex- 
perience. As  a  soldier's  title  to  his  clothing  is  shared  by  the  Gov- 
ernment until  discharge,  it  is  legal  and  equitable  to  require  him  to 
keep  some  service  uniform  during  his  period  of  furlough  and  to  use 
it  at  each  annual  assembl}^  for  training  and  on  mobilization. 

On  the  other  hand,  a  furloughed  soldier  might  wear  this  uniform 
when  not  called  for  training  or  mobilization,  and  many  would  not 
have  serviceable  clothing  when  such  is  needed. 

An  organization  will  be  more  uniformly  and  serviceably  clothed 
if  the  latter  plan  be  finally  adopted,  but  its  adoption  will  increase 
considerably  the  expense  of  maintaining  the  reserve. 

29.  ADVANTAGES  OF  POLICY  OUTLINED. 

The  policy  recommended  will  develop  a  reserve.  Its  strength  can 
be  definitely  estimated.  Its  efficient  employment  with  the  regular 
troops  with  the  colors  whenever  circumstances  warrant  mobilization 
can  be  reasonably  anticipated.  Its  adoption  will  reduce  the  per 
capita  cost  of  the  force  demanded  for  solution  of  the  national  mili- 
tf.ry  problem. 

While  more  than  human  foresight  is  required  to  frame  legislation 
for  which  subsequent  experience  may  not  suggest  the  propriety  of 
amendment,  the  reasons  just  cited  justify  adoption  of  legislation 
giving  sanction  to  the  policy. 

522 

o 


ORGANIZATION,  TRAINING,  AND  MOBILIZATION  OF 

VOLUNTEERS  UNDER  THE  ACT  OF 

APRIL  25,  1914 


PREPARED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION,  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

AS  A  SUPPLEMENT  TO  THE  STATEMENT  OF  A  PROPER  MILITARY 

POLICY  FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES 


WCD  8160-25 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE  :  WASHINGTON 

NOVEMBER,  1915 


523 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 

1916 


i 


Wah  Depaetment, 

Document  No.  523. 

Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff. 


SYNOPSIS. 


I.  Introduction. 

n.  Relation  or  the  Organized  Militia  to  the  Voltinteehs. 

III.  Organization  op  Volunteers. 

Page. 

1.  Proclamation 8 

2.  Term  of  enlistment,  etc 9 

3.  Pay,  allowances,  and  pensions g 

4.  Reports,  returns,  etc g 

5.  Laws,  orders,  and  regulations 9 

6.  Organization  of  units 10 

7.  Strength  of  organizations 10 

8.  Recruiting  rendezvous  and  depots 11 

IV.  Appointment  of  Volunteer  Officers. 

9.  Power  of  appointment 11 

10.  Fields  of  selection 12 

11.  Recommendations  of  governors 12 

12.  General  considerations 12 

13.  Appointment  of  line  officers,  assignment  to  duty,  and  transfers 13 

14.  Appointment  of  staff  officers 13 

15.  Appointment  of  chaplains 14 

16.  Special  provision  regarding  medical  officers 14 

17.  Appointment  of  officers  for  recruit  rendezvous  and  depots 14 

18.  Appointment  of  officers  for  a  recruiting  system 14 

19.  Temporary  appointments  and  promotions  of  regular  officers 15 

V.  Training  of  Volunteers. 

VI.  Mobilization  op  Volunteers. 

Mobilization  camps , 18 

Details  of  mobilization  of  Organized  Militia  as  Volimteers 19 

Details  of  mobilization  of  Volunteers 19 

62a  (3) 


ORGANIZATION,    TRAINING,    AND    MOBILIZATION    OF 
VOLUNTEERS  UNDER  THE  ACT  OF  APRIL  25,  1914. 


I.    INTRODUCTION. 

Under  existing  laws  and  under  conditions  contemporaneous  tliere- 
witli  it  has  heretofore  been  assumed  that  in  the  event  of  a  war  with 
a  first-chiss  power  the  United  States  would  require  not  less  than 
half  a  million  men  for  the  first  line,  behind  which  could  be  prepared 
the  greater  army  of  citizen  soldiers,  upon  whom  our  main  reliance 
for  national  defense  is  traditionally  phiced. 

According  to  the  recommendations  of  the  War  College  Division 
of  the  (jeneral  Staff,  the  first  line  should  now  consist  of  half  a 
million  fuUy  trained  troops,  composed  of  the  Regular  Army  and  the 
reserve,  which  has  been  trained  by  service  in  the  Regular  Army, 
supported  by  an  additional  force  of  fully  half  a  million  citizen  sol- 
diers, "  prepared  to  take  the  field  immediately  on  the  outbreak  of 
war,''  who  "  should  have  had  sufficient  previous  military  training  to 
enable  them  to  meet  a  trained  enemy  within  three  months." 

At  the  present  time  the  Regular  Army  at  home  could  perhaps  be 
expanded  to  about  100,000  men  by  the  addition  of  a  large  proportion 
of  recruits,  and  there  would  still  be  required  for  our  first  line  about 
400.000  citizen  soldiers.  This  combined  force  would  be  insufficiently 
trained. 

The  existing  Organized  Militia,  if  expanded  to  war  strength, 
would  furnish  some  280,000  men;  but,  as  explained  later,  these  will 
not  be  available  for  all  national  purposes.  To  insure  the  entire  con- 
trol by  the  Federal  Government  over  the  required  additional  forces 
and  the  employment  of  such  forces  wherever  the  interests  of  the 
Nation  may  require,  they  must  be  enrolled  as  Federal  troops,  either 
as  Regulars  or  as  Volunteers. 

The  War  Department,  in  Circular  No.  19,  Division  of  Militia 
Affairs,  December  29,  1914,  has  published  tables  showing  the  tenta- 
tive assignment  of  existing  and  proposed  units  of  Organized  Militia 
to  complete  the  organization  of  four  field  armies,  which,  with  re- 
cruit-depot troops,  headquarters  detachments,  trains,  etc.,  would 
aggregate  about  400,000  men.  Accordingly  the  first  call  for  volun- 
teers would  be  for  that  number,  and  later  calls  would  be  made  as 
circumstances  might  warrant.  The  manner  of  raising  volunteers 
under  a  later  call  would  be  in  all  respects  similar  to  that  followed 
in  raising  of  new  units  under  the  first  call. 

523  (6) 


The  volunteer  law  is  contained  in  the  act  of  April  25,  1914,  and 
provides  for  the  raising  of  such  forces  in  time  of  actual  or  threatened 
war.  The  law  should  be  so  amended  as  to  provide  for  raising  and 
partially  training  a  force  of  half  a  million  citizens  in  time  of  peace 
and  before  war  is  actual  or  threatened. 

n.   RELATION    OF    THE    ORGANIZED     MILITIA    TO     THE 

VOLUNTEERS. 

The  difficulties  attendant  upon  the  raising  of  volunteer  forces  can 
be  appreciated  only  by  considering  the  relation  which  the  Organized 
Militia  bears  to  such  forces.  The  militia  law  is  contained  in  the  act 
of  January  21,  1903,  as  amended  by  the  acts  of  May  27,  1908,  and  of 
April  21,  1910.  Section  5  provides  "  that  whenever  the  President 
calls  forth  the  Organized  Militia  *  *  *  to  be  employed  in  the 
service  of  the  United  States,  the  militia  so  called  shall  continue  to 
serve  *  *  *  either  within  or  without  the  territory  of  the  United 
States." 

The  Attorney  General,  in  a  decision  of  February  17,  1912,  states 
that  the  Constitution  "  affords  no  warrant  for  the  use  of  the  militia 
by  the  General  Government  except  to  suppress  insurrection,  repel 
invasions,  or  to  execute  the  laws  of  the  Union;  but  by  its  careful 
enumeration  of  the  three  occasions  or  purposes  for  which  the  militia 
may  be  used  forbids  such  use  for  any  other  purpose." 

Hence  the  Organized  Militia,  though  called  and  mustered  into 
the  service  of  the  United  States,  can  be  employed  only  for  the  pur- 
poses stated  above.  It  can  not,  therefore,  become  in  all  respects  a 
national  force,  available  for  all  purposes  for  which  an  army  may 
properly  be  employed. 

Section  5  also  provides: 

Provided  further.  That  when  the  military  needs  of  the  Federal  Government 
arising  from  the  necessity  to  execute  the  laws  of  the  Union,  suppress  insurrec- 
tion, or  repel  invasion  can  not  be  met  by  the  Regular  forces,  the  Organized 
Militia  shall  be  called  into  the  service  of  the  United  States  in  advance  of  any 
volunteer  force  which  it  may  be  determined  to  raise. 

In  any  war  in  which  we  are  likely  to  become  engaged  the  military 
needs  of  the  Federal  Government  can  not  be  met  by  the  Eegular 
forces,  and  it  will  be  necessary  that  the  militia  be  called  out. 

The  governor  is  the  commander  in  chief  of  the  militia  of  his  State. 
Circumstances  might  arise  which  would  apparently  justify  him  in 
failing  to  cooperate  and  give  effect  to  the  call.  Or,  if  neither  he  nor 
the  people  of  his  State  were  in  full  sympathy  with  the  objects  of  the 
war,  he  might,  in  anticipation  of  the  call,  discharge  any  or  all  of  the 
militia,  thus  nullifying  the  call  as  far  as  that  State  is  concerned.  It 
is  but  a  few  months  since  that  a  governor  exercised  his  prerogative 
and  mustered  out  the  entire  State  Militia. 

623 


Individuals  of  the  militia  who  refuse  or  neglect  to  respond  to  the 
call  of  the  President  are  subject  to  trial  by  court-martial  and  to  such 
punishment  as  the  court-martial  may  direct.  It  is  probable  that 
many  would  find  that  they  were  unable  to  leave  their  homes,  for 
reasons  that  might  seem  to  them  sufficient,  and  it  would  hardly  be 
practicable  to  spare  from  other  and  more  important  duty  the  num- 
ber of  officers  that  would  be  required  for  this  court-martial  duty 
alone.  Careful  consideration  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  attempts 
to  force  such  unwilling  service  will  generally  be  barren  of  result. 

Section  3  of  the  volunteer  law  provides: 

Provided  further,  That  when  three-fourths  of  the  prescribed  minimum  enlisted 
strength  of  any  company,  troop,  or  battery,  or  when  three-fourtlis  of  the  pre- 
scribed minimum  enlisted  strength  of  each  company,  troop,  or  battery  com- 
prised in  any  battalion  or  regiment  of  the  organized  land  militia  of  any  State, 
Territory,  or  the  District  of  Columbia,  organized  as  prescribed  by  law  and 
War  Department  regulations,  shall  volunteer  and  be  accepted  for  service  in 
the  Volunteer  Army  as  such  company,  troop,  battery,  battalion,  or  regiment, 
such  organization  may  be  received  into  the  volunteer  forces  in  advance  of  other 
organizations  of  the  same  arm  or  class  from  the  same  State,  Territory,  or  dis- 
trict, and  the  officers  in  the  organized  land-militia  service  with  such  organi- 
zation may  then,  within  the  limits  prescrii)ed  by  law,  be  appointed  by  the  Presi- 
dent, by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  tlie  Senate,  as  officers  of  corre- 
sponding grades  in  the  Volunteer  Army  and  be  assigned  to  the  same  grades  in 
the  said  organization  or  elsewhere  as  the  President  may  direct. 

Under  this  authority,  it  would  be  possible  for  49  men,  three- 
fourths  of  the  prescribed  minimum  strength,  of  a  militia  company 
of  Infantry,  with  little  or  no  training,  to  volunteer  and  bring  into 
the  volunteer  service  with  them  their  three  officers  in  advance  of  150 
men,  who  have  perhaps  had  service  either  in  the  Regulars  or  Volun- 
teers, and  who  are  ready  to  be  mustered  into  the  volunteer  service 
as  a  company  of  Infantry.  It  remains  to  be  judicially  determined 
whether  such  organizations  must  be  received,  and  whether  such 
officers  must  be  appointed. 

In  the  last  proviso  of  section  3  of  the  volunteer  law.  Congress  has 
apparently  anticipated  that  not  all  the  organizations  of  land  militia 
called  into  the  Federal  service  would  volunteer;  and  that  it  may 
be  desirable  in  raising  volunteers  to  depart  from  the  present  propor- 
tions of  the  various  arms  or  classes  in  the  militia. 

Provided  further,  That  when  the  raising  of  a  volunteer  force  shall  have 
been  authorized  by  Congress,  and  after  the  organized  land  militia  of  any  arm 
or  class  shall  have  been  called  into  the  military  service  of  the  United  States, 
volunteers  of  that  particular  arm  or  class  may  be  raised  and  accepted  Into 
said  service  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  this  act,  regardless  of  the  extent 
to  which  other  arms  or  classes  of  said  militia  shall  have  been  called  into  said 
service. 

It  will  be  noted,  however,  that  this  provision  becomes  effective 
only  during  the  existence  or  imminence  of  war. 

623 


8 

From  what  precedes,  it  follows  that  not  even  an  approximate 
estimate  can  be  made  of  the  number  of  officers  and  men  of  the 
Organized  Militia  who  will  respond  to  the  call  of  the  President; 
nor,  having  responded,  of  the  number  of  organizations  that  will 
volunteer  and  be  accepted  for  service  in  the  Volunteer  Army.  The 
transfer  from  the  status  of  militia  to  that  of  volunteer  must  be  a 
voluntary  act;  and  it  can  be  accomplished  only  during  the  existence 
or  imminence  of  war,  and  after  Congress  shall  have  authorized  the 
raising  of  a  volunteer  force.  A  promise,  made  in  time  of  peace,  to 
volunteer  in  the  event  of  war,  can  not  be  legally  binding,  and  should 
therefore  be  neither  given  nor  accepted. 

It  is  evident  that  no  definite  plans  can  be  made  in  time  of  peace 
for  the  actual  employment  in  war  of  any  individual  or  organization 
of  the  Organized  Militia,  either  as  militia  or  as  volunteer.  In  such 
plans  as  have  been  made,  however,  it  has  been  assumed  that  all  will 
respond  to  the  call  as  militia  and  that  all  militia  organizations  will 
volunteer  and  be  accepted  for  service  in  the  Volunteers. 

TTT.   ORGANIZATION    OF  VOLUNTEERS. 
1.  PROCLAMATIONS. 

Volunteer  forces  may  be  raised,  organized,  and  maintained  only 
during  the  existence  or  imminence  of  war,  and  only  after  Congress 
shall  have  authorized  the  President  to  raise  such  forces.  Congress 
could,  however,  by  legislative  enactment,  authorize  the  President  to 
raise  such  forces  in  time  of  peace. 

When  so  authorized  the  President  will  issue  his  proclamation, 
stating  the  number  of  men  desired  for  each  arm,  corps,  or  depart- 
ment, within  such  limits  as  may  be  fixed  by  law.  It  is  probable 
that  the  proclamation  will  also  recite  the  causes  that  make  the  call 
necessary  and  will  state  that  the  enlisted  men  shall  be  taken,  as  far 
as  practicable,  from  the  several  States,  Territories,  and  the  District 
of  Columbia  in  proportion  to  the  respective  populations  thereof. 

The  volunteer  law  provides  that  at  the  termination  of  the  war, 
or  upon  the  passing  of  the  imminence  thereof,  the  President  will 
issue  a  proclamation  reciting  that  fact,  and  as  soon  as  practicable 
thereafter  all  officers  and  enlisted  men  of  Volunteers  will  be  mus- 
tered out  of  such  service. 

Following  the  call  of  the  President  for  volunteers,  the  Secretary 
of  War  notifies  the  governors,  etc.,  as  in  a  call  for  militia,  informing 
them  of  the  quota  for  their  respective  States,  the  existing  militia 
organizations  that  will  be  received  into  the  Volunteers,  the  new 
organizations  that  it  is  desired  to  raise,  and  the  maximum  and 
minimum  strength  of  organizations. 

628 


It  will  obviously  be  impracticable  to  apportion  volunteers  exactly 
according  to  population  if  all  the  militia  volunteer,  for  many  of  the 
smaller  States  have  organizations  which,  if  brought  to  war  strength, 
would  exceed  their  quota  under  a  call  for  400,000  men.  The  law 
requires  such  apportionment  to  be  made  "  as  far  as  practicable " 
according  to  population.  If  the  quota  be  exceeded  in  any  State, 
such  excess  would  be  adjusted  in  a  later  call. 

2.  TERM  OF  ENLISTMENT,  ETC. 

The  term  of  enlistment  will  be  the  same  as  that  for  the  Regular 
Army,  exclusive  of  reserve  periods. 

No  person  will  be  enlisted  in  the  volunteer  forces  or  mustered  as 
an  enlisted  man  into  said  forces  who  is  not  effective  and  able-bodied, 
or  who  is  under  18  or  over  35  years  of  age,  or  who  is  unable  to  speak 
the  English  language ;  except  that  the  superior  age  limit  of  35  years 
is  not  applicable  to  those  members  of  the  enlisted  personnel  of  a 
company,  troop,  battery,  battalion,  or  regiment  of  duly  Organized 
Land  Militia  who  volunteer  and  are  accepted  as  a  part  of  the  organi- 
zation to  which  they  belong,  if  said  organization  be  accepted  as  such 
for  service  in  the  volunteer  forces,  nor  is  it  applicable  to  the  reenlist- 
ment  in  the  volunteer  forces  or  the  muster  into  said  forces  of  a  man 
who  has  had  prior  enlisted  service  either  in  the  regular  or  volunteer 
forces  of  the  United  States. 

A  minor  between  the  ages  of  18  and  21  years  must  deliver  to  the 
mustering  officer  a  written  consent  to  his  enlistment  as  a  soldier  in 
the  volunteer  army  of  the  United  States,  signed  by  his  father,  only 
surviving  parent,  or  legally  appointed  guardian,  in  the  presence  of 
at  least  one  witness. 

3.  PAY,  ALLOWANCES,  AND  PENSIONS. 

All  officers  and  enlisted  men  of  the  volunteer  forces  will  be  in  all 
respects  on  the  same  footing  as  to  pay,  allowances,  and  pensions  as 
officers  and  enlisted  men  of  corresponding  grades  in  the  Regular 
Army. 

4.  REPORTS,  RETURNS,  ETC. 

The  same  rules  are  provided  for  the  rendering  and  final  disposition 
of  reports,  returns,  and  muster  rolls  of  volunteer  organizations  as 
now  govern  in  the  Regular  Army. 

5.  LAWS,  ORDERS,  AND  REGULATIONS. 

The  volunteer  forces  are  subject  to  the  laws,  orders,  and  regulations 
governing  the  Regular  Army,  in  so  far  as  such  laws,  orders,  and 
regulations  are  applicable  to  officers  and  enlisted  men  whose  perma- 

30669°— No.  52S— 16 2 


10  j 

nent  retention  in  the  military  service,  either  on  the  active  or  retired 
list,  is  not  contemplated  by  existing  law. 

And  no  distinction  shall  be  made  between  the  Regular  Army,  the 
Organized  Militia  while  in  the  service  of  the  United  States,  and 
the  volunteers  in  respect  to  promotion  or  the  conferring  upon  officers 
and  enlisted  men  of  brevet  rank,  medals  of  honor,  certificates  of 
merit,  or  other  rewards  for  distinguished  service;  nor  in  respect  to 
the  eligibility  of  any  officer  of  the  land  forces,  regular,  militia,  or 
volunteer,  for  service  on  any  court-martial,  court  of  inquiry,  or 
military  commission. 

6.  ORGANIZATION  OF  UNITS. 

The  organization  of  all  mobile  units  of  the  line  and  of  Signal 
troops  will  be  the  same  as  that  prescribed  by  law  and  regulations 
for  the  Regular  Army,  including  the  same  attached  personnel  of 
the  Medical  Department;  that  of  all  other  units  and  of  necessary 
adjuncts,  whose  organization  is  not  otherwise  provided  for,  will  be 
as  the  President  may  direct. 

The  President  may  organize  the  land  forces  into  brigades,  divi- 
sions, and  such  higher  units  as  he  may  deem  necessary,  and  he  may 
prescribe  the  composition  of  units  higher  than  a  regiment.  The 
organization  of  brigades  and  divisions  shown  in  the  tables  in  Cir- 
cular 19,  Division  of  Militia  Affairs,  1914,  has  been  decided  upon 
for  the  Organized  Militia;  and  in  case  all  the  militia  shall  volun- 
teer, the  same  organization  will  be  used  for  the  Volunteers. 

He  is  authorized  to  provide,  within  such  limits  as  may  be  pre- 
scribed by  law,  all  officers  and  enlisted  men  of  all  grades  and  classes 
and  the  trained  nurses,  male  and  female,  that  may  be  necessary  in 
the  various  arms,  corps,  and  departments. 

7.  STRENGTH  OF  ORGANIZATIONS. 

No  organization  will  be  accepted  that  is  below  the  minimum  pre- 
scribed by  the  President  for  the  Organized  Militia  in  time  of  peace, 
nor  above  the  maximum  prescribed  by  law  for  the  Regular  Army. 
For  a  company  of  Infantry  these  limits  will  be  65  and  150  men, 
respectively. 

Exception  is  made,  however,  as  has  already  been  indicated,  in 
favor  of  existing  militia  organizations,  which  may  be  accepted  with 
only  three-fourths  of  the  minimum,  or  49  men,  for  a  company  of 
Infantry;  and  the  War  Department  has  decided  that  the  sanitary 
personnel  attached  to  battalions  and  regiments  of  the  Organized 
Militia,  and  organized  as  provided  in  the  Tables  of  Organization,  are 
to  be  regarded,  for  the  purposes  of  transfer  to  the  Volunteers,  as  a 
part  of  such  battalions  or  regiments. 

523 


11 

It  has  also  been  decided  by  the  War  Department  that  any  existing 
organization  of  militia  which  desires  to  volunteer  in  another  arm 
of  the  service  will  be  accepted  in  that  arm,  with  not  less  than  three- 
fourths  of  the  minimum  prescribed  strength  thereof,  and  in  advance 
of  any  other  Volunteers  of  the  same  arm  or  class  from  the  same 
State,  Territory,  or  District. 

8.  RECRUITING  RENDEZVOUS  AND  DEPOTS. 

With  a  view  to  recruiting  and  maintaining  all  organizations  of 
the  land  forces  as  near  their  prescribed  strength  as  practicable,  the 
necessary  rendezvous  and  depots  will  be  established  by  the  Secretary 
of  War  and  will  be  directly  controlled  by  him.  Here  the  recruits 
will  be  enlisted  and  trained.  For  the  purposes  of  instruction  and 
discipline,  the  troops  at  the  recruit  depots  may  be  organized  into 
companies  and  battalions,  at  the  discretion  of  the  Secretary  of  War. 
The  noncommissioned  officers  and  privates  will  be  of  such  grades 
and  numbers  as  the  President  may  prescribe. 

It  is  apparent  that  the  recruits  at  the  rendezvous  and  depots  are 
intended  to  form  a  reserve  battalion  for  each  regiment  or  equiva- 
lent thereof  of  Regulars  and  Volunteers  only;  for  the  act  also  pro- 
vides that  in  order  to  maintain  the  land  militia  organizations  at 
their  maximum  strength  the  recruit  rendezvous  and  depots  in  any 
State  or  Territory  may,  at  the  request  of  the  governor  thereof,  enlist 
and  train  recruits  for  land  militia  in  the  service  of  the  United  States 
from  such  State  or  Territory. 

All  the  officers  required  for  such  recruit  rendezvous  and  depots 
will  be  Volunteers  of  the  proper  arm  of  the  service. 

IV.  APPOINTMENT  OF    VOLUNTEER   OFFICERS. 
9.  POWER  OF  APPOINTMENT. 

All  volunteer  officers  are  appointed  by  the  President,  but  the 
number  and  grade  of  such  officei-s  shall  not  exceed  the  number  and 
grade  of  like  officers  provided  for  a  like  force  of  the  Regular  Army, 
and  they  will  be  subject  to  such  assignment  to  duty  and  transfers 
as  the  President  may  direct. 

The  second  proviso  of  section  5  of  the  volunteer  law  provides  that 
no  officer  above  the  grade  of  colonel  shall  be  appointed  under  the 
act.  In  the  event  of  war  Congress  would  probably  be  requested  to 
repeal  this  proviso;  otherwise,  it  would  be  necessary  to  invoke  the 
volunteer  law  of  1898  for  the  appointment  of  general  officers;  and 
that  law  provided  for  no  grade  above  that  of  major  general. 

523 


12 

10.  FIELDS  OF  SELECTION. 

The  President  may  select  the  officers  from  the  following  classes: 
(a)  The  Regular  Army.  But  not  to  exceed  one  regular  officer 
may  at  the  same  time  hold  a  volunteer  commission  in  any  battalion 
of  field  artillery,  engineer  or  signal  troops ;  and  not  to  exceed  four  in 
any  regiment  of  infantry,  cavalary,  or  field  artillery,  nor  in  any  12 
companies  of  Coast  Artillery,  including  their  field  and  staff.  The 
War  Department  has  decided  that  the  best  interests  of  the  Govern- 
ment require  that  advantage  be  taken  of  this  proviso,  as  far  as  prac- 
ticable. 

(h)  Those  duly  qualified  and  registered  pursuant  to  section  23  of 
the  militia  law. 

(c)  The  country  at  large. 

(d)  The  Organized  Land  Militia  of  the  District  of  Columbia. 

(e)  The  Organized  Land  Militia  of  the  several  States  and  Terri- 
tories, upon  recommendation  of  the  governors  thereof;  taking  them 
as  far  as  practicable  according  to  population  and  from  the  localities 
whence  the  troops  are  recruited. 

11.  RECOMMENDATIONS  OF  GOVERNORS. 

(a)  Governors  may  recommend,  for  appointment  by  the  President, 
officers  of  existing  organizations  of  the  Organized  Militia  volunteer- 
ing with  their  respective  organizations,  who  are  qualified  for  such 
service,  under  regulations  established  by  the  War  Department. 

(b)  Governors  will  also  advise  the  War  Department  of  the  num- 
ber and  grades  of  vacancies  in  their  Organized  Militia  volunteering, 
which  they  desire  filled  by  detail  from  the  Regular  Army. 

12.  GENERAL  CONSIDERATIONS. 

In  order  that  the  lives  of  those  patriotic  citizens  who  may  volunteer 
for  service  may  be  safeguarded  and  conserved  and  not  risked  under 
persons  lacking  in  experience  in  the  care  of  soldiers  in  camp  and  in 
battle,  the  War  Department  has  decided  and  announced  that  the  ap- 
pointment to  volunteer  commissions  will  be  made  from  those  classes 
of  our  citizens  who  have  had  such  experience;  and  that  from  those 
classes  the  selections  will  be  made  in  the  following  order,  viz : 

(a)  Persons  who  have  had  experience  as  commissioned  officers  in 
the  Regular  Army  of  the  United  States  and  ex-officers  of  volunteers 
of  proved  experience  and  efficiency. 

(b)  Noncommissioned  officers  of  experience  in  the  Regular  Army. 

(c)  Persons  who  have  had  experience  as  commissioned  officers  in 
the  militia. 

623 


13 

(d)  Persons  who  have  qualified  according  to  law  under  prescribed 
examinations  to  test  their  fitness  to  command  and  control  men  in  the 
field. 

(e)  Graduates  of  educational  institutions  of  military  standing  to 
which  Regular  Army  officers  are  detailed  as  professors  of  military 
science  under  the  law. 

(/)  Should  the  necessary  number  of  volunteer  officers  required  not 
be  furnished  from  the  above  classes,  the  AVar  Department  will  give 
civilians  lacking  in  actual  military  experience  an  opportunity  to  ap- 
pear for  examination  to  test  their  fitness  for  commissions,  before 
boards  which  the  War  Department  proposes  to  create  in  the  several 
States. 

13.  APPOINTMENT    OF    LINE    OFFICERS,    ASSIGNMENT    TO    DUTY, 

AND  TRANSFERS. 

All  officers  of  the  line  below  the  grade  of  brigadier  general  will  be 
commissioned  in  an  arm  of  the  service  and  not  in  any  particular 
regiment  or  other  organization.  Officers  of  each  arm  may  be  as- 
signed to  or  transferred  from  organizations  in  that  arm  as  the  inter- 
ests of  the  service  may  require  by  orders  from  the  Secretary  of  War. 
Promotion  will  be  lineal  in  the  arm  of  the  service  and  not  regi- 
mental as  in  volunteer  forces  heretofore  raised. 

14.  APPOINTMENT  OF  STAFF  OFFICERS. 

The  President  is  authorized  to  appoint  such  number  of  staff  officers, 
of  grades  authorized  by  law  for  the  Regular  Army,  as  he  may  find 
necessary  for  the  various  staff  corps  or  departments. 

But  their  number,  including  those  of  Organized  Militia  called  into 
the  ser^dce  of  the  United  States,  shall  not  exceed  1  officer  for  each 
200  enlisted  men  of  the  combined  militia  and  volunteer  forces  in 
the  service  of  the  United  States.  And  in  any  staff  corps  or  depart- 
ment the  number  of  staff  officers  in  any  grade  shall  not  exceed  the 
proportionate  authorized  strength  of  regular  officers  of  correspond- 
ing grade  in  that  corps  or  department  of  the  Regular  Army. 

This  provision  for  staff  officers  is  inadequate.  No  special  provi- 
sion is  made  for  General  Staff  officers,  the  necessary  number  of 
whom  will  be  detailed  as  in  the  Regular  Army.  The  Medical  Corps 
alone  would  require  approximately  1.1  officers  for  each  200  enlisted 
men.  The  full  quota  of  the  other  staff  corps  and  departments,  in- 
cluding the  General  Staff  Corps,  will  be  needed  at  once,  while  the 
maximum  of  medical  personnel  will  not  be  needed  until  actual  hos- 
tilities and  campaigning  are  well  under  way. 

Certain  extra  officers  should  be  assigned  to  certain  staff  corps  or 
departments,  to  be  available  for  detail  to  the  General  Staff:  other- 

523 


u 

wise  they  must  be  detailed  from  the  line,  whose  officers  can  not  be 
spared  from  their  exacting  duties.  The  General  Staff  officers  should 
be  of  the  grade  of  captain  and  higher,  according  to  the  duties  to  be 
performed.  When,  however,  volunteer-staff  appointments  to  the 
higher  grades  are  made  in  the  Engineers,  Signal  Corps,  or  Ordnance 
Department,  in  which  there  are  many  officers  of  lower  grades,  there 
must  also  be  appointed  the  proportionate  number  of  officers  of  the 
lower  grades,  for  some  of  whom  there  are  no  duties  laid  down  in 
the  Tables  of  Organization. 

A  scheme  of  assignment  of  volunteer  staff  officers  has  been  pre- 
pared by  the  War  Department,  in  which  all  staff  corps  and  depart- 
ments are  fully  provided  for,  except  the  Medical  Department,  and  in 
the  event  of  War  Congress  would  be  requested  to  supply  the  de- 
ficiency in  medical  personnel. 

15.  APPOINTMENT  OF  CHAPLAINS. 

Chaplains  may  be  appointed  at  the  rate  of  not  to  exceed  one  for 
each  regiment  of  volunteer  infantry,  cavalry,  or  field  artillery  and 
for  each  12  companies  of  coast  artillery  that  are  raised. 

16.  SPECIAL  PROVISION  REGARDING  MEDICAL  OFFICERS. 

It  is  provided  that  medical  officers  of  Volunteers  detailed  as  con- 
sulting surgeons  shall  not  exercise  command  over  hospitals  to  which 
they  may  be  assigned  to  duty,  except  that  by  virtue  of  their  commis- 
sions they  may  command  all  enlisted  men ;  and  it  is  required  that  no 
officer  shall  be  detailed  for  duty  as  a  medical  inspector,  except  he  be 
experienced  in  military  sanitation. 

17.  APPOINTMENT  OF  OFFICERS  FOR  RECRUIT  RENDEZVOUS  AND 

DEPOTS. 

To  provide  the  necessary  officers  for  the  recruit  rendezvous  and 
depots  that  may  be  established  by  the  Secretary  of  War  and  directly 
controlled  by  him,  the  President  is  authorized  to  appoint  officers  of 
Volunteers  of  the  proper  arm  of  the  service  of  number  and  grade 
not  exceeding  for  each  organized  regiment  or  its  equivalent  1  major, 
4  captains,  5  first  lieutenants,  and  5  second  lieutenants. 

18.  APPOINTMENT  OF  OFFICERS  FOR  A  RECRUITING  SYSTEM. 

To  organize  a  recruiting  system,  after  Congress  shall  have  au- 
thorized the  raising  of  volunteer  forces,  the  President  is  authorized 
to  employ  retired  officers,  noncommissioned  officers,  and  privates  of 
the  Regular  Army,  either  with  their  rank  on  the  retired  list  or,  in 
the  case  of  enlisted  men,  with  increased  commissioned  rank;  or  he 
may  appoint  and  employ  retired  officers  below  the  grade  of  colonel, 

S23 


15 

with  increased  volunteer  rank  of  not  to  exceed  one  grade  in  the  case 
of  an  officer  and  not  above  that  of  first  lieutenant  in  the  case  of 
retired  enlisted  men.  Such  officers  and  enlisted  men  so  employed 
shall  not  be  eligible  for  transfer  to  the  field  units.  When  such  em- 
ployment ceases  they  will  be  mustered  out,  and  they  revert  to  their 
retired  status. 

19.  TEMPORARY  APPOINTMENTS  AND  PROMOTIONS  OF  REGULAR 

OFFICERS. 

Regular  officers  appointed  to  and  accepting  higher  volunteer  com- 
missions do  not  thereby  vacate  their  regular  commissions  nor  preju- 
dice their  lineal  or  relative  standing  in  the  Regular  Army,  but  in 
grades  not  above  that  of  colonel  they  create  thereby  temporary 
vacancies  which  will  be  filled  by  temporary  promotions  or  appoint- 
ments from  the  next  lower  grade  or  by  details  under  sections  26  and 
27,  act  of  February  2,  1901. 

Such  temporary  appointments  or  promotions  will  be  for  a  term 
that  will  not  extend  beyond  the  termination  of  the  war  or  the  pass- 
ing of  the  imminence  thereof,  as  indicated  in  the  proclamation  of 
the  President ;  and  upon  the  expiration  of  such  term  all  officers  will 
be  discharged  from  such  temporary  appointments  or  promotions 
and  will  revert  to  their  lineal  or  relative  standing  under  their 
permanent  commissions. 

V.   TRAINING  OF  VOLUNTEERS. 

The  training  of  volunteer  troops  must  begin  without  delay  after 
their  induction  into  the  service.  No  time  must  be  lost.  It  should 
begin  at  the  company  rendezvous,  without  waiting  for  complete 
mobilization. 

Under  our  traditional  policy  of  relying  principally  for  national 
defense  upon  citizen  soldiers,  the  larger  part  of  our  land  forces  will 
not  be  fully  trained  at  the  outbreak  of  war.  It  is  more  than  probable 
that  we  shall  have  to  employ  some  of  them  with  little  or  no  training 
as  soon  as  they  can  be  assembled  in  suitable  units. 

The  amount  and  character  of  the  training  will  at  first  be  directly 
proportional  to  the  time  consumed,  provided  a  rational  scheme  be 
followed.  How  much  time  will  be  available  it  is  impossible  to  pre- 
dict. It  is  reasonable  to  assume,  however,  that  in  the  event  of  a 
war  with  an  over-sea  enemy  it  will  be  the  time  required  for  our 
enemy  to  establish  at  least  a  partial  control  of  the  sea  sufficient  to 
open  the  way  for  landing  of  expeditionarj'^  forces. 

We  may  consider  ourselves  extremely  fortunate  if  we  are  allowed 
for  training  three  months  from  the  date  of  declaration  or  imminence 
of  war  before  our  new  troops  will  be  required  to  take  up  the  more 

523 


16 

serious  work  of  actual  fighting.  In  all  probability  the  time  will 
be  less  than  three  months.  Under  present  laws  our  first  volunteers 
must  be  a  part  of  our  first  line  of  defense,  and  no  volunteers  may  be 
raised  until  war  is  actual  or  imminent,  and  until  Congress  shall  have 
authorized  such  action. 

The  existing  militia  organizations  will  have  had  some  training, 
but  as  the  authority  of  training  the  militia  is  reserved  by  the  Consti- 
tution to  the  States,  respectively,  there  will  always  be  a  lack  of  uni- 
formity in  training,  both  in  character  and  amount.  To  secure  par- 
ticipation in  the  appropriations  made  by  Congress  for  the  support 
af  the  militia  it  is  required  that  the  militia  shall  assemble  for  drill, 
instruction,  and  target  practice  24  times,  and  shall  have  five  days  of . 
practice  marches  or  camps  of  instruction  each  year.  Assuming  1^ 
hours  as  the  drill  period,  36  hours,  or  the  equivalent  of  6  training 
days,  will  be  used  for  drills,  etc.,  and  5  days  for  practice  marches  or 
camp — 11  days  in  all  per  year,  33  days  in  an  enlistment  period  of  3 
years.  If  there  be  a  full  attendance  at  all  exercises,  the  average  man 
will  have  had  1|  years'  service  and  about  one-half  of  this  training, 
or  about  17  days.  When  it  is  remembered  that  the  organizations 
should  be  brought  to  war  strength  by  adding  to  each  company  of 
infantry  from  85  to  101  recruits  (an  addition  of  from  130  to  206 
per  cent  to  the  strength  thereof),  it  may  be  said  that  the  militia  will 
be  practically  untrained,  and  that  the  same  procedure  must  be  fol- 
lowed with  them  as  with  the  new  volunteers. 

Our  most  recent  experience  in  raising  volunteers  was  in  1899, 
when  24  United  States  Volunteer  regiments  of  Infantry  were 
raised  for  service  in  the  Philippine  Islands.  The  reports  of  the 
colonels  of  those  regiments  show  that  before  proceeding  to  the  Phil- 
ippine Islands  the  regiments  averaged  training  periods  of  about 
seven  weeks.  Although  these  regiments  strongly  impressed  officers 
who  had  the  opportunity  to  observe  their  fine  organization  and 
splendid  material,  it  would  be  unsafe  to  take  that  period  as  a  stand- 
ard for  future  training  of  volunteers;  for  it  must  be  borne  in  mind 
that,  those  regiments  not  being  called  upon  to  face  trained  troops 
under  trained  officers,  their  training  and  discipline  were  never  put 
to  a  test  sufficiently  severe  to  base  thereon  definite  conclusions.  Fur- 
thermore, although  there  could  be  little  opportunity  for  real  train- 
ing on  transports  while  en  route,  there  was  necessarily  much  time  on 
the  voyage  that  could  be  and  was  utilized  in  certain  classes  of 
instruction  that  had  been  postponed  purposely,  and  there  was  much 
opportunity  for  the  development  of  the  forces  of  discipline  and  cohe- 
sion. The  period  of  instruction  and  training,  from  the  beginning 
to  the  time  the  regiments  were  put  into  the  firing  line,  was  approxi- 
mately three  months. 

523 


17 

Another  consideration  bearing  upon  the  length  of  time  that  thesie 
regiments  were  actually  in  training  is  the  splendid  material  that 
was  available.  Every  regiment  was  commanded  by  a  regular  offi- 
cer, and  practically  all  the  field  officers  were  Regulars.  The  remain- 
ing commissioned  and  enlisted  personnel  comprised  the  pick  of  ex- 
Regulars  and  of  some  250,000  ex- Volunteers  from  the  War  with 
Spain,  who  had  had  about  a  year  of  training  in  addition  to  any 
prior  military  service. 

The  present  war  in  Europe  will  in  time  furnish  valuable  data  on 
the  subject  of  the  time  required  and  the  best  methods  to  be  pursued 
in  the  training  of  new  troops.  Such  information  regarding  the 
new  armies  of  Great  Britain  will  be  particularly  valuable  to  us,  as 
their  troops,  like  our  own,  serve  under  voluntary  enlistment.  It  is 
significant,  however,  that  the  policy  of  the  war  office  has  been  to 
refrain  from  sending  new  troops  to  the  Continent  for  service  in 
the  first  line  until  they  have  had  a  minimum  of  six  months'  training ; 
and  the  scarcity  of  trained  officers  and  noncommissioned  officers  has 
necessarily  had  its  effect  upon  the  character  of  the  training  given. 

It  goes  without  saying  that  the  more  the  men  know  about  the 
art  of  war  the  better.  Time  will  not,  however,  be  available  to  teach 
them  everything,  even  if  they  were  capable  of  absorbing  it.  Care- 
ful distinction  must  be  made  between  those  things  which  it  is  essen- 
tial that  every  soldier  should  know  and  those  things  which  it  is 
desirable  that  he  should  know.  Every  effort  should  be  made  and 
all  available  time  devoted  at  first  to  teaching  the  essentials,  while 
later,  if  time  be  available,  the  instruction  and  training  may  be  ex- 
tended in  other  directions. 

Imperfectly  trained  troops  must  pay  with  their  lives  for  their  own 
mistakes  and  for  those  of  imperfect  leadership.  The  more  efficient 
the  leadership  the  better  will  be  the  training,  and  the  better  the  train- 
ing the  fewer  will  be  the  mistakes,  and  the  less  will  be  the  ultimate 
cost  of  any  results  sought  to  be  obtained  by  the  war. 

Any  system  of  training,  however  good  in  itself,  will  fail  to  bring 
the  desired  results  unless  there  are  available  a  sufficient  number  of 
trained  instructors,  officers,  and  noncommissioned  officers.  The  blind 
can  not  lead  the  blind.  A  partial  appreciation  of  the  difficulties 
likely  to  be  encountered  will  follow  from  a  consideration  of  the 
number  of  trained  officers  that  will  be  available  for  this  most  impor- 
tant work  of  all.  For  the  four  field  armies  proposed  under  Circular 
19,  Division  of  Militia  Affairs,  1914,  there  will  be  required  approxi- 
mately 11,200  officers  of  the  mobile  arms,  upon  which  the  brunt  of 
the  fighting  will  fall.  There  are  about  2,900  officers  of  those  arms 
now  authorized  for  the  Regular  Army,  and  of  these  at  least  one- 
fourth  will  be  on  foreign  service,  not  available  for  service  at  home. 

623 


18 

Many  Regular  oflBcers  will  be  selected  for  the  higher  commands, 
both  in  the  line  and  in  the  staflp,  with  increased  volunteer  rank. 

It  is  apparent,  therefore,  that  for  the  training  of  our  regular 
mobile  forces  at  home  and  of  our  400,000  volunteers,  requiring  more 
than  11,000  officers,  probably  less  than  one-lifth  will  be  fully  trained 
officers.  The  efficiency  of  the  Regular  troops  must  be  conserved,  and 
to  that  end  care  must  be  exercised  that  not  too  many  of  their  officers 
be  selected  for  duty  with  the  Volunteers. 

The  indicated  shortage  in  trained  officers  will  exist  in  approxi- 
mately the  same  degree  in  trained  noncommissioned  officers.  If  our 
existing  laws  could  be  so  amended  as  to  provide  one-half  million 
trained  men  for  our  first  line  and  an  equal  number  of  partially 
trained  men  for  the  second  line,  such  action  would  result  in  a  longer 
period  of  training  for  our  volunteers,  and  the  proportion  of  trained 
leaders,  officers  and  noncommissioned  officers,  available  for  their 
training  would  be  vastly  increased. 

Until  we  know  how  much  tune  we  have,  which  is  the  same  as  say- 
ing until  the  emergency  arises,  we  can  not  establish  a  definite  system 
of  training  that  would  meet  all  requirernents.  But  there  have  been 
prepared  and  are  available  well-digested  systems  of  intensive  train- 
ing for  new  troops,  extending  over  periods  of  10  weeks  and  more,  and 
covering  only  the  essential  things  that  all  soldiers  must  be  taught. 
It  is  not  the  intention  to  publish  any  of  these  systems  at  the  present 
time,  but  they  will  be  kept  up  to  date  and  published  when  needed. 

VI.   MOBILIZATION  OF  VOLUNTEERS. 

The  mobilization  points  or  camps  are  indicated  for  each  State  in 
the  tables  contained  in  Circular  19,  Division  of  Militia  Affairs,  1914, 
referred  to  above.  These  points  have  been  selected  by  the  State 
authorities,  with  the  approval  of  the  War  Department,  and  are  in- 
tended primarily  for  the  mobile  organizations  of  the  Organized 
Militia,  but  as  these  may  be  received  into  the  volunteer  service  the 
mobilization  points  will  be  available  for  both  militia  and  volunteers 
under  the  first  call  and  for  other  volunteers  under  a  later  call. 

Mobile  organizations  will  be  assembled  at  the  State  camps;  but  it 
may  happen  that  under  extreme  emergency  organizations  will  be  sent 
directly  from  their  company  rendezvous  to  certain  other  designated 
points,  where  their  mobilization  will  be  completed.  Organizations 
belonging  to  the  Coast  Artillery  reserves  will  be  sent  directly  from 
their  company  rendezvous  to  coast-defense  commands  to  which  they 
may  be  assigned,  and  will  there  complete  their  mobilization. 

Plans  have  been  prepared  for  temporary  buildings,  or  cantonments, 
at  the  mobilization  camps  so  that  all  personnel  and  animals  may  be 
suitably  sheltered.    The  buildings  will  be  constructed  as  funds  be- 

523 


19 

come  available,  and  suitable  arrangements  will  be  made  for  terminal 
facilities,  lighting,  water  supply,  sanitation,  etc.,  so  that  the  camps 
may  be  ready  to  receive  troops  when  necessary. 

For  mobilization  in  winter,  if  the  cantonments  have  not  been  con- 
structed, use  will  be  made  of  armories  or  other  suitable  buildings. 

Under  the  militia  law,  when  the  military  needs  of  the  country  aris- 
ing from  the  necessity  to  execute  the  laws  of  the  Union,  suppress 
insurrection,  or  repel  invasion,  can  not  be  met  by  the  regular  forces, 
the  militia  must  be  called  out  in  advance  of  any  volunteers;  and  as 
in  the  event  of  war  this  condition  would  generally  obtain,  two  calls 
will  be  necessary,  one  for  the  militia  and  one  for  the  volunteers.  It 
is  not  contemplated,  however,  that  there  shall  be  two  musters. 

When  the  call  for  the  Organized  Militia  is  issued,  the  orders 
requisite  to  give  effect  to  the  call  must  be  issued  through  the  gover- 
nors of  States.  Department  commanders  will  have  charge,  under 
general  directions  from  the  War  Department,  of  all  matters  per- 
taining to  the  mobilization  of  troops  in  their  respective  departments. 
From  the  date  that  mobilization  of  the  Organized  Militia  is  ordered 
all  officei-s  on  militia  or  college  duty  in  a  State  affected  by  the  call 
will  be  under  the  orders  of  the  commander  of  the  department  in 
which  they  may  be  serving. 

The  details  of  the  mobilization  of  volunteers  will  be  generally  the 
same  as  those  now  prescribed  in  the  rules  and  regulations  laid  down 
for  the  mobilization  of  the  Organized  Militia,  particularly  under 
the  first  call  for  volunteers.  It  is  only  in  the  formation  of  such  new 
volunteer  units  as  may  be  desired  that  any  considerable  departure 
from  those  rules  and  regulations  will  be  necessary;  and  such  de- 
parture results  from  the  fact  that  no  State  official  not  in  the  military 
service  of  the  United  States  may  induct  persons  into  such  service. 

While,  as  stated,  the  mobilization,  both  of  militia  and  of  volunteers, 
will  be  under  charge  of  department  commanders,  the  services  of 
State  authorities  should  be  utilized  as  far  as  practicable  in  the  many 
details  prior  to  the  actual  induction  of  volunteers  into  the  service  of 
the  United  States,  where  there  is  no  interference  with  the  control 
vested  in  department  commanders. 

It  is  especially  desirable  that  the  existing  militia  organizations 
shall,  when  received  into  the  volunteer  service,  comprise  the  best 
possible  personnel.  Prior  to  their  muster  into  the  service  of  the 
United  States  the  militia  is  under  State  control,  and  the  War  De- 
partment has  announced  that  governors  will  be  requested  to  eliminate 
all  undesirables,  the  inefficient,  and  the  physically  unfit,  and  to  pro- 
ceed with  the  recruitment  of  organizations  to  the  maximum  strength. 

Following  the  call  for  militia  the  organizations  thereof. will  as- 
semble at  their  company  rendezvous,  and  a  canvass  will  be  made 
to  determine  what  individuals  desire  to  volunteer.    The  undesirables, 

523 


20 

the  inefficient,  and  the  physically  unfit  will  be  discharged  from  the 
State  service  by  the  governors.  Individuals  and  organizations,  other- 
wise eligible  but  not  desiring  to  volunteer,  may  still  be  held  to  Fed- 
eral service  as  militia,  subject  to  the  constitutional  limitations  re- 
garding such  service. 

Kecruiting  will  proceed  as  rapidly  as  possible.  Prior  to  the 
muster  in  of  the  militia  recruiting  is  a  State  function  and  is  gov- 
erned by  State  laws.  In  some  States  the  regimental  and  company 
commanders  are  designated  as  recruiting  officers,  being,  presumably, 
most  interested  in  keeping  the  organizations  at  the  required  strength. 
Upon  muster  into  the  Federal  service,  howcA^er,  each  command  will 
have  its  own  recruiting  officer,  detailed  under  Army  Regulations; 
or  recourse  may  be  had  to  the  recruit  rendezvous  and  depots  estab- 
lished and  controlled  by  the  Secretary  of  War. 

Governors  will  be  requested  to  order  to  the  State  mobilization 
camps,  or  to  such  other  points  as  may  be  necessary,  the  necessary 
staff  officers  of  militia.  These  officers,  if  not  actually  included  in  the 
call  for  militia,  or  received  into  the  volunteer  service,  may  be 
retained  in  the  State  service  or  discharged,  at  the  discretion  of  the 
governor.  State  medical  officers,  especially,  should  be  assembled 
at  suitable  points  and  mustered  into  the  Federal  service,  so  that 
they  may,  as  Federal  officers,  be  available  to  assist  in  mustering  in 
the  remainder. 

The  War  Department  will  order  to  the  mobilization  camps  and 
to  other  designated  points  the  necessary  mustering  officers  and  medi- 
cal examiners. 

The  necessary  eliminations  having  been  made,  such  organizations 
as  meet  the  requirements  of  section  3  of  the  volunteer  law  will  now 
be  ready  for  muster  into  the  volunteer  service.  They  will  be  sent 
to  the  State  camps  or  other  designated  points  where  their  muster 
into  the  service  of  the  United  States  will  be  accomplished  under  the 
Regulations  for  Mustering  United  States  Volunteers.  None  but 
those  who  desire  to  volunteer  will  be  taken  from  the  company 
rendezvous. 

Officers  of  accepted  militia  organizations  can  be  mustered  into 
the  volunteer  service  only  when  the  mustering  officers  have  been 
notified  that  they  have  been  appointed  by  the  President.  With 
other  volunteer  officers,  no  muster  in  is  necessary,  as  the  acceptance 
of  commission  and  taking  the  oath  of  office  mark  their  entry  into 
the  service.  All  officers,  as  soon  as  appointed,  should  be  sent  at 
once  to  their  commands,  so  that  the  work  of  organization  and  train- 
ing may  be  expedited. 

Organizations  that  have  not  complied  with  the  standard  for 
physical  examination  prescribed  for  the  Regular  Army  will  be  so 
examined  prior  to  muster  in.  Those  that  have  complied  with  that 
standard  will  be  examined  immediately  after  muster  in 

523 


21 

State  authorities  are  required  to  keep  on  hand  at  all  times,  either 
at  the  various  armories  or  in  suitable  storehouses,  a  sufficient  supply 
of  arms,  uniforms,  and  equipment  to  completely  equip  for  the  field 
the  minimum  number  of  men  prescribed  by  the  President  for  each 
militia  organization,  so  that  upon  being  called  into  the  service  any 
organization  will  be  completely  equipped  from  stores  on  hand  with- 
out calling  upon  the  War  Department  for  assistance. 

The  War  Department  will  inform  each  governor  of  the  maximum 
strength  to  which  organizations  will  be  recruited  under  the  call  for 
militia,  and  the  Federal  supply  departments  concerned  will  at  once 
ship  without  requisition  to  the  senior  mustering  officers  at  the  proper 
State  mobilization  camps  sufficient  arms,  equipment,  and  clothing 
to  equip  organizations  to  the  war  strength  ordered. 

The  State  authorities  will  be  responsible  for  the  rationing  and 
transportation  of  the  Organized  Militia  from  the  time  of  arrival 
at  the  company  rendezvous  until  arrival  at  the  mobilization  camp. 
Federal  funds  for  this  purpose  will  be  placed  to  the  credit  of  local 
Federal  disbursing  officers  by  the  department  quartermaster  of  the 
proper  territorial  department  as  soon  as  the  call  is  issued. 

An  expenditure  of  75  cents  per  ration  is  authorized  for  each  day 
of  actual  service  prior  to  arrival  at  mobilization  camps.  Thereafter 
rations  in  kind  will  be  issued. 

All  serviceable  military  property  in  the  hands  of  the  Organized 
Militia  which  may  be  needed  for  camps  or  for  field  service,  including 
wheel  transportation,  whether  it  be  Federal  or  State  property,  if 
of  standard  pattern  or  quality,  will  be  brought  to  the  mobilization 
camps. 

All  expense  of  the  mobilization  will  be  paid,  or  reimbursed  in 
kind,  by  the  United  States. 

Following  the  proclamation  of  the  President  calling  forth  the 
Volunteers,  the  War  Department  will  communicate  to  the  governors, 
etc.,  the  quota  for  each  State,  etc.,  the  number  of  existing  organiza- 
tions of  Organized  Militia  that  will  be  received  into  the  volunteer 
service,  and  the  number  of  new  units  that  it  is  desired  to  raise. 
They  will  be  requested  to  assist  in  the  formation  of  the  new  units,  in 
so  far  as  they  may  be  competent  to  render  such  assistance. 

In  addition,  if  it  be  found  necessary  or  desirable,  the  War  Depart- 
ment may  designate  in  orders  the .  rendezvous  of  the  various  new 
regiments  or  other  organizations,  and  the  territorial  limits  within 
which  recruiting  for  each  is  to  be  conducted. 

The  method  that  has  been  followed  in  the  past  with  satisfactory 
results,  is  to  receive  groups  of  men  that  desire  to  enter  the  A^olunteer 
service  as  a  body.  If  they  are  found  qualified  physically,  and  are 
not  below  the  minimum  nor  above  the  maximum  strength  prescribed, 
the  group  may  be  mustered  in  as  a  body. 

523 


22 

It  may,  however,  be  necessary  to  designate  officers  to  proceed  to 
specially  indicated  points  and  raise  the  new  organizations.  In  this 
case,  individual  recruiting  will  be  necessary;  and  for  this  purpose 
the  recruiting  rendezvous  and  depots  may  be  charged  with  making 
enlistments,  such  service  to  be  supplemented  by  the  assignment, 
under  Army  Regulations,  of  officers  of  the  new  organizations  as  they 
become  available  by  appointment. 

When  officers  or  recruits  arrive  at  the  designated  regimental  or 
other  rendezvous,  they  will  at  once  be  assigned  by  the  proper  com- 
mander. Appointment  of  regimental  and  battalion  staff  officers  and 
of  noncommissioned  officers  will  be  made  as  authorized  in  Army 
Regulations. 

As  soon  as  any  new  organization  is  reasonably  well  filled  up  it  will 
be  sent  to  the  proper  mobilization  camp  to  receive  its  equipment  and 
complete  its  organization  and  training.  As  in  the  case  of  existing 
militia  organizations,  the  Federal  supply  departments  will  ship, 
without  requisition,  either  to  the  designated  regimental  rendezvous 
or  to  the  proper  mobilization  camps,  sufficient  arms,  equipment,  and 
clothing  to  equip  the  new  organizations  at  war  strength. 

Pay  and  allowances  begin,  in  the  case  of  militia  organizations, 
from  the  date  of  appearance  at  the  company  rendezvous ;  in  the  case 
of  other  Volunteers  from  the  date  of  muster  or  of  taking  the  oath  of 
enlistment. 

As  soon  as  the  mobilization  in  any  State  is  complete,  the  volunteer 
organizations  may  be  assembled  with  others  at  suitable  concentration 
camps;  and  the  mobilization  camps  thus  vacated  will  be  available 
for  other  Volunteers,  new  organizations,  recruit  depot  troops,  etc. 

The  time  required  to  mobilize  and  muster  existing  militia  organi- 
zations into  the  Volunteer  service  would  be  but  a  few  days.  The 
time  required  to  recruit  such  organizations  to  full  strength  and  to 
raise  new  organizations  would  depend  upon  the  popularity  or  other- 
wise of  the  war,  general  trade  conditions,  etc.,  and  can  not  be  readily 
predicted. 

The  procedure  imder  a  later  call  for  Volunteers  would  be  along 
the  same  lines  as  indicated  above,  but  owing  to  the  absence  with  the 
first-line  troops,  of  practically  all  trained  officers  and  noncommis- 
sioned officers,  the  actual  organization,  training,  and  mobilization 
would  be  accomplished  with  confusion  and  delay,  and  under  the 
most  adverse  conditions. 

The  Division  of  Militia  Affairs  has  prepared  and  issued  to  State 
authorities  Suggestions  for  Mobilization  of  Volunteers,  covering  in 
greater  detail  the  points  indicated  above. 

628 

o 


OUTLINE  OF  PLAN  FOR  MILITARY  TRAINING  IN 
PUBLIC  SCHOOLS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 


PREPARED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION,  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

AS    A    SUPPLEMENT    TO    THE    STATEMENT    OF    A    PROPER   MILITARY 

POLICY  FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES 


WCD  9064-16 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE  :  WASHINGTON 

NOVEMBER,   1915 


524 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
1916 


1 


i 


War  Department, 

Document  No.  524. 

Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff. 


SYNOPSIS. 


Page. 

I.  Introduction 5 

II.  The  Wyoming  plan 6 

(A)  Military  preparation 6 

Discussion  of  course  ia  military  prei)aralion 8 

(B)  Moral  preparation * 8 

(C)  Civic  preparation 8 

(D)  Business  preparation 9 

III.  Recommendations 9 

30669°— No.  524—16  (^) 


OUTLINE  OF  PLAN  FOR  MILITARY  TRAINING  IN  PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES. 


I.   INTRODUCTION. 

In  paragraph  6,  Statement  of  a  Proper  Military  Policy  for  the 
United  States,  it  was  shown  that  our  military  system  should  be  able 
to  furnish  at  the  outbreak  of  war  500,000  trained  and  organized 
mobile  troops,  and  to  have  available  not  less  than  500,000  more  90 
days  thereafter.  In  addition,  to  supply  losses  and  wastage  in  war, 
it  is  considered  that,  after  the  outbreak  of  hostilities,  the  systern 
should  provide  a  plan  for  raising  and  training  500,000  more. 

To  prepare  for  this  task  requires  us  to  use  every  available  means 
of  educating  the  young  as  to  their  future  duties  as  citizens. 

If  our  democracy  is  to  endure  it  must  "  recognize  as  its  primary 
standard  of  duty  the  obligation  of  the  individual  man  and  woman  to 
sacrifice  themselves  for  the  whole  community  in  time  of  need." 

The  necessary  elementary  instruction  that  every  young  American 
should  have  in  order  to  be  prepared  when  the  time  comes  to  play  his 
part  in  the  national  defense  can  be  given  in  the  public  schools. 
Moreover,  this  can  be  done  in  such  a  way  as  to  enlist  parental  ap- 
proval, because  of  the  manifest  improvement  of  the  scholars  in 
physique,  deportment,  and  obedience  to  authority  at  home  as  well 
as  at  school. 

The  object  of  the  prescribed  course  of  instruction  is  to  inculcate 
high  ideals  and  correct  views  on  the  duties  of  the  citizen  to  the  State. 
The  training  given  is  along  military  lines,  but  is  so  conducted  as  to 
encourage  initiative  and  individuality,  to  correct  defects  and  develop 
natural  gifts,  and  to  teach  self-control  by  showing  the  value  of 
obedience  to  superior  authority.  The  old  method  of  "breaking  the 
will "  by  insisting  on  blind  unreasoning  obedience  to  arbitrary  rules 
13  replaced  by  one  showing  how  to  use  the  individual  will  in  attain- 
ing the  concerted  effort  known  as  "  teamwork,"'  which  is  the  secret 
of  efficiency,  and  which  is  dependent  upon  a  conscious  and  willing 
obedience  to  a  superior  directing  authority.  Those  who  learn  how 
to  obey  fit  themselves  to  direct  and  by  practicing  self-control  become 
imbued  with  the  fundamental  principle  underlying  good  citizenship. 

524 

(5) 


This  is  not  a  theoretical  scheme.  It  is  a  practical  system  carefully 
worked  out  by  Lieut.  E.  Z.  Steever,  United  States  Army,  and  applied 
with  marked  success  in  the  public  high  schools  of  the  State  of 
Wyoming.  It  has  been  designated  the  "  Wyoming  plan,"  and  its 
distinctive  features  are  outlined  in  what  follows. 

II.   THE  WYOMING  PLAN. 

The  Wyoming  school  authorities  hold: 

1.  That  good  citizenship  involves  a  willingness  on  the  part  of  each 
able-bodied  youth  to  make  such  effort  and  sacrifice  as  will  prepare 
him  for  his  obligations  and  duties  as  a  citizen. 

2.  That  this  preparation  embraces  the  following: 

(a)   Military  preparation. 
(6)   Moral  preparation. 

(c)  Civic  preparation. 

(d)  Business  preparation. 

(e)  Educational  preparation. 

(A)  MILITARY  PREPARATION. 

It  is  unsound  to  assume  that  any  system  of  training  its  adolescent 
youth  will  remove  from  the  nation  the  further  responsibility  of  train- 
ing its  manhood. 

Trained  youth  can  not  take  the  place  of  trained  manhood.  Youths 
make  imitation,  but  not  real,  soldiers. 

A  thorough  preliminary  military  training  of  its  adolescent  youth 
has  been  recognized  in  primitive  as  well  as  modern  civilizations  as 
the  first  step  in  the  greater  training  of  the  tribe  or  nation. 

With  the  civilized  as  with  the  primitive  youth  the  "  game  "  is  the 
medium  of  all  successful  training.  "  Competition  "  is  to  youth  what 
"  security  "  is  to  old  age. 

According  to  the  Wyoming  plan  all  cadets  are  organized  into 
competition  units. 

Leaders  take  "  turnabouts  "  choosing  the  members  of  their  units, 
so  that  each  unit  (squad,  platoon,  or  company)  is  made  up  of  an 
equal  number  of  strong,  medium,  and  weak  lads. 

After  final  choosing-up  these  units  are  fixed  and  can  not  be  added 
to  nor  subtracted  from. 

All  the  work  is  done  by  competition  units. 
There  are: 

Wall-scaling  units. 
Infantry  drill  units. 
Troop  leadership  units. 
Scholarship  units. 
Field  firing  units. 
Camp  and  field  units. 

624 


Sponsors  are  elected  from  the  girls  in  the  mixed  school  and  as- 
signed to  the  competition  units.  The  sponsors  are  in  every  sense 
members  of  the  cadet  organization.  They  attend  all  drills,  are  the 
leaders  in  all  social  functions,  and  while  they  do  not  actually  drill  the 
sponsors  are  entitled  to  and  receive  such  individual  rewards  as  may 
be  won  by  their  units. 

Medals,  ribbons,  and  distinctive  marks  on  the  uniform  are  given 
each  member  of  a  winning  unit,  the  sponsor,  of  course,  included. 

Each  cadet  organization  is  based  on  the  voluntary  enlistment  plan. 
The  cadet  classes  are  held  generally  during  and  not  after  school 
hours,  and  credit  toward  graduation  is  awarded  therefor. 

Cadet  tournaments  are  held  during  the  school  year  between  the 
different  high  schools,  to  which  the  public  is  invited,  and  at  which  are 
held  infantry  drill,  wall-scaling,  field  firing,  and  camp  and  field  and 
troop  leadership  competition  "  games." 

From  the  Wyoming  experience  is  deduced  the  following  system 
of  training,  adapted  to  the  adolescent  American  youth.  Local  con- 
ditions will  necessarily  modify  the  application  of  this  system,  but 
the  general  principles  on  which  it  is  based  will  obtain  in  any  part 
of  the  United  States,  and  will  permit  the  evolution  of  a  practical 
course  suited  to  local  conditions: 

1.  Cut  the  school  year  into  separate,  short,  intensive  training 
periods,  working  up  through  preliminary  to  final  competition  dates, 
with  the  fixed  competition  units. 

2.  September  1  to  December  31,  wall-scaling  and  calisthenic 
events ;  minimum  of  drill,  maximum  of  body  building. 

3.  January  1  to  February  28,  troop-leadership  competitions,  12- 
inch  Gettysburg  war-game  map.  Include  military  policy  of  the 
United  States. 

4.  January  1  to  February  28,  minimum  of  drill,  maximum  of  gal- 
lery practice,  group  competitions. 

5.  March  1  to  May  7,  minimum  of  drill,  maximum  of  range  prac- 
tice, and  field-firing  competitions. 

6.  May  8  to  June  15,  minimum  of  drill,  maximum  of  camp  and 
field  problems,  competitive  between  high  schools. 

7.  All  through  school  year,  commencing  in  the  spring  and  running 
through  the  following  fall  and  winter,  take  boys  into  camp  each 
week-end  and  harden  them  to  the  rigors  of  camp  life.  Teach  them 
sanitation,  cooking,  woodcraft,  simple  field  engineering,  plains-craft, 
castramentation,  sketching,  scouting,  patroling.  the  service  of  se- 
curity and  information,  and  qualify  them  as  guides  in  their  own 
immediate  surrounding  territory. 

8.  Summer  camp  immediatel}'  after  closing  of  school,  14  days. 

624 


8 

Discussion  of  course  in  military  preparatiok. 

The  organization  that  puts  into  effect  the  "  game "  idea  differs 
fundamentally  from  the  modern  American  athletic  system.  The 
cadet  leaders  choose  up  each  in  turn  so  that  each  fixed  competition 
unit  represents  a  certain  proportion  of  strong,  of  medium,  and  of 
weak  lads. 

In  football  and  basket  ball  and  track  events,  only  the  few  physi- 
cally fit  take  part.  In  this  system  each  squad  represents  an  average 
and  every  hoy  takes  part.  There  is  as  much  "in  it"  for  the  weak 
as  for  the  strong,  and  the  survival  of  the  fittest  units,  whether  they 
be  squads,  platoons,  or  companies,  gives  the  competition  spirit. 

(B)  MORAL  PREPARATION. 

A  nation  stands  or  falls,  succeeds  or  fails,  just  in  proportion  to  the 
high-mindedness,  cleanliness,  and  manliness  of  each  succeeding  gen- 
eration of  men. 

In  the  Wyoming  system  the  fundamental  factor  is  the  competition 
between  equally  balanced  units.  The  individuals  are  forced  by  public 
opinion  amongst  their  fellows  to  go  into  training,  and  this  training 
means  clean,  moral  youths.  It  is  shown  conclusively  in  the  various 
competitions  that  clean  men  morally  are  the  surest  kind  of  winners. 
Smoking  and  immoral  practices  must  go.  Under  the  fiercest  kind 
of  competition,  and  a  new  and  fascinating  interest  in  life,  the  ado- 
lescent youth  is  better  enabled  to  negotiate  that  difficult  period  of 
life. 

(C)  CIVIC  PREPARATION. 

It  is  almost  a  fundamental  principle  of  correct  military  organiza- 
tion that  the  leader  should  not  be  voted  for.  The  Wyoming  system 
is  not  intended  to  make  soldiers.  The  Wyoming  schoolmasters  are 
of  the  opinion  that  soldiers  can  only  be  made  from  mature  man- 
hood, and  that  the  preparation  of  the  adolescent  youth  should  be 
such  that  when  he  reaches  manhood  he  may  then  be  made  into  the 
highest  type  of  soldier.  Hence  the  objection  to  voting  for  leaders 
does  not  obtain  in  the  cadet  organization,  whereas  the  objection  is 
perfectly  valid  in  a  military  organization. 

The  cadet  leaders  are  chosen  at  the  beginning  of  each  year  by  vote 
of  the  older  cadets.  The  leaders  are  selected  on  merit,  very  much 
as  the  captain  of  the  football  team  is  selected  for  his  merit.  It 
has  been  noticeable  that  on  the  first  organization,  boy  politics  elect 
a  certain  percentage  of  popular  but  inefficient  leaders,  whose  very 
inefficiency  is  later  a  terrible  punishment  to  the  members  of  their 
ftwn   units.     The   stress   of  competition   soon   brings   out   the   real 

524 


leaders.  The  cadets  never  repeat  their  mistake.  After  the  first 
election  they  take  steps  to  insure  a  very  wise  and  careful  selection 
of  leaders. 

This  civic  lesson  can  not  be  wholly  lost  to  them  in  years  to  come, 
when  they  are  called  upon  as  citizens  to  elect  the  leaders  of  their 
city,  county,  State,  and  National  Governments. 

(D)  BUSINESS  PREPARATION. 

Teamwork  and  efficiency  are  prime  requisites  in  the  business  life 
of  to-day. 

The  soldier  game  can  be  made  the  keenest,  as  well  as  the  most 
fascinating  of  all  games,  and  efficiency  is  a  necessity  if  a  competi- 
tion unit  is  to  win.  Not  only  must  each  man  be  worked  to  the  limit 
of  his  capacity,  but  each  competition  unit  leader  must  analyze  his 
men  and  fit  each  to  his  proper  place.  The  leaders  are  always  lead- 
ing and  learning  efficiency. 

III.   RECOMMENDATIONS. 

1.  That  school  boards  throughout  the  United  States  be  encouraged 
by  the  War  Department  to  institute,  in  their  school  systems,  a  citizen- 
ship training  similar  to  that  outlined  above. 

2.  That  the  proper  authority  request  Congress  to  authorize  the 
detail  of  United  States  Army  officers  as  instructors  in  public  school 
systems. 

3.  That  tentage  and  field  equipment  of  obsolete  or  modern  pattern 
be  issued  to  school  boards  under  bond  in  the  same  manner  that 
Krag  rifles  and  ammunition  are  now  furnished. 

624 

o 


THE  PENSION  ROLL  AS  AFFECTED  BY  THE 
WAR  WITH  SPAIN  IN  1898 


PREPARED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION,  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

AS    A    SUPPLEMENT    TO    THE    STATEMENT    OF    A    PROPER    MILITARY 

POLICY  FOR  THE  UNITED   STATES 


WCD  9290-3 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE  :  WASHINGTON 

NOVEMBER,   1915 


525 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICl! 

1916 


War  Department, 

Document  No.  525. 

Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff. 


SYNOPSIS. 


Page. 

1.  Inception  of  the  practice  of  pensioning  disabled  soldiers  and  sailors 5 

2.  The  War  with  Spain — Beginning  and  duration 6 

3.  Forces  employed 6 

4.  Total  enlistments  and  reenlistments — Number  of  individuals  in  service...  7 

(a)  Regular  Army  enlistments  and  reenlistments 7 

(b)  Volunteers  of  1898 8 

(c)  Volunteers  of  1899 9 

Total  for  War  with  Spain 9 

5.  Number  of  individuals  who  acquired  an  actual  pensionable  status  by  date 

of  discharge  or  muster  out 9 

6.  Number  of  pension  applications  filed 10 

(a)  War  of  the  Rebellion  (first  seven  years) 11 

(b)  War  with  Spain  (first  seven  years) 11 

Deductions  drawn  from  data  in  regard  to  the  10  regiments  of  1898  vol- 
unteers         11 

7.  Number  of  pensioners  on  the  roll 15 

8.  Percentage  of  pensioners  on  the  rolls  16  years  after  the  beginning  of  hos- 

tilities          15 

(a)  War  of  the  Rebellion 16 

(6)  War  with  Spain 16 

9.  Amounts  disbursed  for  pensions 16 

10.  Probable  futiu-e  cost  of  the  pension  list  for  the  War  with  Spain 17 

Table  No.  1,  showing  applications  filed,  pensions  granted,  total  pensioners, 

amount  paid  for  pensions  from  1899  to  1914,  inclusive  (for  all  wars) 18 

Table  No.  2,  showing  applications  filed,  pensions  granted,  number  pensioners, 
paid  for  pensions  from  1899  to  1914,  inclusive  (War  with  Spain) 19 

Table  No.  3,  showing  applications  filed  from  1899  to  1913,  inclusive  (War  with 
Spain) 19 

Table  No.  4,  showing  certain  data  for  ten  1898  volunteer  regiments  (War  with 
Spain) 20 

Table  No.  5,  showing  claims  filed,  claims  allowed,  and  percentage  of  claims 
allowed  to  claims  filed  from  1862  to  1868,  inclusive.  War  of  the  Rebellion,  and 
from  1899  to  1905,  inclusive.  War  with  Spain 21 

Table  No.  6,  showing  number  of  pensioners  for  the  Army  and  Navy  from  1898 
to  1914,  inclusive  (War  with  Spain),  and  number  of  pensioners  and  percentage 
of  pensioners  (War  with  Spain)  to  total  (all  wars) 22 

Table  No.  7,  showing  pensions  for  the  Army  and  Navy  from  1899  to  1914,  inclu- 
sive (War  with  Spain),  and  administration  and  maintenance  from  1899  to 
1914,  inclusive  (all  wars) 22 

Table  No.  8,  showing  number  of  invalid  pensioners,  per  cent  to  strength,  widows, 
etc.,  per  cent  to  strength,  per  cent  total  pensioners  to  strength  from  1902  tto 
1914,  inclusive  (War  with  Spain) 23 

Table  No.  9,  showing  number  of  pensioners,  cost  of  administration,  per  capita 
cost  per  pensioner  from  1899  to  1914,  inclusive  (all  wars),  and  number  of  pen- 
sioners and  cost  of  administration  (War  with  Spain) 23 

Table  No.  10,  showing  (a)  Invalids,  (h)  widows,  etc..  (c)  gain,  {d)  loss,  irom  1899 
to  1914,  inclusive  (War  with  Spain),  and  total  pensioners  on  roll  (all  wars)..        24 
625  (3) 


THE  PENSION  ROLL  AS  AFFECTED  BY  THE  WAR  WITH 

SPAIN  IN  1898. 


1.  INCEPTION  OF  THE  PRACTICE  OF  PENSIONING  DISABLED 
SOLDIERS  AND  SAILORS. 

The  practice  of  pensioning  soldiers  incapacitated  by  injuries  re- 
ceived in  active  service  and  of  providing  relief  for  their  dependent 
families  began  long  before  the  Eevolutionary  War.  In  1G36  the 
Pilgrims  at  Plymouth  enacted  a  law  providing  that  any  man  sent 
forth  as  a  soldier  and  who  returned  maimed  should  be  maintained 
competently  by  the  colony  during  the  remainder  of  his  life.  In  1644 
the  Virginia  Assembly  passed  a  disability  pension  law,  and  later  a 
provision  for  the  relief  of  indigent  members  of  the  families  of  sol- 
diers who  should  be  killed.  In  1676  a  standing  committee  of  the 
General  Court  of  Massachusetts  Bay  held  regular  meetings  to  hear 
the  applications  of  Avounded  soldiers  for  relief.  After  the  union  of 
Massachusetts  Bay  and  Plymouth  Colonies,  under  the  charter  of  1691, 
the  Province  continued  to  make  provision  for  the  relief  of  disabled 
soldiers  out  of  the  public  treasury.  In  1718  Ehode  Island  enacted 
a  pension  law  which  provided  that  every  officer,  soldier,  or  sailor 
employed  in  the  service  of  the  colony,  who  should  be  disabled  from 
getting  a  livelihood  for  himself  and  family  or  other  dependent  rela- 
tives, should  have  his  wounds  looked  after  at  the  colony's  charge, 
and  should  have  an  annual  pension  for  the  maintenance  of  himself 
and  his  dependents.  This  law  further  provided  that  if  any  person 
who  had  the  charge  of  maintaining  a  wife,  children,  parents,  or 
other  dependent  relatives  should  be  slain  in  the  colony's  service,  these 
relatives  should  be  maintained  while  unable  to  provide  for  them- 
selves. 

The  first  national  law  on  pensions  was  passed  August  26,  1776, 
long  before  the  independence  of  the  Colonies  was  established.  This 
law  provided  half  pay  for  life  or  during  disability  to  any  officer, 
soldier,  or  sailor  losing  a  limb  in  any  engagement,  or  being  so  dis- 
abled in  the  service  of  the  United  States  as  to  render  him  incapable 
of  earning  a  livelihood.  On  August  24,  1780,  a  resolution  was 
adopted  extending  the  above  half -pay  provision  to  the  widows  or 
orphan  children  of  such  officers  as  had  died  or  should  die  in  the 
service.  This  was  the  first  national  law  in  behalf  of  widows  and 
orphans.  On  April  23,  1782,  Congress  provided  that  soldiers  who 
were  sick  or  wounded  or  unfit  for  duty  should  receive  a  discharge 
and  be  pensioned  at  the  rate  of  $5  per  month. 

525  (5) 


6 

It  is,  therefore,  evident  that  the  feeling  that  soldiers  incapacitated 
in  the  service  of  the  Government  should  be  maintained  thereafter  at 
the  expense  of  the  Government  is  not  of  recent  growth,  but  existed 
in  the  very  early  days  of  the  colonization  of  this  country. 

2.  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN— BEGINNING  AND  DURATION. 

The  War  with  Spain  began,  officially,  on  April  21, 1898,  and  ceased, 
officially,  on  April  11,  1899.  Actual  hostilities  were  in  progress  be- 
tween the  land  forces  during  this  period  as  follows: 

Cuba,  June  24  to  July  11,  1898. 

Philippine  Islands,  July  31  to  August  13,  1898. 

Porto  Rico,  July  25  to  August  12,  1898. 

On  February  4, 1899,  the  Philippine  insurrection  began  and  hostili- 
ties continued  until  April  27,  1902.  During  this  period  the  Boxer 
outbreak  in  China  occurred,  necessitating  combined  operations  on  the 
part  of  the  powers  concerned  for  the  relief  of  their  legations  at 
Peking.  The  actual  hostilities  in  which  our  land  forces  took  part 
in  this  campaign  lasted  from  July  13  to  August  13,  1900. 

It  thus  appears  that  active  hostilities  participated  in  by  our  troops 
were  in  progress  from  June  24,  1898,  to  April  27,  1902,  a  period  of 
3  years,  10  months,  and  6  days  (1,401  days).  The  Philippine  in- 
surrection ended  officially  on  July  4,  1902.  The  official  period  of 
hostilities,  then,  extended  from  the  beginning  of  the  War  with  Spain 
to  the  end  of  the  Philippine  insurrection,  a  period  of  4  years,  2 
months,  and  14  days  (1,535  days). 

In  the  records  of  the  Bureau  of  Pensions  this  entire  period  is 
considered,  so  far  as  pensions  are  concerned,  as  the  War  with  Spain, 
and  all  applications  for  pensions  for  disabilities  incurred  during  the 
period  from  April  21,  1898,  to  July  4,  1902,  are  credited  'to  the 
War  with  Spain. 

3.  FORCES  EMPLOYED. 

The  first  Volunteer  regiment  for  service  in  the  War  with  Spain 
was  mustered  into  the  service  of  the  United  States  on  May  1,  1898, 
and  the  last  Volunteer  (United  States)  regiment  was  mustered  out 
of  service  on  July  25,  1901.  There  were  thus  Volunteers  in  service 
continuously  for  a  period  of  3  years,  2  months,  and  25  days  (1,181 
days). 

At  first  glance  it  would  appear  that  the  number  of  troops  em- 
ployed in  the  War  with  Spain  could  easily  be  ascertained  from 
official  records.  This  is,  however,  far  from  the  truth.  For  the  pur- 
poses of  this  paper  we  must  know  the  number  of  individuals  em- 
ployed during  the  official  period  of  the  war  in  order  to  ascertain  the 
number  of  pensionable  persons  coming  into  existence  during  that 
period.     A  man  who  has  served  an  enlistment  in  one  organization 

525 


7 

and  then  reenlisted  in  that  or  some  other  organization  constitutes 
one  possible  pensionable  individual.  But  our  records  may  show  this 
individual  as  two^  or  even  more,  since  no  tabulations  have  yet  been 
made  which  will  show  how  many  of  the  reenlistments  in  the  Regular 
Army  were  by  individuals  who  had  had  previous  service  in  some 
organization  during  the  period  covered  by  the  War  with  Spain. 
Nor  has  any  tabulation  been  yet  made  that  will  show  how  many 
men  enlisting  in  the  Regular  Army  had  had  previous  service  in  the 
Volunteers,  nor  men  enlisting  in  the  Volunteers  who  had  had  pre- 
vious service  in  the  Regular  Army  or  Volunteers.  So  it  is  evident 
that  it  wall  be  impossible,  with  the  data  available,  to  ascertain  ex- 
actly how  many  individuals  were  employed  in  the  War  with  Spain. 
To  take  the  total  enlistments  and  reenlistments  for  the  Regular 
Army  the  force  in  service  on  May  1,  1898,  the  totals  for  the  Volun- 
teers as  shown  by  the  muster-out  rolls,  would  give  us  a  total  of 
451,970,  which  is,  of  course,  vastly  in  excess  of  the  number  of  indi- 
viduals employed  in  the  War  with  Spain. 

The  published  reports  of  the  Bureau  of  Pensions  give  an  estimate 
of  the  individuals  employed  in  the  land  forces  in  the  War  with 
Spain  as  follows: 

War  with  Spain   (proper) 312,000 

Philippine  insurrection 139,  438 

Boxer  trouble  in  China 6,  713 

As  no  tabulations  covering  this  subject  have  yet  been  made  in  the 
office  of  The  Adjutant  General  it  is  not  known  by  what  method 
these  figures  were  arrived  a,t.  The  total,  458,151,  is  undoubtedly  too 
great.  Even  if  we  deduct  the  6,713  men  credited  to  the  "  Boxer '' 
troubles  in  China  (all  of  whom  are  accounted  for,  of  course,  in  the 
Philippine  force)  we  will  have  a  total  of  452,561,  which  is  still 
much  too  great. 

4.  TOTAL   ENLISTMENTS   AND   REENLISTMENTS— NUMBER   OF 
INDIVIDUALS  IN  SERVICE. 

From  the  published  records  of  The  Adjutant  General's  Office  we 
find  the  following: 

{a)  Regular  Army  enlistments  and  reenlistments: 

May  1,  1898,  to  June  30,  1898 18,  880 

June  30,  1898,  to  June  30,  1899 62,  175 

June  30,  1899,  to  June  30,  1900 19,549 

June  30,  1900,  to  June  30,  1001 22,  479 

June  30,  1901,  to  June  30,  1902 36.  964 

Total  enlistments  and  reenlistments 160,  047 

Strength  Regular  Army  May  1,  1898 30,  268 

Total  Regular  Army 190,  315 

But  we  know  that  this  number  does  not  give  us  the  actual  number 
of  individuals  employed  in  the  Regular  Army,  since  it  contains 

C25 


8 

reenlistments  and  a  certain  number  of  men  who  had  seen  previous 
service  in  the  1898  Volunteers.  Without  tabulated  data  we  can  only 
guess  at  what  the  actual  number  of  individuals  serving  in  the 
Regular  Army  during  the  period  of  the  War  with  Spain  really  was ; 
but  it  is  believed  that  even  a  guess  will  bring  us  nearer  the  truth 
than  to  take  the  figures  as  they  stand. 

The  strength  of  the  Regular  Army  on  May  1,  1898,  was  30,268. 
The  total  number  of  enlistments  and  reenlistments  between  May  1 
and  June  30,  1898,  was  18,880.  This  gives  us  a  total  for  the  Regular 
Army  on  June  30,  1898,  counting  enlistments  and  reenlistments, 
of  49,148.  The  total  enlistments  and  reenlistments  between  June 
30,  1898,  and  June  30,  1902,  was  141,167.  This  number  includes 
many  reenlistments  and  a  certain  number  of  ex- Volunteers  of  1898. 
From  the  records  of  The  Adjutant  General's  Office  we  find  that  the 
largest  force  in  the  Regular  Army  for  any  one  month  during  the 
period  between  June  30,  1898,  and  June  30,  1902,  was  88,362.  While 
this  number  contains  many  reenlistments  and  a  certain  proportion 
of  ex-Volunteers  of  1898,  there  were  also  during  this  period  a  total 
of  78,561  men  killed,  died,  discharged,  retired,  and  deserted,  whose 
places  had  to  be  filled.  It  seems  probable,  therefore,  that  if  we 
estimate  that  two-thirds  of  the  men  enlisted  in  the  Regular  Army 
during  this  period  represent  the  number  of  individuals  in  service 
who  had  not  had  previous  service  during  the  War  with  Spain,  we 
will  be  not  far  from  the  truth.  This  would  give  us  94,112.  We 
would  have,  therefore,  for  the  Regular  Army  for  the  period  from 
April  21,  1898,  to  July  4,  1902,  a  total  of  about  143,360  individuals. 

Another  method  of  estimating  the  number  of  individuals  employed 
in  the  Regular  Army  was  as  follows : 


Original  enl 


Original  enl 


stments  of  1896  to  serve  until  1898-99 5,  676 


Original  enlistments  of  1897  to  serve  until  1899-1900 5,  332 

Original  enlistments  of  1898  to  serve  until  1900-1 24,  248 

Original  enlistments  of  1899  to  serve  until  1901-2 43,  780 

Original  enlistments  of  1900  to  serve  until  1902-3 15,  588 


stments  of  1901  to  serve  until  1903-4 25,  688 


Original  enlistments  of  1902  to  serve  until  1904-5 26,  026 

Total 146,  338 

A  mean  of  the  results  arrived  at  by  the  two  methods  would  give 
us  144,849,  which  is  perhaps  nearer  the  truth  than  either  result 
taken  separately  and  as  near  the  actual  number  as  we  can  arrive 
with  the  data  now  at  our  disposal. 

When  we  come  to  the  Volunteers  our  data  are  better,  but  still 
by  no  means  complete. 

The  muster-out  rolls  of  volunteer  organizations  show  the  number 
of  all  individuals  who  at  any  time  served  therein. 

(6)  Volunteers  of  1898. 

As  there  were  no  reenlistments  in  the  1898  volunteer  organizations, 
and  as  there  were  no  men  in  these  organizations  who  had  had  pre- 

525 


vious  service  in  the  War  with  Spain,  the  totals  as  shown  by  the 
muster-out  rolls  will  give  us  the  number  of  individuals  serving 
therein.    This  number  was  223,235. 

(c)  Volunteers  of  1899. 

The  muster-out  rolls  of  the  organizations  of  1899  (the  United 
States  Volunteers)  show  a  total  of  38,420  men  who  served  in  these 
organizations.  However,  this  number  contains  a  large  number  of 
men  who  had  had  previous  service  in  the  War  with  Spain,  so  that 
we  can  not  use  this  figure  as  it  stands. 

It  is  a  matter  of  common  knowledge  that  there  was  a  large  number 
of  men  in  these  organizations  who  had  previously  served  either  in 
the  1898  volunteers  or  in  the  Regular  Army  during  the  War  with 
Spain  period.  Just  what  this  number  was  we  have  no  means. of  tell- 
ing with  certainty,  since  no  tabulation  from  the  records  on  the  sub- 
ject has  yet  been  made.  In  the  report  of  The  Adjutant  General's 
Office  for  1901  it  is  estimated  that  at  least  65  per  cent  of  the  volun- 
teers raised  in  1899  (United  States  Volunteers)  had  had  previous 
service  during  the  War  with  Spain.  If  we  accept  this  statement  as 
a-ccurate  we  will  have  to  deduct  the  number  corresponding  to  this 
percentage  from  the  total  number  of  1899  volunteers.  This  would, 
then,  give  us  only  13,447  individuals  in  these  organizations  who  had 
not  seen  previous  service  and  who  had,  therefore,  not  already  been 
counted  either  in  the  Regular  Army  or  in  the  1898  volunteers. 

As  a  result  of  all  our  estimates  and  guesses,  then,  we  have  the 
following : 

Total  number  of  individuals  employed  in  the  Re.£nilar  Army 144,  849 

Totnl  numl)er  of  individuals  employed  in  the  1898  Volunteers 223,  235 

Total  number  of  individuals  employed  in  the  1899  Volunteers 13,  447 

Total  for  tlie  War  with  Spain 381,  531 

The  charge  has  been  made  many  times  that  the  number  of  applica- 
tions for  pensions  filed  by  survivors  of  the  War  with  Spain  or  by 
their  dependents  was  unduly  large  in  comparison  with  the  forces 
emplo3^ed  and  with  the  battle  casualties.  Let  us  see  to  what  extent 
this  charge  is  justified.  In  order  to  make  any  comparisons  with  other 
wars  we  must  endeavor  to  arrive  at  the  total  number  of  possible 
pensioners. 

5.  NUMBER   OF   INDIVIDUALS   WHO  ACQUIRED   AN  ACTUAL  PEN- 
SIONABLE STATUS  BY  DATE  OF  DISCHARGE  OR  MUSTER-OUT. 

It  is  evident  that  the  "dependents", of  those  men  who  were  killed 
or  who  died  in  service  and  those  men  themselves  who  were  dis- 
charged for  disability  or  found  with  disability  upon  muster-out, 
acquired  an  actual  pensionable  status. 
30669°— No.  525—16 2 


10 

The  records  of  The  Adjutant  General's  Office  show  that  the  total 
mortality  from  all  causes  for  the  period  May  1,  1898,  to  June  30, 
1902,  was: 

Regular  Army 5,  870 

Volunteers 6,  025 

Total 11,  895 

A  computation  made  in  the  Office  of  the  Commissioner  of  Pensions 
in  connection  with  the  records  of  the  War  of  the  Rebellion  shows 
that  36  per  cent  of  those  dying  did  not  leave  pensionable  depend- 
ents. As  this  percentage  will  probably  hold  good  for  the  War  with 
Spain,  we  must  deduct  from  the  above  total  of  those  who  died  in 
service  4,282,  in  order  to  ascertain  the  number  of  individuals  who 
attained  a  pensionable  status  by  date  of  discharge  or  muster-out. 

Referring  again  to  the  records  of  The  Adjutant  General's  Office 
we  find  that  the  number  of  men  discharged  for  disability  during 
this  period  was : 

Regular  Army 8, 103 

Volunteers 4,  862 

Total 12,  965 

The  number  of  1899  Volunteers  found  with  disability  at  date  of 
muster-out  was  586.  The  records  do  not  show  the  results  of  the 
examinations  of  the  1898  Volunteers  at  muster-out. 

The  above  figures,  then,  will  give  us  a  total  of  21,164  persons  who 
had  attained  an  actual  pensionable  status  at  date  of  discharge  or 
muster-out. 

There  were  wounded  during  the  period  under  consideration  2,645 
Regulars  and  2,032  Volunteers.  In  figuring  the  number  acquiring  an 
actual  pensionable  status  this  figure  is  disregarded,  because  it  is 
not  known  how  many  of  this  number  are  included  in  those  discharged 
for  disability  or  how  many  wounds  constituted  actual  pensionable 
disability. 

6.  NUMBER  OF  PENSION  APPLICATIONS  FILED. 

Table  1  shows  the  number  of  applications  received  on  account  of, 
all  wars  from  June  30,  1899,  to  June  30,  1905.  Also  the  number  of j 
pensions  granted  during  this  period.  The  total  number  of  applica- 
tions received  for  this  period  was  373,083,  and  the  pensions  granted,! 
297,222,  a  percentage  of  pensions  granted  to  applications  filed  of] 
79.6  per  cent. 

Table  5  gives  the  number  of  applications  filed  on  account  of  the! 
War  with  Spain  credited  to  Army  invalids  and  to  widows,  etc.,  from! 
June  30,  1899,  to  June  30,  1905,  and  for  the  War  of  the  Rebellion,] 
from  June  30,  1862,  to  June  30,  1868.     We  can  therefore  obtain  com- 

526 


11 

parative  figures  for  these  two  wars  for  the  first  seven  years  after 
the  beginning  of  hostilities  in  each. 

(o)   War  of  the  Rebellion  (first  seven  years)  : 
Claims  filed— 

Invalids 134,  300 

Widows,  etc 162,454 

Total 296,  754 

Claims  granted — 

Invalids 84, 427 

Widows,  etc 116,499 

Total 200,  926 

Percentage  of  pensions  granted  to  claims  filed,  67.7  per  cent, 
(b)    War  with  Spain   (first  seven  years)  : 
Claims  filed — 

Invalids 69,  687 

Widows,  etc 10,  248 

Total 79,  935 

Claims  granted — 

Invalids 18,  510 

Widows,  etc 5,416 

Total 23,926 

Percentage  of  pensions  granted  to  claims  filed,  29.0  per  cent. 
The  percantage  of  invalid  pensions  granted  to  claims  filed  was  : 

(a)  War  of  the  Rebellion,  per  cent 62.  8 

(6)    War  with  Spain,  per  cent 26.5 

The  percentage  of  widows,  etc.,  pensions  granted  to  claims  filed  was  : 

(o)    War  of  the  Rebellion,  per  cent 71.7 

(b)  War  with  Spain,  per  cent 52.  8 

Among  the  causes  for  this  great  difference  between  claims  filed 
and  pensions  granted  the  two  which  are,  undoubtedly,  of  most  im- 
portance are: 

(1)  That  the  Army  in  the  War  with  Spain  constituted  only  a 
very  small  percentage  of  the  total  population,  while  in  the  War  of 
the  Eebellion  it  constituted  a  very  large  one,  and  (2)  that  maAy 
Spanish  War  soldiers  and  their  dependents  claimed  pensions  who 
were  not  entitled  to  them.  This  latter  fact  will  appear  more  clearly 
as  we  proceed. 

Table  3  shows  the  applications  received  year  by  year  from  June 
80,  1899,  to  June  30,  1913,  credited  to  the  War  with  Spain.  This 
includes  both  the  Army  and  the  Navy,  but  as  the  number  for  the 
Navy  is  undoubtedly  small  it  may  be  disregarded. 

It  is  a  remarkable  fact,  as  will  be  seen  from  the  table,  that  the 
number  of  claims  filed  up  to  June  30,  1899,  only  14  months  after 
hostilities  began,  was  larger  by  2,829  than  for  any  other  year.  The 
next  largest  number  was  for  1901,  14,157.  This  latter  year,  of  course, 
included  many  of  those  mustered  out  of  the  1899  Volunteers.  With- 
out doubt  the  vast  majority  of  the  applications  filed  during  1899 
pertain  to  the  period  covered  by  the  hostilities  with  Spain,  proper — 
April  21,  1898,  to  April  11,  1899.  Of  this  number,  also  it  is  evident 
that  few  came  from  men  serving  in  the  Philippine  Islands,  since 
almost  the  entire  Infantry  of  the  Regular  Army  was  in  the  Philip- 

525 


12 

pine  Islands  by  June  30,  1899,  and  the  1899  Volunteers  had  not  yet 
been  organized.  In  addition  to  this,  those  organizations  of  the  1898 
Volunteers  sent  to  the  Philippine  Islands  in  the  early  expeditions  had 
not  yet  been  returned  to  the  United  States.  While  our  information 
is  by  no  means  complete,  we  can  find  the  approximate  number  to 
whom  the  claims  filed  up  to  June  30,  1899,  should  be  credited. 

From  what  has  been  said  above,  it  is  evident  that  the  vast  major- 
ity of  the  16,986  claims  filed  by  June  30,  1899,  must  have  come  from 
(1)  the  1898  Volunteers  (less  the  organizations  of  this  force  actually 
in  the  Philippine  Islands),  (2)  the  men  of  those  regular  organiza- 
tions serving  in  the  Philippine  Islands  who  were  discharged  for  any 
cause  before  their  organizations  were  sent  to  the  Philippines,  (3)  the 
men  of  the  regular  regiments  which  did  not  go  to  the  Philippine 
Islands  and  were  either  still  in  service  or  who  had  been  discharged 
and  were  in  the  United  States,  (4)  also  members  of  the  organiza- 
tions of  the  1898  Volunteers  serving  in  the  Philippines  who  had  been 
discharged  before  June  30,  1899,  (5)  also  the  dependents  of  those 
men  who  had  died  in  service  before  June  30,  1899.  Let  us  see  if 
we  can  make  any  estimate  of  what  this  number  of  possible  appli-« 
cants  was. 

The  total  regular  force  which  served  in  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico 
during  the  hostilities  with  Spain  was  approximately  17,688.  Of 
this  number  it  is  estimated  that  only  about  25  per  cent  went  to 
the  Philippine  Islands  with  their  organizations  in  the  early  part  of 
1899,  the  remaining  75  per  cent  having  either  died  or  been  discharged 
for  various  reasons.  Thus  about  13,251  men  of  the  Cuban  and 
Porto  Rican  forces  (or  their  dependents)  were  in  a  position  to  file 
applications  for  pensions  by  the  date  in  question.  Of  the  1898 
Volunteers  there  were  18,819  serving  with  their  organizations  in 
the  Philippine  Islands.  This  number  deducted  from  the  total 
number  of  1898  Volunteers  leaves,  in  the  United  States,  201,416. 
The  number  belonging  to  the  various  organizations  serving  in  the 
Philippines  who  died  or  were  discharged  before  June  30,  1899.  and 
who  (or  their  dependents)  Avere  in  a  position  to  file  claims  for  pen- 
sions, was  6,872.  Combining  these  figures  we  have  13.251  Regulars 
and  211,288  Volunteers,  a  total  of  224,539  individuals  who,  on  or 
before  June  30,  1899,  were  in  a  position  to  file  applications  for  pen- 
sions. Since  the  number  of  applications  filed  up  to  that  date  was 
16,986,  the  percentage  of  applications  filed  to  the  total  number  of 
individuals  in  a  position  to  apply  for  pensions  was  7.5  per  cent, 
certainly  a  very  large  percentage  within  14  months  after  hostilities 
had  begun. 

In  connection  with  the  large  percentage  of  Spanish  War  soldiers 
who  filed  applications  for  pensions,  the  report  of  the  Commissioner 
of  Pensions,  dated  September  10,  1901,  says: 

525 


13 

Much  criticism  has  been  visited  upon  Spanish  War  soldiers  by  reason  of  the 
promptness  witli  whicli  they  filed  claims  for  disal>ilitic'S  and  by  reason  of  the 
large  percentage  of  claims  filed  considering  their  short  service  and  the  al)sence 
of  battle-field  casualties  as  compared  with  the  Civil  War.  Only  a  little  over  three 
years  have  passed  since  hostilities  l)Ogan.  and  yet  claims  amounting  to  about  20 
per  cent  of  the  number  of  men  enlisted  for  the  Spanish  War  have  been  filed. 

It  is  believed  that  the  percentage  given  by  the  Commissioner  of 
Pensions  is  too  large.  Apparently  he  has  considered  only  the  1898 
Volunteers,  Avhich  would  give  a  percentage  of  19.3,  which  is,  he  says, 
nearly  20  per  cent.  There  were,  however,  a  large  number  of  men  in 
addition  to  the  1898  Volunteers  who  were  in  a  position  to  file  applica- 
tions which  the  commissioner  does  not  take  into  account.  However, 
that  the  percentage  of  claims  filed  for  pensions  was  much  larger  than 
it  should  have  been  there  is  no  doubt. 

The  Bureau  of  Pensions  has  roughly  tabulated  the  number  of  ap- 
plications filed  from  10  of  the  1898  Volunteer  regiments  up  to  June 
30,  1900.  Table  4  shows  this,  together  with  other  data,  with  respect 
to  these  regiments.  The  total  number  of  claims  filed  from  these  or- 
ganizations was,  roughly,  6,000,  or  19.9  per  cent  of  the  total  number 
of  applications  filed  for  the  War  with  Spain  up  to  that  date.  The 
percentage  of  the  strength  of  these  10  regiments  to  the  strength  of  the 
1898  Volunteers  was  5.8  per  cent. 

By  reference  to  Tables  4  and  5  w^e  find  that  these  10  regiments 
filed  a  total  of  6,000  applications  up  to  June  30,  1900,  out  of  a  total 
number  of  applications  credited  to  the  War  with  Spain  to  that  date 
of  30,025.  The  total  number  of  individuals  enlisted  in  these  10  regi- 
ments was  13,076,  or  about  4  per  cent  of  the  number  of  individuals 
employed  in  the  War  with  Spain  up  to  that  date.  That  is,  with  a 
strength  of  only  about  4  per  cent  these  regiments  filed  applications 
amounting  to  19.9  per  cent  of  the  total  number  of  applications  filed 
up  to  June  30,  1900.  Only  three  of  these  regiments  saw  any  active 
service,  and  of  these  only  9.6  per  cent  of  their  total  strength  acquired 
a  possible  pensionable  status  by  reason  of  death  or  discharge  for  dis- 
ability. Yet  their  percentage  of  applications  filed  to  their  strength 
was  47.4  per  cent.  In  the  seven  regiments  which  saw  no  active  serv- 
ice, 4.3  per  cent  had  acquired  a  pensionable  status  by  date  of  dis- 
charge and  are  credited  w'ith  45.2  per  cent  of  the  total  number  of 
applications  filed  by  the  10  regiments.  That  is,  while  5.3  per  cent 
more  per  total  strength  in  those  regiments  which  had  had  active 
service  acquired  an  actual  pensionable  status  by  date  of  muster  out, 
their  actual  applications  for  pensions  amounted  to  only  2.2  per  cent 
more  than  those  regiments  which  had  seen  no  active  service  at  all. 
It  is  evident,  then,  that  so  far  as  these  particular  regiments  are  con- 
cerned, the  number  of  killed,  died  of  wounds,  and  wounded  had  little, 
if  any,  bearing  on  the  number  of  applications  for  pensions  filed. 
Nor  is  it  believed  that  these  particular  regiments  differed  materially 

625 


14 

from  other  regiments  of  the  1898  Volunteers.  It  seems  impossible 
then,  to  escape  the  conclusion  that  the  1898  Volunteers  were  very 
prompt  to  file  applications  for  pensions,  and  that  an  unusually  large 
percentage  of  them  to  total  strength  did  file  them.  To  those  who 
were  familiar  with  the  conditions  obtaining  at  the  time  of  muster- 
in  and  muster-out  of  these  organizations,  as  the  Commissioner  of 
Pensions  remarks  in  the  above-mentioned  report,  the  cause  for  this 
state  of  affairs  is  not  difficult  to  find.  Before  the  Volunteers  were 
mustered  in,  they  were  examined  physically,  and  it  was  explained 
that  one  of  the  reasons  for  the  examination  was  to  prevent  the  sol- 
dier from  filing  a  claim  for  pension  for  a  disability  supposed  to  have 
been  contracted  in  service  when  he  really  had  the  disability  before 
he  entered  the  service.  The  impression  left  on  the  mind  of  most 
men  was,  undoubtedly,  that  the  Government  expected  them  to  make 
an  application  for  pension  eventually,  else  why  this  care  to  safe- 
guard itself  against  false  claims.  In  addition  to  this  they  were  all,  of 
course,  familiar  with  the  fact  that  a  large  percentage  of  the  soldiers 
of  the  Civil  War  were  drawing  pensions.  But  what  brought  the  ap- 
plications in  so  promptly  was  this :  At  every  camp  where  Volunteers 
were  mustered  out,  a  great  swarm  of  agents  lay  in  wait  and,  in  many 
instances,  actually  fought  with  each  other  for  the  privilege  of  han- 
dling the  application  for  a  pension,  which  they  used  every  endeavor 
to  persuade  each  discharged  soldier  to  make.  These  agents  received, 
at  this  period,  $25  for  each  pension  claim  which  was  allowed.  As 
the  soldier  knew  that  the  law  provided  that  he  should  receive  a  pen- 
sion should  he  have  contracted  any  disability  in  service,  and  believ- 
ing that  the  Government  expected  him  to  make  an  application  should 
he  be  entitled  to  it,  it  was  probably  not  a  very  difficult  matter  for 
these  agents  to  persuade  many  of  the  discharged  men  to  try  for  a 
pension  whether  he  was  suffering  from  a  disability  or  not.  The 
wonder  is  that  more  men  did  not  apply  for  pensions  than  actually 
did.  That  thousands  applied  without  proper  grounds  is  evidenced 
by  the  fact  that  the  percentage  of  Army  disahility  pensions  granted 
to  claims  filed  for  the  period  to  June  30,  1905,  credited  to  the  War 
with  Spain,  was  only  26.5  per  cent,  while  the  percentage  of  pensions 
granted  to  claims  filed  for  all  other  classes  for  the  period  above  cited 
was  91.5  per  cent. 

7.  NUMBER  OF  PENSIONERS  ON  THE  ROLLS. 

Table  6  shows  the  total  number  of  pensioners  on  the  rolls  credited 
to  all  wars  for  each  year  from  June  30,  1899,  to  June  30,  1914,  and 
the  number  of  pensioners  on  the  roll  for  the  same  period  credited 
to  the  War  with  Spain. 

The  total  number  of  pensioners  of  all  classes  and  for  all  wars  onj 
the  rolls  on  June  30,  1914,  was  785,239.    The  total  number  creditec 

626 


15 

to  the  War  with  Spain  on  this  date  was  28,910.  The  number  of 
invalid  pensioners  credited  to  the  War  with  Spain  was  24,250,  The 
number  of  invalid  pensioners  credited  to  the  Army  alone  for  the  War 
with  Spain  was  23,511  and  of  dependents  4,403.  For  this  period  the 
highest  number  of  invalid  Army  pensioners  was  in  1914,  23,416.  The 
highest  number  of  dependent  Army  pensioners  was  in  1909,  4,845. 
The  greatest  annual  increase  for  pensioners  for  the  War  with  Spain 
was  in  1901,  4,658.  The  yearly  gain  for  total  pensioners,  War  with 
Spain,  has  continuously  decreased  since  1908.  In  1914  there  were 
87  less  pensioners  on  the  rolls  for  the  War  with  Spain  than  in  1913. 
There  is  a  continuous  increase  in  the  number  of  invalid  pensioners 
for  this  war  from  1899  to  1915.  The  increase  in  1915,  however,  was 
only  124. 

After  giving  this  brief  resume  of  the  condition  of  the  Spanish  War 
pension  rolls  it  will  be  necessary  to  see  if  we  can  make  some  sort  of 
comparison  of  the  proportion  of  pensioners  on  the  rolls  to  the  number 
of  individuals  employed  in  the  last  two  years. 

8.  PERCENTAGE  OF  PENSIONERS  ON  THE  ROLLS  16  YEARS-  AFTER 
THE  BEGINNING  OF  HOSTILITIES  FOR  (a)  WAR  OF  THE  RE- 
BELLION AND  (b)  WAR  WITH  SPAIN. 

To  a  greater  degree  than  we  found  it  to  be  in  the  War  with  Spain 
is  the  number  of  individuals  employed  in  the  War  of  the  Rebellion 
a  matter  of  estimate.  Many  estimates  have  been  made,  some  of  them 
differing  very  widely.  That  made  in  the  report  of  the  Commissioner 
of  Pensions  for  1882  is  probably  as  reliable  as  any  of  them,  and  we 
will  use  the  figure  deduced  in  that  report  for  the  purposes  of  the 
following  computations.  The  report  gives  the  number  of  individuals 
employed  as  2,046,969.  To  this  figure  is  added  the  16,442  men  in 
service  in  the  Regular  Army  and  Navy  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war, 
giving  a  total  of  individuals  employed  of  2,063,391.  This  figure,  of 
course,  includes  the  Navy,  but  as  there  are  no  data  available  which 
will  give  us  the  number  of  individuals  employed  in  the  Navy,  the 
total  figure  will  have  to  be  employed  in  the  following  computation. 

For  the  War  with  Spain  we  will  use  the  figure  deduced  in  section  4 
of  this  paper,  381,531.  This,  of  course,  includes  only  the  Army,  but 
as  we  have  no  data  on  the  Navy  this  figure  will  have  to  be  used. 

In  order  that  the  comparison  may  be  as  fair  as  possible,  a  period 
has  been  selected  which  is  the  same  number  of  years  after  the  begin- 
ning of  hostilities  for  each  war.  The  number  of  years  selected  is  16, 
which  will  give  us  the  year  1877  for  the  War  of  the  Rebellion  and 
1914  for  the  War  with  Spain.  As  no  "  service  "  pension  laws  had  been 
passed  up  to  1877,  the  laws  under  which  pensions  were  granted  for 
both  wars  were  practically  the  same  at  the  period  selected  for  each 
war. 


16 

{a)  War  of  the  Eebellion. 

The  total  number  of  pensioners  borne  on  the  roll  on  June  J^O,  1877, 
was  211,693.  This  includes  all  pensioners  on  the  rolls  except  the 
pensioners  for  the  War  of  1812.  A  certain  number  must  be  de- 
ducted, therefore,  for  the  War  with  Mexico  and  the  Indian  wars. 
In  no  place  in  the  report  of  the  Commissioner  of  Pensions  for  1877 
does  this  number  appear.  In  House  Report  No.  64,  Forty-fifth  Con- 
gress, second  session  (1878),  an  estimate  of  the  number  of  pensioners 
for  the  War  with  Mexico  is  given  as  11,000.  In  the  report  of  the 
Commissioner  of  Pensions  for  June  30.  1914,  the  number  of  sur- 
vivors for  the  War  with  Mexico  and  for  the  Indian  wars  is  given  as 
practically  the  same.  It  is  probable,  therefore,  that  there  were  about 
the  same  number  for  each  of  these  wars  on  the  roll  in  1877.  If,  then, 
we  deduct  20,000  from  the  total  of  214,693  as  given  above,  we  will 
prohahly  come  very  near  the  number  of  pensioners  for  the  War  of 
the  Rebellion  borne  on  the  rolls  on  June  30,  1877.  This  will  give  us 
a  figure  of  194,693.  | 

Using  this  figure  will  give  us  a  percentage  of  pensioners  to  num-  " 
ber  of  individuals  employed  of  9.5  at  a  period  of  16  years  after  the 
beginning  of  hostilities. 
(b)   War  with  Spain. 

The  total  number  of  pensioners  on  the  rolls  for  the  War  with  Spain 
on  June  30,  1914,  was  27,915.  This  would  give  us  a  percentage  of  pen- 
sioners to  the  number  of  individuals  employed  of  7.3  at  a  period  16 
years  after  the  beginning  of  hostilities- 
It  would  appear,  then,  that,  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  indi- 
viduals employed  (as  nearly  as  this  number  can  be  estimated),  the 
number  of  pensioners  on  the  roll  for  the  War  with  Spain  16  years 
after  the  beginning  of  hostilities  was  less  than  that  for  the  AVar  of 
the  Rebellion  at  the  same  length  of  time  after  the  beginning  of 
hostilities  for  the  war,  the  percentages  standing  9.5  for  the  War  of 
the  Rebellion  and  7.3  for  the  War  with  Spain. 


9.  AMOUNTS  DISBURSED  FOR  PENSIONS. 


1 


The  amount  disbursed  for  pensions  for  the  War  of  the  Rebellion 
for  the  year  ending  June  30,  1914,  was  $163,377,551.53.  The  amount 
disbursed  for  pensions  for  the  War  with  Spain  for  this  year  was 
$3,907,510.53. 

The  total  amount  disbursed  for  pensions  proper  for  all  wars  up  to 
June  30,  1914,  was  $4,633,511,926.71,  and  the  total  cost  of  adminis- 
tration was  $127,938,472.79,  or  a  total  cost  to  the  Government  for 
our  pension  system  of  $4,761,450,399.50.  (Report,  Commissioner  of 
Pensions,  1914.) 

625 


17 

10.  PROBABLE  FUTURE  COST  OF  THE  PENSION  LIST  FOR  THE  WAR 

WITH  SPAIN. 

It  only  remains  to  endeavor  to  make  some  estimate  as  to  what  the 
future  cost  of  the  pension  system  for  the  War  with  Spain  is  likely 
to  be. 

In  the  nature  of  things  this  must  be  a  very  rough  sort  of  a  guess. 
By  the  use  of  the  "  mortuary  tables  "  in  common  use  by  life  insurance 
companies  we  can  ascertain  the  approximate  date  when  the  last 
survivor  will  have  died,  since  we  know  the  average  age  at  which 
they  entered  the  service.  But  we  have  no  such  information  with 
regard  to  the  ages  of  the  dependents.  Again,  no  one  can  forecast 
the  action  of  Congress  in  regard  to  pensions.  Up  to  this  date  no 
"service"  law  has  been  passed  for  the  War  with  Spain,  and  it  is 
possible  that  none  will  be.  If  we  judge  the  future  action  of  Congress 
by  what  its  action  has  been  in  the  past,  however,  we  are  justified  in 
expecting  that  such  action  will  eventually  be  taken. 

For  the  wars  prior  to  the  War  with  Spain  service-pension  provi- 
sions were  passed  as  follows:  War  of  1812  (14  days'  service),  on 
March  9,  1878;  War  with  Mexico  (60  days'  service),  on  January  29, 
1887;  War  of  the  Kebellion  (90  days'  service),  on  May  11,  1912. 

That  is,  in  the  case  of  these  three  wars  service-pension  provisions 
were  passed  an  average  of  50  years  after  the  ending  of  hostilities. 
The  sentiments  of  our  people  with  respect  to  the  pension  system  and 
political  methods  remaining  the  same,  we  may,  then,  reasonably 
expect  a  service-pension  bill  for  the  survivors  of  the  War  with  Spain 
to  be  passed  about,  say,  1950.  If  we  grant  that  this  will  occur,  we 
can  make  at  least  a  rough  estimate  of  the  number  of  survivors  who 
will  still  be  living  on  that  date  and  the  approximate  amount  that  the 
pension  list  will  cost. 

The  total  number  of  individuals  estimated  to  have  been  employed 
in  the  War  with  Spain  was  381,531.  From  this  number  we  must 
deduct  the  number  of  those  who  deserted  during  the  war,  since  neither 
they  nor  their  dependents  are  entitled  to  pensions.  This  number  was 
17,599.  This  will  leave  at  the  end  of  the  war  363,532  possible  pen- 
sioners. By  the  use  of  our  "  mortuary  tables "  we  will  find  that 
there  should  be  living  in  1950,  124,692  survivors,  since  238,840  will 
have  died.  However,  it  is  possible,  though  not  probable,  that  all 
of  these  survivors  (less  a  percentage  to  be  deducted  later)  will  leave 
surviving  pensionable  dependents.  A  calculation  made  by  the  Com- 
missioner of  Pensions  in  1882  in  connection  with  the  War  of  the 
Rebellion  shows  that  36  per  cent  of  those  dying  do  not  leave  pen- 
sionable dependents.  In  order,  then,  to  ascertain  the  number  of 
pensionable  individuals  living  in  1950  we  must  deduct  85,982  from 
this  total.  We  will  then  find  that  we  may  have  in  1950,  277,550  pos- 
sible pensioners  still  living.  However,  all  of  these  wiU  not  apply  for 
pensions,  nor  will  they  all  be  living. 

525 


18 


The  largest  amount  paid  out  for  pensions  for  the  War  of  the  Re- 
bellion in  any  one  year  was  in  the  year  1913.  So  that  52  years  after 
the  beginning  of  hostilities  the  "  high  tide  "  of  pension  disbursements 
was  reached  for  the  War  of  the  Rebellion.  In  that  year  the  total 
number  of  pensioners  on  the  roll  for  all  wars  was  820,200,  of  which 
number  762,331  were  credited  to  the  War  of  the  Rebellion,  which 
would  be  36.9  per  cent  of  the  total  number  of  individuals  employed 
in  that  war.  The  amount  disbursed  for  pensions  proper  for  the 
War  of  the  Rebellion  for  the  year  1913  was  $164,897,872.48,  which 
would  make  the  average  annual  value  of  a  pension  amount  to  $216.30. 
The  total  cost  for  administration  and  maintenance  of  the  pension 
system  for  the  year  1913  was  $2,543,246.39.  This  would  make  the 
per  capita  cost  per  pensioner  amount  to  $3.10  for  that  year. 

With  the  above  data  as  a  basis  we  can  roughly  calculate  the  cost 
of  the  War  with  Spain  pension  roll  52  years  after  the  beginning  of 
hostilities  in  that  war,  bearing  in  mind  that  we  are  supposing  that 
the  same  conditions  as  to  longevity  and  laws  will  obtain  as  have  been 
found  to  exist  for  the  War  of  Rebellion  pensioners. 

In  1950,  then,  we  would  have  140,785  pensioners  of  the  War  wit 
Spain  still  on  the  rolls.     To  them  would  be  paid  a  total  of  $30,451 
795.50  in  pensions.     The  cost  of  administration  and  maintenance 
for  the  War  with  Spain  for  this  year  would  amount  to  $436,433.50, 
making  a  total  disbursement   for  the  year   1950  for  this  war  of 
$30,888,229. 

On  the  same  basis,  then,  the  total  amount  disbursed  for  pensions 
for  the  War  with  Spain,  up  to  and  including  the  year  1950,  would 
be  $677,832,376.82,  and  for  administration  and  maintenance,  $10,242,- 
457.98,  which  would  make  a  total  cost  to  the  Government,  for  this  waFj 
to  and  including  1950,  of  $688,074,834.80. 

Table  1. — All  wars. 
Table  showing  the  total  number  of  applications  for  pensions  filedjj 
total  number  of  pensions  granted,  total  number  of  pensioners  on  the 
roll,  and  the  total  amount  paid  for  pensions  proper  on  June  30  oi 
each  year  from  1899  to  1914,  inclusive  (from  reports  of  the  Bureau 
of  Pensions)  : 


I 


Year. 

Applica- 
tions filed. 

Pensions 
granted. 

Total 
pensioners. 

Amount  paid 
for  pensions. 

1899 

53,881 
51,946 
58,373 
47, 965 
52, 325 
65, 794 
52,841 
(1) 

37,077 
40,645 
44, 868 
40, 173 
40,136 
44, 296 
50,027 

('^ 
(V 

991,519 
993, 529 
997, 735 
999, 446 
969, 545 
994, 762 
998, 441 
985,971 
967,371 
951,687 
946, 194 
921,083 
892, 098 
860,294 
820, 200 
785,239 

$138,355,052.95 

1900 

138, 462, 130. 65 

1901 

138,531,483.34 

1902 

137,504,267.99 

1903 

137, 759, 663. 71 

1904 

141,093,571.49 

1905 

141,142,861.33 

1906 

139, 000, 288. 25 

1907 

138,155,412.46 

1908 

153,093,086.27 

1909 

161,973,703.77 

lijlO 

159,974,056.08 

1911 

157,325,160.35 

1912 

152,986,433.72 

1913 

174,171,660.80 

1914 

172,417,646.26 

525 


*  No  data. 


19 


Table  2. — War  loith  Spain. 

Table  showing  applications  for  pensions  filed,  pensions  granted, 
and  number  of  pensioners  on  roll  on  June  30  of  each  year  from  1899 
to  1914,  inclusive,  for  the  Army  for  the  War  with  Spain  (from 
reports  of  Bureau  of  Pensions)  : 


Year. 


Applica- 
tions 
filed. 


Pensions 
granted. 


Number 
pension- 
ers. 


Paid  for  pen- 
sions. 


1899: 

Invalids 

Widows,  etc. 
1900: 

Invalids 

"Widows,  etc. 
1901: 

Invalids 

Widows,  etc. 
1902: 

Invalids 

Widows,  etc . 
1903: 

Invalids 

Widows,  etc. 
1901: 

Invalids 

Widows,  etc. 
1905: 

Invalids 

Widows,  etc . 
1906: 

Invalids 

AVidows,  etc. 
1907: 

Invalids 

Widows,  etc . 
1908: 

Invalids 

Widows,  etc. 
1909: 

Invalids 

Widows,  etc . 
1910: 

Invalids 

Widows,  etc. 
1911: 

Invalids 

Widows,  etc . 
1912: 

Invalids 

Widows,  etc. 
1913: 

Invalids 

Widows,  etc. 
1914: 

Invalids 

Widows,  etc.. 


15,009 
2,551 

12,038 
1,383 

12,814 
1,834 

10,210 
1,395 

7,728 
1,282 

6,152 
938 

5,736 
865 

?! 

(') 
(') 

(>) 
(') 

('^ 
(') 

(') 

(') 

(') 
(') 


0) 
(') 

(') 


125 
178 

801 
710 

2,795 
1,240 

3,441 
884 

3,415 
936 

4,013 

885 

3,920 
583 


(') 
(') 

u 

(') 


117 
165 

822 
845 

3,344 
1,981 

6,282 
2,727 

8,798 
3,488 

11,946 
4,187 

15, 138 
4,540 

17,038 
4,715 

18,393 
4,775 

19,857 
4,840 

21,264 

4,845 

22,063 
4,817 

22,644 
4,817 

23,097 
4,734 

23,416 
4,586 

23,512 
4,403 


S8, 
16, 

145, 
170, 

644, 
476, 

1,121, 

536, 

1,468, 
634, 

2, 147, 
825, 

2, 457, 
806, 

2,508, 
787, 

2,533, 
789, 

2,698, 
797, 


852.41 
972. 06 


460.54 
562. 64 


315.04 
914. 68 


499.79 
452.50 


368. 56 
126. 10 


332.08 
983. 17 


638. 71 
604.92 


428.09 
952.60 


410.75 
997. 06 


394.73 
024.38 


V  3, 820, 169.80 
js  3, 807, 919. 91 


2,999, 

787, 

3,021, 

789, 

3, 130, 
780, 

3,019, 
726, 


776. 96 
431.05 


362. 75 
612.03 


866. 45 
066. 43 


167.05 
829. 98 


'  No  data. 

*  Amounts  p%Id  for  pensions  for  these  years  show  only  as  total  for  Army  and  Navy  combined. 

Table  3. — War  with  Spain. 

Table  showing  the  number  of  applications  for  pensions  filed  on 
June  30  of  each  year  credited  to  both  Army  and  Navy  for  the  War 
with  Spain,  from  1899  to  1913  (from  data  furnished  by  the  Bureau 
of  Pensions)  : 


Year. 

Applica- 
tions filed. 

Year. 

Applica- 
tions filed. 

1899 

16,986 
13,039 
14, 157 
11,055 
8,546 
6,774 
6,309 
6,302 

1907 

4,170 

1900 

1908 

4,472 

1901 

1909 

4,207 
3,372 
2,878 

1902 

1910 

1903 

1911 

1904 

1912 

2,710 

1905 

1913 

2,465 

1906 

525 


20 


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'  :  :  : 

5 

M 

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s 

CO 

•  jno  ja;snin  jo  aj'ep  jb 
^^Unq^srp  qjiM  pnnoj  }nao  jaj; 

CD 

•}no  jg^snra  jo  ajcp 

CO 
00 

■:>no  J3isnm  jo  aicp  ib  q^Suajjs  o^ 
suosjad  aiqenoisuad  jo  juao  joj 

■fl" 

•si33}nniOA  8681  'qjSnaJis 
IBjo}  0^  qiSnaiis  JO  luao  ja<j 

X 

•snoi:iBonddB 
I^ioii  0}  snonBafidd'B  jo  ^nao  jaj 

i-O  lO                     CC  lO  CO  iC  CO  CO 
C  !N  W         O        1-4  I>  CC  C^  GO  1- 

•q:;2najis 
0}    snoi^Boiidde    jo    !jnao    iq^ 

60.6 
56.2 
56.2 

43.8 

48 

32 

37.2 

36.3 

42.3 

48.7 

X 

•qiSnans  oj 
suosjad  ajq^noisnad  jo  inao  jaj 

I^t^C^        to        COM        -VC^tO 

oi  X  to      .-;      m  « (N  ■<>'  "O  't 

C-. 

■006T  01  suois 
-nad  joj  suofiBonddB  jo  jaquinj^ 

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coi^t^       CO       b--^OTiot^ 

o 
o 
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N 
N 

(N 

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oj  asBasip  JO  paip  jo  inao  jaj 

CC  X  CD            ■        .-J      ■  i-i  rt  rt  M 

CO 

CO 

•qiSuaJis  1^101 01  spunoAi 
JO  paip  puE  paiitii  JO  inaa  aaj 

C5       • 

00 

•aoiAjas  JO  siBp  i^^ox 

X-  as  o      CD      c^  ic  (N  X  r^  -r 
r^a;^      cs      cr.  -rco^-^co 

X 
CO 

•ooiAjas  nSiaiojjo  syCea 

X  o  -<r 

o 

•XCO  CD 

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•paptmojA. 

•«r    • 

: ~  ;° 

1^ 

•pa;j3saa 

LO,-l       '. 

*    SS'^aS'' 

X 
CC 

CO 

•^iniq^sip  JOJ  paSjBqosici 

N-H        M        OCMOOOJOiO 

.-1      coco          I/;  'J" 

X 
<N 

•sasn'BO  jaqio  jo  paid 

.-(Cq 

■""^ 

•     JN     '■ 

I^ 

s 

■asBasipjopaia 

X"^0         rH         XWOOO»0 

1 

o 

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■CO       '-H 

X 

s 

•pains 

iO      .      . 

is  :?3 

g 

X 

•qiSuoJis  iBjox 

993 
1,334 
1,334 

1,369 

1,462 
1,370 
1,341 
1,237 
1,180 
1,456 

CO 

o 

CO 

1 

a 

.a 

CO 

g 

■  d 

1.1 

II 

■^  : 
n  : 
3  : 

tk  ; 

S   ; 
■a    • 

§  : 

TJ    ; 
|l 

o 

.B  :  : 
.Q  :  : 

■g  :^ 

-Sci& 

Q  q  c3 

sis 

gas 

Fifth  Afaryland 

First  volunteer  cavalry 

Fourth  volunteer  infantry.. 
Twentieth  ICansas 

'So  ; 

i 

c3  a, 

a 

Totals     for     United 
States       volunteer 
regiments    of    1899 
(25) 

526 


21 

Tabte  5. — War  oj  the  Rebellion  and  War  with  Spafn. 

Table  showing  the  number  of  applications  for  pensions  filed  and 
of  claims  allowed,  credited  to  the  Army  alone,  for  the  first  seven 
years  after  the  beginning  of  hostilities  in  (a)  "War  of  the  Rebellion 
and  (b)  War  with  Spain.  Also  the  percentage  of  claims  granted  to 
claims  filed. 

[From  reports  of  the  Bureau  of  Pensions.] 


(o)  WAR  OF  THE  REBELLION. 


Year. 


Claims 
filed. 


Claims 
allowed. 


Percent- 
age of 
claims 
allowed 
to  claims 
filed. 


1862: 

Invalids 

Widows,  etc 

1863: 

Invalids 

widows,  etc 

1864: 

Invalids 

Widows  ,etc 

1865: 

Invalids , 

Widows,  etc , 

1866: 

Invalids 

Widows,  etc , 

1867: 

Invalids 

Widows,  etc 

1868: 

Invalids 

Widows,  etc 

Total 

(6)  WAR  WITH  SPAIN. 

1899: 

Invalids 

Widows,  etc 

1900: 

Invalids 

Widows,  etc 

1901: 

Invalids 

Widows,  etc 

1902: 

Invalids 

Widows,  etc 

1903: 

Invalids 

Widows,etc 

1904: 

Invalids 

Widows,  etc 

1905: 

Invalids 

Widows,  etc 

Total 

525 


1, 
1, 

•26, 
22, 

20, 
32, 

27, 
44, 

35, 

28, 

15, 
20, 

7, 
13, 


335 


3,938 
3,630 

16, 770 
22, 198 

14,962 
24,693 

22,645 
27, 076 

16,452 
19, 660 

9,325 
19,242 


296,754 


200,926 


14.1 


15.5 


55.3 


77 


140 


67.7 


15,009 
2,551 

125 
178 

12,038 

801 

1,383 

710 

12, 814 
1,834 

2,795 
1,240 

10,210 
1,395 

3,441 
884 

7,728 
1,282 

3,415 
936 

6,152 
938 

4,013 

885 

5,736 
865 

3,920 
683 

79,935 

23,928 

}  '•' 

}  11.2 

}  27.5 

}  37.2 

\  48.2 


29.9 


22 


Tabu:  6. — War  with  Spain  and  all  wars. 

Table  showing  the  number  of  pensioners  for  the  Army  and  the 
Navy  in  the  War  with  Spain  and  the  total  number  of  all  pensioners 
for  all  wars  from  1898  to  1914.  Also  the  percentages  of  pensioners 
for  the  War  with  Spain  to  the  total  number  of  pensioners. 

[From  Reports  of  the  Bureau  of  Pensions.] 


Year. 

Pensioners,  War 
with  Spain. 

Pension- 
ers, all 
wars. 

Percent- 
age pen- 
sioners, 
war  with 
Spain  to 
total. 

Year. 

Pensioners,  war 
■with  Spain. 

Pension- 
ers, all 
wars. 

Percent- 
age pen- 
sioners, 

Army. 

Navy. 

Army. 

Navy. 

war  with 

Spain,  to 

total. 

J898 

993,714 
991,519 
993.529 
997,  735 
999, 446 
969,545 
994, 762 
998, 441 
985,971 

1907 

1908 

1909 

1910 

1911 

1912 

1913 

1914 

23,168 
24,697 
26, 109 
26,880 
27, 461 
27,831 
28,002 
27,915 

909 

968 

986 

1,009 

1,029 

1,019 

1,010 

995 

967, 371 
951,687 
946, 194 
921,083 
992,098 
860,294 
820,200 
785,239 

2.4 

1899 

1900 

1901 

1902 

1903 

1904 

1905 

1906 

282 
1,667 
5,325 
9,009 
12,286 
16,133 
19,678 
21,753 

17 

88 
279 
456 
576 
696 
813 
868 

0.03 
.17 
.56 
.94 
1.3 
1.6 
2.04 
2.2 

2.6 

2.8 

3.0 

2.89 

3.3 

3.5 

3.6 

Table  7. — War  loith  Spain  and  all  wars. 

Table  showing  disbursements  for  pensions  for  each  year  from  1899 
to  1914,  inclusive,  for  the  Army  and  for  the  Navy.  Also  the  total 
disbursements  for  administration  and  maintenance  of  the  Bureau  of 
Pensions  for  the  above-named  years. 

[From  Reports  of  the  Bureau  of  Pensions.] 


Year. 

Pensions,  War  with  Spain. 

Administra- 
tion and 

maintenance, 
all  wars. 

Year. 

Pensions,  War  with  Spain. 

Ad  ministra- 
tion and 

Army. 

Navy. 

Army. 

Navy. 

maintenance, 
all  wars. 

1899.... 
1900.... 
1901.... 
1902.... 
1903.... 
1904.... 
1905.... 
1906.... 
1907 

$25,824.47 
316, 023. 18 
1,121,229.72 
1,657,957.29 
2, 102, 494.  66 
2,973,315.25 
3,264,243.63 
3,296,380.69 
3,323,407.81 

$2,782.34 
16,882.07 
53,996.04 
80, 488. 99 
101,589.55 
133, 616. 53 
145, 754.  91 
145.  775. 84 
147, 749. 46 

$4,147,517.73 
3.841.706.74 
3, 868, 795. 44 
3,831,378.96 
3.993,216.79 
3,849,366.25 
3,721,832.82 
3,523,269.51 
3,309,110.44 

1908.... 
1909.... 
1910.... 
1911.... 
1912.... 
1913.... 
1914.... 

Total 

$3,495,419.11 
13,820 
13,807 
3,787,208.01 
3,810,974.78 
3, 910, 932.  88 
3,745,997.03 

$158,703.87 

, 169. 80 

,  919. 91 

164,043.24 
160,111.27 
160,235.54 
161,513.50 

$2,800,963.36 
2, 852, 583.  73 
2, 657, 673. 86 
2,517,127.06 
2,448,857.31 
2,543,246.39 
2,066,507.15 

236,831,408.51 

1,633,243.15 

1  Amounts  for  these  years  not  shown  separately  for  Army  and  Navy. 
'Disbursements  for  1909  and  1910  not  in  this  total. 

Total,  Army  column $36,831,408.51 

Total,  Navy  column 1,633,243.15 

Total,  Army  and  Navy,  1909 3,820,169.80 

Total,  Army  and  Navy,  1910 3,807,919.91 

Total,  Army  and  Narj ' 46,092,741.87 

626 


23 

Table  8. — War  with  Spain. 

Table  showing  percentages,  from  the  close  of  hostilities  to  June  30, 
1914,  of  "  invalids,"  "  widows,  etc.,"  and  total  pensions  granted  each 
year,  to  the  total  number  of  individuals  employed  in  the  War  with 
Spain. 

[From  reports  of  the  Bureau  of  Pensions  and  computations.] 


Year. 

Invalid 
pensioners. 

Per  cent  to 
strength. 

Widows, 
etc. 

Per  cent  to 
strength. 

Per  cent 
total  pen- 
sioners to 
strength. 

1902 

6,282 
8,798 
11,946 
15, 138 
17,038 
18, 393 
19,857 
21, 264 
22, 063 
22,644 
23,097 
23,416 
25, 512 

1.7 
2.3 
3.2 
4.1 
4.6 
4.9 
5.3 
5.7 
5.9 
6.1 
6.2 
6.3 
6.3 

2,727 
3,488 
4,187 
4,540 
4,715 
4,775 
4,840 
4,  845 
4,817 
4,817 
4,734 
4,586 
4,403 

0.7 
.9 
1.1 
1.2 
1.2 
1.2 
1.3 
1.3 
1.3 
1.3 
1.2 
1.2 
1.1 

2.4 
3.2 
4.3 
5.3 
5.9 
6.2 
6.6 
7.0 
7.2 
7.4 
7.6 
7.5 
7.5 

1903 

1904 

1905 

1906 

1907 

1908 

1909 

1910 

1911 

1912 

1913 

1914 

Table  9. 


Year. 

Number 
of  pen- 
sioners 

all  wars. 

Cost  of 
administra- 
tion. 

Per  capita 

cost  per 

pensioner. 

Number  of 

pensioners 

War  with 

Spain. 

Cost  of 
adminis- 
tration for 
War  with 

Spain. 

1899 

991,519 
993, 529 
997, 735 
999,446 
969,545 
994, 762 
998,441 
985,971 
967,371 
951, 687 
•46, 194 
921, 083 
892, 098 
860,294 
820, 200 
785,239 

$4,147,517.73 
3,841,706.74 
3, 868,  795. 44 
3,831,378.96 
3,993,216.79 
3, 849, 366. 25 
3,721,832.82 
3,523,269.51 
3,309,110.44 
2, 800, 963. 36 
2, 852, 583.  73 
2, 657, 673.  86 
2,517,127.06 
2,448,857.31 
2, 543, 246. 39 
2, 066, 507. 15 

$4.18 
3.86 
3.87 
3.83 
4.12 
3.86 
3.72 
3.57 
3.42 
2.94 
3.01 
2.88 
2.82 
2.84 
3.10 
2.50 

282 
1,667 
5,325 
9,009 
12, 286 
16,133 
19,678 
21, 753 
23,168 
24, 697 
26, 109 
26,880 
27,461 
27,831 
28, 002 
27, 915 

11. 178. 76 
6,434.62 

20. 607. 77 
34,504.47 
50, 618. 32 
62,273.38 
73,202.16 
77,658.21 
79,234.56 
72,609.18 
78, 588. 09 
77,214.40 
77, 440. 02 
79,040.04 
86, 806. 20 
69,787.50 

1900 

1901 

1902 

1903 

1904 

1905 

1906 

1907 

1908 

1909 

1910 

1911 

1912 

1913 

1914 

525 


24 


Table  10. — War  with  Spain  and  all  wars. 

Table  showing  the  following  on  June  30  of  each  year  from  1899  to 
1914,  inclusive.  For  the  War  with  Spain :  (a)  Number  of  "  invalid  " 
pensioners,  (&)  number  of  "widows,  etc.,"  (c)  total  gain  to  roll  for 
the  year,  (d)  total  loss  to  the  roll  for  the  year.  For  all  wars:  Total 
number  of  pensioners  on  the  roll. 

[From  reports  of  the  Bureau  of  Pensions.] 


War  with  Spain. 

Total  pen- 

Year. 

(a)Invalids. 

(6)  Widows, 
etc. 

(c)  Gain. 

(d)  Loss. 

sioners  on 
roU. 

1899 

117 
822 
3,344 
6,282 
8,798 
11,946 
15,138 
17,038 
18,393 
19,857 
21,264 
22,063 
22,644 
23,097 
23,416 
23,512 

165 
845 
1,981 
2,727 
3,488 
4,187 
4  540 
4,715 
4,775 
4,840 
4,845 
4,817 
4,817 
4,734 
4,586 
4,403 

991,519 

1900 

728 

4,658 

3,784 

3,277 

3,847 

3,545 

2,075 

1,415 

1,529 

1,412 

771 

581 

370 

171 

993,529 

1901 

997, 735 

1902 

999, 446 

1903 

969,545 

1904 

994,762 

1905   

998, 441 

1906 

985,971 
967,371 

1907 

1908         

951,687 

1909 

946, 194 

1910 

921,083 

1911 

892,098 

1912  

860, 294 

1913 

820,200 

1914 

87 

785,239 

525 


o 


PERSONNEL  VERSUS  MATERIEL  IN  PLANS  FOR 
NATIONAL  DEFENSE 


PREPARED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION,  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

AS    A    SUPPLEMENT    TO    THE    STATEMENT    OF    A    PROPER    MILITARY 

POLICY  FOR  THE   UNITED  STATES 


WCD  9314-1 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE  :  WASHINGTON 

NOVEMBER,   1915 


626 


WASHINGTON 

GOVEBNaiENT  PRINTING  OPPIOE 

lfil3 


War  Department, 

Document  No.  526. 

Offi.ce  of  the  Chief  of  Staff. 


SYNOPSIS. 


Page, 

1.  Effect  of  views  of  noted  men  on  public  opinion 5 

2.  Influence  of  present  European  war  on  military  policy 5 

3.  Importance  of  materiel  exaggerated  by  special  situation  in  France  and 

Flanders 5 

4.  Necessity  of  materiel  and  latest  mechanical  devices  in  war 5 

5.  Arms  and  ammunition  required  for  1,000,000  men 6 

6.  Vital  importance  of  trained  persoimel  in  war 6 

7.  An  army  a  complicated  machine b 

8.  Trained  operatives  imperative  for  complex  machinery 7 

9.  Correlation  and  interdependence  of  the  mobile  arms 7 

10.  Influence  of  materiel  on  issue  of  war — Trained  personnel  vital  requisite..  8 

11.  Results  of  employment  of  untrained  troops  by  United  States  in  past  wars. .  8 

12.  Employment  of  untrained  troops  by  France  during  Franco-Prussian  War..  9 

13.  Relative  importance  of  materiel  and  personnel — Statement  of  Gen.  von 

Bernhardi 10 

14.  Limitations  of  a  "Raw  army" — Napoleon.     Nueve  Chapelle  an  example. .  11 

15.  Time  required  for  training  new  levies — Opinion  of  an  Americaa  in  British 

Army 11 

16.  Deductions  from  British  losses  in  present  European  war 12 

17.  Development  of  armies — Peace  training  necessary 13 

18.  Conclusions 14 

30669°— No.  526-16  (3) 


PERSONNEL  VERSUS  MATERIEL  IN  PLANS   FOR 
NATIONAL  DEFENSE. 


1.  EFFECT  OF  VIEWS  OF  NOTED  MEN  ON  PUBLIC  OPINION. 

Kecently  one  of  our  most  noted  men  in  the  field  of  science  and 
invention  was  quoted  in  the  press  of  the  country  to  the  effect  that 
wars  in  the  future  will  be  fought  by  machines  and  not  by  men.  The 
question  of  national  defense  is  of  such  paramount  importance  at 
the  present  time  that  anything  that  a  well  and  favorably  known 
man  says  may  have  great  influence  in  molding  public  opinion  and 
thereby  be  productive  of  national  good  or  national  harm. 

2.  INFLUENCE  OF  PRESENT  EUROPEAN  WAR  ON  MILITARY  POLICY. 

It  is  believed  that  the  deductions  that  have  already  been  made 
from  the  present  European  war,  and  will  be  made  in  the  future, 
will  exert  a  vast  influence  in  shaping  our  military  policy.  We  should 
exercise,  then,  the  greatest  care  that  our  conclusions  are  sound  and 
not  too  hastily  drawn.  It  is  not  the  present  war  alone,  but  war  in 
general  that  we  must  study,  if  we  would  reach  sound  conclusions. 
A  conclusion  that  is  drawn  from  a  single  example  is  almost  sure 
to  be  wrong.  For  that  reason  the  European  war  should  be  con- 
sidered as  only  one  of  many  wars  that  should  furnish  us  the  infor- 
mation in  the  light  of  which  our  military  policy  should  be  framed. 

3.  IMPORTANCE  OF  MATERIEL  EXAGGERATED  BY  SPECIAL  SITUA- 

TION IN  FRANCE  AND  FLANDERS. 

The  great  war  now  being  fought  in  Europe  has  created  in  the 
minds  of  many  influential  people  the  fixed  idea  that  materiel  is 
everything  in  modern  war  and  that  personnel  counts  for  but  little. 
This  idea  has  been  fostered  by  a  consideration  of  the  situation  as 
developed  in  France  and  Flanders,  while  the  lessons  to  be  learned 
from  a  study  of  the  great  campaigns  in  other  theaters  have  been 
almost  entirely  overlooked. 

4.  NECESSITY  OF  MATERIEL  AND  LATEST  MECHANICAL  DEVICES 

IN  WAR, 

This  is  indeed  an  age  of  mechanics.  The  development  in  labor- 
saving  machines  and  mechanical  devices  has  been  marvelous.     The 

526  (5) 


machinery  of  war  has  kept  pace  with  the  development  in  the  indus- 
trial field,  and  in  many  respects  has  even  surpassed  it.  No  one  will 
contend  that  a  mobile  army  not  equipped  with  the  most  modern 
appliances  of  war — that  is,  magazine  rifles,  machine  guns,  field  guns, 
aircraft,  motor  transport,  etc. — can  be  successful  in  war.  It  is  con- 
ceded that  the  United  States  should  keep  on  hand  materiel  to  fully 
equip  an  army  of  the  size  which  we  determine  will  be  necessary  to 
meet  any  of  the  first-class  powers  that  are  likely  to  attack  us. 

5.  ARMS   AND   AMMUNITION  REQUIRED   FOR   ONE   MILLION   MEN. 

The  following  estimate  of  the  supplies  of  rifles,  machine  guns, 
field  guns,  and  ammunition  that  would  be  required  by  an  army  of 
a  million  men  at  the  beginning  of  a  campaign,  under  modern  condi- 
tions, is  based  on  a  careful  study  of  actual  conditions  in  the  European 
theater  of  war. 

Army  of  1,000,000. 


Reserve  sup- 
ply at  open- 
ing of  war. 
(Estimated 
loss  and  ex- 
penditure 
during  first 
four  months 
of  war.)' 

Supply  with 

troops  for 

mobiliza- 

tion.2 

Monthly  supply  for  first  four  months.* 

Article. 

First 
month. 

Second 
month. 

Third 
month. 

Fourth 
month. 

Rifles 

500,000 

2,500 

2,250,000, 000 

3,000 

'10,000 

800,000 

5,000 

1,020,000,000 

6,000 

'2,000 

90,000 

400 

500,000,000 

500 

2,000 

180,000 

soo 

1,000,000,000 
1,000 

?,000 

180,000 

800 

1,000,000,000 

1,000 

'4,000 

90,000 

Machine  guns 

Cartridges. 

400 
500, 000, 000 

Field  guns 

500 

Ammunition  for  field 
guns 

2,000 

'  These  supplies  are  to  be  maintained  at  these  figures  at  all  times  during  the  war  to  provide  a  reservoir. 

*In  the  case  of  the  rifle  cartridges  the  amount  may  be  too  small. 

*  These  amounts  show  the  estimated  expenditxu"e  for  each  of  the  first  four  months  of  the  war. 

<  Rounds  per  gun. 

6.  VITAL  IMPORTANCE  OF  TRAINED  PERSONNEL  IN  WAR. 

A  study  of  the  above  figures  shows  the  vital  importance  of  materiel 
in  modern  war  and  the  hopelessness  of  any  war  in  which  we  might 
be  engaged  with  any  country  having  a  trained  army,  should  we  fail 
to  be  amply  provided  with  such  materiel.  But  many  people  believe 
that,  if  we  are  well  supplied  with  the  modern  machinery  of  war, 
there  will  be  no  need  of  a  trained  personnel.  There  can  be  no 
greater  fallacy  nor  one  likely  to  bring  greater  disaster  to  the  country 
if  acted  on  to  the  extent  that  some  influential  men  believe  possible. 

7.  AN  ARMY  A  COMPLICATED  MACHINE. 


It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  an  army  itself  is  the  most  marvelous 
and,  at  the  same  time,  the  most  complicated  machine  connected  with 
the  carrying  on  of  war,  and  to  the  degree  of  perfection  with  which 


526 


it  is  organized,  trained,  and  equipped  in  every  part  and  detail  will 
depend  victory  or  defeat. 

8.  TRAINED  OPERATIVES  IMPERATIVE  FOR  COMPLEX  MACHINERY. 

A  chain  is  no  stronger  than  its  weakest  link.  It  might  as  well  be 
contended  that  one  of  the  parts  of  a  giant  locomotive  could  be  made 
of  indifferent  metal,  as  that  an  efficient  army  could  be  made  up  of  an 
untrained  personnel.  As  the  weak  part  of  the  locomotive  will  sooner 
or  later  snap  and  break,  and  probably  at  the  most  critical  time,  so 
will  an  army  of  untrained  or  partially  trained  men  go  to  pieces  under 
the  great  shock  of  modern  battle.  As  well  might  we  say  that  it  is 
as  possible  to  go  into  the  streets  of  one  of  our  cities,  or  to  our  farms, 
pick  up  a  lot  of  untrained  men  and  set  them  to  work  with  the  intri- 
cate machinery  of  one  of  our  great  gun  factories,  as  it  is  to  put  the 
same  men  to  handling  the  complicated  machines  of  modern  war  or  to 
make  them  parts  of  that  most  complex  of  all  machines,  a  modern 
army,  and  expect  them  to  be  successful  against  a  highly  trained  and 
organized  army  of  one  of  the  first-class  powers.  As  you  would  ex- 
pect the  gun  factory  to  be  speedily  disorganized  and  disabled  by 
such  a  proceeding,  just  so  surely  will  an  army  of  untrained  or  par- 
tially trained  men  come  to  disaster  in  the  stress  of  war,  and  all  the 
latest  types  of  rifles,  machine  guns,  high-powered  cannon,  aeroplanes, 
motor  transport,  and  mountains  of  ammunition  in  its  possession  will 
not  and  can  not  save  it. 

9.  CORRELATION  AND  INTERDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  MOBILE  ARMS. 

The  tendency  to  exaggerate  the  importance  of  materiel  in  modern 
war  and  to  underrate  personnel  comes  from  the  superficial  conclu- 
sions which  have  been  drawn  from  the  observations  that  have  been 
made  of  the  present  war  in  Europe,  and,  as  stated  above,  the  events 
in  Flanders  and  France,  likewise  in  the  Dardanelles,  where  the  war 
has  settled  to  the  condition  of  a  siege  on  both  sides,  have  formed  the 
basis  of  most  conclusions,  while  the  operations  in  the  eastern  and 
Serbian  theaters,  which  probably  more  nearly  approach  those  of  any 
war  in  which  the  United  States  might  be  engaged,  have  practically 
been  overlooked. 

To  be  sure,  in  this  siege  warfare  the  role  of  artillery  takes  on  considerable 
importance,  and  only  the  lar?;e  cannon  can  crush  casemates  burled  sevt-ral 
meters  under  the  earth.  To  it  falls  almost  the  entire  task  of  the  preparation 
aeainst  an  enemy  who  is  at  the  same  time  too  close  and  invisible  and  who 
thus  escapes  both  the  75-niillimeter  shell  and  the  bullet  of  the  rifle.  But  as 
soon  as  this  zone  of  siege  warfare  is  crossed  and  space  is  opened,  the  bullet 
will  recover  its  field  of  action  beyond  that  covered  by  the  75-millimeter  gun, 
the  cannon  of  maneuver  warfare.  The  war  of  1914  has  cruelly  proved  to  us 
that  between  the  preparation  of  the  attack  by  the  artillery  and  the  execution 

61i6 


8 

of  this  attack  with  the  bayonet  a  period  and  a  zone  intervene  where  the 
infantry  should  be  supreme,  if  it  knows  how  to  deliver  a  firo  that  kills.  *  *  • 
This  man  is  the  king  of  the  battle  field ;  he  rules  it  through  his  intelligent 
fire,  his  aimed  bullets,  which  the  accurate  rifie  has  cured  from  being  wild ;  lie 
rules  it  by  the  work  which  completes  and  continues  the  preparations  of  tlie 
artillery  and  which  will  make  easy  the  effect  of  tlie  bayonet  against  an  enemy 
already  three-quarters  annihilated.     (Gen.  Cherfils,  French  Army.) 

In  short,  the  role  of  the  mobile  arms  has  not  changed  materially; 
in  other  words,  we  must  still  have  artillery  to  destroy  the  enemy's 
position,  infantry  to  assault  and  drive  him  from  it,  and  cavalry  to 
pursue  and  complete  his  destruction.  It  should,  moreover,  be  borne 
in  mind  that  in  point  of  time  mobile  operations  precede  the  static 
and  are  therefore  the  first  in  order  of  preparation. 

10.  INFLUENCE  OF  MATERIEL  ON  ISSUE  OF  WAR— TRAINED 
PERSONNEL  VITAL  REQUISITE. 

The  influence  of  materiel  on  the  issue  of  a  war  is  usually  much 
overemphasized.  It  floats  on  the  surface  of  events,  where  it  catches 
the  eye  of  the  superficial  observer,  ignorant  of  the  profounder  move- 
ments beneath.  This  tendency  to  overrate  its  influence  is  increased 
by  the  natural  human  inclination  to  attribute  defeat  to  materiel 
rather  than  personal  causes.  It  is  natural  for  men  who  have  spent 
all  their  time  and  best  efforts  in  the  field  of  science  and  invention 
to  believe  that  the  mechanical  or  materiel  side  of  war  is  all-impor- 
tant, but  there  can  be  no  greater  mistake.  A  trained  personnel  has 
been  a  most  vital  requisite  of  armies  in  the  past  and  will  continue  to 
be  in  the  future. 

The  whole  military  history  of  the  United  States  proclaims  the 
truth  of  this. 

11.  RESULTS  OF  EMPLOYMENT  OF  UNTRAINED  TROOPS  BY  UNITED 
STATES  IN  PAST  WARS. 

During  the  Revolutionary  War  the  Colonies  depended  almost  en- 
tirely on  untrained  or  partially  trained  men.  During  the  entire 
course  of  this  war  Great  Britain  employed  not  more  than  150,000 
men,  yet  the  total  number  of  British  troops  in  the  Colonies  at  any 
time  was  very  much  less ;  while  the  Colonies  themselves  used  395,858 
men,  notwithstanding  which  the  largest  force  that  Washington  was 
ever  able  to  assemble  for  battle  at  one  time  was  about  17,000.  Speak- 
ing of  the  imreliability  of  untrained  or  partially  trained  troops, 
he  said : 

Regular  troops  alone  are  equal  to  the  exigencies  of  modern  war,  as  well  for 
defense  as  offense,  and  when  a  substitute  is  attempted  it  must  prove  illusory 
and  ruinous.  No  militia  will  ever  acquire  the  habits  necessary  to  resist  a 
regular  force.  *  *  *  The  firmness  requisite  for  the  real  business  of  fighting 
is  only  to  be  attained  by  a  constant  course  of  discipline  and  service.    I  have 

526 


9 

never  yet  been  witness  to  a  single  instance  that  can  justify  a  different  opinion, 
and  it  is  most  earnestly  to  be  wished  that  the  liberties  of  America  may  no 
longer  be  trusted,  in  any  material  degree,  to  so  precarious  a  dependence. 
(Washington.) 

During  the  War  of  1812  the  United  States  employed  527,654  men, 
of  whom  only  a  small  proportion  were  regular  soldiers,  and  most  of 
these  were  Regulars  in  name  only,  for  the  majority  of  regular  regi- 
ments w^ere  organized  after  the  beginning  of  the  war,  while  Great 
Britain  employed  only  67,000  men,  and  never  at  one  time  had  more 
than  16,000  men  opposed  to  us  on  any  field  of  battle.  That  we  did 
not  suffer  a  great  disaster  was  undoubtedly  due  to  the  fact  that 
Great  Britain,  during  this  entire  war,  was  engaged  in  her  gigantic 
contest  with  Napoleon,  and  used  only  the  odds  and  ends  of  her  mili- 
tary forces  against  us. 

The  Civil  War  was  fought  by  volunteer  troops  on  both  sides,  and 
it  was  not  until  the  United  States  had  spent  several  fruitless  years 
in  training  her  new  armies  and  had  suffered  great  losses  in  men  and 
money  that  we  had  any  real  military  success.  Competent  critics  are 
of  the  opinion  that  had  the  United  States  had  at  the  first  Bull  Run 
a  brigade  of  Grant's  veteran  army  that  brought  about  the  sur- 
render of  Lee  at  Appomattox  there  would  have  been  no  Civil  War. 
The  Confederates  were  almost  as  badly  demoralized  by  their  victory 
in  this  battle  as  the  Federals  were  by  defeat,  but  their  victory  gave 
time,  priceless  almost  beyond  anything  else  in  war  to  an  unprepared 
nation,  to  train  and  equip  their  armies.  The  money  that  was  spent 
during  that  war  and  has  been  spent  since  on  the  aftermath  of  it 
(pensions,  interest  on  the  national  debt,  etc.)  would  have  main- 
tained and  would  now  maintain  an  army  that  would  insure  the 
United  States  adequate  defense. 

12.  EMPLOYMENT   OF   UNTRAINED   TROOPS   BY    FRANCE    DURING 
FRANCO-PRUSSIAN  WAR. 

The  folly  and  futility  of  intrusting  the  interests  of  a  nation  in 
war  to  untrained  or  partially  trained  troops  can  not  be  better  illus- 
trated than  by  the  experience  of  France  following  the  surrender 
of  the  French  Army  at  Metz  in  1870. 

Marshal  McMahon  surrendered  the  army  of  Chalons  on  September  2; 
Marshal  Bazaine  surrendered  the  army  of  the  Rhine  at  Metz  on  October 
27  *  *  *  The  war  should  have  ended  then,  but  there  were  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  patriotic  men  left  in  the  country,  and  there  were  statesmen  then, 
as  now,  who  thought  nothing  was  necessary  to  create  an  army  except  to  collect 
men  and  place  arms  in  their  hands. 

At  Paris  the  Empire  had  been  overthrown  and  a  provisional  government 
established  at  Tours,  with  Gambetta  as  virtual  dictator.  This  extraordinary 
man,  whom  no  misfortune  could  conquer,  set  to  work  to  raise  armies,  and  with 
such  herculean  energy  and  ability  that  within  a  few  weeks  half  a  million  men 

526 


10 

had  been  assembled  and  fairly  well  equipped.  Armies  of  100,000  men  were 
Improvised  almost  overnight  in  the  northwest  and  south.  Unfortunately  Gam- 
betta  found  no  leader  of  his  own  mold,  and  his  tireless  efforts  finally  went  for 
naught. 

Nor  were  the  armies  themselves  ever  competent.  Time  was  lacking.  The 
experienced  officers  were  almost  all  prisoners  of  war.  Organization  was  loose; 
supplies  irregular  or  lacking;  even  the  clothing  was  insufficient  for  a  winter 
campaign.  Poor  discipline,  wounds,  disease,  exhaustion,  cold,  and  famine 
ravaged  these  vast  armies  of  volunteers  and  conscripts  and  strewed  the  roads 
of  France  with  their  debris. 

Unless  it  be  the  retreat  from  Moscow,  there  is  no  sadder  picture  in  all  his- 
tory than  one  of  these  intensely  patriotic  but  helpless  bodies  of  luen,  driven 
about  by  the  iron  German  veteran  armies,  suffering  all  possible  miseries  and 
wretchedly  perishing  to  no  purpose  during  the  winter  of  1870-71.  They  did 
not  even  have  the  satisfaction  of  inflicting  heavy  losses  on  the  enemy,  as  did 
the  armies  of  McMahon  and  Bazaine ;  but  with  little  loss  to  the  Germans 
sacrificed  themselves  by  thousands  in  hopeless  defeats  and  then  struggled  off 
along  the  roads,  carrying  disease  to  the  villages  which  sheltered  them  and 
themselves  perishing  uncared  for  in  the  snow.  Their  history  should  be  a  ter- 
rible example  for  those  who  trust  in  new  levies  against  experienced  and 
efficient  regular  troops.  (Le  Corps  de  Sante  Militaire  en  France,  by  Brice  et 
Botteet. ) 

Anyone  who  believes  that  an  army  can  be  called  into  existence 
overnight  or  that  the  liberty  of  a  country  can  be  intrusted  to  an 
army  of  untrained  or  partially  trained  troops  should  read  the  pitiful 
story  of  these  armies  of  Gambetta,  from  which  the  above  is  quoted. 

13.  RELATIVE  IMPORTANCE  OF  MATERIEL  AND  PERSONNEL- 
STATEMENT  OF  GEN.  VON  BERNHARDI. 

In  an  article  contributed  to  the  New  York  Tribune,  Gen.  von 
Bernhardi,  author  of  "  Germany  and  the  next  war,"  tell  us  what 
observations  show  to  be  true  when  he  says : 

It  is  constantly  said  on  the  other  side  that  tlie  success  in  a  decisive  manner 
depends  on  the  quantity  of  munitions  which  is  available,  and  that,  aside  from 
the  superior  masses,  the  technical  means  were  instrumental  to  success.  It  is 
constantly  emphasized  that,  in  contrast  to  former  wars,  these  factors  are  to-day 
determining.  How  little  have  men  who  hold  this  belief  penetrated  into  the  real 
spirit  of  the  war !  Munitions  in  sufficient  quantities  certainly  are  essential 
in  warfare,  and  the  technical  means  of  warfare  are  certainly  an  important 
factor  to  success,  and  it  is  surely  not  of  little  importance  that  just  in  this 
respect,  in  the  technique  of  war,  we  are  in  advance  of  our  enemies.  The 
superiority  in  artillery  and  in  number  is,  of  course,  of  prime  importance. 
The  masses,  however,  win  their  decisive  importance  only  when  they  have  been 
trained  in  discipline  and  capability,  are  full  of  belligerent  spirit,  and  are  led 
by  men  tvho  are  thoroughly  aware  of  what  brings  results  in  war  and  who  are 
masters  of  their  professions  or,  rather,  art.  Munitions  and  technical  war  ma- 
terials achieve  their  full  value  only  when  they  arc  used  with  a  purpose  and 
with  valiant  military  spirit. 
526 


11 

14.  LIMITATIONS  OF  A   "  RAW   ARMY  "—NAPOLEON.     NUEVE 
CHAPELLE  AN  EXAMPLE. 

With  a  raw  army  it  is  possible  to  carry  a  formidable  position,  but  not  to  carry 
out  a  plan.     (Napoleon.) 

15.  TIME  REQUIRED  FOR  TRAINING  NEW  LEVIES— OPINION  OF  AN 
AMERICAN  IN  BRITISH  ARMY. 

The  course  of  very  intensive  training  prescribed  for  the  new 
levies  of  the  British  Army  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  contem- 
plated having  them  ready  for  active  service  on  the  firing  line  in 
six  months.  But  few  of  these  men  were  sent  to  France  with  less 
than  nine  months'  training.  What  was  the  reason  for  the  change 
of  plan  of  the  British  Army  authorities,  especially  in  view  of  the 
great  and  pressing  necessity  for  troops  in  France?  It  is  believed 
that  it  was  found  that  troops  w^ith  the  six  months'  very  intensive 
training  which  had  been  given  them  had  neither  the  physical  hardi- 
hood, the  morale,  nor  the  knowledge  of  the  business  of  war  which 
was  absolutely  essential  to  make  progress  against  the  intrenched 
troops  opposing  them.  In  this  connection  the  following  quotation 
from  a  letter  written  by  an  American  now  serving  with  the  British 
Army  in  France,  is  pertinent: 

In  common  with  all  of  my  comrades  in  one  of  the  first  units  of  Lord  Kitch- 
ener's first  citizen  army,  I  believed  that  within  a  few  weeks  of  enlistment  we 
should  be  fighting  side  by  side  with  the  seasoned  regulars  of  the  first  British 
expeditionary  force.  But  after  three  months  of  hard  work  we  began  to  appre- 
ciate the  tremendous  difficulties  of  the  task  we  had  in  hand.  During  those 
three  months  we  had  worked  from  5.30  in  the  morning  until  4.30  in  the  after- 
noon every  day  in  the  week,  Sunday  excepted.  And  yet,  at  the  end  of  that 
time,  we  had  mastered  only  the  fundamentals  of  squad,  platoon,  and  company 
drill  and  some  elementary  knowledge  of  battle  formations  and  of  the  use  of 
our  rifles.  AVe  were  no  more  cohesive  than  so  many  grains  of  wet  sand.  We 
were  still  so  many  individuals,  fretting  under  the  restraints  of  discipline,  and 
no  more  fit  to  be  called  soldiers  than  apprentices  of  three  months  are  to  be 
called  mechanics. 

Many  of  the  men  had  been  used  to  a  healthy  out-of-doors  life,  but  even  they 
were  far  from  fit  for  the  rigors  and  hardships  of  soldiering.  How  much  less 
so  were  those  indoor  workers — the  clerks,  the  shop  assistants,  the  small  mer- 
chants— fit  for  it.  *  *  *  But  it  was  not  until  they  had  been  through 
months  of  the  hardest  kind  of  work  that  they  were  physically  eflScient.  Ten 
or  twelve  weeks'  training  would  have  never  given  these  men  the  physical 
stamina  enabling  them  to  endure  the  terrible  fatigues  of  a  rapid  strategic 
retx'eat  like  that  from  Mons.  They  would  have  dropped  out  on  the  roadside 
by  tens  of  thousands,  to  be  gathered  in  by  the  swiftly  advancing  enemy. 
*  *  *  And  so  we  went  on  from  week  to  week  and  from  month  to  month,  and 
it  was  not  until  we  had  been  trained  for  nine  months  that  we  were  sent  to  the 
"  Somewhere  Trench  "  to  take  our  part  in  the  greatest  war  in  history.  *  *  * 
Four  months  of  active  service  in  France  has  convinced  us  how  necessary,  how 
vitally  necessary,  these  nine  months  of  preparation  were.  We  had  been  uncon- 
sciously acquiring  the  ability  to  act  instinctively,  and  this  is  unquestionably 
the  most  important,  as  well  as  the  most  diflicult  thing  a  soldier  must  gain. 
520 


12 

Work  must  always  be  done  with  the  sureness  and  promptitude  of  instinct. 
Otherwise,  in  tlie  heat  of  battle,  when  all  men  are  laboring  under  the  stress  of 
great  excitement,  the  soldier  is  lost  and  useless.  Battalions  must  be  units  in 
the  strictest  sense  of  the  word,  orders  must  be  obeyed  without  a  moment  of 
hesitancy.     *     *     * 

With  my  own  year  of  experience  as  a  criterion,  I  am  firmly  of  the  opinion 
that,  in  order  to  become  even  fairly  good  soldiers,  men  must  have  at  least  a 
year  of  training.  The  will  to  be  defenders  is  nothing  unless  there  is  back  of 
it  long  and  careful  preparation.     (Outlook,  Nov.  3,  1915.) 

With  all  this  intensive  training  over  a  period  of  nine  months  or 
more,  and  some  months'  actual  experience  in  war,  the  British  forces 
have  not  up  to  the  present  time  undertaken  a  sustained  general 
offensive. 

16.  DEDUCTIONS  FROM  BRITISH  LOSSES  IN  PRESENT  EUROPEAN 

WAR. 

That  wars  in  the  future  will  be  fought  by  men,  as  the}'^  are  at 
present  and  always  have  been,  and  that  trained  officers  and  men  will 
be  required  in  ever-increasing  numbers  is  shown  by  the  enormous 
losses  sustained  by  the  British  Armies  from  the  beginning  of  the 
war  up  to  October  9,  as  announced  officially  by  Premier  Asquith  to 
the  House  of  Commons : 

Total  casualties,  493,294.     The  losses  for  the  western  area  were 
distributed  as  follows : 

Killed,   officers 4,401 

Wounded,  officers 9,  169 

Missing,  officers 1,  567 

Total 15,  137 

Killed,  other  ranks 63,  059 

Wounded,  other  ranks 225,716 

Missing,  other  ranks 61,  134 

Total 349,  909 

Total  casualties  in  all  operations : 

Killed,   officers 6,660 

Wounded,  officers 12,633 

Missing,  officers 2,  000 

Total 21,  293 

Killed,  other  ranks 94,  992 

Wounded,  other  ranks 304,832 

Missing,  other  ranks 72,  177 

Total 472,  001 

British  casualties  up  to  August  21,  as  given  officially  on  September 
14,  were  381,983.  This  shows  a  total  between  that  time  and  October 
9  of  111,311,  or  a  daily  average  of  2,271.  Losses  between  June  9 
and  August  21  averaged  about  1,500  daily. 

After  a  study  of  the  above  table  of  losses  it  is  not  understood  how 
anyone,  whether  civilian  or  soldier,  can  maintain  that  the  role  of 
the  human  element  in  war  has  been  or  can  be  decreased.  Rather  is 
it  seen  that  the  enormous  losses  suffered  by  troops  in  battle  require 
ever- increasing  numbers  of  men  to  be  trained  in  peace  and  held  in 

626 


13 

reserve  to  take  the  place  of  the  fallen,  and  that  tune  will  probably 
never  again  be  available  to  train  new  troops  in  large  numbers  after 
war  begins.  It  is  said  that  the  British  Eegular  Army,  as  it  existed 
at  the  beginning  of  the  present  war,  practically  disappeared  during 
the  first  campaign  in  France;  that  is,  in  the  retreat  to  the  Marne 
and  the  subsequent  advance  to  the  Aisne.  The  British  losses  in 
officers  and  men  were  so  enormous  that  there  was  practically  no 
trained  personnel  left  available  for  the  instruction  of  the  new 
levies,  which  undoubtedly  accounts  somewhat  for  the  delay  in  send- 
ing the  new  units  to  France. 

17.  DEVELOPMENT  OF  ARMIES— PEACE  TRAINING  NECESSARY. 

"The  time  requirel  for  raising  extemporized  armies  depends  largely 
on  the  presence  or  absence  of  trained  instructors.  If  there  be  a  corps  of 
trained  officers  and  noncommissioned  officers  and  a  tested  organization 
of  higher  units  with  trained  leaders  and  staff  officers,  the  problem  of 
training  is  limited  to  the  training  of  the  private  soldier.  *  *  * 
But  where  the  leaders  themselves  are  untrained,  and  where  the  officers 
and  men  must  alike  stumble  toward  efficiency  without  intelligent 
guidance,  the  formation  of  an  efficient  army  is  a  question  of  years; 
indeed,  such  a  force  can  not  become  an  army  at  all  within  the  period 
of  duration  of  modern  war.  The  American  war  of  1861-1865  presents 
the  singular  phenomenon  of  two  extemporized  armies  gradually  de- 
veloping while  in  conflict  with  each  other  and  is  a  most  remarkable 
record  of  the  evolution  of  such  forces.  In  the  conflicts  of  1861  both 
officers  and  men  were  untrained  for  the  duties  demanded  of  them. 
Even  the  companies  were  imperfectly  organized  as  units  of  the  regi- 
ments, and  the  lack  of  cohesion  was  still  more  apparent  in  the  higher 
units.  *  *  *  But  even  in  the  early  stages  of  the  war  the  influ- 
ence of  trained  and  able  leaders  was  apparent.  The  time  required 
to  make  an  effective  soldier  depends  very  largely  on  the  organiza- 
tion in  which  the  recruit  is  enrolled.  The  recruit  of  1861  could  not 
become  a  good  private  until  his  captain  became  a  good  captain,  but 
the  recruit  of  1863  was  absorbed  in  a  team  already  trained,  and 
therefore  became  a  trained  soldier  in  a  few  months  of  active  service. 
But,  while  the  history  of  the  Civil  War  is  instructive  as  a  record  of 
military  evolution,  it  can  not  be  invoked  as  a  guide  of  military  pol- 
icy, for  we  can  count  upon  it  that  in  our  career  as  a  world  power  no 
serious  competitor  will  ever  oppose  us  with  extemporized  armies. 
*  *  *  It  should  be  a  fundamental  principle  of  American  policy 
that  no  officer  should  be  intrusted  with  the  leadership  of  American 
soldiers  who  has  not  prepared  himself  for  that  responsibility  in 
time  of  peace.  The  American  soldier,  whether  regular  or  volun- 
teer, is  entitled  to  trained  leadership  in  war." — Organization  of  the 
Land  Forces,  1912. 

526 


14 

18.  CONCLUSIONS. 

The  present  European  war  has  demonstrated — 

1.  That  the  leading  of  an  untrained  or  partially  trained  and  ill- 
armed  citizen  soldiery  against  an  army  of  trained  veterans,  with  all 
the  enginery  of  modern  warfare,  results  in  useless,  senseless  slaughter. 

2.  That  in  direct  proportion  as  warfare  becomes  more  scientific, 
complicated,  and  expensive  does  it  require  longer  time  to  prepare 
for  war,  both  in  the  materiel  of  war  and  in  the  training  of  the 
soldiers. 

3.  That  the  United  States  can  not  rely  on  having  time  to  raise 
and  equip  new  armies  after  the  declaration  of  war,  unless  we  have 
allies  with  well-trained  armies  to  stand  between  us  and  disaster 
while  we  are  preparing.  Our  traditional  policy  has  been  against 
entangling  alliances. 

4.  That  in  making  deductions  from  the  operations  and  events  of 
the  present  European  war  we  should  consider  the  events  not  alone 
in  France  and  Flanders  and  the  Dardanelles,  which  have  developed 
into  siege  warfare,  but  the  operations  in  other  theaters  which  ap- 
proximate more  closely  what  would  happen  in  the  United  States 
should  they  be  attacked. 

5.  That  it  is  necessary  to  have  on  hand  at  the  beginning  of  war 
material  for  the  equipment  of  all  troops  to  be  mobilized  during  the 
first  three  months  of  the  war,  and  that  this  equipment  should  be 
accumulated  by  complete  division  units. 

6.  That  modern  armies,  to  be  successful,  must  be  well  balanced — 
that  is,  composed  of  the  proper  proportions  of  infantry,  cavalry, 
artillery,  and  special  troops — and  that  if  any  arm  or  corps  is  lack- 
ing in  time  of  peace  successful  military  operations  will  be  delayed 
until  it  is  brought  up  to  its  due  proportion. 

7.  That  in  the  wars  of  the  future  materiel  will  play  a  very  impor- 
tant part;  but  in  the  last  analysis  that  side  will  be  successful,  other 
things  being  equal,  which  can  longest  supply  reserves  of  adequately 
trained  and  disciplined  officers  and  men. 

526 

o 


I 


i 


STUDY  ON 

PLACES  OF  ORIGIN  AND  ABILITY  TO  PROCURE 

SUPPLIES  NEEDED  IN  VAST  QUANTITIES 

IN  TIME  OF  WAR 


PREPARED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION,  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

AS    A    SUPPLEMENT    TO    THE    STATEMENT    OF    A    PROPER   MILITARY 

POLICY  FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES 


WCD  8121-39 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE  :  WASHINGTON 

NOVEMBER,   1915 


527 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 

1916 


War  Department, 

Document  No.  527. 

Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff. 


I 


STUDY  ON  PLACES  OF  ORIGIN  AND  ABILITY  TO  PROCURE 
SUPPLIES  NEEDED  IN  VAST  QUANTITIES  IN  TIME  OF 
WAR. 


L  The  supplies  needed  for  our  armies  in  the  event  of  mobilization 
include  supplies  which  can  be  purchased  in  quantity  at  any  time, 
and  also  those  which  can  not  be  turned  out  except  after  weeks  or 
months  of  delay.  This  delay  would  be  due,  first,  to  the  fact  that  the 
article  is  not  a  standard  article  used  in  quantity  by  the  civilian  com- 
munity; second,  that  the  manufacture  of  some  of  the  articles  re- 
quires special  dies  and  machinery  not  generally  used  by  our  manu- 
facturers. 

2.  The  principles  which  should  be  adopted  therefore  are — 

(a)  To  standardize  all  articles  of  clothing  and  equipment  as  far 
as  possible,  using  designs  that  are  ordinarily  used  by  the  civilian  or 
which  can  be  turned  out  in  quantity  from  hundreds  of  existing 
factories. 

(b)  To  store  up  dies,  machinery,  and  samples  of  special  munitions, 
so  that  in  the  event  of  mobilization  hundreds  of  factories  could  be 
given  the  special  additional  equipment  which  would  enable  them  to 
begin  at  once  the  manufacture  of  these  special  munitions. 

3.  In  order  to  obtain  certain  data  from  the  chiefs  of  the  five  supply 
departments,  each  of  them  on  September  14,  1915,  was  furnished  a 
copy  of  the  paragraphs  below  quoted,  and  also  of  paragraphs  50 
and  52  to  62,  inclusive,  of  the  Statement  of  a  Proper  Military  Policy 
for  the  United  States,  prepared  by  the  War  College  Division  of  the 
General  Staff  Corps,  in  compliance  with  instructions  of  the  Secretary 
of  War,  March,  1915,  and  submitted  to  him  September  11, 1915.  The 
paragraphs  are  as  follows: 

IV. 

Has  any  study  ever  been  made  of  the  places  of  origin  and  ability  to  procure 
the  various  things  which  would  be  needed  by  us  in  vast  quantities  in  time  of 
war?  If  no  such  study  has  been  made,  ought  it  not  to  be  made?  In  other 
words,  does  the  Quartermaster  General  and  the  Chief  or  Ordnance,  and  the 
other  heads  of  bureaus  and  departments,  know  in  a  general  way  what  the  need 
would  be  for  an  army  of  a  million  men,  and  where  they  could  get  all  the  things, 
and  an  assurance  that  in  time  of  war  they  could  get  them?  This  should  be 
considered,  of  course,  in  the  light  of  the  possibility  that  one  or  both  oceans 
are  closed  to  us ;  so  that  there  should  not  only  be  a  survey  and  accurate  knowl- 
edge of  what  could  be  procured  here  and  where  It  could  be  procured  and  how 
long  it  would  take  to  procure  it,  but  of  what  we  would  lack  here  and  whether 
we  could  supply  that  lack  and  whence  and  how  long  It  would  take,  etc 

30669'— No.  627—16  (3) 


V. 

Have  we  reports  in  hand  of  what  materiel  shoulcl  be  asked  for,  particularly 
ammunition,  small  arms,  small-arm  ammunition,  tiekl  guns,  Artillery,  Field 
Artillery,  Coast  Artillery,  etc.?  If  not.  let  the  suggestions  be  made  as  soon  as 
possible,  so  that  they  can  be  submitted  and  revised  and  some  idea  obtained  of 
totals.  The  same  thing  should  be  done  with  respect  to  all  other  materiel  which 
must  be  kept  on  hand.  In  this  connection  I  think  it  would  be  extremely  ad- 
visable for  us  to  omit  asking  for  anything  as  a  reserve  which  we  inidoubtedly 
could  get  speedily  if  needed,  and  confine  ourselves  to  making  a  reserve  of  those 
things  which  require  periods  of  time. 

50.  For  the  purpose  of  storage,  military  supplies  may  be  divided  into  four 
classes — 

(a)  Supplies  that  can  be  obtained  in  great  quantities  in  the  open  market  at 
any  time. 

(b)  Those  that  caji  be  obtained  in  sufficient  quantities  on  15  days'  notice. 

(c)  Those  that  can  be  obtained  on  three  months'  notice. 
{(l)   Those  that  can  not  be  obtained  within  three  months. 

52.  A  fully  trained  force,  to  be  effective  during  the  critical  period  when  war 
is  imminent  and  during  the  first  few  weeks  of  a  war,  must  not  be  hampered  by 
lack  of  necessary  supplies  and  equipment.  For  this  reason  supplies  of  all 
kinds  which  can  not  be  obtained  in  the  open  market  at  any  time  must  be  kept 
on  hand,  in  use  and  in  store,  at  home  and  oversea,  sufficient  to  equip  without 
delay  all  troops  whose  training  warrants  sending  them  promptly  into  the  field. 

53.  It  is  probable  that  as  soon  as  war  becomes  imminent  the  partially  trained 
citizen  soldiery — 500,000  mobile  troops — will  also  be  called  out.  As  this  par- 
tially trained  force  can  not  be  expected  to  take  the  field  within  three  months' 
time,  it  is  practicable  to  refrain,  after  the  third  year,  from  keeping  on  hand  or 
in  store  for  it  any  articles  of  equipment  except  those  necessary  to  complete  its 
training  and  those  which  can  not  be  procured  within  three  months. 

54.  The  total  number  of  harbor-defense  troops  necessary  is  about  50,000. 
Due  to  conditions  of  service,  it  is  believed  that  ultimately  supplies  of  all  kinds 
for  60,000  should  be  kept  on  hand. 

55.  In  any  great  war  volunteers  must  be  called  out  in  addition  to  the  troops 
above  enmnerated. 

56.  It  would  be  unwise  to  have  on  hand  at  the  beginning  of  a  war  merely 
the  supplies  sufficient  to  place  in  the  field  our  first  contingent  of  troops  and  to 
complete  the  training  of  the  partially  trained  citizen  soldiery,  and  to  be  un- 
prepared to  supply  to  even  a  limited  extent  the  volunteer  army  we  should  have 
to  raise,  not  to  mention  replacements  of  arms,  ammunition,  clothing,  and  eqiHp- 
ment  of  all  kinds  for  those  already  in  the  field,  but  on  account  of  the  great 
sum  of  money  which  will  be  necessary  in  entering  upon  a  program  foi*  collect- 
ing and  storing  military  supplies  it  is  believed  that  the  subject  of  equipment 
for  a  volunteer  army  and  replacements  for  the  Regular  Army  and  partially 
trained  citizen  soldiery  should  be  provided  for  by  obtaining  options  with  domes- 
tic manufactui-ers  to  furnish  the  required  supplies,  all  of  domestic  manufac- 
ture, in  accordance  with  tentative  contracts  to  be  made  by  the  supply  depart- 
ments with  such  manufacturers  in  time  of  peace.  By  so  doing  we  will  be 
taking  the  initial  steps  toward  organizing  the  industrial  and  economic  resources 
of  the  country  as  well  us  its  resources  in  fighting  men. 

527 


57.  Referring  to  "  reserves,"  approximately  the  following 
able  at  the  close  of  the  sucoessive  years : 


troops  will  be  avail- 


Fully 
trained 
mobile 
troops. 


Partially 
trained 
continen- 
tal army. 


Harbor- 
defense 
troops. 


Total. 


First  year... 
Second  year. 
Third  year.. 
FourtH  year. 

Filth  year 

Si.xth  "year . . . 
Seventh  year 
Eighth  year. 


160,000 
219,000 

;{2(),  000 

3SH,(IO0 
4M.  000 

•isy,  000 

M4,000 
oV-l ,  000 


IS.5,000 

3:)  1,000 

.'1(10,000 
■jOO,  1)00 
fjOO,  000 
.')00,000 
.')00,0(I0 
.wo,  000 


30,000 
40,000 
50,  (XH) 
.52, 000 
54,000 
56, 000 
5S,  000 
60, 000 


375,000 

610,000 

870, 000 

935, 000 

993,000 

1,045,(«)0 

1,092,000 

1,134,000 


A  study  of  these  figures  and  of  the  difficulties  Ave  have  experienced 
in  the  past  in  the  matter  of  supplies  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
program  adopted  for  procuring  reserve  supplies  should  be  such  that 
at  the  close  of  each  year  we  should  have  in  use  and  in  store,  at  home 
and  oversea,  siijiplies  of  all  kinds  necessary  to  equip: 


Cavalry 

divi-ion^ 

of  nine 

regiments. 


First  year . . . 
Second  year. 
Third  year .  . 
Fourth  year. 
Fifth  year. .. 
Sixth  year.. . 
Seventh  year 
Eighth  year. 


Harbor- 
defense 
troops. 


30, 000 
40,000 
50,000 
.■52,000 
54, too 
56,  (.00 
.58,000 
60,000 


The  supplies  ucquiretl  during  the  first  three  years  should  include  all  articles 
which  can  not  be  obtained  in  sufficient  quantities  on  fifteen  days'  notice,  those 
acquired  during  the  last  five  years  to  include  only  those  articles  which  can  not 
be  obtained  on  three  months'  notice.  After  the  eighth  year  the  program  should 
be  extended  to  provide  for  the  storing  of  such  additional  machine  guns,  rifies, 
field  guns,  ammunition,  etc.,  as  may  be  considered  advisable. 

5S.  In  order  that  vast  supplies  pertaining  to  one  supply  bureau  should  not  be 
secured  and  relatively  nothing  be  done  by  other  supply  bureaus,  supplies  should 
be  obtained  progressively  in  complete  division  units. 

59.  In  order  that  the  elt'orts  of  the  various  supply  bureaus  may  be  properly 
coordinated  by  the  Chief  of  Staff,  reserve  supplies  should  be  collected  in 
general  supply  depots  located  in  accordance  with  the  general  principle  below 
enumerated.  Each  general  supply  depot  should  be  considered  a  place  of  issue 
in  time  of  peace  for  all  articles  of  field  equipment,  so  that  the  stock  on  hand 
will  be  continually  turned  over  and  the  machinery  for  the  issuing  and  forward- 
ing of  supplies  will  be  in  ojieration  at  the  outbreak  of  war.  The  commander 
of  each  general  supply  depot  should  be  either  a  line  or  a  staff  officer  specially 
selected  by  and  reporting  direct  to  the  Chief  of  Staff  or  to  the  department  com- 
mander and  independent  of  the  control  of  any  one  particular  staff  department, 
but  keeping  in  touch  with  all.  The  commander  of  each  general  supply  depot 
should  be  assisted  by  the  necessary  commissioned,  enlisted,  and  civilian  per- 
527 


6 

sonnel.  Supplies  for  not  more  than  three  division  units  should  be  stored  at 
any  one  locality.  Each  place  selected  for  a  reserve  storehouse  should  be  one 
that  will  be  at  all  times  under  adequate  military  protection,  where  ground  is 
available  and  where  abundant  railroad  facilities  exist. 

60.  As  a  general  military  principle,  no  supply  depot,  arsenal,  nor  manufac- 
turing plant  of  any  considerable  size,  supported  by  War  Department  appro- 
priations for  military  purposes  should  be  established  or  maintained  east  of 
the  Appalachian  Mountains,  west  of  Cascade  or  Sierra  Nevada  Mountains,  nor 
within  two  hundred  miles  of  our  Canadian  or  Mexican  borders,  and  steps  should 
be  taken  gradually  to  cause  to  be  moved,  depots  and  manufacturing  plants 
already  established  in  violation  of  this  military  principle. 

61.  The  estimated  cost  of  the  field  equipment  of  one  Infantry  division,  Tables 
of  Organization,  1914,  is  as  follows : 


Kind  of  supplies. 


Can  be  ob- 
tained in 
the  open 
market  in 
great  quan- 
tities at 
any  time. 


Can  b«  ob- 
tained on 
15  days' 
notice. 


Can  be  ob-        Can  not  be 
tained  on       obtained  on 
three  months'  three  months* 
notice.  notice. 


Signal  supplies 

Quartermaster  supplies 

Engineer  supplies 

Ordnance  supplies 

Medical  supplies 


$722. 12 

51,983.35 

1,835.26 

5,779.67 

10,997.95 


$1,688.51 

54,054.45 

471.59 

7, 730. 96 

10,189.63 


$6,030.46 

3,177,083.47 

7, 703. 97 

257, 489. 89 

88,861.51 


$285,310.26 


8,428.95 
4,164,770.68 


And  the  estimated  cost  of  one  cavalry  division  of  nine  regiments  is  approxi- 
mately as  follows: 


Kind  of  supplies. 


Can  be  ob- 
tained in 
the  open 
market  in 
great  quan- 
tities at 
any  time. 


Can  be  ob- 
tained on 
15  days' 
notice. 


Can  be  ob- 
tained on 
three  months 
notice. 


Can  not  be 

obtained  on 

three  months' 

notice. 


Signal  supplies 

Quartermaster  supplies 

Engineer  supplies 

Ordnance  supplies 

Medical  supjrties 


$370. 80 

55,102.48 

1,769.59 

31,862.02 

13, 454. 99 


$1,638.53 
76, 143. 40 
416.53 
8,630.56 
13,060.57 


$4,290.61 

4,584,628.93 

10, 885. 20 

311,056.68 

108,630.36 


$277,156.48 


3,999.45 
3,641,004.68 


62.  While  the  amount  of  money  involved  is  large,  practically  all  of  it  will 
remain  at  home,  especially  if  every  effort  be  made  by  the  supply  bureaus  to 
eliminate  from  supply  tables  all  articles  not  of  domestic  manufacture.  It  must 
also  be  kept  in  mind  that  it  is  cheaper  to  buy  war  supplies  in  time  of  peace 
than  in  time  of  war. 

4.  The  salient  points  mentioned  in  the  reports  received  are  as 
follows : 

Chief  of  Engineers. — No  adequate  study  made,  but  one  should  be 
made;  work  of  the  several  bureaus  ought  to  be  supervised  and  co- 
ordinated so  that  they  may  be  working  to  the  same  end  and  avoid 
getting  confused  and  overlapping  letters  from  the  manufacturers 
and  commercial  firms  who  would  supply  articles  to  more  than  one 
bureau. 

527 


Chief  Signal  Officer. — Steps  have  been  taken  to  procure  estimates 
as  to  the  quantity  of  material  the  principal  manufacturers  of  the 
country  can  furnish  and  the  probable  length  of  time  necessary  for 
deliveries. 

Chief  of  Ordnance. — A  study  has  been  nuide  of  the  probable  out- 
put of  ordnance  materiel  of  establishments  in  this  country;  the  de- 
gree of  preparedness  of  these  plants  in  any  future  year  can  not  be 
predicted;  practically  none  of  the  ordnance  materiel  can  be  procured 
in  less  than  three  months,  and  a  much  longer  time  will  be  required 
for  the  procurement  in  quantity  of  any  of  the  articles,  even  in  case 
of  plants  that  are  thoroughly  equipped  at  the  time  the  orders  are 
placed. 

Surgeon  General. — It  is  known  where  the  necessary  supplies  can 
be  purchased  under  usual  conditions;  a  very  large  number  of  medici- 
nal products  are  imported  and  could  not  be  procured  within  our 
borders,  but  none  are  absolutely  indispensable  except  quinine,  opium, 
and  cocaine;  a  large  proportion  of  surgical  instruments  are  im- 
ported ;  a  fair  amount  of  soft-metal  goods  can  be  obtained,  but  a 
pinch  would  be  manifested  in  the  lines  of  hand-forged  steel  instru- 
ments, such  as  knives,  hemostatic  forceps,  and  scissors. 

Quartermaster  General. — A  study  has  been  made  of  the  places  of 
origin  and  ability  to  procure  supplies  needed  for  an  army  of  a  mil- 
lion men;  all  the  necessary  articles  are  of  domestic  manufacture 
and  can  be  readily  obtained  on  reasonable  notice. 

5.  The  War  College  Division  can  find  nothing  in  the  reports  re- 
ceived which  indicates  the  advisability  of  changing  its  recommenda- 
tions contained  in  paragraphs  46  to  62,  inclusive,  of  the  Statement 
of  a  Proper  Military  Policy  for  the  United  States,  submitted  Sep- 
tember 11,  1915.  The  War  College  Division  is  of  the  opinion,  how- 
ever, that  before  anything  can  be  accomplished  looking  toward  co- 
ordinated action  in  the  matter  of  storing  reserve  materiel  a  com- 
mittee of  the  General  Staff  Corps  must  be  charged,  under  the  au- 
thority contained  in  section  2  of  the  act  of  Congress  approved  Feb- 
ruary 14,  1903,  with  the  duty  of  supervising  and  coordinating  the 
entire  work  of  preparing  each  year  the  estimates  for  all  amounts 
which  the  War  Department  recommends  that  Congress  appropriate. 

527 


I 


THE  PROPER  RELATIONSHIP  BETWEEN  THE 
ARMY  AND  THE  PRESS  IN  WAR 


PREPARED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION,  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

AS    A    SUPPLEMENT    TO    THE    STATEMENT    OF    A    PROPER   MILITARY 

POLICY  FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES 


WCD  8976-6 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE  :  WASHINGTON 

NOVEMBER,  1915 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 

1916 


52S 


4 


War  Department, 

Document  No.  528. 

Office  of  the  Chief  of  Sixiff. 


I 

J 


SYNOPSIS. 


Page. 

1.  Influence  of  the  press  on  the  conduct  of  the  war 5 

2.  Instances  of  military  successes  resulting  from  information  gleaned  from  the 

press  during  past  wars 5 

3.  Control  of  press  by  Japan  in  Russo-Japanese  War 7 

4.  Control  of  press  by  Bulgaria 7 

5.  Control  of  press  by  Great  Britain  in  present  war 7 

6.  Control  of  press  by  France  in  present  war 9 

7.  Control  of  press  by  Germany  in  present  war 9 

8.  Influence  of  press  on  success  of  the  Army 9 

9.  Willingness  of  press  to  cooperate  with  the  Government 10 

10.  Field  Service  Regulations 11 

11.  Study  of  questions  by  General  Staff  in  1908 11 

12.  Recommendations  of  War  College  Division,  General  Staff,  with  draft  show- 

ing character  of  suggested  legislature 11 

13.  References  on  file  in  Wax  College  Division , IS 

30<iu&°-Mo.  52»-ld  (3) 


1 


THE  PROPER  RELATIONSHIP  BETWEEN  THE  ARMY  AND 
THE  PRESS  IN  WAR. 


1.  INFLUENCE  OF  THE  PRESS  ON  THE  CONDUCT  OF  THE  WAR. 

When  other  means  have  failed  and  the  country  has  decided  on  war 
the  Army  and  Navy  are  the  only  agencies  of  the  Government  by 
which  it  can  obtain  its  desired  ends.  They  become  paramount,  and 
every  utility  and  influence  within  the  country  should  be  brought  to 
their  aid. 

The  press,  powerful  in  peace,  may  become  more  so  in  war.  By 
its  editorials  and  presentation  of  news  it  may  sway  the  people  for 
or  against  the  war  and  thus  stimulate  recruiting  and  hearten  and 
encourage  the  fighting  forces  in  their  work  or,  by  adverse  criticism, 
may  tend  to  destroy  the  efficiency  of  these  agencies. 

Again  by  publishing  news  of  the  movements  and  numbers  of  our 
own  troops  valuable  information  can  be  conveyed  to  the  enemy. 

2.  INSTANCES  OF  MILITARY  SUCCESSES  RESULTING  FROM  INFOR- 
MATION GLEANED  FROM  THE  PRESS  DURING  PAST  WARS. 

During  the  Crimean  War  the  Russians  gained  very  reliable  infor- 
mation regarding  the  works  in  the  trenches  of  the  allied  armies  and 
the  progress  of  the  siege  of  Sebastopol  from  the  English  newspapers. 

In  the  American  Civil  War  the  northern  generals  obtained  exact 
and  valuable  information  through  the  Confederate  papers.  After 
the  fall  of  Atlanta,  Jefferson  Davis,  speaking  at  Macon  and  Palmetto, 
stated  that  measures  had  been  taken  in  Tennessee  and  Kentucky  to 
cut  off  Sherman's  supplies  from  the  North,  and  that  having  an  army 
in  his  front  and  rear,  in  a  hostile  land,  he  must  be  annihilated.  These 
speeches,  published  in  the  southern  and  reproduced  in  the  northern 
press,  soon  reached  Sherman.  Acting  on  this  information,  and  in 
order  to  keep  his  communication  free,  the  Federal  general  began  his 
famous  march  through  Georgia  to  the  sea.  The  reports  of  his  suc- 
cessful progress,  which  appeared  in  the  southern  press,  enabled 
Grant  to  send  supplies  to  meet  him  at  the  coast. 

In  July,  1870,  Maj.  Krause,  of  the  German  staff,  was  able  by 
means   of    French   newspapers    to   ascertain    the    composition    and 
strategical  disposition  of  all  the  French  corps. 
528  (5) 


When  McMahon  in  1870  attempted  his  disastrous  march  to  the 
relief  of  Bazaine  in  Metz,  to  the  success  of  which  secrecy  was  essen- 
tial, his  movements  became  known  to  Prussian  headquarters  through 
English  and  French  newspapers. 

An  instance,  though  of  less  importance,  may  be  quoted  from  the 
other  side,  when,  on  the  8th  of  December,  1870,  Gen.  Faidherbe 
assumed  the  offensive  with  30,000  men  of  the  Army  of  the  North,  he 
made  his  diversion  by  way  of  St.  Quentin,  having  learned  from  the 
Prussian  newspapers  that  the  first  German  army  was  in  Normandy. 

During  the  Spanish  War  the  success  of  the  Cuban  expedition  of 
May,  1898,  was  seriously  menaced  by  the  news  in  the  American  press 
concerning  the  concentration  at  Tampa.  Every  military  movement 
was  reported  in  the  American  newspapers,  and  the  Spanish  Govern- 
ment had,  wuthin  two  or  three  hours,  complete  accounts  of  the  Ameri- 
can preparation  for  war. 

As  an  example  of  the  importance  of  excluding  from  the  press  all 
mention  of  military  movements,  the  following  may  be  related : 

When  it  became  evident  to  our  Military  Information  Division  in 
,1897  that  war  was  certain  to  occur  between  the  United  States  and 
Spain  an  attempt  was  made  to  discover  not  only  the  numbers  but 
the  garrisons  of  the  Spanish  Army  in  Cuba.  This  was  an  extremely 
difficult  task,  because  there  was  little,  if  any,  direct  information  upon 
the  subject,  the  Spanish  Government  having,  so  far  as  known,  dis- 
continued the  practice  of  announcing  in  orders  the  departure  of 
troops  for  the  island.  But  the  division  was  a  subscriber  for  the 
chief  Spanish  newspapers,  both  before  the  war  and  during  its  prog- 
ress. In  these  newspapers  mention  would  be  made  now  and  then  of 
an  action  at  such  and  such  a  place  in  Cuba,  the  name  of  the  regiment 
and  battalion  being  given.  By  carefully  compiling  such  mentions 
during  a  space  of  time  extending  over  many  months  the  Military  In- 
formation Division  was  enabled  to  arrive  at  a  really  accurate  esti- 
mate of  the  strength  of  the  Spanish  forces  in  Cuba,  with  their  sup- 
plies of  ammunition  and  other  resources,  and,  moreover,  enabled  to 
state  the  composition  of  the  various  garrisons  scattered  throughout 
the  island.  This  information  naturally  was  of  the  very  greatest 
value  to  our  Government.  It  would  have  been  of  still  greater  value 
had  land  operations  in  Cuba  lasted.  Now,  most  of  this  information 
was  gathered,  as  already  said,  from  the  newspapers,  but  not  from 
formal  statements  of  the  departure  of  troops,  giving  their  number, 
destination,  and  regiment  or  other  unit,  but  from  the  most  casual 
and,  as  it  were,  accidental  mention  of  regiments  and  actions  in  the 
island  by  the  Madrid  papers  from  time  to  time.  These  mentions  were 
so  broken  in  character  that  it  perhaps  never  occurred  to  the  Spanish 
that  they  could  be  made  the  solid  foundation  of  accurate  information 
as  to  the  strength  of  Spanish  garrisons  in  the  island,  but  slight  and 

628 


insignificant  as  these  data  were,  taken  item  by  item,  they,  neverthe- 
less, were  made  to  yield  a  most  important  result ;  a  thing  that  would 
have  been  impossible  had  the  Spanish  press  been  totally  silent  on  the 
subject  of  the  troops  serving  in  Cuba.  Subsequent  events  showed  that 
these  estmiates  were  almost  exactly  correct. 

3.  CONTROL  OF  PRESS  BY  JAPAN  IN  RUSSO-JAPANESE  WAR. 

Japan  was  the  first  nation  to  completely  take  control  of  the  press. 
In  the  early  days  of  her  war  with  Russia  editors  of  Japanese  news- 
papers were  expressly  prohibited  from  publishing  the  details  regard- 
ing the  organization,  mobilization,  or  transportation  of  their  coun- 
try's naval  and  military  forces.  A  warning  was  addressed  to  them 
emphasizing  the  power  of  the  press  to  mar  plans  of  operations,  in- 
stances being  cited  from  the  Chinese- Japanese  War  of  1894-95 ;  and 
an  appeal  was  made  to  their  patriotism  to  suppress  any  information 
which,  however  interesting  to  the  public,  might  be  of  use  to  the  enemy 
or  give  him  the  least  indication  of  Japanese  intentions  or  movements. 
How  loyally  the  Japanese  press  had  responded  to  this  appeal  is 
proved  by  the  impenetrable  mystery  which  shrouded  the  movements 
of  Admiral  Togo's  ships  and  the  marches  of  Marshal  Oyama's  armies. 

The  treatment  of  foreign  newspaper  correspondents  by  the  Jap- 
anese is  well  expressed  in  a  cartoon  of  London  Punch,  which  pictured 
a  Japanese  officer  blindfolding  a  correspondent,  and  as  remarking, 
"Abjectly  we  desire  to  distinguish  honorable  newspaper  man  by  hon- 
orable badge."  The  blindfolding  of  the  foreign  correspondents 
caused  much  ill  feeling  against  Japan,  and  was  expressed  in  many 
articles  published  after  these  correspondents  returned  to  their  coun- 
tries, but  Japan  gained  her  purpose. 

4.  CONTROL  OF  PRESS  BY  BULGARIA. 

In  the  first  Balkan  war  Bulgaria's  mobilization  and  concentration 
was  kept  secret  even  from  her  own  people.  Correspondents  after  the 
concentration  were  received,  though  they  were  not  permitted  to  see 
or  report  anything  of  value.  Correspondents  were,  however,  free  to 
leave  as  they  pleased,  and  after  they  crossed  the  boundary  could  pub- 
lish what  they  pleased.  Man}^  false  reports  of  movements,  etc.,  were 
sent  from  neutral  cities  by  correspondents  who  had  never  been  at  the 
front. 

5.  CONTROL  OF  PRESS  BY  GREAT  BRITAIN  IN  PRESENT  WAR. 

In  the  present  European  conflict  all  nations  engaged  have  insti- 
tuted a  rigorous  censorship.  Great  Britain's  experience  must  be  of 
greater  interest  to  us,  as  conditions  there  are  more  nearly  similar  to 
our  own. 

528 


8 

Great  Britain  appears  at  first  to  have  had  two  distinct  organiza- 
tions dealing  with  censorship :  First,  the  press  bureau,  from  which  is 
given  out  such  news  as  the  Government  desires  to  publish,  and  to 
which  articles  and  dispatches  to  London  newspapers  are  submitted 
lor  confirmation,  permission  to  publish  without  confirmation,  or  sup- 
pression; second,  the  cable  censors  who  pass  on  all  cables  filed, 
whether  private,  business,  or  journalistic.  There  is  in  addition  a 
censorship  on  mail  to  hostile  countries. 

In  addition  to  the  main  press  bureau,  there  has  been  established 
in  the  foreign  office  a  publicity  bureau  for  the  purpose  of  issuing 
information  favorable  to  the  allies. 

There  also  exists  in  the  admiralty  a  censorship  of  wireless. 

This  censorship  has  its  authority  in  the  general  act  giving  to  the 
naval  and  military  officials  the  legal  right  to  take  such  steps  as  might 
be  necessary  for  the  defense  of  the  realm. 

For  the  period  preceding  the  declaration  of  war,  and  for  several 
days  thereafter  (until  Aug.  11),  there  was  no  official  or  organized 
press  bureau.  However,  the  proprietors  and  editors  of  the  great 
newspapers,  irrespective  of  class  or  party,  all  combined  to  take  no 
notice  of  questions  which  the  Admiralty  or  war  office  did  not  want 
referred  to.  Later  the  cable  censorship  became  incorporated  in  the 
press  bureau,  and  all  press  telegrams  were  censored  at  the  Govern- 
ment central  telegraph  office.  Cablegrams  from  abroad  were  sent 
by  pneumatic  tube  to  the  central  office,  and  after  a  censor's  action 
sent  to  the  addressee.  Telegrams  and  cablegrams  filed  at  any  office 
were  sent  to  the  central  office  and  after  a  censor's  action  placed  on 
the  Government  lines  or  delivered  to  the  company  operating  the 
cable.  All  press  representatives  were  registered  and  any  bulletin 
given  out  by  the  press  bureau  was  simultaneously  dictated  to  all. 
None  could  use  it  till  all  had  received  it.  Before  this  change,  made 
about  September  1,  1914,  much  criticism  had  been  expressed  of  the 
methods  employed,  particularly  that  some  censors  permitted  dis- 
patches to  pass  which  other  censors  prohibited.  No  correspondents 
were  allowed  at  the  front.  Daily  communiques  or  bulletins  were 
issued  from  army  headquarters,  and  these  have  been  supplemented 
by  weekly  descriptions  given  out  as  written  by  an  "  eyewitness." 

It  is  understood  that  when  the  Dardanelles'  expedition  was 
planned  that  the  active  heads  of  the  great  papers  were  called  to  the 
war  office  and  informed  that  but  one  correspondent  would  be  per- 
mitted with  the  expedition.  The  newspapers  were  to  decide  on  this 
man,  and  he  would  be  in  honor  bound  to  send  nothing  but  what  was 
passed  by  the  censor.  '  Mr.  Ashmead  Bartlett  was  chosen  for  this 
purpose. 

The  censorship  has  caused  much  criticism  and  discontent  in  Eng- 
land.    The  Government  has  been  interpellated  in  Parliament,  and 

628 


the  press,  particularly  the  Northcliffe  papers,  publish  violent  edi- 
torial comment. 

At  first  there  was  much  confusion,  due  to  the  inexperience  of  the 
censors  and  to  the  lack  of  system;  this  seems  now  to  be  partly 
remedied. 

It  was  claimed,  not  without  reason,  that  recruiting  was  impeded; 
later,  when  more  accurate  statements  of  the  losses  in  Flanders  were 
permitted  to  be  published,  recruiting  was  greatly  stimulated. 

6.  CONTROL  OF  PRESS  BY  FRANCE  IN  PRESENT  WAR. 

In  France,  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  the  Government  took  ad- 
vantage of  the  parliamentary  act  of  1850,  which  specifies  that  the 
military  government  shall  have  the  right  to  suppress  newspapers 
for  disobedience  of  instructions  given  concerning  the  publication  of 
military  information.  At  the  call  of  mobilization,  shortly  before  war 
was  declared,  the  ministry  in  power  commenced  the  organization  of 
a  bureau  of  press  censorship. 

In  a  session  of  August  5,  the  Chambre  de  Deputes  passed  a  special 
act  describing  the  military  censorship  to  be  established  for  the  dura- 
tion of  the  present  war,  but  generally  limiting  the  power  of  the 
censor  to  military  and  diplomatic  information,  political  matters  be- 
ing excluded. 

France,  as  in  other  nations,  first  permitted  no  correspondents  at 
the  front;  later,  certain  well-vouched-for  newspaper  men  have  been 
taken  on  personally  conducted  tours.  The  army  issues  daily  com- 
muniques, supplemented  by  periodical  "  eyewitness "  stories,  which 
are  carefully  worded  and  which,  of  course,  contain  nothing  of  value 
to  the  enemy. 

7.  CONTROL  OF  PRESS  BY  GERMANY  IN  PRESENT  WAR. 

Germany,  as  in  all  matters  of  preparation,  was  forehanded  in  her 
laws,  and  it  was  only  necessary  to  issue  the  necessary  decrees  or  orders 
prohibiting  the  publication  of  military  information.  While  guard- 
ing the  publication  of  useful  military  information,  she  has  used  the 
press  to  her  advantage  by  permitting  carefullj^  conducted  tours  to 
the  front  of  accredited  newspaper  men,  especially  neutral  corre- 
spondents, and  permitting  them  to  publish  interesting  "  human  in- 
terest" stories,  all  showing  Germany  in  a  favorable  light,  but  con- 
taining nothing  of  value  to  the  enemy. 

8.  INFLUENCE  OF  PRESS  ON  SUCCESS  OF  THE  ARMY. 

The  above  has  been  written  with  a  view  of  showing  the  influence 
that  the  press  can  have  on  the  success  of  armies  and  the  steps  that 

528 


10 

have  been  taken  by  foreign  nations  to  prevent  the  publication  of  in- 
formation valuable  to  the  enemy. 

There  are  two  ways  in  which  the  press  has  a  direct  influence  on 
the  success  of  the  army : 

First.  It  may,  by  publishing  names  of  organizations,  numbers, 
movements,  accounts  of  victories  or  defeats,  furnish  information  to 
the  enemy  that  will  enable  him  to  deduct  the  strength  and  location 
and  intended  movements  of  our  own  troops. 

Second.  By  criticism  of  the  conduct  of  campaigns,  the  action  of 
certain  officers  or  exploiting  others,  the  people  will  be  led  to  lose 
confidence  in  the  army  with  the  result  that  the  moral  support  of  the 
people  is  lost;  they  cry  for  and  obtain  new  generals,  and  new  plans 
of  campaign,  not  based  on  expert  knowledge  and  thought,  with  a 
consequent  lengthening  of  the  war  or  even  defeat. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  desire  of  the  people  to  know  how  the  war 
is  progressing  and  how  fare  their  men,  is  one  that  should  be  fulfilled. 

The  press  is  their  means  of  this  information  and  their  mouthpiece. 

The  right  correlation  of  these  opposing  interests  will  furnish  the 
solution  of  the  proper  relationship  between  the  Army  and  the  press 
m  war. 

In  our  country,  with  its  numerous  newspapers  expressing  the  ideas 
and  wishes  of  different  political  parties,  the  numerous  telegraph, 
cable  lines,  and  wireless  stations  furnishing  means  of  communication 
within  and  without  the  country,  the  difficulty  of  proper  control  is 
great,  and  shows  that  unless  the  question  is  taken  up  now  and  studied 
with  great  care,  and  unless  proper  regulations  are  made  at  the  out- 
break of  war,  we  wdll  be  in  a  worse  position  than  England. 

9.  WILLINGNESS  OF  THE  PRESS  TO  COOPERATE  WITH  THE 

GOVERNMENT. 

It  is  laiown  from  the  statements  of  prominent  newspaper  men  that 
the  responsible  press  associations  and  newspapers  will  meet  the  Gov- 
ernment half  way  in  this  matter. 

In  1913  Mr.  J.  C.  O'Loughlin  delivered  a  lecture  before  the  Army 
War  College  in  which  he  advocated  publicity  for  the  Army  in  peace, 
but  in  time  of  war  "  a  censorship  so  strict,  so  thorough,  that  the  op- 
erations of  the  armies,  including  the  units  composing  them,  would 
not  even  be  referred  to  in  the  press."  In  that  "  twilight  zone  "  be- 
tween the  above  two  conditions,  when  preparations  for  hostilities  ac- 
company diplomatic  negotiations  to  avoid  war,  he  would  have  the 
War  Department  appeal  "  to  press  associations  and  newspapers,  con- 
servative and  yellow,  to  print  no  information  respecting  mobiliza- 
tion, movements,  and  anything  which  might  affect  injuriously  our 
operations."  He  read  letters  from  Mr.  Melville  E.  Stone,  general 
manager  of  the  Associated  Press;  Mr.  James  Keeley,  general  man- 

628 


1 


11 

ager  of  the  Chicago  Tribune;  and  Mr.  Frederic  Palmer,  all  in- 
dorsing censorship  and  expressing  belief  that  the  selection  of  the 
right  kind  of  war  correspondents  would  make  censorship  possible. 
One  of  our  naval  observers,  in  a  report  on  press  censorship  in  Great 
Britain  during  the  present  war,  quotes  two  American  journalists, 
as  follows: 

The  trouble  with  the  censorship  is  easily  discerned;  all  the  difficulties  that 
have  been  encountered  are  readily  chargeable  to  one  thing — lack  of  prepara- 
tion.    *     *     * 

In  the  United  States  the  censorship  would  be  as  new  and  strange  as  it  is  in 
England ;  therefore  every  preparation  should  be  made  to  take  up  the  work  in 
time  of  war.  The  Government  in  Washington  should  send  officers  to  study  all 
the  telegraph  and  cable  systems  and  locate  all  wires  crossing  the  borders,  and 
wireless  stations,  and  so  forth.  More  important  still,  a  study  should  be  made  of 
the  requirements  of  the  newspapers,  whose  support  and  cooperation  the  Govern- 
ment must  have,  and  whose  needs,  after  all,  are  only  the  needs  of  the  people. 
If  officers  detailed  to  investigate  this  problem  were  to  go  to  newspaper  editors 
and  managers  they  would  be  given  a  hearty  welcome  and  full  cooperation,  par- 
ticularly at  this  moment,  when  censorship  matters  are  uppermost  in  the  minds 
of  newspaper  people.  If  an  understanding  is  reached  with  the  press  in  advance, 
the  Government  will  find  it  easier  in  time  of  war  to  control  the  press  and  to 
guide  it.  Officers  should  also  go  to  the  great  press  associations  of  the  country 
and  study  their  system  of  disseminating  news.  The  headquarters  of  these  press 
associations  would  be  where  the  censors  would  have  to  be  stationed  in  order  to 
control  publication  in  American  newspapers. 

10.  FIELD  SERVICE  REGULATIONS. 

In  our  Field  Service  Regulations  of  1914  there  are  regulations  pro- 
viding a  censorship  and  governing  correspondents  with  field  armies. 
Therein  is  provided  a  chief  censor  at  "Washington,  but  his  duties  are 
not  stated.  These  rules  seem  to  be  full  and  ample,  but  they  apply 
only  to  censorship  with  the  active  armies  in  the  field.  They  have  had 
a  limited  trial  in  the  recent  occupation  of  Vera  Cruz. 

11.  STUDY  OF  QUESTION  BY  GENERAL  STAFF  IN  1908. 

In  1908  the  General  Staff  made  an  exhaustive  study  of  this  ques- 
tion. Therein  the  constitutional  aspect  of  restriction  of  publication 
was  carefully  considered. 

12.  RECOMMENDATIONS   OF   WAR    COLLEGE    DIVISION,    GENERAL 

STAFF. 

In  February,  1915,  the  War  College  Division,  by  direction  of  the 
Chief  of  Staff,  submitted  a  memorandum  on  the  control  of  the  press 
in  war.  After  a  full  discussion  of  the  question,  the  following  recom- 
mendations were  made: 

628 


12 

(a)  That  an  officer  of  the  Army,  designated  by  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  an 
officer  of  the  Nav-y,  designated  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  be  directed  to 
consult  with  representatives  of  the  press  associations  and  managers  of  leading 
newspapers  of  the  country  in  drafting  legislation  authorizing  the  President  to 
issue  regulations  for  control  of  publication  and  censorship  of  telegraph,  cable, 
wireless,  and  mail  communication  wherever  such  course  may  seem  to  him  neces- 
sary for  the  defense  of  the  country. 

(6)  That  such  draft,  after  approval  by  the  Judge  Advocate  General  of  the 
Army,  either  be  submitted  to  Congress  at  once  or  held  ready  to  submit  when 
conditions  seem  to  warrant  favorable  action,  as  the  President  may  deem  proper. 

(c)  That  whether  or  not  such  draft  be  now  submitted,  regulations  to  render 
an  effective  censorship  be  drawn  up  and  careful  plans  be  prepared  for  execu- 
tion of  the  censorship  under  such  regulations.  These  should  include  record 
of  each  cable,  telegraph,  and  wireless  station  which  would  require  supervision 
by  a  censor ;  list  of  all  newspapers,  periodicals,  and  correspondents ;  selection  of 
Army  and  Navy  officers,  preferably  retired,  and  of  experienced  newspaper 
men  as  personnel  of  the  censorate.  Following  the  British  plan,  the  Assistant 
Secretary  of  War  could  well  be  assigned  as  director  of  the  censorate. 

(d)  In  time  of  national  peril  and  absence  of  legislation,  the  President  should 
at  once  direct  a  censorship  of  all  communication  by  mail,  cable,  wire,  or  wire- 
less; if  necessary,  declaring  martial  law  to  an  extent  necessary  to  effect  arbi- 
trary suppression  of  publication  or  communication  of  matter  that  might  prove 
detrimental  to  national  defense  or  useful  to  a  possible  enemy. 

It  is  of  vital  importance  that  all  these  steps  be  taken  before  the 
occasion  arises  for  application  of  a  censorship.  We  may  anticipate 
greater  confusion  and  dissatisfaction  than  Great  Britain  experienced 
if  no  plans  be  prepared  and  no  personnel  be  selected  for  execution 
thereof  until  the  time  arrives  when  censorship  and  control  of  the 
press  become  as  necessary  as  in  Europe  in  1914. 

The  following  tentative  draft  suggests  the  character  of  legislation 
recommended : 

A  BILL  To  confer  upon  the  President  power  to  restrict  the  publication  of  certain  informa- 
tion inconsistent  with  the  defense  of  the  country. 

Be  it  enacted  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the  United 
States  of  America  in  Congress  assembled,  That  whenever  in  his  judgment  the 
defense  of  the  country  requires  such  action,  the  President  may  issue  a  proclama- 
tion prohibiting  the  publication  of  all  news  referring  to  the  armed  forces  of  the 
Government  or  the  means  and  measures  that  may  be  contemplated  for  defense 
of  the  country,  except  when  such  publication  shall  have  been  duly  authorized, 
and  he  may  issue  such  regulations  as  may  be  necessary  to  render  such  prohibi- 
tion effective. 

Sec.  2.  That  after  the  President  shall  have  issued  such  proclamation  as  is 
authorized  by  section  1  of  this  act  it  shall  be  unlawful  for  any  person  within 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States  to  publish  or  cause  or  procure  to  be  pub- 
lished, or  to  assist  in  the  publication  of  any  information,  facts,  rumors,  or  news 
prohibited  by  the  terms  of  the  proclamation  or  regulations  issued  under  this  act, 
except  when  such  publication  shall  have  been  duly  authorized  under  such  regu- 
lations, and  any  person  who  so  offends  may  be  punished  by  a  fine  of  not  more 
than  $10,000,  or  by  a  term  of  imprisonment  of  not  more  than  three  years,  or 
both. 

628 


13 

Sec.  S.  That  when  In  the  judgment  of  the  President  the  defense  of  the  coun- 
try no  longer  requires  prohibition  of  publication  he  shall  issue  a  proclamation 
revoking  any  proclamation  issued  under  section  1  of  this  act;  thereupon  the 
pains  and  penalties  authorized  by  this  act,  except  for  violations  of  regulations 
committed  prior  to  such  revocation,  shall  cease. 

Note. — In  this  draft  details  of  means  for  effective  enforcement  are  purposely 
omitted,  as  they  should  be  the  subject  of  regulations  authorized  and  could  thug 
be  changed  whenever  conditions  warrant  change. 

13.  REFERENCES  ON  FILE  IN  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION. 

There  are  on  file  in  the  War  College  Division  voluminous  reports 
on  censorship  from  our  military  attaches  and  observers  with  the 
countries  now  at  war.  These  should  be  studied  by  any  board  that 
may  be  appointed  to  draw  up  regulations  on  the  subject  for  our  own 
service. 

628 

o 


THE  RECRUITMENT  OF  OFFICERS  IN  TIME  OF  PEACE 
IN  THE  PRINCIPAL  ARMIES  OF  EUROPE 


PREPARED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION,  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

AS    A    SUPPLEMENT    TO    THE    STATEMENT    OF    A    PROPER    MILITARY 

POLICY  FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES 


WCD  9278-1 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE  :  WASHINGTON 

NOVEMBER,   1915 


529 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFPIOE 

1918 


War  Department, 

Document  No.  529. 

Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff. 


SYNOPSIS. 


I.  Active  Army. 

Page. 

1.  Germany 5 

2.  France 6 

3.  Austria-Hungary 7 

4.  Italy 8 

5.  Russia 9 

6.  Great  Britain 10 

II.  Recruitment  of  Reserve  Officers. 

7.  Germany 12 

8.  France 13 

9.  Austria-Hungary 13 

10.  Italy 14 

11.  Russia 15 

12.  Great  Britain 16 

III.  Military  Schools. 

13.  Germany 20 

14.  France 23 

15.  Austria-Hungary 24 

16.  Italy 24 

17.  Russia 25 

18.  Great  Britaiu 25 

IV.  Conclusions. 

19.  Comparison 30 

20.  Remedy  and  recommendation ;\ 31 

21.  Reserve  officers'  training  corps 31 

Object 31 

Output 31 

Composition 32 

Instruction 33 

Camps 33 

Control  of  instruction 34 

Conditions  of  service 34 

Advantages  of  the  system 36 

Comparison  with  the  English  officers'  training  corps 37 

Officers'  reserve  corps  (Appendix  A) 38 

Reserve  officers'  training  corps  (Appendix  B) 40 

Bibliography  (Appendix  C) 43 

529  (3) 


RECRUITMENT  OF  OFFICERS  IN  TIME  OF  PEACE. 


I.   ACTIVE  ARMY. 
1.  GERMANY. 

In  the  active  army. — In  time  of  peace  officers  are  obtained  princi- 
pally from  two  sources: 

1.  From  the  corps  of  cadets. 

2.  From  young  men  of  education  and  culture  who  enter  the  army 
as  F ahnenjunkers  (ensigns). 

Appointment  as  a  commissioned  officer  must  be  preceded  by  ap- 
pointment as  FahnHch  (ensign).  Appointment  as  Fahnrich  is  con- 
ditional upon: 

{a)  The  age  limits  within  which  persons  may  be  appointed  en- 
signs are  17|  and  23. 

(J)  Educational  qualifications:  Diploma  from  a  Gymnasium, 
Real  Gymnasium,  Cher  Realschule,  corps  of  cadets,  or  passing  the 
Fahnrich  examination. 

{c)  Certificate  of  conduct,  adaptability,  and  proficiency  after  at 
least  six  months'  service  with  troops. 

Appointment  as  commissioned  officer  is  conditional  upon: 

{a)  Attendance  at  a  "war  school"  (in  exceptional  cases  this  may 
be  dispensed  with ;  for  instance,  where  a  candidate  has  studied  several 
terms  at  a  higher  educational  institution). 

(6)  Passing  the  "officers'  examination"  at  a  "war  school"  or  as 
a  member  of  the  Selekta  (a  selektaner;  see  military  schools  of  Ger- 
many). 

(c)  A  favorable  indorsement  or  certificate  from  the  troop  unit  to 
which  attached. 

{d)  Election  by  officers  of  the  regiment. 

The  election  of  new  officers  by  the  corps  of  officers  was  introduced 
in  the  Prussian  Army  in  1808.  Through  it  the  aristocratic  character 
of  the  German  Army  is  maintained.  For  conspicuous  bravery  or 
conduct  on  the  field  of  battle  recommendations  for  a  commission  may 
be  made.  But  here,  also,  such  a  recommendation  must  be  preceded 
by  a  vote  of  the  officers  of  the  regiment. 

Officers  on  the  active  list  who  on  account  of  age  or  disability  are 
required  to  leaA'e  the  service  are  entitled  to  a  pension,  depending 
in  amount  on  rank,  length  of  service,  character  of  disability.     Offi- 

629  (5) 


cers  on  the  reserve  and  Landwehr^  upon  reaching  the  required  statu- 
tory age,  pass  to  the  Landwehr  or  Landsturm,^  respectively,  if  they 
do  not  desire  to  continue  in  the  reserve  of  the  Landwehr.  Should 
they  become  disabled  in  the  line  of  duty  they  are  entitled  to  the  same 
pensions  as  officers  of  the  active  army. 

The  officer  aspirant  must  be  at  least  23  years  of  age,  must  be  un- 
married, a  German  by  birth,  and  be  physically  qualified  for  service. 
Each  candidate  should  have  a  diploma  from  a  certain  type  of  insti- 
tution, and  should  have  served  a  period  of  one  year  in  the  Army. 
In  place  of  the  examination  which  is  given  to  the  cadet  when  he 
leaves  a  cadet  school,  the  officer  aspirant  must  qualify  in  the  fol- 
lowing : 

German  language  and  literature:  in  three  other  languages  chosen 
from  the  following :  Latin,  Greek,  French,  English,  or  Russian ;  his- 
tory, geography,  and  mathematics  are  obligatory.  In  case  he  is  a 
graduate  of  one  of  the  higher  Royal  schools  one  of  the  languages  is 
replaced  by  physics  and  chemistry.  There  are  certain  other  require- 
ments which  are  elective,  such  as  map  reading  and  topographical 
sketching. 

Having  passed  these  tests  he  is  then  required  to  enter  the  army  for 
six  months'  service  as  a  temporary  officer,  at  the  end  of  which  time 
he  is  sent  to  one  of  the  "  war  schools,"  and  upon  graduation  from 
this  last  institution  may  become  an  officer.  The  cadet  schools,  how- 
ever, furnish  about  one-third  of  all  the  officers  in  the  German  service. 

2.  FRANCE. 

Officers  are  recruited  from  three  principal  sources :  the  great  mili- 
tary schools,  schools  for  noncommissioned  officers,  and  from  selected 
warrant  officers  of  at  least  10  years'  service  as  noncommissioned 
officers.  The  proportion  from  the  last  class  is  about  one-fifth  of  the 
promotions  to  the  grade  of  sublieutenant. 

Commissions  in  the  French  Army  are  obtained  by  passing  through 
one  of  the  military  schools,  either  with  or  without  previous  service 
in  the  ranks. 

Young  men  who  desire  a  commission  without  going  through  the 
ranks  must,  in  the  first  instance,  pass  through  the  Ecole  Spedale  at 
St.  Cyr,  for  the  infantry  and  cavalry,  or  the  Ecole  Polytechnique 
for  the  artillery  and  engineers. 

After  passing  successfully  out  of  St.  Cyr  the  young  infantry  offi- 
cers pass  direct  to  their  regiments. 

Cavalry  candidates  have  to  complete  a  course  of  instruction  at  the 
Ecole  d'' Application,  at  Saumur,  and  artillery  and  engineer  candi- 
dates, after  passing  out  of  the  Ecole  Polytechnique.^  a  course  at  the 
similar  establishment  at  Fontainebleau. 

629 


Admission  to  the  Ecole  Spedale,  at  St.  Cyr,  is  by  competitive  ex- 
amination, the  age  limits  being  between  18  and  21.  The  students 
form  a  battalion  of  6  companies.  The  course  lasts  2  years,  and  the 
number  of  competitors  is  always  large. 

The  Ecole  Poly  technique^  in  addition  to  the  training  of  artillery 
and  engineer  candidates,  supplies  young  men  for  the  naval  and 
state  engineering  departments,  telegraphs,  state  factories,  etc.  Ad- 
mission is  by  competitive  examination,  and  the  age  limit  as  for  St. 
Cyr  (with  certain  exceptions  in  favor  of  soldiers).  The  course  lasts 
two  years.  The  Ecole  (T Application^  at  Saumur,  completes  the  edu- 
cation of  young  cavalry  officers  from  St.  Cyr,  and  the  Ecole  d' Ap- 
plication, at  Fontainbleau,  that  of  the  young  officers  of  artillery  and 
engineers  going  from  the  Polytechnique.  The  course  at  the  former 
establishment  last  11  months,  at  the  latter  two  years. 

The  Ecole  Militaire,  at  St.  Maixent,  completes  the  military  instruc- 
tion of  ''  sous-officers "  of  the  infantry  and  cavalry,  who,  in  peace 
time,  only  receive  commissions  after  passing  the  course  with  credit. 
Candidates  must  have  at  least  two  years'  service  in  the  rank  of 
"  sous-officer  "  before  being  allowed  to  compete,  and  they  have  also 
to  pass  a  preliminary  examination  at  their  regimental  schools.  Ad- 
mission to  the  school  is  by  competition,  and  the  course  lasts  one  year. 
Those  who  pass  through  it  successfully  are  appointed  sublieutenants. 

The  Ecole  Militaire  at  Versailles  for  noncommissioned  officers  of 
artillery  and  engineers  is  organized  on  similar  lines. 

3.  AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 

Officers  for  the  Imperial  Austro-Hungarian  Army  are  recruited 
from  two  distinct  sources — from  the  military  schools  and  from  the 
cadet  corps.  The  schools  or  military  academies — for  so  they  might 
be  called — are  two  in  number,  one  at  Neustadt,  outside  of  Vienna, 
and  the  other  in  Vienna  itself.  The  first  provides  officers  for  the  in- 
fantry, cavalry,  and  pioneers,  and  the  technical  academy  at  Vienna 
for  artillery  and  other  engineer  officers.  The  candidates  for  admis- 
sion to  these  institutions  must  be  between  the  ages  of  18  and  21,  and, 
after  having  undergone  the  course  of  instruction,  are  named  by  the 
Emperor  to  the  position  of  lieutenant  and  assigned  by  the  Minister  of 
War  in  accordance  with  the  needs  of  the  service,  although  a  choice  is 
given  them  of  the  arm  in  which  they  desire  to  serve.  The  cadet  schools 
are  not  exactly  analogous  to  any  of  the  schools  heretofore  mentioned, 
but  are  rather  elementary  in  their  nature.  They  take,  as  a  rule, 
young  men  from  14  to  18  years  of  age.  These  young  men  do  not 
necessarily  belong  to  the  army,  but  a  part  of  the  vacancies  are  saved 
for  a  certain  number  of  young  men  who  are  already  serving  volun- 
tarily in  the  army  who  complete  a  period  of  from  six  months  to  one 

629 


8 

year.  The  duration  of  a  course  at  this  school  is  four  years,  but  the 
two  first  are  devoted  solely  to  perfecting  the  student  in  the  line  of  a 
general  education,  and  the  last  two  solely  to  studies  which  are  pro- 
fessional and  military. 

The  cadet  schools  are  18  in  number.  There  are  15  infantry  schools, 
one  cavalry  school,  one  artillery  school,  and  one  for  pioneers.  Those 
graduates  who  have  completed  satisfactorily  the  course  are  assigned 
throughout  the  service  where  vacancies  exist.  Those  who  have  for- 
merly served  are,  upon  their  reentrance  into  service,  assigned  to  the 
corps  in  which  they  originally  served.  They  take  rank  among  all 
other  cadets  throughout  the  army,  seniority  being  determined  by  the 
rank  upon  leaving  the  school.  All  cadets,  of  whatever  school,  are 
placed  upon  a  single  list  according  to  the  arm  and  are  drawn  in 
accordance  with  the  vacancies  by  seniority.  During  the  time  in 
which  they  are  serving  as  a  cadet  officer  they  are  exercising  the 
functions  of  an  officer  but  without  rank.  It  is  during  this  period  that 
they  are  passed  upon  by  their  regimental  commanders  and  by  the 
officers  of  the  regiment,  recommendation  from  whom  is  necessary 
before  the  cadet  receives  his  final  commission.  Generally  speaking, 
about  five-sixths  of  the  infantry  and  cavalry,  and  about  four-sixths 
of  the  special  arms,  come  from  the  cadet  schools. 

4.  ITALY. 

The  law  governing  the  recruitment  of  officers  in  the  Italian  Army 
has  been  in  force  since  1832,  and  few",  if  any,  changes  have  been  made. 
With  no  exceptions  all  officers  must  pass  through  the  royal  academy 
at  Turin  and  the  royal  military  school  at  Modena.  The  law  requires 
that  no  one  shall  be  promoted  a  sublieutenant  who  has  not  reached 
the  age  of  18  years  unless  he  has  served  two  years  as  a  noncommis- 
sioned officer  in  the  active  army  and  has  established  to  the  satis- 
faction of  all  concerned  his  qualifications  for  this  position.  One- 
third  of  all  vacancies  in  the  grade  of  sublieutenant  are  reserved  for 
noncommissioned  officers ;  the  two  other  thirds  are  left  to  the  gradu- 
ates of  the  military  establishments.  The  royal  military  academy  at 
Turin  furnishes  all  the  officers  for  the  artillery  and  engineers,  while 
the  royal  military  academy  at  Modena  furnishes  those  for  the  infan- 
try and  cavalry.  In  addition,  there  are  a  number  of  schools  of  ap- 
plication, mainly  for  artillery  and  cavalry.  These  cadet  schools  are 
open  to  all  native-born  Italians  between  the  ages  of  15  and  20,  but 
the  age  limit  can  be  extended  to  23  in  case  the  applicant  has  served 
with  the  colors.  The  duration  of  the  course  in  the  two  first-men- 
tioned establishments  is  three  years;  sublieutenants  of  the  special 
arms,  on  leaving  the  academy,  must  pass  two  more  years  in  a  second 
school,  namely,  the  school  of  application,  also  at  Turin,  and  upon 

629 


9 

graduation  from  this  institution  they  are  named  lieutenants.  The 
sublieutenants  of  cavalry  are  sent  to  the  cavalry  school  at  Modena 
for  one  year  more  to  finish  their  professional  instruction.  The  sub- 
lieutenants of  infantry  alone  are  sent  directly  to  their  corps  without 
any  further  instruction. 

The  noncommissioned  officers  who  are  named  have  no  opportunity 
of  undergoing  such  a  course  as  is  laid  down  for  the  sublieutenants 
of  the  special  arms,  but  pass  directly  into  the  grade  of  sublieutenant, 
after  examination,  as  do  the  sublieutenants  of  infantry  on  leaving  the 
military  academy.  It  has  been  found  that  all  of  these  various  cata- 
gories  reach  their  lieutenancies  in  practically  the  same  time,  but  the 
noncommissioned  officer,  owing  to  his  age,  as  well  as  for  other  reasons, 
seldom  passes  the  grade  of  captain,  although  a  few  attain  the  grade 
of  major. 

5.  RUSSIA. 

Owing  to  the  fact  that  the  military  profession  is  the  most  im- 
portant one  in  all  Russia,  the  number  of  applicants  for  entrance 
into  the  corps  of  officers  is  very  large,  and  considerable  care  must 
be  taken  in  the  selection  of  the  material  which  applies  for  com- 
missions. Before  the  war  the  corps  of  officers  was  recruited  from 
the  following  sources : 

1.  The  corps  of  pages  of  the  Emperor. 

2.  The  military  schools. 

3.  From  military  academies  for  those  young  men  of  superior  edu- 
cation who  desired  to  perfect  themselves  after  service  of  one  year 
with  the  colors. 

4.  From  noncommissioned  officers  appointed  directly  from  the 
ranks. 

Preparatory  schools. — School  of  Pages  at  Petrograd.  Sons  of 
high  dignitaries  of  the  court.  Nine  years  of  instruction,  of  which 
seven  are  devoted  to  general  education  and  the  last  two  to  military 
instruction. 

Cadet  schools. — Sons  of  officers  and  dignitaries  of  court,  from  10 
to  18  years  of  age.  Since  1909,  by  paying  certain  fees  at  designated 
schools,  the  sons  of  merchants  and  of  other  civilians  may  attend. 

Seven  years  of  instruction.  The  organization  is  military,  but 
instruction  is  under  civil  professors. 

There  are  four  of  these  schools  at  Petrograd,  three  at  Moscow,  one 
at  Orel,  at  Voronege,  at  Novi  Novgorod,  at  Polotsk,  at  Pskov,  at 
Poltava,  at  Soumy,  at  Kiev,  at  Jaroslow,  at  Warsaw,  at  Symbirsk, 
at  Odessa,  at  Omsk,  at  Tiflis,  at  Novotchevkask,  at  Khaborovsk,  two 
at  Orenburg,  one  at  Taskhevt,  at  Vladikavkas,  at  Valsk,  and  at 
Irkontsk — 29  in  all. 

Military  schools. — Pages  of  the  Emperor. 
30669°— No.  529—16 2 


10 

The  upper  class  at  the  School  of  Pages  is  admitted  by  examination, 
and  the  course  covers  two  years  of  military  studies.  A  classifica- 
tion is  made  at  end  of  course  into  four  categories : 

1.  Graduates  who  are  nominated  sublieutenants  in  the  guard  (with 
rank  of  lieutenant). 

2.  By  nomination  to  line  of  the  army  with  commission  antedated 
by  one  year. 

3.  Nominated  sublieutenants  at  date  of  graduation. 

4.  Assigned  as  noncommissioned  officers  in  a  corps  for  six  months' 
service. 

Military  academies. — Entrance  by  examination.  Minimum  age,  16 
years.  Young  men  coming  from  secondary  civil  schools  or  from 
cadet  schools,  who  must  show  a  certificate  of  proficiency. 

For  infantry  officers. — There  are  12  schools,  the  course  being  two 
years. 

For  cavalry  officers. — There  are  three  schools,  the  course  being 
two  years. 

For  artillery  officers. — There  are  two  schools,  the  course  being  three 
years. 

For  Cossacks. — There  are  two  schools. 

For  engineers. — There  is  one  school  at  Petrograd,  with  a  course  of 
three  years. 

The  graduates  of  infantry  and  cavalry  can,  upon  leaving  their 
special  schools,  continue  for  a  third  year  in  the  artillery  and 
engineer  school,  and  thus  enter  these  arms. 

6.  GREAT  BRITAIN. 

The  commissions  in  the  regular  army  are  given  to  the  following 
persons : 

A  commission  as  second  lieutenant  in  the  cavalry  or  infantry  may 
be  given — 

To  a  cadet  who  has  passed  through  a  course  of  instruction  at  the 
Royal  Military  College,  Sandhurst,  or  to  a  cadet  of  the  Royal  Military 
College,  Kingston,  Canada. 

To  an  officer  of  the  special  reserve  of  officers,  militia,  or  territorial 
force,  to  an  officer  of  the  local  military  forces  of  the  colonies,  or  to 
a  second  lieutenant  or  a  lieutenant  of  the  Royal  Malta  Artillery. 

To  a  candidate  from  a  university. 

To  a  warrant  officer  or  noncommissioned  officer. 

In  the  case  of  an  appointment  as  second  lieutenant  of  a  regiment 
of  the  Household  Cavalry,  the  nomination  for  the  approval  of  a 
qualified  candidate  shall  be  vested  in  the  colonel  in  chief  of  the 
brigade. 

529 


u 

In  the  case  of  an  appointment  as  second  lieutenant  in  the  Foot 
Guards,  the  colonel  of  the  regiment  concerned  shall  nominate  for 
approval  a  candidate  qualified  under  this  article. 

A  commission  as  second  lieutenant  in  the  Royal  Artillery  may  be 
given — 

To  a  cadet  who  has  passed  through  a  course  of  instruction  at  the 
Koyal  Military  Academy,  Woolwich,  or  to  a  cadet  of  the  Royal  Mili- 
tary College,  Kingston,  Canada. 

To  an  artillery  officer  of  the  special  reserve  of  officers,  militia,  or 
territorial  force. 

To  an  officer  of  the  local  military  forces  of  the  colonies. 

To  a  candidate  from  a  university. 

To  a  warrant  officer  or  noncommissioned  officer. 

A  commission  as  second  lieutenant  in  the  Royal  Engineers  may  be 
given — 

To  a  cadet  who  has  passed  through  a  course  of  instruction  at  the 
Royal  Military  Academy,  Woolwich,  or  to  a  cadet  of  the  Royal  Mili- 
tary College,  Kingston,  Canada. 

To  a  warrant  officer  or  noncommissioned  officer. 

A  commission  as  second  lieutenant  in  the  army  service  corps  may 
be  given — 

To  a  qualified  officer  of  the  regular  army,  of  the  royal  marines, 
with  not  less  than  one  year's  commissioned  service. 

To  a  cadet  who  has  passed  through  a  course  of  instruction  at  the 
Royal  Military  College,  Sandhurst,  or  to  a  cadet  of  the  Royal  Military 
College,  Kingston,  Canada. 

To  an  officer  of  the  special  reserve  of  officers,  militia,  or  territorial 
force. 

To  an  officer  of  the  local  military  forces  of  the  colonies. 

To  a  candidate  from  a  university. 

By  open  competition. 

To  a  warrant  officer  or  noncommissioned  officer. 

Before  final  appointment  to  the  army  reserve  corps,  all  candidates 
shall  be  required  to  pass  a  probationary  period  of  one  year  from  the 

date  of  joining.     T\Tien  it  is  desirable  in  the  interests  of  the  service, 
the  probationary  period  may  be  terminated  earlier. 

A  commission  as  second  lieutenant  on  the  unattached  list  of  candi- 
dates for  appointment  to  the  Indian  Army  may  be  given  to  a  cadet 
who  has  passed  through  a  course  of  instruction  at  the  Royal  Military 
College,  Sandhurst,  or  to  a  cadet  of  the  Royal  Military  College, 
Kingston,  Canada,  or  to  a  duly  qualified  candidate  from  a  university. 

A  commission  as  director  of  music  in  the  army  may  be  given  to  a 
bandmaster  of  specially  meritorious  service  and  not  over  55  years 
of  age. 

529 


12 

A  commission  as  lieutenant  in  the  cavalry,  the  infantry,  or  the 
army  service  corps,  may  be  given  to  a  quartermaster  or  ridingmaster 
not  over  32  years  of  age. 

A  commission  as  lieutenant  on  the  list  of  district  officers  of  the 
Royal  Artillery,  or  in  the  coast  battalion  of  the  Royal  Engineers, 
may  be  given  to  a  quartermaster  or  a  ridingmaster,  or  to  a  warrant 
officer  or  noncommissioned  officer  of  the  Royal  Artillery  or  Royal 
Engineers,  not  over  40  years  of  age.  The  above  limit  of  age  may  be 
extended  in  a  case  of  promotion  for  service  in  the  field. 

A  commission  as  quartermaster  or  ridingmaster  may  be  given  to 
an  officer,  a  warrant  officer,  or  a  noncommissioned  officer,  not  over 
40  years  of  age. 

The  above  limit  of  age  may  be  extended  in  the  following  cases: 

(a)  If  promoted  for  service  in  the  field. 

(6)  If  selected  for  an  extra  regimental  appointment  in  the  army, 
not  being  a  departmental  appointment,  or  if  promoted  before  at- 
taining the  age  of  40  to  the  rank  of  quartermaster-corporal-major, 
or  quartermaster-sergeant,  or  to  an  appointment  which  carries  with 
it  the  rank  of  warrant  officer;  in  which  case  the  limit  of  age  may  be 
extended  to  45. 

II.   RECRUITMENT  OF  RESERVE   OFFICERS. 
7.  GERMANY. 

Officers  of  the  reserve  are  recruited  from — 

1.  Officers  of  the  active  army  who  have  been  furloughed  after  18 
years'  service. 

2.  Officers  who  leave  the  service  before  the  completion  of  that 
period. 

(a)  Officers  who  have  not  finished  18  years'  service  are  assigned 
with  their  actual  rank  and  in  accordance  with  their  age  to  the 
reserve  and  landwehr. 

(i)  Officers  after  18  years'  service  are  classed  as  being  "at  dis- 
posal," and  if  they  are  capable  of  being  utilized  are  often  employed 
with  higher  rank. 

(c)  Those  officers  whose  age  and  health  do  not  permit  them  to  be 
placed  "  at  disposal "  are  sent  to  depots  for  duty. 

3.  From  former  one-year  volunteers  who  fulfill  certain  conditions. 
Prerequisites  to  such  an  appointment  from  this  last-named  class 

are — 

(a)  Participation  in  two  courses  of  practical  exercises  of  eight 
weeks'  duration  each,  as  a  rule,  during  the  two  years  next  following 
their  discharge  from  service.  The  first  of  these  periods  the  aspirant 
performs  the  duties  of  a  noncommissioned  officer  and  the  second 
period  as  an  officer. 

620 


13 

(b)  Election.  In  peace  time  by  the  corps  of  officers  of  the  land- 
wehr  district.  Officers  who  are  "  f  urloughed  "  may  be  required,  if 
reserve  officers,  to  attend  on  three  separate  occasions  exercises  lasting 
from  four  to  eight  weeks  each.  As  a  matter  of  principle  they  are 
attached,  in  event  of  mobilization,  to  the  organization  to  whose 
reserve  they  belong.  A  reserve  officer  advances  to  a  higher  grade 
pari  passu  with  the  regimental  officer  of  the  line  next  below  him. 

Officers  who  are  "  furloughed "  may  be  required  as  landwehr 
officers  to  attend  exercises  especially  ordered  for  the  landwehr,  or  if 
they  wish,  to  duty  with  troops  of  the  active  army.  They  are  assigned 
either  to  troops  of  the  landwehr  or  line. 

8.  FRANCE. 

Officers  of  the  reserve  consist  of — 

1.  Officers  of  the  active  army  who  have  retired  under  certain  con- 
ditions. 

2.  Students  of  the  polytechnic,  forestry  and  other  schools  where  a 
certain  amount  of  military  instruction  is  required.  These  men  pass 
an  examination  and  are  then  attached  to  regiments  as  reserve  officers 
for  one  year. 

3.  Certain  noncommissioned  officers  of  the  reserve. 

As  a  general  rule  the  above-mentioned  categories  retain  their 
appointments  (promotions  being  allowed  to  include  the  grade  of 
captain)  as  long  as  the  class  to  which  they  would  belong  remains  in 
the  reserve  of  the  regular  army.  They  then  pass  into  the  territorial 
army  with  same  rank. 

Subalterns  of  the  reserve  may  be  promoted  to  be  captains  after 
certain  periods  of  service  in  the  lower  grades. 

Captains  of  the  reserve  who  have  previously  served  as  captains 
are  eligible  under  conditions  to  a  majority. 

Sublieutenants  in  the  reserve  are  eligible  for  promotion  to  lieuten- 
ancies in  the  territorial  army,  and  captains  of  reserve  to  majors  in 
the  territorial  army. 

Officers  of  both  reserve  and  territorial  armies,  at  their  request, 
may  be  retained  after  expiration  of  legal  term  of  service,  but  field 
officers  may  be  retired  at  65  and  others  at  60  years  of  age. 

9.  AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 

The  reserve  officers  necessary  to  complete  the  units  of  the  common 
army  upon  mobilization  are  provided  by : 

1.  Using  all  officers  who  are  furloughed  from  the  service.  Each 
officer  who  has  finished  three  years  in  the  active  army  is  permitted 
to  pass  into  the  reserve  and  remain  there  until  60  years  of  age,  pro- 
vided he  engages  to  serve  in  case  of  war. 

629 


14 

2.  By  the  promotion  to  the  grade  of  lieutenant  of  former  cadets  or 
volunteers  who  engaged  under  obligation  to  become  reserve  officers 
after  a  year's  service. 

These  officers  are  very  numerous,  and  the  needs  of  mobilization 
are  amply  provided  for. 

Officers  of  the  landwehr  or  honved  are  supplied  as  follows : 

1.  By  transfer  to  the  landwehr  (or  honved  according  to  nation- 
ality), upon  request,  of  officers  who  have  served  10  years  in  the  army 
or  reserve. 

2.  By  nominating  to  the  rank  of  second  lieutenant  young  men, 
able  to  pass  the  recruiting  requirements,  who  pass  through  special 
schools  for  instruction  of  officers  of  the  landwehr  or  honved. 

3.  By  promotions  in  the  landwehr  or  honved  to  the  several  grades 
of  officers,  made  in  conformity  with  regulations  governing  promo- 
tion in  the  active  army. 

These  last  promotions  are  governed  by  conditions  sufficiently  rig- 
orous, and  it  is  impossible  to  reach  the  higher  grades  without  having 
served  in  the  active  army  as  a  subaltern. 

In  Hungary  the  conditions  for  entrance  to  the  honved  have  been 
carefully  and  conscientiously  watched,  so  that  this  force  has  at- 
tained practically  the  standard  of  a  semipermanent  force.  The  same 
can  be  said  of  the  forces  in  Galicia,  Croatia,  and  Bohemia. 

10.  ITALY. 

The  military  system  of  this  country  differs  considerably  from  those 
of  other  European  countries,  and  for  this  reason  there  is  a  different 
system  for  the  selection  and  assignment  of  the  additional  officers 
needed  for  the  troops  of  the  second  and  third  lines. 

Additional  officers  are  obtained  about  as  follows: 

There  are  two  courses  of  instruction : 

(a)  A  six  months'  course  for  all  young  men  holding  certificates 
from  the  lyceums  or  similar  institutions.  This  does  not  apply  to  the 
cavalry,  train,  or  field  artillery. 

(b)  A  course  of  nine  months  for  those  young  men  having  only  a 
certificate  of  admission  for  a  two-years'  course  at  lyceums,  or  those 
having  undergone  a  general  examination  for  a  commission. 

These  courses  are  taken  by  young  men  from  18  to  26  years  of  age 
who  are  not  yet  drawn  for  service  either  as  corporals  or  privates  of 
the  active  army;  also  by  privates  and  corporals  on  unlimited  fur- 
lough who  ask  for  a  return  to  the  active  army. 

The  courses  are  placed  under  the  superior  direction  of  corps  com- 
manders and  the  young  men  assigned  to  a  special  unit  for  the  course. 
It  is  divided  into  two  equal  parts,  and  at  the  completion  of  each  part 
the  candidates  must  pass  an  examination.  At  the  end  of  the  first 
period  they  are  appointed  corporals,  and  at  the  end  of  the  second 
period  sergeants,  provided  their  work  has  been  satisfactory. 

629 


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The  candidates  who  are  appointed  sergeants  are  then  required  to 
perform  four  months  with  a  unit,  and  at  the  end  of  this  stage  they 
must  pass  the  required  officer's  examination. 

The}^  are  then  furlonghed,  but  at  the  end  of  two  months  they  are 
called  as  officers  and  assigned  to  still  another  unit  to  serve  three 
months  as  officers. 

Noncommissioned  officers  on  unlimited  furlough  can  be  commis- 
sioned by  passing  an  officer's  examination. 

The  students  at  military  colleges  and  schools  who  have  successfully 
passed  the  second  year's  examination  can  be  appointed  additional 
officers  only  after  a  period  of  service  of  three  months  as  officers. 
Other  students,  by  passing  an  examination  and  showing  proficiency, 
must  serve  four  months  as  privates  and  four  months  as  sergeants  be- 
fore qualifying  sufficiently  to  serve  their  three  months  as  officers. 

11.  RUSSIA. 

The  reserves  of  the  active  army  are  officered  by  (1)  assigning 
officers  who  are  "  on  furlough  "  or  "  retired  "  but  still  bound  to  render 
service  in  time  of  war;  (2)  volunteers  who  have  passed  a  special 
examination  at  the  end  of  their  service,  as  well  as  selected  noncom- 
missioned officers  passing  the  examination  after  a  probationary 
period  of  six  weeks.  Both  of  these  can  be  appointed  ensigns  in  the 
reserve. 

Officers  of  the  reserve  called  in  case  of  mobilization  can  be  pro- 
moted to  a  higher  grade,  provided  they  have  had  at  least  four 
years  in  their  grade  since  last  promotion,  have  had  at  least  four 
months'  actual  service  upon  rejoining  their  organizations,  and  have 
passed  a  satisfactory  examination. 

Once  a  year — in  the  summer — a  special  commission  is  assembled 
which  is  charged  with  the  examination  of  candidates  for  the  reserve 
officers. 

The  examinations  are  briefly  as  follows: 

For  the  infantry : 

1.  Regulations  and  military  law, 

2.  Field-service  regulations. 

3.  Principles  of  infantry  flre. 

4.  Field  fortification. 
For  the  cavalry : 

1,  2,  and  3  as  for  infantry. 
4.  Methods  of  hasty  demolition. 
For  the  artillery: 

1  and  2  as  for  infantry,  with  necessary  modifications. 

3.  A  brief  course  on  the  different  types  of  artillery. 

4.  As  for  infantry,  with  necessary  modifications. 

For  the  engineers:  1,  2,  and  3  as  for  infantry,  with  necessary  modifica- 
tions for  arm. 

629 


16 

If  successful  the  candidate  is  sent  immediately  to  a  reserve  unit 
for  active  duty,  the  duration  of  which  must  be  at  least  four  months. 

In  case  they  are  unsuccessful  they  may  present  themselves  the 
following  year  and  they  may  remain  in  the  service  during  this 
period  until  time  for  examination. 

The  number  of  reserve  officers  is  insufficient  and  there  are  a  con- 
siderable number  needed  for  mobilization  purposes. 

To  remedy  this  deficiency  a  number  of  acting  ensigns  will  have  to 
be  chosen  from  selected  noncommissioned  officers. 

12.  GREAT  BRITAIN. 

An  officer  who  has  retired  from  the  regular  forces  on  retired  pay, 
or  with  a  gratuity,  shall  be  a  member  of  the  reserve  of  officers  so  long 
as  he  is  liable  to  be  recalled  to  army  service  under  certain  age  limita- 
tions ;  until  50  if  a  lieutenant  or  captain ;  until  56  if  a  quartermaster, 
major,  lieutenant  colonel,  or  colonel;  and  until  67  if  a  general  officer. 

Provided  that  an  officer  who  misconducts  himself  or  who  is  certi- 
fied by  the  regulated  medical  authority  to  be  mentally  or  physically 
unfit  may  be  removed  from  the  reserve  of  officers. 

A  commission  in  the  reserve  of  officers  may  be  granted  to — (a) 
the  regular  forces;  (5)  the  special  reserve  of  officers;  (c)  the  aux- 
iliary forces;  or  (d)  the  Indian  military  forces,  with  the  exception 
of  those  who  entered  the  Indian  army  subsequent  to  the  8th  of  Janu- 
ary, 1892. 

A  gentleman  who  has  served  as  an  officer  or  cadet  in  the  officers' 
training  corps. 

An  officer  who  served  in  South  Africa  as  an  officer  of  the  Imperial 
Zeomanry,  City  of  London  Imperial  Volunteers,  volunteer  service 
companies,  or  colonial  irregular  corps  may  be  granted  a  commission 
in  the  reserve  of  officers,  subject  to  articles  688  and  690,  and  subject 
to  the  following  conditions: 

For  the  rank  of  captain  he  must  have  served  in  South  Africa 
with  the  rank  of  captain  for  not  less  than  12  months. 

For  the  rank  of  lieutenant  he  must  have  served  in  South  Africa 
with  the  rank  of  captain  or  lieutenant  for  not  less  than  six  months. 

An  officer  or  a  gentleman  who  has  served  as  an  officer  or  cadet  in 
the  officers'  training  corps,  volunteering  for  service  in  the  reserve  of 
officers,  shall,  if  his  services  are  accepted,  receive  from  the  Govern- 
ment a  commission  as  an  officer  in  the  land  forces. 

A  commission  shall  not  be  granted  to  any  officer  or  gentleman  wht 
has  served  as  an  officer  or  cadet  in  the  officers'  training  corps  wh( 
is  not  medically  fit  for  service  or  whose  character  and  qualifications 
are  not  satisfactory. 

529 


17 

An  officer  who  has  retired  from  the  auxiliary  forces  shall  not  be 
granted  a  commission  in  the  reserve  of  officers  unless  he  fulfills  the 
following  conditions: 

For  the  rank  of  captain  he  must  have  had  at  least  seven  years' 
commissioned  service  at  the  time  of  his  retirement,  including  three 
years  as  captain  or  field  officer,  and  have  qualified  for  the  rank  of 
field  officer. 

For  the  rank  of  lieutenant  or  second  lieutenant  he  must  have  had 
at  least  two  years'  commissioned  service  at  the  time  of  his  retirement 
and  have  qualified  for  the  rank  of  captain. 

An  officer  who  has  retired  from  the  special  reserve  of  officers  may 
be  granted  a  commission  in  the  reserve  of  officers,  subject  to  the 
following  conditions: 

He  must  have  completed  not  less  than  10  years'  commissioned  serv- 
ice in  the  special  reserve  of  officers  and  have  attained  the  age  of  35. 

An  officer  shall  not  be  appointed  to  the  reserve  of  officers  in  a  rank 
higher  than  that  which  he  held  on  retirement ;  nor  shall  he  be  granted 
a  commission  in  that  reserve  if  his  age  exceeds  the  following: 

For  appointment  as  a  captain,  45. 

For  appointment  as  a  lieutenant  or  second  lieutenant,  40. 

A  gentleman  who  has  served  as  an  officer  in  the  officers'  training 
corps  shall  not  be  appointed  to  the  reserve  of  officers  in  a  higher 
rank  than  that  of  lieutenant,  nor  a  gentleman  who  has  served  as  a 
cadet  in  a  higher  rank  than  that  of  second  lieutenant. 

A  conmiission  in  the  reserve  of  officers  shall  not  be  granted  to  an 
officer  who  is  serving  in  the  special  reserve  of  officers,  the  Channel 
Islands,  or  the  Malta  Militia,  under  the  provisions  of  article  559. 

The  limitations  of  age  and  the  qualifications  prescribed  by  articles 
683  to  690  may  be  dispensed  with  in  cases  where  the  army  council 
consider  it  desirable  in  the  interests  of  the  service  that  the  rules  laid 
down  in  those  articles  should  not  be  enforced. 

An  officer  of  the  Eoyal  Army  Medical  Corps  with  at  least  three, 
and  not  more  than  six  years'  service,  may  be  permitted  to  join  the 
reserve  of  officers  for  a  period  of  seven  years.  While  so  situated  he 
shall  receive  a  retaining  fee  at  the  rate  of  £25  per  year. 

With  the  sanction  of  the  army  council  he  may  be  permitted  to 
return  to  the  active  list,  and  if  the  period  he  has  been  in  the  reserve 
amounts  to  at  least  one  year,  and  not  more  than  three  years,  he  shall 
be  allowed  to  reckon  one-third  of  such  period  toward  promotion, 
gratuity,  and  pension. 

Any  army  reserve  officer  shall  report  himself  at  the  commence- 
ment of  each  year,  in  writing,  to  the  army  council.  Should  he  fail 
to  do  so,  he  shall  (unless  he  is  an  officer  retired  from  the  regular 
80669°— No.  529—16 3 


18 

forces,  with  liability  for  further  service  in  case  of  emergency)  be 
removed  from  the  reserve  at  the  end  of  the  year  in  which  he  fails 
to  report  himself. 

An  officer  appointed  under  article  682  or  683  shall  be  removed 
from  the  reserve,  by  notification  in  the  London  Gazette,  at  the  age  of 
55,  if  a  field  officer;  and  at  the  age  of  50,  if  a  captain,  lieutenant,  or 
second  lieutenant. 

EMPLOYIMENT  ON  ARMY  SERVICE. 

An  army  reserve  officer  shall  be  liable  to  be  called  to  army  service 
at  home  or  abroad  at  a  time  of  national  emergency,  or  when  a 
national  emergency  appears  to  be  imminent. 

An  army  reserve  officer  may,  with  his  own  consent  and  the  sanc- 
tion of  the  army  council,  be  employed  on  army  service  at  any  time. 

An  army  reserve  officer  shall,  while  employed  on  army  service,  and 
not  over  65  years  of  age,  be  eligible  for  promotion. 

An  army  reserve  officer,  not  being  a  retired  officer,  and  not  coming 
under  the  conditions  of  article  496  (governing  the  rate  of  pay  and 
allowances),  shall  be  granted,  from  the  date  of  joining  for  army 
service  to  the  date  on  which  his  services  are  no  longer  required,  and 
subject  to  article  501  (special  pay  allowances),  the  rates  of  pay  and 
allowances  granted  to  an  officer  on  the  active  list  of  corresponding 
rank  in  the  same  branch  of  the  reserve. 

SPECIAL   RESERVE   OF   OmCERS,   MHJTIA,   AND  TERRITORIAL  FORCE. 

General  qualifications. — To  be  eligible  to  attend  a  competitive  ex- 
amination, a  candidate  must  fulfill  the  following  conditions : 

{a)  He  must  be  unmarried,  and  will  not  be  accepted  unless,  in  the 
opinion  of  the  army  council,  he  is  in  all  respects  suitable  to  hold  a 
commission  in  the  regular  army. 

(6)  He  must  attain  the  age  of  20  and  not  attain  the  age  of  25  on 
the  1st  of  April  for  a  March  examination,  or  on  the  1st  of  October 
for  an  examination  in  that  month. 

(c)  He  must  have  qualified  at  an  army  entrance  examination  or 
passed  some  other  examination  accepted  in  lieu  thereof. 

{d)  He  must  serve  for  18  months  in  the  branch  of  the  service  to 
which  he  belongs. 

Note. — Certificates  A  and  B  obtained  in  the  officers'  training  corps  entitle  a 
candidate  to  reductions  in  the  period  of  total  service  and  attachment  mentioned 
above. 

An  officer  of  the  special  reserve  of  officers  must  have  completed  his 
probationary  training  and  been  confirmed  in  his  appointment. 

An  officer  of  the  Irish  Horse,  Malta,  Bermuda,  or  Channel  Islands 
Militia,  or  territorial  force  must  have  completed  a  period  of  attach- 

529 


19 

ment  to  a  regular  unit  of  the  arm  of  the  service  to  which  he  belongs 
and  have  been  satisfactorily  reported  upon. 

In  the  case  of  infantry  the  full  period  of  attachment  is  6  months, 
and  in  the  case  of  other  arms  12  months. 

(e)  He  must  be  recommended  by  his  commanding  officer. 

(/)  If  a  candidate  for  the  Royal  Artillery,  he  must  be  an  oflScer 
of  the  special  reserve  artillery,  militia  artillery,  or  territorial  force 
artillery. 

(g)  If  a  candidate  for  Royal  Field  Artillery,  he  must  also  have  an 
equitation  certificate. 

An  officer  of  the  artillery  may,  if  eligible,  compete  as  a  candidate 
for  the  Royal  Artillery,  and  also  on  the  general  list  for  other 
branches  of  the  service. 

COMPETITIVE  EXAMINATION    (WRITTEN). 

Subjects. — Military  history  and  strategy  (2  papers),  tactics  (2 
papers),  field  engineering  (2  papers),  map  reading  and  field  sketch- 
ing (1  paper),  military  law  (1  paper),  military  administration  and 
organization  (1  paper). 

Qualifying  minimum. — Four  of  the  marks  in  each  paper  and  five 
of  the  aggregate  marks. 

Practical  test. — ^A  candidate  must  also  pass  a  practical  test  in  map 
reading  and  field  sketching. 

UNIVERSITIES. 

(Including   Universities   in   the   Overseas  Dominions   and   Crown 

Colonies.) 

General  qualifications. — A  certain  number  of  commissions  in  the 
cavalry,  Royal  Artillery,  infantry,  army  service  corps,  and  Indian 
army  are  granted  each  half  year  on  the  nomination  of  such  univer- 
sities or  groups  of  universities  as  have  established  courses  of  military 
instruction  approved  by  the  army  council. 

For  a  list  of  the  universities  empowered  to  nominate  candidates 
see  the  regulations. 

Nomination  is  made  in  January  and  July  of  each  year. 

A  candidate  must  be:  {a)  Unmarried.  (6)  Suitable,  in  the  opin- 
ion of  the  army  council,  to  hold  a  commission.  {c)  Able  to  pro- 
duce a  certificate  of  good  character  from  the  head  of  the  university 
or  college. 

Age. — A  candidate  must  have  attained  the  age  of  21  and  must  not 
have  attained  the  age  of  25  on  the  loth  of  January  for  the  winter 
nomination  or  the  15th  of  July  for  the  summer  nomination. 

(A  candidate  for  appointment  to  the  Indian  army  must  be  between 
the  ages  of  21  and  24  on  the  dates  named.) 

S28 


20 

Antedate. — The  commission  of  nominated  candidates  will  be  ante- 
dated 18  months  from  the  date  in  which  their  names  appear  in  the 
London  Gazette. 

A  candidate  who  has  graduated  with  first  or  second  class  honors 
may,  on  the  recommendation  of  the  nomination  board,  be  granted  such 
an  additional  antedate  (not  exceeding  6  months)  as  may  be  approved 
by  the  army  council. 

GENERAL  OUTLINE  OF  TESTS  WHICH  MUST  BE  PASSED. 

A  candidate  must — 

1.  Fulfill  certain  conditions  as  to  residence  or  presence  during  a 
certain  course  of  study  at  the  university. 

2.  Undergo  a  course  of  military  instruction  at  the  university, 
qualify  at  an  examination  in  military  subjects. 

3.  Be  a  member  of  the  university  contingent  of  the  officers'  training 
corps. 

4.  Fulfill  certain  conditions  as  to  attachment  to  a  regular  unit  of 
the  army. 

6.  Take  a  degree  in  an  approved  subject  or  group  of  subjects. 
6.  Pass  a  medical  examination. 

SUBJECTS  OF  WRITTEN  EXAMINATION. 

Group  Ar 

1.  Military  History  and  Strategy  (2  papers). 

2.  Tactics  (2  papers). 
Group  B: 

3.  Field  Engineering  (2  papers). 

4.  Map  Reading  and  Field  Sketching  (1  paper). 
Group  C: 

5.  Military  Administration  and  Organization  (1  paper). 
Candidates  who  desire  may  take  up  the  examination  in  three  parts. 
For  this  purpose  the  subjects  are  divided  into  groups  as  shown. 

ni.   MILITARY  SCHOOLS.  ' 
13.  GERMANY. 
CORPS  OF  CADETS. 

The  organization  of  the  cadet  corps  has  been  already  outlined.    Its 

members  are  largely  the  sons  of  army  and  navy  officers  and  receive 

their  subsistence,  clothing,  and  tuition  free,  or  at  a  nominal  charge. 

.After  passing  through  one  of  the  six  "  cadet  houses,"  cadets  enter  the 

central  cadet  institute  at  Gross-Lichterfelde,  in  the  vicinity  of  Berlin, 

629 


21 

of  which  a  colonel  is  the  superintendent,  where  they  are  formed  into 
companies  and  battalions  for  military  drill  and  discipline. 

The  battalion  organization  has  no  connection  with  the  classes,  of 
which  there  are  three,  namely,  the  secunda,  prima,  and  selecta.  Each 
of  the  first  named  is  again  divided  into  a  lower  and  upper  section, 
known,  respectively,  as  lower  and  upper  secunda,  lower  and  upper 
prima.  Those  of  the  cadets  who  complete  their  seventeenth  year  be- 
fore April  1  of  the  current  year,  have  an  adequate  bodily  develop- 
ment, and  who  after  passing  through  the  upper  secunda  are  deemed 
sufficiently  prepared,  are  examined  (in  February  or  March)  before 
the  "  superior  military  examining  committee."  With  the  exception 
of  some  of  the  most  proficient  and  promising,  who  are  entered  in  the 
selecta  class,  all  who  have  passed  the  examination  join  regiments  as 
titular  sword-knot  ensigns,  thus  being  placed  on  substantially  the 
same  footing  with  the  college  (gymnasia  or  real  school)  graduates 
of  the  officer  aspirants.  The  cadets  who,  having  passed  through  the 
upper  secunda,  fail  at  the  examination,  as  well  as  those  who,  though 
of  sufficient  age  and  physique  are  not  admitted  to  it,  are,  as  a  rule, 
returned  to  their  parents  or  entered  in  the  army  as  privates,  excep- 
tionally so  as  noncommissioned  officers,  for  the  discharge  of  their 
liability  to  military  service. 

To  the  lower  prima  are  transferred  cadets  of  deficient  age  or 
physique  who  have  passed  successfully  through  the  upper  secunda, 
and  also  talented  cadets  of  the  same  class  standing  who  are  not  so 
deficient,  but  whose  parents  desire  the  transfer.  In  exceptional  cases 
the  latter  class  of  cadets  may  also  be  appointed  sword-knot  noncom- 
missioned officers  and  the  former  noncommissioned  officers,  all  being 
at  the  same  time  members  of  lower  prima.  After  successful  passage 
through  the  lower  prima,  cadets  are  either  admitted  to  the  "ensign 
examination"  or  transferred  to  the  upper  prima,  according  to  the 
expressed  desire  of  their  parents.  If  in  the  former  case  they  pass  the 
examination,  as  they  almost  invariably  do,  it  depends  upon  circum- 
stances whether  they  are  sent  to  their  regiments  as  titular  or  actual 
sword-knot  ensigns.  The  course  through  upper  prima,  during  which 
the  members  may  hold  the  appointment  of  sword-knot  noncommis- 
sioned officers,  is  terminated  by  what  is  termed  the  Arhiturienten 
Examen}  The  cadets  who  pass  the  examination  are  transferred  to 
the  army  as  actual  ensigns  and  simultaneously  sent  to  the  war  school. 
If,  after  going  through  the  latter,  they  pass  the  officer  examination 
with  credit,  they  are  commissioned  second  lieutenants  as  of  the  date 
of  their  transfer  to  the  army. 

1  This  Is  also  called  the  Maturitilts  Examen,  as  the  diploma  issued  to  the  person  who  has 
passed  it  declares  that  he  is  ripe  or  mature  for  the  commencement  of  professional  studies 
at  the  university. 

5li9 


22 

The  members  of  the  selecta  are  at  the  close  of  the  course  subjected, 
if  deemed  proficient,  to  the  officer  examination;  those  who  pass  and 
who  seem  qualified  by  reason  of  their  conduct  and  bearing  while  on 
and  off  duty,  receive  the  appointment  as  second  lieutenant.  Such 
selecta  cadets  as  have  passed  the  examination,  but  whose  deportment 
has  not  been  altogether  satisfactory,  join  regiments  as  ensigns,  a 
period  of  not  less  than  two  months  nor  more  than  six  months  inter- 
vening before  their  advancement  to  the  grade  of  second  lieutenant. 
Those  cadets  who  fail  upon  examination,  or  who  by  reason  of  de- 
ficient deportment  or  insufficient  preparation  are  not  admitted  thereto, 
are  appointed  ensigns  and  join  regiments,  the  former  for  reexamina- 
tion at  the  end  of  three  months.  The  latter  may,  without  previous 
attendance  of  the  war  school,  be  reported  by  their  commanding  offi- 
cer to  the  "  superior  military  examining  committee,"  as  prepared  for 
the  "  officer  examination "  when  they  have  acquired  the  prescribed 
certificate  of  good  conduct  and  good  soldiership. 

Upon  passing  the  officer  examination,  and  having  been  approved 
by  the  corps  of  officers,  ensigns  may  be  recommended  for  appoint- 
ment as  second  lieutenants. 

In  Prussia  the  control  of  military  training  and  education,  discon- 
nected from  service  with  troops  (excepting  that  of  the  war  academy, 
which,  being  a  staff  college,  is  under  the  supervision  of  the  chief 
of  the  general  staff  of  the  army),  is  lodged  in  a  "general  inspec- 
tion of  the  system  of  military  education  and  training,"  at  the 
head  of  which  stands  a  general  of  infantry  as  inspector  general,  to 
whom  two  officers  (a  lieutenant  colonel  and  a  major)  are  assigned  as 
adjutants.     Subordinated  to  the  general  inspection  are — 

1.  The  '"''superior  viilitary  committee  of  studies^''  consisting  of  V6 
officers  of  high  rank,  to  whom  questions  affecting  the  organization, 
course,  and  methods  of  studies  of  Prussian  military  schools  (except 
the  war  academy)  are  referred  for  opinion. 

2.  The  "  superior  military  examination  committee,^''  presided  over 
by  a  major  general,  whose  duties  will  be  explained  further  on. 

3.  The  inspection  of  war  schools^  headed  by  a  colonel.  These 
schools  prepare  sword-knot  ensigns  (Portepeefahnriche)  of  all  arms 
for  the  so-called  officer  examination.  They  are  located  at  the  fol- 
lowing places:  Potsdam,  Glogau,  Neisse,  Engers,  Cassel,  Hannovei, 
Auklam,  Metz,  and  Hersfeld.  There  is  a  similar  institution  at 
Munich,  Bavaria. 

The  course  lasts  from  9  to  10  months  and  embraces  tactics,  manu- 
facture of  ordnance  and  ordnance  stores,  science  of  arms,  field  and 
permanent  fortifications,  attack  and  defense  of  strong  places,  mili- 
tary topography,  and  army  administration.  Artillery  ranges  and 
technical  institutes  and  fortresses  are  visited  by  the  students. 

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4,  TKe  corfs  of  cadets^  commanded  by  a  major  general,  which  con- 
sists of  young  men  in  training  for  the  position  of  officer,  distributed 
among  six  "  cadet  houses,"  situated,  respectively,  at  Koslin,  Potsdam, 
Wahlstatt,  Bensberg,  Plon,  and  Oranienstein,  whence  they  are  passed 
to  the  central  cadet  school  at  Gross-Lichterfelde.  Except  that  the 
pupils  are  uniformed,  armed,  and  drilled,  the  cadet  houses  and  the 
central  cadet  institute  correspond  in  organization  and  course  of 
study  to  the  so-called  Real  schools  {Real  SchuUn) ,  at  which  young 
men  are  prepared  for  the  higher  technical  schools  {Techniche  Hoch- 
schulen).  The  Real  schools  again  bear  a  certain  resemblance  to 
the  Gymnasia,  graduates  (Arbitunenfen)  from  either  of  which  are 
ripe  for  the  university  or  a  higher  technical  school  and  need  not 
undergo  the  ensign  examination,  the  chief  distinction  between  the 
Real  school  and  the  Gymnasia  being  that  special  attention  is  devoted 
in  the  former  to  the  dead  languages  and  classics,  and  in  the  latter  to 
the  sciences. 

The  Government  maintains  eleven  "  war  schools "  for  the  further 
education  of  the  oiftcer  aspirants.  There  are  in  addition  two  war 
colleges,  one  at  Berlin  and  one  at  Munich.  There  are  two  ordnance 
schools,  an  academy  for  the  medical  education  of  men  who  desire 
to  become  members  of  the  medical  corps,  a  military  veterinarian 
college,  two  technical  military  academies  for  the  further  instruction 
of  engineers  and  artillerymen,  10  noncommissioned  officers'  schools, 
and  9  schools  for  enlisted  men  or  sons  of  soldiers  or  noncommissioned 
officers  who  desire  to  qualify  for  the  grade  of  noncommissioned  officer 
in  the  active  army.  In  addition  to  these  schools,  which  are  main- 
tained by  the  Government  for  the  education  of  future  officers  and 
noncommissioned  officers,  it  maintains  other  schools  for  the  further 
training  of  the  active  officer.  There  are  two  infantry  firing  schools, 
a  firing  school  for  field  artillery  and  for  foot  artillery,  four  schools 
for  equitation,  two  cavalry  telegraph  schools,  eight  schools  for  horse- 
shoers,  and  one  gymnastic  school  for  the  instruction  of  noncommis- 
sioned officers  in  work  connected  with  the  physical  training  of  the 
soldier  and  for  bayonet  and  other  fencing. 

14.  FRANCE. 

The  Government  maintains  the  following  schools  for  the  instruc- 
tion of  officers:  the  War  Academy,  in  Paris,  and  the  following  post- 
graduate schools  for  officers :  School  of  Application  for  Artillery  and 
Engineers,  1 ;  School  of  Application  for  Cavalry,  1 ;  School  of  Appli- 
cation for  Ordnance  Officers,  1;  School  of  Application  for  Medical 
Corps,  1. 

The  following  preparatory  schools  are  maintained:  Polytechnic; 
special  military  school  at  St.-Cyr;  military  school  for  infantry  at 

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St.-Maixent;  school  for  cavalry  at  Saumur;  school  for  artillery  and 
engineers,  1;  school  for  military  administration  (Vincennes),  1; 
school  for  candidates  for  the  military  service,  1. 

There  is  also  a  school  for  developing  teachers  of  physical  training 
throughout  the  army;  a  central  musketry  school;  an  artillery  firing 
school;  two  other  musketry  schools  for  infantry;  and  one  school  for 
engineers.  There  is  also  a  school  for  the  instruction  of  officers  be- 
longing to  the  railway  service;  and  at  each  army  headquarters  is 
maintained  a  school  for  the  artillery  officers  serving  with  that  corps- 
district.  In  the  last  few  years  a  school  for  the  scientific  study  of 
aeronautics  has  been  established. 

15.  AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 

In  addition  to  the  cadet  schools  before  mentioned,  the  Government 
maintains  a  war  college  at  Vienna  for  the  education  of  general 
staff  officers;  a  school  for  military  administration,  to  which  are  sent 
officers  who  are  serving  in  the  supply  services;  courses  are  also  pre- 
scribed for  intendant  officers,  superior  supply  officers,  officers  charged 
with  purchase  of  clothing  and  equipment,  subsistence  officers  and 
train.  There  is  also  maintained  at  each  brigade  headquarters  a 
school  for  cavalry  officers.  There  is  a  higher  artillery  school  and  a 
school  for  the  technical  branches  of  engineers,  both  military  and 
civil.  There  are  two  telegraph  schools,  one  for  cavalry  and  one  for 
infantry ;  a  school  for  ordnance  officers ;  a  firing  school  for  infantry ; 
three  schools  for  equitation,  one  of  which  is  for  infantry  officers;  a 
firing  school  for  artillery ;  and  a  separate  riding  school  for  the  train- 
ing of  drivers  and  riding  instructors  in  the  field  artillery. 

16.  ITALY. 

In  addition  to  the  military  schools  before  mentioned,  there  are 
preparatory  military  schools  maintained,  one  at  Naples  and  one  at 
Eome.  These  are  for  the  sons  of  officers,  and  their  education  is  car- 
ried out  at  the  Government  expense.  The  war  college,  at  Turin, 
is  charged  with  the  instruction  and  training  of  general  staff  officers. 
There  is  a  school  of  application  for  members  of  the  sanitary  serv- 
ice, somewhat  similar  to  the  schools  of  application  for  artillery,  en- 
gineers, and  cavalry.  There  is  a  central  school  of  fire;  a  musketry 
school  for  infantry,  at  Palma,  and  one  for  field  artillery  at  Nettino, 
while  at  Rome  there  exists  a  school  for  the  instruction  of  the  Royal 
Carbinieros,  a  species  of  military  gendarmerie,  and  a  school  for 
fencing  and  gymnastics  is  maintained  at  the  same  locality. 

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17.  RUSSIA. 

Schools. — ^In  addition  to  the  schools  before  mentioned  the  Gov- 
ernment maintains  a  war  college  at  Petrograd  for  the  education  of 
general  staff  officers;  a  topographical  school  for  training  officers  who 
belong  to  the  topographical  section  of  the  general  staff;  an  in- 
tendance  school;  an  artillery  academj^;  an  engineer  academy;  a 
medical  academy;  a  law  academy;  an  electro-technical  school;  and 
a  number  of  schools  for  the  instruction  of  noncommissioned  officers. 
For  the  further  training  of  officers  in  schools  of  application,  there 
is  maintained  a  school  for  infantry  fire;  school  for  field  artillery; 
a  school  for  equitation  for  cavalry ;  and  an  aeronautical  school. 

18.  GREAT  BRITAIN. 

The  following  schools  are  maintained  by  the  Government :  Royal 
Staff  College,  for  the  education  of  general  staff  officers;  Royal  Mili- 
tary Academy;  Royal  Military  College;  Ordnance  College;  Cavalry 
School ;  Camel  Corps  School ;  School  of  Gunnery ;  School  of  Military 
Enginering;  Central  Flying  School;  School  of  Musketry;  Schools 
of  Electric  Lighting;  Army  Signal  School;  A.  S.  C.  training  estab- 
lishment ;  Royal  Army  War  College ;  Army  Veterinary  School ;  Royal 
Military  School  of  Music;  Duke  of  York's  Royal  Military  School; 
Queen  Victoria  School. 

IHETHODS  OF  ENTERING  THE  REGULAR  ARMY — ROTAL   MILITARY  COLLEGE, 

SANDHURST. 

Methods  of  entry. — There  are  two  methods  of  obtaining  admis- 
sion to  the  Royal  Military  College : 

1.  By  successful  competition  at  an  army  entrance  examination. 
{a)  The  following  enter  without  competition,  provided  they  qualify 

in  the  obligatory  subjects  at  an  army  entrance  examination :  King's 
Cadets;  Honorary  King's  Cadets  (10  annually)  ;  King's  Indian 
Cadets  (20  annually)  ;  Honorary  King's  Indian  Cadets  (3  annu- 
ally) ;  Pages  of  Honor. 

2.  On  the  nomination  of  the  army  council. 

General  qualification. — Candidates  must  be  unmarried,  and  will 
not  be  accepted  unless,  in  the  opinion  of  the  army  council,  in  every 
way  suitable  to  hold  a  commission. 

All  successful  and  nominated  candidates  must  pass  a  medical 
examination. 

Age. — Candidates  must  have  attained  the  age  of  17  and  must  not 
have  attained  the  age  of  19^  (the  half  year  being  reckoned  by  calen- 
dar months)  on  the  1st  of  June  and  1st  of  December,  respectively,  for 

629 


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admission  to  the  college  at  the  commencement  of  the  ensuing  spring 
and  autumn  terms. 

Candidates  of  the  West  India  Regiment  may  compete  if  under  21 
years  of  age  on  the  above  dates. 

ARMY   ENTRANCE   EXAMINATION. 

General  outline  of  the  army  entrance  examination. — The  army 
entrance  examination  is  both  qualifying  and  competitive,  i.  e.,  a  can- 
didate to  be  considered  successful  must  obtain  a  qualifying  minimum 
of  marks  in  certain  obligatory  subjects  and  must,  in  addition,  gain 
a  sufficiently  high  place  on  the  list  to  entitle  him  to  one  of  the  cadet- 
ships  offered. 

Certificates  required. — The  candidate,  v^hen  called  upon  to  do  so, 
will  be  required  to  furnish  the  folloveing: 

1.  An  extract  from  the  register  of  his  birth;  or,  if  this  can  not 
be  obtained,  a  certificate  of  his  baptism,  or  other  documentary  evi- 
dence accompanied  by  a  statutory  declaration  made  by  one  of  his 
parents  or  guardians  before  a  magistrate,  giving  the  exact  date  of 
birth. 

2.  If  the  candidate  holds  a  commission  in  the  special  reserve  of 
officers,  militia,  or  territorial  force,  a  recommendation  from  the  com- 
manding officer  of  the  regiment. 

3.  On  Form  A  the  names  of  two  responsible  referees  (not  tutors, 
relatives,  or  near  connections),  who  having  known  him  during  the 
four  years  previous  to  the  examination  will  furnish  a  certificate  as 
to  character. 

Subjects : 
Class  I— 

Obligatory — 
English. 

English  history  and  geography. 
Mathematics  A  (elementary), 
French  or  German. 
Class  II— 

Optional — 

German  or  French. 

Latin. 

Greek. 

Science  (physics  and  chemistry). 

Matlijematics  B   (intermediate). 

Mathematics  C   (higher). 

All  subjects  in  Class  I  must  be  taken  up,  and  a  qualifying  mini- 
mum of  33  per  cent  of  the  maximum  marks  must  be  obtained  in  each. 
Only  two  of  the  subjects  in  Class  II  may  be  taken  up,  and  if  one  of 
these  is  a  modern  language  it  must  be  different  to  the  modern 
language  selected  in  Class  I. 

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27 

In  addition,  free-hand  drawing,  to  which  400  marks  are  allotted, 
may  be  taken  up. 

Certificate  A,  obtained  in  a  unit  of  the  officers'  training  corps, 
will  entitle  the  holder  to  receive  200  marks. 

NOMINATION   TO   CADETSHIP   BY   THE   ARMY   COUNCIL. 

Conditions. — A  certain  number  of  suitable  candidates,  recom- 
mended by  the  headmasters  of  schools  recognized  for  the  purpose, 
are  nominated  to  cadetships  by  the  army  council  each  half  year. 

To  be  eligible  to  recommendation  by  the  headmaster  a  candidate 
must — 

1.  Have  attended  continuously  for  at  least  three  years  one  or 
more  approved  schools  and  remain  in  residence  at  the  school  until 
the  end  of  the  term  immediately  preceding  the  nomination. 

2.  Be  within  the  prescribed  limits  of  age. 

3.  Be  an  eflScient  member  of  the  school  contingent  of  the  officers' 
training  corps. 

PRIZE    CADETSHIPS. 

A  certain  number  of  prize  cadetships  are  awarded  to  successful 
competitors  (other  than  candidates  for  commissions  in  the  West 
India  Regiment)  in  order  of  merit  at  each  half-yearly  army  entrance 
examination.  Emoluments  varying  in  value  up  to  a  maximum  of 
£255  may  be  attached  to  a  prize  cadetship. 

EOYAL    MILITARY   ACADEMY,   WOOLWICH. 

Method  of  entry. — Admission  to  the  Eoyal  Military  Academy  can 
only  be  gained  by  successful  competition  at  an  army  entrance 
examination. 

General  qualifications. — Candidates  must  be  unmarried,  and  will 
not  be  accepted  unless,  in  the  opiaion  of  the  army  council,  in  every 
way  suitable  to  hold  a  commission. 

All  successful  candidates  must  pass  a  medical  examination. 

Age. — Candidates  must  have  attained  the  age  of  16^,  and  must 
not  have  attained  the  age  of  19^  (the  half  year  being  reckoned  by 
calendar  months)  on  the  1st  of  June  for  the  summer  and  on  the  1st  of 
December  for  the  winter  army  entrance  examination. 

ARMY  ENTRANCE  EXAMINATION. 

General  outline  of  array  entrance  examination. — Same  as  for  the 
Royal  Military  College. 

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Certificates  required. — Same  as  for  the  Royal  Military  College. 

Subjects : 
Class  I — 

Obligatory — 
English. 

English  history  and  geography. 
Mathematics,  A  (elementary). 
Frencli  or  German. 
Science  (physics  and  chemistry). 
Mathematics,  B   (intermediate). 
Class  II— 

Optional — 

German,  French,  Latin,  or  Greek. 
Mathematics,  C  (higher). 

All  subjects  in  Class  1  must  be  taken  up.  Only  one  of  the  subjects 
in  Class  II  may  be  taken  up,  and  if  it  is  a  modern  language  it  must  be 
different  to  the  modern  language  selected  in  Class  I. 

In  addition,  free-hand  drawing,  to  which  400  marks  are  allotted, 
may  be  taken  up. 

Certificate  A,  obtained  in  the  officers'  training  corps,  will  entitle 
the  holder  to  receive  200  marks. 

A  candidate  may,  if  eligible  in  respect  to  age,  compete  for  both 
Eoyal  Military  Academy  and  Royal  Military  College  at  the  same 
examination  by  taking  up  the  subjects  which  are  obligatory  for  the 
Royal  Military  Academy. 

Medical  examination. — Same  as  for  the  Royal  Military  College. 

Prize  cadetships. — A  certain  number  of  prize  cadetships  are 
awarded  to  successful  competitors  in  order  of  merit  at  each  half- 
yearly  army  entrance  examination.  Emoluments  varying  in  value 
up  to  a  maximum  of  £255  may  be  attached  to  a  prize  cadetship. 

ROYAL  MILITARY  COLLEGE,  KINGSTON,  CANADA. 

General  qualifications. — The  college  has  a  wider  scope  than  the 
English  military  colleges,  as,  besides  military  subjects,  it  teaches 
civil  engineering,  surveying,  etc. 

Seven  commissions  in  His  Majesty's  Regular  Army  are  granted 
annually  to  the  students,  viz :  Royal  Engineers,  1 ;  Royal  Artillery, 
1 ;  Cavalry,  1 ;  Infantry,  1 ;  Indian  Army,  1 ;  Army  Service  Corps,  2. 

Candidates  must  be  British  subjects,  and  they  or  their  parents  must 
have  resided  in  Canada  for  two  years  immediately  preceding  the 
examination;  short  periods  of  absence  in  Europe  for  purposes  of 
education  to  be  included  as  residence. 

Age. — Between  16  and  20  on  January  1st,  preceding  the  examina- 
tion. 

General  outline  of  tests  which  must  he  passed. — Admission  by  com- 
petitive examination. 

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COMPETITIVE  EXAMINATION. 

Papers  and  certificates  required  with  application. —  (1)  Certified 
abstract  from  birth  register  in  duplicate,  or  if  not  procurable,  a  decla- 
ration made  before  a  magistrate;  (2)  a  certificate  of  good  character. 

Suhjects. —  (1)  Mathematics;  (2)  grammar  and  composition,  Eng- 
lish or  French;  (3)  geography;  (4)  history,  British  and  Canadian; 
(5)  French;  (6)  Latin;  (7)  geometrical  drawing;  (8)  chemistry; 
(9)  free-hand  drawing. 

Medical  examination. — The  candidate  must  be  medically  examined 
before  admission  to  the  competitive  examination. 

MILITARY    FORCES     OF     THE     SELF-GOVERNING     DOMINIONS     AND     CROWN 

COLONIES. 

General  quali-flcations. — A  certain  number  of  commissions  are 
granted  each  half  year  to  candidates  from  the  self-governing  domin- 
ions and  Crown  Colonies. 

Candidates  who  fulfill  the  following  conditions  may  be  nominated 
by  the  governor  general  of  a  dominion  or  by  the  secretary  of  state  for 
the  colonies  in  the  case  of  Crown  Colonies.    A  candidate  must: 

{a)  Be  unmarried. 

(6)  Have  attained  the  age  of  20  and  not  have  attained  the  age  of 
25  on  April  1st  if  nominated  in  January,  or  on  October  1st  if  nomi- 
nated in  July. 

((?)  Have  qualified  at  any  army  entrance  examination,  or  have 
passed  one  of  the  examinations  accepted  in  lieu  thereof. 

{d)  Have  served  as  an  officer  in  the  local  forces  of  the  dominion 
or  colony  from  which  he  is  nominated,  and  have  attended  two  annual 
trainings  (each  in  a  distinct  year),  or  have  seen  active  service  in  the 
field.  A  candidate  for  a  commission  in  the  Royal  Artillery  must  be 
an  officer  of  the  artillery. 

{e)  Have  been  attached  to  a  British  regular  unit  or  to  a  unit  of  the 
permanent  military  force  of  the  dominion  or  colony  for  two  con- 
secutive months  at  any  time  after  the  completion  of  his  first  training, 
and  have  obtained  a  satisfactory  report. 

ARMY  ENTRANCE  EXAMINATION. 

To  whom  to  apply  and  date  of  application. — A  candidate  must 
apply  to  his  commanding  officer  at  such  date  as  will  allow  of  the 
application  reaching  the  war  office  not  later  than  April  1st  or 
September  1st  for  a  June  or  November  examination,  respectively. 

Subjects. — Same  as  for  candidates  from  the  special  reserve,  militia, 
or  territorial  force. 

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30 

PROM  THE  RANKS. 

General  qiuiliflcations. — A  candidate  for  a  commission  from  the 
ranks:  (1)  Must  be  specially  recommended  by  his  commanding 
officer;  (2)  must  not  be  of  lower  rank  than  corporal;  (3)  must  have 
two  years'  service;  (4)  must  have  a  first-class  certificate  of  education; 
(5)  must  have  a  clear  regimental  conduct  sheet;  (6)  must  be  un- 
married. 

Age. — Must  be  under  26  years  of  age. 

Medical  examination. — A  certificate  from  a  medical  officer  as  to 
fitness  for  service  at  home  and  abroad  must  be  attached  to  the  recom- 
mendation of  the  commanding  officer. 

General  outline  of  tests  which  must  he  passed. — After  the  candi- 
date's name  has  been  approved  by  the  Secretary  of  State  he  must 
pass  in  subject  {a)  as  laid  down  in  the  King's  Regulations.  He  is 
then  duly  gazetted,  and  granted  an  outfit  allowance  of  £100. 

IV.   CONCLUSIONS. 

19.  COMPARISON. 

A  study  of  the  various  measures  employed  by  the  several  European 
powers  to  recruit  their  corps  of  active  officers  brings  out  the  following 
points : 

1.  In  the  German  and  English  armies  all  officers  come  from  the 
same  school  or  from  schools  of  similar  rank. 

2.  In  Austria-Hungary,  Italy,  and  Russia  there  exists  to  a  more 
or  less  extent,  as  in  France,  a  certain  dualism  of  origin. 

3.  The  noncommissioned  officers  are  recruited  from  the  inferior 
material  coming  from  military  schools  or  from  those  who  fail  to 
qualify  in  an  officer's  examination. 

4.  All  promote  selected  noncommissioned  officers. 

5.  In  Italy  and  France  the  material  coming  from  the  last- 
mentioned  class  receives  a  training  at  special  schools  before  being 
commissioned. 

RESERVE  OFFICERS. 

In  all  armies  the  officers  for  the  reserve  or  the  third  line  are  re- 
cruited in  practically  the  same  way,  viz :  From  former  officers  of  the 
army  who  are  furloughed,  and  from  special  candidates  who  have 
had  at  least  a  year's  service  with  the  colors  or  at  a  military  school. 
Every  endeavor  is  made  to  get  as  many  reserve  officers  as  possible, 
and,  after  having  these  men  placed  " at  disposal"  or  "  en  complement," 
a  certain  period  of  training  at  stated  intervals  is  required  of  them  all. 
This  is  absolutely  necessary  as  in  no  other  way  can  they  be  kept  up 
to  a  fairly  high  standard  of  training. 

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Attention  must  be  called  to  the  fact,  however,  that  all  these  officers 
must  be  trained  in  the  same  great  school,  the  active  army  (our  Regu- 
lar Army)  or  under  its  immediate  guidance  and  example. 

20.  REMEDY  AND  RECOMMENDATION. 

While  our  military  system  differs  greatly  from  those  of  other 
nations,  and  our  social  conditions  do  not  provide  us  with  a  ruling 
class,  a  satisfactory  solution  is  nevertheless  possible.  The  fact  that 
our  educational  institutions  provide  us  with  a  class  superior  in  edu- 
cation and  training  to  the  average  citizen  who  enlists  to  make  up 
the  rank  and  file  of  the  Army  makes  it  possible  to  solve  this  problem 
in  a  scientific  manner.  By  taking  advantage  of  this  state  of  affairs, 
we  are  enabled  to  avail  ourselves  of  the  moral  factor  of  superior 
knowledge  and  position  produced  by  education. 

The  possibilities  of  the  system  proposed  are  set  forth  in  a  War  Col- 
lege study  entitled  "  Educational  Institutions  as  a  Source  of  Supply 
of  Officers,"  and,  therefore,  this  phase  of  the  problem  is  not  discussed 
here,  but  a  remedy  is  proposed  by  organizing  legally  in  each  of  these 
institutions  one  or  more  units  of  the  reserve  officers'  training  corps. 

21.  THE  RESERVE  OFFICERS'  TRAINING  CORPS. 

Ohject. — The  primary  object  of  the  reserv-e  officers'  training  corps 
is  to  provide  reserve  officers  for  the  Regular  Army,  its  reserve  units 
and  the  continental  army,  by  maintaining  at  our  civil  educational 
institutions,  college  and  university,  as  well  as  preparatory,  a  standard 
course  of  military  instruction. 

The  organization  of  a  unit  at  any  educational  institution  must  of 
necessity  be  based  on  agreement  between  the  War  Department  and 
the  institution  itself,  and  a  just  balance  must  be  maintained  between 
the  efforts  of  the  War  Department  to  obtain  these  badly  needed 
trained  officers  and  those  of  the  institutions  to  provide  a  suitable 
academic  training  for  each  matriculate.   . 

OUTPUT. 

There  are  567  colleges  in  the  country  with  an  enrollment  of  170,000 
male  students,  and  the  probability  of  obtaining  a  large  number  of 
trained  officers  by  means  of  the  reserve  officers'  training  corps  can  be 
readily  grasped.  Of  these  567  colleges,  62  collegiate  institutions 
have  an  enrollment  in  their  military  departments  of  26,352  students, 
and  those  graduated  in  1915  numbered  5,200.  If  all  of  the  567  could 
be  interested  or  incorporated  in  this  movement  the  annual  output 
might  reach  15,000,  or  about  50  per  cent  of  the  probable  number, 
34,000,  who  are  graduated  each  year. 

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32 

During  the  past  10  years  44,529  young  men  have  been  graduated 
from  collegiate*  institutions  maintaining  military  departments,  and 
these  young  men  have  pursued  a  course,  both  practical  and  theoreti- 
cal, which  insures  a  working  knowledge  of  at  least  the  rudiments 
of  military  training.  Since  1912  the  training  has  become  more  in- 
tensive and  the  graduates  under  this  new  system,  numbering  15,323, 
are  now  better  prepared  to  be  officers;  but  it  should  be  remembered 
that  under  the  proposed  system  the  course  would  be  thoroughly 
standardized  and  the  additional  six  months'  service  in  the  Regular 
Army  would  complete  the  training  already  started  in  the  reserve 
officers'  training  corps. 

In  the  past  two  months  a  number  of  universities  of  the  nonmilitary 
type  have  indicated,  through  a  voluntary  movement  on  the  part  of 
the  undergraduates,  the  desire  of  the  students  themselves  to  undergo 
a  course  in  military  training,  and  those  students  have  asked  for  help 
from  the  War  Department. 

The  proposed  training  corps,  therefore,  not  only  reaches  out  to 
include  the  institutions  where  this  willingness  is  manifested  but  it 
also  includes  the  land-grant  institutions,  which  now,  under  the  pro- 
visions of  the  act  approved  July  2,  1862,  have  compulsory  military 
training  for  their  male  students.  In  fact,  any  college  or  university 
complying  with  necessary  requirements  can  have  organized  thereat 
a  unit  of  the  corps. 

COMPOSITION. 

In  order  to  provide  for  standardized  training  it  is  thought  best 
to  provide  in  the  law  for  the  organization  of  two  divisions  of  the 
training  corps:  (1)  The  senior  division,  consisting  of  units  organized 
at  colleges  and  universities,  and  (2)  the  junior  division,  organized 
from  units  at  all  other  institutions.  The  preparatory-school  type 
of  institution,  such  as  St.  John's  Manlius,  Culver  Military  Academy, 
Shattuck  School,  St.  John's,  Delafield,  etc.,  is  particularly  well 
adapted  for  the  organization  of  a  unit  of  the*  junior  division. 

It  is  intended  that  the  junior  division  shall  act  as  a  feeder  for  the 
senior  division.  The  majority  of  students  who  are  now  receiving 
instruction  in  military  schools  of  the  preparatory  type  go  to  some 
college. 

A  large  number,  however,  from  the  public  and  grammar  schools 
of  the  country  undertake  a  college  education,  and  if  provision  be 
made  for  such  institutions  the  efficiency  of  the  senior  division  of  the 
corps  will  be  enhanced.  For  this  reason  it  is  believed  that  the  junior 
division  is  an  absolute  necessity;  first,  with  the  idea  of  providing 
a  center  for  elementary  military  instruction,  and,  second,  to  make 
use  of  these  useful  preparatory  instructions. 

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In  order  to  provide  officers  for  the  several  branches  of  the  service, 
the  organization  of  training  corps  units  of  infantry,  cavah-y,  field 
artillery,  engineers,  sanitary,  and  signal  units  will  be  necessary.  A 
carefully  prepared  system  of  instruction  has  been  laid  out  so  as  not 
to  duplicate  in  the  senior  division  the  work  given  in  the  junior 
division.  When  cadets  join  the  senior  division  a  certain  numlDer  of 
credits  will  be  given  to  enable  this  transfer  to  be  made  on  a  just 
and  sound  basis. 

INSTRUCTION. 

The  instruction  laid  down  for  cadets,  until  organizations  other 
than  infantry  are  formed,  should  include  the  following:  (later 
schedules  of  instruction  for  cavalry,  field  artillery,  etc.,  will  have  to 
be  prepared.) 

SENIOB  DIVISION. 

Subjects : 

1.  Infantry  Drill  Regulations   (theoretical  and  practical),  school  of  the 

soldier,  school  of  the  squad,  school  of  the  company,  and  school  of 
the  battalion. 

2.  Manual  of  Guard  Duty. 

3.  Field  Service  Regulations:  Service  of  information,  service  of  security, 

marches,  shelter,  and  orders. 

4.  Tables  of  organization,  to  include  the  (company)  regiment. 

5.  Small  Arms  Firing  Regulations :  Theoretical  principles,  estimating  dis- 

tances, and  target  practice. 

6.  Military  Law  (Manual  of  Courts-Martial). 

7.  Topography :  Map  reading  and  road  and  position  sketching. 

8.  Troop  leading. 

9.  Military  policy  and  military  history. 

10.  Military  hygiene. 

11.  Field  engineering. 

JUNIOR  DIVISION, 

Subjects : 

1.  Infantry  Drill  Regulations  (practical), 

2.  Manual  of  Guard  Duty. 

3.  Physical  drill. 

4.  Military  hygiene. 

5.  Visual  signaling. 

6.  Bayonet  exercises  and  bayonet  combat. 

7.  Military  history. 

8.  Small-arms  firing  (practical). 

9.  Camping  and  camping  expedients. 

CAMPS. 

To  afford  practical  experience  for  cadets  of  both  divisions  the  ini- 
tiation of  a  scheme  for  a  number  of  camps  should  be  required,  espe- 
cially at  the  institutions  during  the  academic  year.  This  will  also  en- 
able the  cadets  of  the  senior  divisions  to  obtain  practical  training 

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34 

with  troops ;  it  being  a  well-known  maxim  that  no  school  can  provide 
so  efficient  a  method  of  practical  instruction  for  an  officer  as  duty 
at  the  head  of  his  unit. 

Every  opportunity  should  be  given  these  units  to  serve  at  the  side 
of  organizations  of  the  Eegular  Army,  and  with  this  end  in  view  the 
law  has  been  drawn  to  provide  for  this  contingency. 

It  will  be  found  necessary  to  provide  Federal  funds  for  the  pur- 
pose of  transporting  members  of  the  reserve  corps  to  and  from  camps 
of  instruction,  as  well  as  to  provide  for  their  messing  while  in  attend- 
ance thereat.  A  number  of  different  suggestions  have  been  made  rela- 
tive to  this  important  matter;  but  the  principle  that  some  provision 
must  be  made  for  these  items  of  expense  for  the  student  is  most 
apparent,  and  should  be  provided  for  by  a  definite  amount  of  money 
appropriated  for  this  purpose. 

CONTROL  or  INSTRUCTFION. 

It  is  manifest  that  each  unit  should  be  trained  by  its  own  officers 
under  the  supervision  and  guidance  of  the  officer  detailed  at  the  in- 
stitution. Experience  gained  from  numerous  inspections  at  various 
institutions  shows  that  at  least  one  officer  of  the  Army  should  be 
assigned  to  every  400  cadets  enrolled  in  the  military  department  of 
the  institutions. 

The  detail  of  noncommissioned  officers  at  a  number  of  institutions 
has  shown  that  the  services  of  suitable  men  can  be  utilized  to  great 
advantage.  They  have  been  valuable  as  armorers,  instructors  in 
small-arms  practice,  and  to  assist  the  professor  of  military  science 
and  tactics  detailed  thereat  in  many  other  ways. 

Provision  is  therefore  made  in  the  proposed  act  for  the  detail  and 
assignment,  of  not  to  exceed  500,  for  duty  with  units  of  the  reserve 
officers'  training  corps.  The  duty  required  of  these  enlisted  men  will 
be  analogous  to  that  now  performed  by  noncommissioned  officers 
detailed  with  the  Organized  Militia. 

Harmonious  and  coordinate  control  by  the  General  Staff  of  the 
Army  should  exist,  so  as  to  assure  standardization  and  also  arrange 
for  a  proper  flow  of  officers  into  the  reserve  corps  from  this  reser- 
voir. 

CONDITIONS  OF  SERVICE. 

It  should  be  clearly  understood  that  cadets  of  the  reserve  officers' 
training  corps  are  not,  as  such,  liable  for  active  service;  but  their 
duty  consists  in  undergoing  training  laid  down  for  them  upon  entry 
into  the  unit. 

University  and  school  authorities  should  retain  the  ordinary  pow- 
ers of  supervision  and  discipline,  and  it  should  be  made  clear  to  all 
that  the  maintenance  of  a  high  standard  of  discipline  is  needed  to 

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35 

assist  in  turning  out  efficient  officers  at  the  end  of  the  training  pre- 
scribed for  the  reserve  officers'  training  corps. 

In  providing  for  the  organization  of  a  unit  or  units  at  any  insti- 
tution the  number  of  students  guaranteed  under  instruction  should 
be  a  minimum  of  100,  while  the  minimum  age  of  13  years  is  provided 
for  in  the  law,  so  as  to  include  the  youngest  student  in  the  prepara- 
tory type  of  institution.  Upon  enrollment  as  a  member  of  the  corps 
a  distinctive  badge  should  be  worn,  showing  that  the  student  is  being 
trained  for  a  commission  as  a  reserve  officer  of  the  national  forces. 

Upon  reaching  the  time  for  graduation  the  trained  student  should 
then  be  given  a  temporary  commission  as  an  additional  second  lieu- 
tenant in  the  Regular  Army  and  undergo  an  intensive  course  of 
training  as  an  officer,  thus  fitting  him  for  assignment  to  duty  with 
units  of  the  reserve  army  or  with  the  continental  army.  If  a  profes- 
sional man,  while  a  reserve  officer,  desires  to  move  to  any  particular 
part  of  the  country,  a  transfer  as  an  officer  to  a  reserve  formation 
of  the  Eegular  Army  or  to  a  unit  of  the  continental  army  organized 
in  the  vicinity  of  the  locality  in  which  he  is  required  by  his  profes- 
sion to  locate  can  be  easily  accomplished. 

Before  entering  upon  his  six  months'  training  each  reserve  officer 
should  be  required  to  take  the  oath  of  allegiance  and  obligate  himself 
to  serve  for  10  years  as  a  reserve  officer  unless  otherwise  discharged 
by  proper  authority.  This  six  months'  service,  which  is  in  addition 
to  his  reserve  service,  is  really  a  probationary  term,  which  should 
enable  his  superior  officers  to  determine  whether  or  not  he  should  be 
retained  as  a  reserve  officer,  and  if  so,  what  grade  he  should  be  given. 
This  provision  has  another  advantage  in  that  it  will  provide  a  cer- 
tain number  of  officers  for  duty  with  Regular  troops  and  to  some 
extent  counteract  the  effect  of  too  much  detached  service  for  Regular 
officers,  which  w^ill  undoubtedly  be  quite  large  when  it  comes  to  or- 
ganizing and  training  the  proposed  continental  army  units.  This 
prevents  a  depletion  of  commissioned  personnel  serving  with  the 
Regular  forces  for  at  least  six  months  of  the  year. 

Briefly  stated,  a  boy  who  is  13  years  of  age  will  enter  the  junior 
division  of  the  reserve  officers'  training  corps,  pass  through  the 
course  of  instruction  required,  including  such  camps  as  may  be  pro- 
vided, either  at  the  institution  or  at  some  selected  place  during  the 
summer  vacation,  and  at  the  age  probably  of  18  years  pass  into  the 
senior  division.  Here  he  remains  for  a  definite  period  of  from  two 
to  four  years,  and  attends  such  camps  as  may  be  required  of  him 
during  that  period  of  training.  Upon  graduation,  if  found  qualified, 
he  acquires  the  status  of  a  reserve  officer  and  becomes  a  temporary 
additional  second  lieutenant  for  the  period  of  six  months,  and  if 
qualified,  after  undergoing  this  intensive  course  of  instruction  and 
training,  he  is  assigned  with  definite  rank  to  the  reserve  officers'  train- 


36 

ing  corps  and  to  such  duty  as  the  War  Department  may  consider 
necessary. 

Exception. — It  may  be  found  that  there  will  be  members  of  the 
junior  division  who  will  have  reached  an  age  of  approximately  19 
years  upon  graduation  from  the  preparatory  school  and  from  its 
training-corps  unit,  and  for  this  reason  some  steps  should  be  taken 
to  make  use  of  this  material,  especially  if  they  have  undergone  a 
special  course  of  instruction.^  have  qualified  and  been  pronounced 
proficient  by  the  officer  detailed  with  the  unit  at  the  institution. 
Proficiency  in  all  subjects  required  for  graduation  from  the  senior 
division  of  the  reserve  officers'  training  corps  should  be  assured  by 
examination,  both  practical  and  theoretical.  Exceptional  cases  will 
undoubtedly  exist,  and  each  one  should  be  decided  upon  its  own 
merits,  because  it  is  believed  that  the  large  majority  of  these  young 
men  in  the  junior  division  are  too  immature  and  have  not  sufficient 
academic  or  military  training  to  be  safely  commissioned  as  reserve 
officers. 

ADVANTAGES   OF  THE   SYSTEM. 

The  main  advantage  of  the  proposed  system  is  based  on  the  fact 
that  it  makes  use  of  existing  agencies  and  the  cadet  units  as  they 
now  stand,  organized  under  the  provisions  of  section  1225,  Revised 
Statutes.  No  extra  expenses  will  be  needed  for  their  organization, 
but  under  the  patriotic  directorship  of  experienced  schoolmen  who 
have  been  in  this  business  for  a  number  of  years  the  corps  unques- 
tionably will  expand  and  increase  in  efficiency. 

To  the  youth  of  the  country  whose  parents  are  financially  able  to 
support  their  children  at  school  and  college  the  system  offers  a 
decided  benefit,  not  only  from  a  physical  standpoint  and  from  the 
viewpoint  of  training  a  young  man  to  perform  his  duties  as  a  citizen 
in  time  of  great  national  stress,  but  also  because  his  future  economic 
efficiency  will  be  increased  thereby. 

A  military  training  is  most  valuable  educationally,  because  it  not 
only  quickens  the  mind,  but  also  hardens  the  body.  It  seems  but 
logical  that  parents  would  be  pleased  to  have  their  sons  undergo 
such  training,  not  only  in  the  junior  division,  but  also  that  laid 
down  for  the  senior  division.  This  for  the  reason  that  the  conditions 
as  to  future  active  service  do  not  apply  during  service  in  the  training 
corps,  and  no  training  corps  unit  could  be  called  upon  for  war 
service.  In  addition,  this  training  takes  a  young  man  before  he  has 
embarked  on  his  life's  profession,  and  therefore  from  an  economical 
standpoint,  when  he  is  best  able  to  receive  preliminary  training  at 
this  time,  especially  if  he  does  not  intend  to  take  up  a  military 
career.  In  any  event  the  physical  and  mental  discipline  obtained 
will  be  a  valuable  asset  in  his  future  career. 

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5? 

COMPARISON   WITH  THE   ENGLISH   OFFICERS*  TRAINING   CORPS. 

It  will  be  of  interest  to  compare  results  obtained  under  a  system 
somewhat  similar  to  the  one  proposed,  which  has  been  in  existence 
in  Great  Britain  since  1908. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war,  in  August,  1914,  6,322  men  of  the 
officers'  training  corps  were  gazetted  for  duty  in  the  newly  formed 
units  of  the  Kitchener  Army.  From  August,  1914,  to  March,  1915, 
20,577  were  appointed  officers  and,  in  addition,  12,290  served  in  the 
ranks  of  the  new  army. 

When  it  is  considered  that  the  total  number  of  colleges  is  far 
below  the  number  in  existence  in  the  United  States  and  the  number 
of  students  very  much  less,  it  is  clear  that  there  exists  in  this  country 
a  source  for  such  officers  not  excelled  in  an}'^  other. 

A  number  of  reports  have  been  received  as  to  the  usefulness  and 
efficiency  of  these  officers  who  were  trained  in  the  British  officers' 
training  corps  before  and  during  the  early  part  of  the  present  war. 
Many  suggestions  have  been  made  looking  toward  an  improvement 
of  this  corps  for  the  future,  and  among  the  most  prominent  are  the 
following : 

*  *  *  On  the  principle,  therefore,  of  strilving  while  the  iron  is  hot,  I  urge 
that  our  first  act  of  peace  be  to  malie  membership  of  the  officers'  training  corps 
compulsory  on  all  members  of  schools  and  universities.  There  are  other  rea- 
sons for  this  step,  and  the  chief  of  them  is  discipline.  The  officers'  training 
corps  is  purely  an  instructional  and  not  a  fighting  force ;  compulsion  to  serve 
can  meet  with  none  of  the  objections  which  might  possilily  be  urged  against 
compulsion  to  fight.  It  is  a  hopeless  travesty  of  discipline,  and  all  that  it 
implies,  to  put  into  the  hands  of  boys  and  very  young  men  the  power  to  resign 
a  duty  out  of  pique  or  because  the  work  appears  irksome.  However  successful 
an  officers'  training  corps,  however  full  its  ranks,  its  discipline  can  never  be 
truly  of  the  military  type  if  members  feel  that  the  key  to  any  diflicult  situation 
is  in  their  hands  and  not  in  the  keeping  of  their  officers.  If  the  last  word  is 
allowed  to  remain  with  the  embryo  soldier,  he  is  learning  the  worst  possible 
lesson  he  can  learn  and  one  that  goes  far  to  destroy  any  benefit  he  may  other- 
wise have  gathered  from  his  apprenticeship.  With  men  of  mature  age  and  with 
the  honor  of  the  regiment,  permanent  and  not  ephemeral,  in  their  thoughts,  this 
danger  is  not  so  acute.  Nevertheless,  it  is  a  very  real  argument  against  any 
form  of  voluntary  service,  and  unanswerable,  unless  the  inducements  to  con- 
tinue to  serve  are  such  as  to  outweigh  any  temporary  temptation  "  to  get  one's 
own  back." 

There  is,  too,  another  strong  reason  for  making  membership  of  the  officers' 
training  corps  compulsory,  and  that  is  to  assure  that  there  will  be  large  num- 
bers from  which  to  make  choice  of  officers.  Under  the  voluntary  system  some 
of  the  very  best  men  and  boys  are  lost,  and  the  more  numerous  the  interests 
of  the  individual  and  the  more  capably  they  are  fostered  the  greater  the  temp- 
tation to  shirk  his  more  obvious  duty.  I  am  not  amongst  those,  if  any  such 
exist,  who  consider  that  training  in  an  officers'  training  corps  necessarily  pro- 
duces an  officer.  There  are  some  men  who  will  never  make  leaders,  and  the 
opportunity  must  exist  to  choose  only  those  who  have  the  natural  aptitude  as 
529 


38 

well  as  the  special  training.  Methods  adopted  perforce  in  the  midst  of  a 
tremendous  war  will  naturally  give  place  in  peace  time  to  more  reasoned  judg- 
ment and  keener  discriaiination.  This  will  not  be  possible  unless  there  are 
numbers — big  numbers — to  choose  from.  If  the  position  of  officers  is  made 
really  difficult  of  attainment  in  all  except  the  pecuniary  way,  the  greater  will  be 
the  competition  to  enjoy  it.  Once  establish  such  a  situation,  as  may  easily  be 
done  in  the  after-enthusiasm  of  the  war,  and  the  problem  of  officering  the 
special  reserve  and  territorial  force  in  peace  time  will  no  longer  be  a  problem 
at  all,  always  providing  that  such  officers  are  treated  with  the  honor  and 
privileges  which  their  place  deserves.     *     *     * 

The  principle  laid  down  above  has  been  found  to  be  sound  by 
officers  who,  in  the  past  few  years,  have  been  engaged  in  th^e  inspec- 
tion of  cadet  units  at  our  civil  educational  institutions,  and  they  have 
recommended  accordingly.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  this  recom- 
mendation is  sound  and  confirmed  by  actual  war  experience  in 
England. 

If  this  last  suggestion  be  carried  out  at  institutions  at  which  an 
officer  of  the  Army  is  detailed,  there  need  never  be  any  anxiety  rela- 
tive to  furnishing  the  immense  number  of  officers — about  60,000 — 
needed  for  our  next  great  war. 

The  training  required  for  reserve  officers  is  discussed  in  the  War 
College  study  on  "  The  Training  and  Uses  of  the  Proposed  Officers' 
Reserve  Corps." 

For  convenience  of  reference  a  draft  of  the  provisions  creating 
the  proposed  officers'  reserve  corps  is  appended  hereto. 

No  more  important  a  subject  than  this  can  be  brought  up  for  dis- 
cussion, and  none  is  of  greater  interest.  The  soul  of  the  Army  rests 
in  its  officers,  and  a  standardization  of  the  character  and  training 
of  this  class  should  be  assured  above  all  things.  Hence,  the  Regular 
Army  should  form  the  sole  exemplar  and  guide,  and  the  best  material 
in  its  corps  of  officers  should  serve  as  instructors  for  reserve  officers. 


APPENDIX  A. 

Officebs'  Reserve  Corps. 

For  the  purpose  of  securing  a  reserve  of  officers  available  for  service  as  tem- 
porary officers  in  the  Regular  Army  as  provided  for  in  this  act,  and  in  section 
8  of  the  act  approved  April  25,  1914,  as  officers  for  recruit  rendezvous  and 
depots,  and  as  officers  of  volunteers,  there  shall  be  organized,  under  such  rules 
and  regulations  as  the  President  may  prescribe,  not  inconsistent  with  the  provi- 
sions of  this  act,  an  Officers'  Reserve  Corps  of  the  Army  of  the  United  States. 

The  President  of  the  United  States  is  authorized  to  appoint  and  commission, 
by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  reserve  officers  in  all  grades 
up  to  and  including  the  grade  of  major,  such  citizens  of  the  United  States  as 

529 


39 

upon  examination  prescribed  by  the  Secretary  of  War  are  found  physically, 
mentally,  and  morally  qualified  to  hold  such  commission,  the  persons  so  com- 
missioned to  constitute  and  be  known  as  the  reserve  corps  of  the  several  arms, 
corps,  or  departments  in  which  they  may  be  found  qualified  and  commissioned 
by  the  President. 

All  persons  now  carried  as  duly  qualified  and  registered,  pursuant  to  section 
23  of  the  act  of  Congress  approved  January  21,  1903,  shall,  for  a  period  of  three 
years  after  the  passage  of  this  act,  be  eligible  for  appointment  in  the  Officers' 
Reserve  Corps  in  the  arm,  corps,  or  department,  for  which  they  shall  have  been 
found  qualified  without  further  examination,  except  the  physical  examination, 
subject  to  the  limitations  as  to  age  and  rank  herein  prescribed. 

Commissions  duly  issued  by  the  President  to  officers  of  the  officers'  reserve 
corps  shall  be  in  force  for  a  period  of  five  years  unless  terminated  in  the  discre- 
tion of  the  President ;  such  officers  may  be  recommissioned  either  in  the  same 
or  higher  grade  for  a  consecutive  period  of  five  years,  subject  to  such  examina- 
tions and  qualifications  as  the  President  may  prescribe. 

Officers  of  the  officers'  reserve  corps  shall  have  rank  therein  in  the  various 
arms,  corps,  and  departments  of  said  reserve  corps  according  to  grades  and  to 
length  of  service  in  their  respective  grades,  and  when  employed  on  active  duty 
shall  rank  next  after  all  officers  of  same  grades  in  the  Regular  Army  and  above 
all  of  the  same  grades  in  the  Organized  Militia  and  Volunteers. 

When  a  volunteer  force  is  authorized  the  Secretary  of  War  may  order 
officers  of  the  reserve  corps,  subject  to  such  subsequent  physical  examinations 
as  he  may  prescribe,  to  temporary  duty  with  the  Regular  Army  in  grades 
thereof  which  can  not,  for  the  time  being,  be  filled  by  promotion  as  officers  in 
volunteer  organizations,  as  officers  of  recruit  rendezvous  and  depots  in  such 
numbers  as  may  be  authorized  by  law.  While  such  reserve  officers  are  on  such 
service  they  shall,  by  virture  of  their  commission  as  reserve  officers,  exercise 
command  appropriate  to  their  grade  and  rank  in  the  organization  to  which 
they  are  assigned  and  shall  be  entitled  to  the  pay  and  allowances  of  the  corre- 
sponding grades  in  the  Regular  Army  with  increase  of  pay  for  length  of  service 
as  now  allowed  by  law  for  officers  in  the  Regular  Army,  to  be  computed  on 
active  duty  only  from  the  date  upon  which  they  are  required  by  the  terms  of 
their  order  to  obey  the  same.  Officers  of  the  reserve  corps  shall  not  be  entitled 
to  retirement  or  retired  pay  and  shall  be  entitled  to  pension  only  for  dis- 
ability incurred  in  the  line  of  duty  and  while  in  active  service. 

To  the  extent  provided  for  from  time  to  time  by  appropriations  the  Secre- 
tary of  War  is  authorized  to  order  reserve  officers  to  duty  with  troops  or  at 
field  exercises  for  periods  not  to  exceed  two  weeks  in  any  one  calendar  year, 
and  while  so  serving  such  officers  shall  receive  the  pay  and  allowances  of  their 
grade.  With  the  consent  of  such  officers  the  Secretary  of  War  is  authorized 
to  prolong  this  period  or  to  order  them  for  duty  on  boards  or  for  consultation 
or  advice  to  the  extent  justified  by  the  amount  appropriated  and  the  public 
needs. 

After  all  officers  of  the  reserve  corps  of  any  arm,  corps,  or  department  have 
been  called  into  active  duty  nothing  should  be  construed  to  prevent  the  appoint- 
ment of  other  officers  of  Volunteers  in  such  arms,  corps,  or  departments  in  such 
numbers  and  with  such  rank  and  pay  as  may  be  provided  by  law,  nor  should 
anything  be  construed  to  prevent  the  commission  of  any  officer  of  the  Regular 
Army  as  an  officer  of  Volunteers  before  all  the  officers  of  the  reserve  corps 
have  been  utilized. 
529 


40 

APPENDIX  B. 

IJan.  27, 1916.] 

A  BILL  To  establish  a  reserve  officers'  training  corps. 

Be  it  enacted  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the  United  States 
of  America  in  Congress  assembled,  That  for  the  purpose  of  securing  a  sufficient 
reserve  of  officers  for  the  military  forces  of  tlie  United  States  the  President  is 
hereby  autliorized  to  establish  and  maintain  in  civil  educational  institutions  a 
reserve  officers'  training  corps  vphich  shall  consist  of  a  senior  division  organized 
at  universities  and  colleges  requiring  four  years  of  collegiate  study  for  a  degree, 
including  those  State  institutions  that  are  required  to  provide  instruction  in 
military  tactics  under  the  provisions  of  the  act  of  Congress  of  July  second,  eight- 
een hundred  and  sixty-two,  donating  lands  for  the  establishment  of  colleges 
vphere  the  leading  object  shall  be  the  practical  instruction  of  the  industrial 
classes  in  agriculture  and  the  mechanic  arts,  including  military  tactics,  and  a 
junior  division  organized  at  all  other  public  or  private  educational  institutions, 
and  each  division  shall  consist  of  units  of  the  several  arms  or  corps  in  such 
number  and  of  such  strength  as  the  President  may  prescribe. 

Sec.  2.  That  the  President  may,  upon  the  application  of  any  State  institution 
described  in  section  one  of  this  act,  establish  and  maintain  at  such  institution 
one  or  more  units  of  the  reserve  officers'  training  corps :  Provided,  That  no 
such  unit  shall  be  established  or  maintained  at  any  such  institution  at  which 
an  officer  of  the  Army  is  not  detailed  as  professor  of  military  science  and 
tactics  or  at  any  such  institution  which  does  not  maintain  under  military 
instruction  at  least  one  hundred  physically  fit  male  students. 

Sec.  3.  That  the  President  may,  upon  the  application  of  any  established 
educational  institution  in  the  United  States  other  than  a  State  institution 
described  in  section  one  of  this  act,  the  authorities  of  which  agree  to  establish 
and  maintain  a  two-years'  elective  or  compulsory  course  of  military  training 
as  a  minimum  for  its  physically  fit  male  students,  which  course  when  entered 
upon  by  any  student  shall,  as  regards  such  student,  be  a  prerequisite  for 
graduation,  establish  and  maintain  at  such  institution  one  or  more  units  of 
the  reserve  officers'  training  corps :  Provided,  That  no  such  unit  shall  be  estab- 
lished or  maintained  at  any  such  institution  at  which  an  officer  of  the  Army 
is  not  detailed  as  professor  of  military  science  and  tactics,  or  at  any  such 
institution  which  does  not  maintain  under  military  instruction  at  least  one 
hundred  physically  fit  male  students. 

Sec.  4.  That  the  Secretary  of  War  is  hereby  authorized  to  prescribe  standard 
coiirses  of  theoretical  and  practical  military  training  for  imits  of  the  reserve 
ofticers'  training  corps,  and  no  unit  of  the  senior  division  shall  be  organized  or 
maintained  at  any  educational  institution  the  authorities  of  which  fail  or 
neglect  to  adopt  into  their  curriculum  the  prescribed  courses  of  military 
training  for  the  senior  division  or  to  devote  at  least  an  average  of  five  hours 
per  week  per  academic  year  to  such  military  training ;  and  no  unit  of  the  junior 
division  shall  be  organized  or  maintained  at  any  educational  institution  the 
authorities  of  which  fail  or  neglect  to  adopt  into  their  curriculum  the  prescribed 
courses  of  military  training  for  the  junior  division  or  to  devote  at  least  an 
average  of  three  hours  per  week  per  academic  year  to  such  military  training. 

Sec.  5.  Eligibility  to  membership  in  the  reserve  officers'  training  corps  .shall 
be  limited  to  students  of  institutions  in  which  units  of  such  corps  may  be  estab- 
lished who  are  citizens  of  the  United  States  or  have  legally  declared  their 
intention  to  become  such,  who  ai-e  over  thirteen  years  of  age,  and  whose  bodily 
529 


41 

condition  indicates  that  they  are  physically  fit  to  perform  military  duty  or  will 
be  so  upon  arrival  at  military  age. 

Sec.  6.  That  the  President  is  hereby  authorized  to  detail  such  numbers  ol' 
officers  of  the  Array,  either  active  or  retired,  not  above  the  grade  of  colonel, 
as  may  be  necessary,  for  duty  as  professors  and  assistant  professors  of  mili- 
tary science  and  tactics  at  institutions  where  one  or  more  units  of  the  reserve 
officers'  training  corps  are  maintained ;  but  the  total  number  of  active  officers 
so  detailed  at  educational  institutions  shall  not  exceed  three  hundred,  and 
no  active  officer  shall  be  so  detailed  who  has  not  had  five  years'  commissioned 
service  in  the  Army.  Retired  officers  shall  not  be  detailed  under  the  provisions 
of  this  section  without  their  consent.  Retired  officers  below  the  grade  of 
lieutenant  colonel  so  detailed  shall  receive  the  full  pay  and  allowances  of 
their  grade,  and  retired  officers  above  the  grade  of  major  so  detailed  shall 
receive  the  same  pay  and  allowances  as  a  retired  major  would  receive  under 
a  like  detail.  No  detail  under  the  provisions  of  this  section  shall  extend  for 
more  than  four  years. 

Sec.  7.  That  the  President  is  hereby  authorized  to  detail  for  duty  at  institu- 
tions where  one  or  more  units  of  the  reserve  officers'  training  corps  are  main- 
tained such  number  of  enlisted  men,  either  active  or  retired,  as  he  may 
deem  necessary,  but  the  number  of  active  noncommissioned  officers  so  detailed 
shall  not  exceed  five  hundred,  and  all  active  noncommissioned  officers  so 
detailed  shall  be  additional  in  their  respective  grades  to  those  otherwise 
authorized  for  the  Army.  Retired  enlisted  men  shall  not  be  detailed  under 
the  provisions  of  this  section  without  their  consent.  While  so  detailed  they 
shall  receive  active  pay  and  allowances. 

Sec.  8.  That  the  Secretary  of  War,  under  such  regulations  as  he  may 
prescribe,  is  hereby  authorized  to  issue  to  institutions  at  which  one  or  more 
units  of  the  reserve  officers'  training  corps  are  maintained,  such  public 
animals,  arms,  uniforms,  equipment,  and  means  of  transportation  as  he  may  deem 
necessary,  and  to  forage  at  the  expense  of  the  United  States  public  animals 
so  issued.  He  shall  require  from  each  institution  to  which  property  of  the 
United  States  is  issued,  a  bond  in  the  value  of  the  property  issued  for  the  care 
and  safe-keeping  thereof,  and  for  its  return  when  required. 

Sec  9.  That  the  Secretary  of  War  is  hereby  authorized  to  maintain  camps  for 
the  further  practical  instruction  of  the  members  of  the  reserve  officers'  training 
corps,  no  such  camps  to  be  maintained  for  a  period  longer  than  six  weeks  ex- 
cept in  time  of  war  or  when  war  is  imminent ;  to  transport  members  of  such 
corps  to  and  from  such  camps  at  the  expense  of  the  United  States  so  far  as  ap- 
propriations will  permit ;  to  subsist  them  at  the  expense  of  the  United  States 
while  traveling  to  and  from  such  camps  and  while  remaining  therein  so  far  as 
appropriations  will  permit ;  to  use  the  Regular  Army,  the  continental  army, 
and  such  Government  property  as  he  may  deem  necessary  for  the  military 
training  of  the  members  of  such  corps  while  in  attendance  at  such  camps ;  to 
prescribe  regulations  for  the  government  of  such  corps,  and  to  authorize,  in  his 
discretion,  the  formation  of  company  units  thereof  into  battalion  and  regi- 
mental units. 

Sec.  10.  That  the  President  alone,  under  such  regulations  as  he  may  pre- 
scribe, is  hereby  authorized  to  appoint  as  a  reserve  officer,  any  graduate  of  the 
senior  division  of  the  reserve  officers'  training  corps,  or  any  graduate  of  the 
junior  division,  who  shall  have  satisfactorily  completed  the  courses  of  military 
training  prescribed  for  the  senior  division  and  participated  in  such  practical 
instruction  as  the  Secretary  of  War  may  prescribe  subsequent  to  graduation  and 
who  is  twenty-one  years  of  age  and  shall  agree,  under  oath  in  writing,  to  serve 
the  United  States  in  the  capacity  of  a  reserve  officer  of  the  Army  during  a 
529 


42 

period  of  at  least  ten  years  from  the  date  of  his  appointment  as  such  reserve 
officer,  unless  sooner  discharged  by  proper  authority,  but  the  total  number 
of  reserve  officers  so  appointed  shall  not  exceed  fifty  thousand :  And  provided, 
That  any  graduate  of  the  senior  division  of  the  reserve  officers'  training  corps 
undergoing  a  postgraduate  course  at  any  institutions  shall  not  be  eligible  for 
appointment  as  a  reserve  officer  while  undergoing  such  postgraduate  course, 
but  his  ultimate  eligibility  upon  completion  of  such  postgraduate  course  for 
such  appointment  shall  not  be  affected  because  of  his  having  undergone  such 
postgraduate  course. 

Sec.  11.  That  when  any  member  of  the  senior  division  of  the  reserve  officers' 
training  corps  has  completed  two  academic  years  of  service  in  that  division,  and 
has  been  selected  for  further  training  by  the  president  of  the  institution  and 
by  its  professor  of  military  science  and  tactics,  and  has  agreed  in  writing  to 
continue  in  the  reserve  officers'  training  corps  for  the  remainder  of  his  course  in 
the  institution,  including  such  camp  training  as  shall  be  prescribed  by  the 
Secretary  of  War,  he  may  be  furnished  at  the  expense  of  the  United  States 
with  commutation  of  subsistence  at  such  rate,  not  exceeding  the  cost  of  the 
garrison  ration  prescribed  for  the  Army,  as  may  be  fixed  by  the  Secretary  of 
War,  during  the  remainder  of  his  service  in  the  reserve  officers'  training  corps. 
Sec.  12.  That  any  physically  fit  male  citizen  of  the  United  States  between 
the  ages  of  twenty-one  and  twenty-seven  years  who  shall  have  graduated  prior 
to  the  date  of  this  act  from  any  educational  institution  at  which  an  officer  of 
the  Army  was  detailed  as  professor  of  military  science  and  tactics,  and  who 
while  a  student  at  such  institution  completed  courses  of  military  training  under 
the  direction  of  such  professor  of  military  science  and  tactics  substantially 
equivalent  to  those  prescribed  pursuant  to  this  act  for  the  senior  division, 
shall,  after  satisfactorily  completing  such  additional  practical  military  train- 
ing as  the  Secretary  of  War  shall  prescribe,  be  eligible  for  appointment  as  a 
reserve  officer  and  as  a  temporary  additional  second  lieutenant  in  accordance 
with  the  terms  of  this  act. 

Sec.  13.  That  the  President  alone  is  hereby  authorized  to  appoint  and  com- 
mission as  a  temporary  second  lieutenant  of  the  Regular  Army  for  a  period 
of  at  least  six  months,  with  the  allowances  now  provided  by  law  for  that 
grade,  but  with  pay  at  the  rate  of  $100  per  month,  any  reserve  officer 
appointed  pursuant  to  this  act,  and  to  attach  him  to  a  unit  of  the  Regular 
Army  for  duty  and  training  during  the  period  covered  by  his  appointment  as 
such  temporary  second  lieutenant,  and  upon  the  expiration  of  such  service  with 
the  Regular  Army  such  officer  shall  revert  to  his  stabus  as  a  reserve  officer. 

Sec.  14.  That  no  reserve  officer  or  temporary  second  lieutenant  appointed 
pursuant  to  this  act  shall  be  entitled  to  retirement  or  to  retired  pay,  and  shall 
be  eligible  for  pension  only  for  disability  incurred  in  line  of  duty  in  active 
service  or  while  serving  with  the  Regular  Army  pursuant  to  the  provisions  of 
this  act. 

Sec.  15.  That  in  time  of  war  the  President  may  order  reserve  officers  ap- 
pointed under  the  provisions  of  this  act  to  active  duty  with  any  of  the  military 
forces  of  the  United  States  in  any  grades  not  below  that  of  second  lieuenant, 
and  while  on  active  duty  they  shall  be  subject  to  the  Rules  and  Articles  of  War. 
Sec.  16.  All  laws  or  parts  of  laws  in  conflict  with  the  provisions  of  this  act 
are  hereby  repealed. 

529 


43 

APPENDIX  O. 

BiBLIOGRAPHT. 

Les  Corps  d'Officers  des  Principales,  Armies  Europfiennes,  Francfort. 
Les  Arin§s  des  Principales  Puissances. 

L'OfScer  Le  Haut  Commandement  et  ses  aides  en  Russie,  Poirer. 
L'Officer  Le  Hant  Commandement  et  ses  aides  en  AUemange,  Poirer. 
Tlie  King's  Regulations — English  War  Office. 
Reports  of  Observers  in  European  War.  1914-15. 
629 

O 


» 


i 


THE  STANDARDIZATION  OF  METHODS  OF  MILITARY 

INSTRUCTION  AT  SCHOOLS  AND  COLLEGES 

IN  THE  UNITED  STATES 


PREPARED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION,  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

AS    A    SUPPLEMENT    TO    THE    STATEMENT    OF    A    PROPER    MILITARY 

POLICY  FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES 


WCD  9089-8 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE  :  WASHINGTON 

NOVEMBER.  1915 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OmOE 

1918 


530 


i 


Wae  Department, 

Document  No.  530. 

Office  of  the  Chief  cf  Staff. 


SYNOPSIS. 

I.  Inteoduction. 


Page. 

1.  Qualifications  for  acceptance  as  reserve  officers 6 

2.  Institutions  available  as  training  centers  for  reserve  officers 6 

3.  Course  of  instruction  recommended  for  colleges  and  universities  having  mili- 

tary instruction  as  part  of  the  curriculum,  including  land-grant  colleges. .  7 

4.  Course  of  instruction  recommended  for  schools  having  military  instruction 

as  part  of  the  curriculum 8 

5.  Institutions  which  do  not  find  it  practicable  to  establish  regular  military 

departments 9 

6.  Course  of  instruction  suggested  for  institutions  not  having  regular  military 

departments 10 

7.  Steps  necessary  to  seciu-e  standardization  of  military  education 10 

(a)  Creation  of  reserve  officers'  training  corps 10 

(6)  Additional  officers,  noncommissioned  officers,  and  enlisted  men  aa 

instructors 10 

(c)  All  necessary  arms,  uniforms,  and  equipment  of  the  latest  model 

and  standard  pattern  should  be  issued  for  pfurposes  of  military 

instruction 10 

(d)  Supervision  of  training 11 

(e)  Graduates  to  enter  reserve  officers'  corps 12 

(J)  Uniformity  of  instruction 12 

(g)  Courses  of  instruction 12 

(h)  Minimum  requirements 12 

(i)  System  of  bulletins 12 

(j)  Use  of  graduates 13 

8.  Arranging  the  schedules  of  the  courses 13 

9.  Uses  of  the  reserve  officers'  training  corps 14 

A  bill  to  establish  a  reserve  officers'  training  corps  (Appendix  A) 14 

530  (3) 


THE  STANDARDIZATION  OF  METHODS  OF  MILITARY 
INSTRUCTION  AT  SCHOOLS  AND  COLLEGES  IN  THE 
UNITED  STATES. 


I.  INTRODUCTION. 

Before  the  methods  of  military  instruction  at  educational  institu- 
tions in  the  United  States  looking  to  the  development  of  reserve  offi- 
cers can  be  standardized  it  is  necessary  to  determine  what  qualifica- 
tions a  reserve  officer  should  possess.  It  is  believed  that  every  effort 
should  be  made  to  bring  the  reserve  officer  up  to  the  standard  re- 
quired for  officers  of  the  Regular  Army,  and  that  this  object  should 
be  sought  in  laying  down  the  course  of  military  instruction  to  be 
followed  by  students  with  a  view  to  their  becoming  reserve  officers. 
Their  training  should  be  largely  practical,  and  they  should  be  ready 
to  perform  their  duties  at  once  when  needed.  The  graduate  of  one 
of  our  colleges  or  universities  has  received  a  high  degree  of  academic 
education,  and  the  War  Department  need  have  nothing  to  do  with 
this  part  of  his  training.  Every  effort  should  be  devoted  to  giving 
him  a  practical  loiowledge  of  his  duties  as  a  company  officer.  He 
should  be  given  a  special  course  of  military  training,  commencing 
with  his  first  year  in  college  and  ending  with  a  period  of  service 
with  a  unit  of  the  Regular  Army.  The  end  in  view  should  be  to 
bring  these  graduates  to  the  approved  standard  of  military  efficiency. 
It  must  be  recognized  that  all  institutions  have  not  the  same  oppor- 
tunities for  instruction,  but  it  is  believed  that  by  systematic  and  pro- 
gressive methods  of  training  the  difficulties  due  to  varying  circum- 
stances may  be  to  a  large  extent  overcome. 

1.  QUALIFICATIONS  FOR  ACCEPTANCE  AS  RESERVE   OFFICERS. 

All  students  should  possess  the  following  qualifications  before 
being  accepted  as  reserve  officers : 

(a)  Should  have  a  thorough  knowledge  of  the  school  of  the  squad, 
company,  and  battalion. 

{h)   Should  knoAv  the  organization  of  a  company,  battalion,  and 
regiment,  and  should  have  a  knowledge  of  the  organization  of  the 
Regular  Army  and  its  various  units. 
530  (5) 


(c)  Should  understand  the  principles  of  attack  and  defense,  and 
should  be  able  to  lead  a  company  in  attack  and  defense. 

(d)  Should  understand  the  principles  governing  the  employment 
of  outposts,  advance,  flank,  and  rear  guards,  and  should  be  able  to 
direct  and  command  a  company  acting  in  any  one  of  these  capacities. 

(e)  Should  have  a  knowledge  of  scouting  and  patrolling,  and 
should  be  able  to  lead  a  patrol. 

(/)  Should  have  a  knowledge  of  the  framing  of  orders,  and  should 
be  able  to  give  orders,  either  verbal  or  written. 

(g)  Should  be  fairly  proficient  in  firing  the  rifle,  and  should  have 
a  knowledge  of  fire  discipline,  fire  direction,  and  fire  control,  and 
should  be  able  to  command  units  in  combat  firing  problems. 

(h)  Should  have  a  thorough  knowledge  of  extended  order  drills 
and  the  use  of  all  the  signals  used. 

(^)   Should  know  how  to  write  messages  and  make  reports. 

(j)  Should  be  able  to  read  a  map  and  to  make  road  and  position 
sketches. 

(k)  Should  know  how  to  care  for  their  men  on  the  march  and  in 
camp,  and  should  have  a  practical  knowledge  of  personal  hygiene 
and  camp  sanitation. 

(l)   Should  be  taught  to  appreciate  the  importance  of  cover. 

(m)  Should  have  a  knowledge  of  military  history  and  also  of  our 
past  military  policy  and  what  our  policy  should  be. 

(n)  Should  be  able  to  direct  the  construction  of  hasty  intrench- 
ments,  obstacles,  etc.,  and  should  have  a  practical  knowledge  of  field 
fortifications. 

(o)  Should  have  a  general  idea  of  how  soldiers  and  the  Army  are 
governed  and  the  principles  of  military  law  and  international  law. 

2.  INSTITUTIONS  AVAILABLE  AS  TRAINING  CENTERS  FOR 
RESERVE  OFFICERS. 

In  any  study  of  the  methods  of  military  instruction  in  the  schools 
and  colleges  of  the  United  States  it  is  necessary  to  consider  the  in- 
stitutions which  are  available  or  may  be  made  available  for  the  pur- 
pose of  training  young  men  in  military  science  and  tactics  with  a 
view  to  their  use  as  reserve  officers  of  the  Regular  Army,  Continental 
Army,  Volunteers,  or  Organized  Militia.  These  institutions  may  be 
divided  into  two  general  classes,  as  follows : 

(a)  The  college  class,  which  includes  colleges,  universities,  and 
land-grant  colleges. 

(b)  Preparatory  schools,  which  include  public  and  private  mili- 
tary schools  and  public  and  private  high  schools. 

At  the  present  time  there  are  G4  institutions  of  class  (a)  and  38 
institutions  of  class  (b)  which  have  military  instruction  under  the 

680 


supervision  of  the  War  Department.  Every  effort  has  been  made 
during  the  past  few  years  to  improve  tlie  nature  of  tliis  instruction 
and  to  standardize  it  in  the  various  institutions. 

The  importance  of  close-order  drills  and  ceremonies  has  been  mini- 
mized, and  great  stress  has  been  laid  upon  the  necessity  for  instruc- 
tion whicii  will  be  of  practical  value  to  the  student  m  case  he  e\er 
has  to  serve  as  an  officer  of  a  volunteer  force.  The  standard  of  m- 
struction  has  been  greatly  improved,  due  to  these  efforts. 

In  the  year  1915  there  were  27,179  students  in  class  (a)  and  5,134 
students  in  class  (b)  undergoing  military  instruction. 

The  last  annual  report  of  the  Connnissioner  of  Education  shows 
5G7  institutions  of  class  {a),  having  a  total  of  approximately  173,000 
students,  and  13,714  public  and  jirivate  high  schools,  having  a  total 
of  approximately  G14.000  students.  These  figures  show  the  possi- 
bility of  extending  military  instruction  in  educational  institutions 
throughout  the  country  if  more  definite  steps  can  be  taken  to  recog- 
nize their  value  as  a  military  asset. 

3.  COURSE  OF  INSTRUCTION  RECOMMENDED  FOR  COLLEGES  AND 
UNIVERSITIES  HAVING  MILITARY  INSTRUCTION  AS  PART  OF 
THE  CURRICULUM,  INCLUDING  LAND-GRANT  COLLEGES. 

1.  Infnntry  Drill  Resiilntions :  To  include  dofiiiitions.  {roneral  priuciples,  drills, 
ceremonies,  vtc.,  wliicli  a  company  odicer  must  kuow. 
School  of  the  soldier. 


lucludes  extended  order. 


School  of  the  squad. 
Scjiool  of  the  company. 
School  of  the  battalion. 
2.  Manual  of  interior  j;uard  duty:  To  include  definitions,  general  principles, 

and  practice  in  guard  duty. 
8.  riiysical    drills:    To    include   calisthenics,   bayonet   exercise,    and   bayonet 

combat. 
4.  Military  hysione :  To  include  the  principles  of  personal  hygiene,  camp  sani- 
tation, first  aid  to  the  injiirod,  etc. 
5.  Fii'Iil  Service  Regulations:  To  include  definitions,  general  principles,  etc. 
(Parts  I,  II,  and  III)- 

Marcliing  and  camping. 

Patrolling. 

Advance  gunrds. 

Flank  guards. 

Rear  guards. 

Attack  arid  defense. 

Outposts. 

Organization. 

Administration. 

6.  Militnry  history:  A  series  of  lectures  on  various  wars,  battles,  and  cam- 

paigns. 

7.  Militai-y  policy: 

Our  military  policy. 

Value  of  military  training  to  a  mnn  and  to  a  nrttion. 
Duty  of  each  citi/.on  to  render  service  in  return  for  protection  received. 
Reserve  otRcers  corps — War  and  policy. 
630 


8 

8.  Military  field  engineering :  General  principles  of  field  fortification,  practical 

work  in  the  construction  of  hasty  intrenchments,  and  obstacles. 

9.  Military  map  reading:  Instruction  in  reading  contoured  maps. 

10.  Small  Arms  Firing  Regulations: 

Definitions,  general  principles,  and  practical  instruction  in  individual 

and  collective  firing. 
Estimating  distance  problems  and  combat  firing  problems. 
Theory  of  target  practice. 

11.  Military  law:  Lectures  on  military  law  and  military  government  and  manual 

of  general  courts-martial. 

12.  International  law:  Lectures  on  general  principles  of. 

13.  Psychology  of  war:  One  or  more  lectures. 

14.  Company  administration:  Practical  work  and  lectures. 

15.  Military  sketching:  Ability  to  prepare  hasty  sketches,  embodying  principal 

military  features  of  the  terrain  sketched. 

4.  COURSE  OF  INSTRUCTION  RECOMMENDED  FOR  SCHOOLS  HAV- 
ING MILITARY  INSTRUCTION  AS  PART  OF  THE  CURRICULUM. 

It  will  not  he  necessary  to  set  as  high  a  standard  of  military  train- 
ing for  students  of  preparatory  schools,  for,  as  a  rule,  they  will  not 
be  able  to  follow  the  course  intelligently,  and  they  are  too  young  to 
be  accepted  as  reserve  officers  upon  their  graduation  from  school. 
Many  of  these  young  men  will  subsequently  go  to  college,  and  they 
should  be  given  credit  for  such  instruction  as  they  may  have  already 
received.  These  preparatory  schools  will  therefore,  to  some  extent, 
act  as  feeders  for  the  colleges  and  universities.  In  case  a  graduate 
of  one  of  these  schools,  however,  does  show  sufficient  capacit}^,  he 
can  be  given  additional  training  with  the  Regular  Army  and  accepted 
as  a  reserve  officer,  each  case  to  be  decided  upon  its  merits  at  the  time. 

It  is  believed,  therefore,  that  at  institutions  of  the  preparatory  type 
the  following  course  of  military  instruction  should  be  adopted : 

1.  Infantry  Drill  Regulations:  To  include  definitions,  general  principles,  drills, 

ceremonies,  etc.,  which  a  company  officer  must  know. 
School  of  the  soldier. 
School  of  the  squad. 
School  of  the  company. 
School  of  the  battalion. 

2.  Manual  of  interior  guard  duty:  To  include  definitions,  general  principles. 

3.  Physical    drills :    To    include    calisthenics,    bayonet    exercise,    and    bayonet 

combat. 

4.  Military  hygiene:  To  include  the  principles  of  personal  hygiene,  camp  sanita- 

tion, first  aid  to  the  injured,  etc. 

5.  Military  policy:  A  few  lectures  on  the  military  policy  of  the  United  States. 

6.  Small-arms  firing  regulations:  Preliminary  instruction  in  rifle  firing. 

7.  Company  administration :  Practical  work  and  lectures. 

8.  Military  map  reading:  Instructions  in  reading  a  contoured  map. 

9.  Field  service  regulations:  Patrolling — Outposts. 

Certain  selected  institutions  of  this  class  may  be  authorized  to 
pursue  the  course  of  instruction  recommended  for  institutions  of  the 
college  class  providing  they  are  able  to  do  so. 

680 


Includes  extended  order. 


5.  INSTITUTIONS   WHICH    DO    NOT   FIND   IT   PRACTICABLE   TO 
ESTABLISH  REGULAR  MILITARY  DEPARTMENTS. 

There  are  quite  a  number  of  institutions  in  the  country  which  will 
probably  never  consent  to  the  establislunent  of  regular  military  de- 
partments requiring  the  permanent  organization  of  tactical  units 
and  frequent  drills,  but  would  be  quite  willing  to  introduce  a  course 
in  military  science  and  policy.  Man}'  applications  have  recently 
been  received  from  institutions  of  this  class.  They  seem  to  desire 
the  introduction  of  a  course  of  lectures  on  military  history  and 
military  policy  and  a  limited  amount  of  practical  instruction  in 
minor  tactics  combined  with  some  practical  camp  life  such  as  is 
conducted  at  the  students'  summer  camps.  Most  of  these  institutions 
are  of  the  large  college  and  university  class,  but  there  are  also  some 
of  the  smaller  institutions  of  the  preparatory  class.  Some  of  those 
which  have  already  taken  up  this  subject  are  Dartmouth,  the  Uni- 
versity of  Pennsylvania,  the  University  of  Michigan,  Harvard,  Yale, 
Princeton,  and  the  University  of  Pittsburgh. 

At  present  the  law  does  not  permit  the  War  Department  to  aid 
these  institutions  in  any  way  unless  they  agree  to  make  military  in- 
struction a  part  of  the  college  curriculum  and  their  authorities  agree 
to  support  the  military  department  and  place  it  on  a  plane  with  all 
other  departments  of  the  institution.  They  are  not  inclined  to  do 
this,  and  yet  it  does  not  seem  advisable  to  disregard  their  interest  in 
the  matter  of  military  instruction. 

It  is  believed  that  much  good  could  be  done  if  authority  could  be 
obtained  from  Congress  for  the  detail  of  officers  to  give  lectures  at 
such  institutions,  and,  in  addition,  to  impart  such  military  instruc- 
tion as  the  authorities  or  students  may  desire.  It  is  suggested  that 
a  department  of  military  history  might  be  established  at  such  insti- 
tutions and  the  President  authorized  to  detail  officers  to  act  as  heads 
of  such  departments.  It  is  believed  that  the  influence  of  such  officers 
at  the  institutions  would  soon  tend  to  popularize  military  training  and 
that,  in  a  short  time,  the  institution  would  be  willing  to  establish  a 
regular  military  department.  In  any  case  the  officer  would  be  able 
to  educate  a  large  number  of  young  men  along  the  proper  lines  and 
give  to  them  a  correct  idea  of  our  military  history  which  w^ould  be 
of  the  gi-eatest  value  to  the  cause  of  military  preparedness.  The  same 
inducements  should  not  in  any  case  be  offered  to  the  graduates  of 
these  institutions  as  are  offered  to  those  who  qualify  under  the 
standard  laid  down  for  reserve  officers,  but  they  might  be  appointed 
reserve  officers  after  they  had  completed  two  or  more  tours  at  sum- 
mer camps  and  the  period  of  training  with  the  Regular  Army. 

80669°— No.  530—16 2. 


10 

6.  COURSE  OF  INSTRUCTION  SUGGESTED  FOR  INSTITUTIONS  NOT 

HAVING   REGULAR   MILITARY    DEPARTMENTS. 

1.  Military  history :  A  course  of  lectures  on  the  more  important  wars,  cam- 

paigns, and  battles. 

2.  Military  policy :  A  course  of  lectures  on  our  military  policy,  what  it  has  been 

in  the  past,  and  what  it  should  be. 

3.  Minor  tactics:  A  course  of  practical  exercises  on  the  map  and  on  the  ground, 

such  as  map  problems,  tactical  walks,  etc. 

4.  Camp  of  instruction :  A  camp  of  instruction  each  summer  lasting  from  four 

weeks  to  two  months,  at  which  all  kinds  of  practical  instruction  will  be 
given. 

5.  Strategy :  A  course  of  five  lectures,  planned  to  show  the  intimate  relationship 

between  the  statesman  and  the  soldier. 

7.  STEPS    NECESSARY   TO    SECURE    STANDARDIZATION    OF    MILI- 

TARY EDUCATION. 

There  are  certain  logical  steps  which,  if  taken,  will  place  the  mili- 
tary education  of  the  youth  of  our  country  upon  a  sound  and  efficient 
basis.  To  be  really  effective  leoislative  authority  will  have  to  be 
secured.  These  steps  will  be  taken  up  in  the  order  of  their  im- 
portance. 

(a)  Creation  of  reserve  o'fficers'  training  corps. — Congress  should 
create  by  law  a  "  reserve  officers'  training  corps."  This  law  should 
authorize  the  Secretary  of  War  to  organize  units  of  the  reserve 
officers'  training  corps  at  various  educational  institutions  in  the  coun- 
try for  the  purpose  of  training  students  in  military  science  and 
tactics.  It  should  provide  for  the  issue  of  necessary  arms,  uniforms, 
equipment,  stores,  etc.,  and  for  the  detail  of  officers  as  professors  of 
military  science  and  tactics,  and  of  enlisted  men  as  assistants.  It 
should  authorize  the  Secretary  of  War  to  prescribe  the  courses  of 
military  instruction  to  be  pursued  and  to  determine  the  standard  of 
military  efficiency  which  graduates  must  attain  before  being  accepted 
as  reserve  officers.  It  should  authorize  the  Secretary  of  War  to  pre- 
scribe regulations  for  the  government  of  the  units  of  the  training 
corps.  A  draft  of  a  proposed  law  to  carry  these  provisions  into 
effect  is  appended  hereto. 

(6)  Additional  officers^  noncommissioned  officers,  and  enlisted  men 
as  instructors. — A  sufficient  number  of  officers  of  the  Army  should  be 
authorized  for  duty  as  professors  of  military  science  and  tactics  and 
military  instructors.  Authority  should  be  granted  to  detail  enlisted 
men  of  the  Army  as  assistants  to  the  officers  on  duty  as  professors  of 
military  science  and  tactics. 

The  officers  and  enlisted  men  so  authorized  should  be  additional  in 
their  respective  grades  in  the  Army. 

((?)  All  necessary  arms,  uniforms,  and  equipment  of  the  latest 
model  and  standard  pattern  should  he  issued  for  purposes  of  military 
instruction. — At  the  present  time  military  instruction  can  not  be  effi- 

530 


11 

ciently  conducted,  due  to  the  lack  of  necessary  equipment.  The  cost 
of  this  equipment  to  the  Government  would  not  he  great  and.  in  any 
case,  it  would  always  be  insured  against  loss  by  a  bond,  and  it  would 
always  be  available  for  use  in  case  of  emergency.  Furthermore, 
there  is  no  reason  why  the  Government  should  not  furnish  uniforms 
to  the  students  who  are  voluntarily  taking  this  instruction  in  order 
that  they  may  serve  efficiently  in  time  of  war.  As  the  Government 
does  not  pay  them  for  their  services,  it  should  at  least  furnish  them 
with  all  the  means  necessary  for  this  instruction.  Many  of  these 
students  are  poor  and  can  little  afford  to  purchase  uniforms.  Mili- 
tary instruction  would  become  much  more  popular  if  these  uniforms 
were  furnished. 

It  is  important  that  the  latest  model  arms  and  equipment  be  issued 
for  the  reason  that  a  reserve  officer  should  become  familiar  with  the 
arms  and  equipment  which  he  is  to  use.  These  arms  and  equipments 
would  furthermore  be  available  as  a  reserve  supply  in  case  of  war. 

(d)  ^wpervision  of  training. — The  supervision  of  this  training 
should  be  in  the  hands  of  a  section  of  the  General  Staff.  This  sec- 
tion should  have  a  field  officer  at  its  head  and  should  consist  of  at 
least  eight  officers  of  the  grade  of  captain  for  purposes  of  inspection, 
to  handle  all  correspondence,  make  the  details  of  officers,  noncom- 
missioned officers,  enlisted  men,  etc. — in  fact  it  should  be  the  agency 
for  the  control  of  this  work.  Enough  importance  has  never  been 
attached  to  this  duty  by  the  War  Department,  and  it  has  been  consid- 
ered as  one  of  the  least  important  duties  of  the  General  Staff.  It 
is  believed  that  the  policy  should  be  to  more  fully  recognize  the  value 
of  this  work. 

A  large  number  of  our  reserve  officers  must,  in  any  war,  come  from 
this  source,  and  the  greatest  care  should  be  exercised  to  see  that  they 
are  properly  trained  in  advance.  In  order  to  accomplish  this  it  is 
necessary  to  keep  in  closer  touch  with  the  institutions  and  more 
frequent  inspections  should  be  made.  The  policy  with  respect  to 
this  instruction  should  be  a  continuing  one  and  should  not  be  changed 
every  time  there  is  a  change  in  personnel  of  the  officers  having  charge 
of  it.  The  authorities  of  these  institutions  are  inclined  to  attach  as 
much  importance  to  this  instruction  as  the  War  Department  does, 
and  if  the  War  Department  will  let  it  be  known  that  it  considers 
this  work  of  the  greatest  importance  then  a  great  impetus  wall  be 
given  it.  Then,  again,  every  student  who  is  won  over  to  the  military 
department  of  one  of  these  institutions  is  pretty  apt  to  become  a 
friend  of  the  Army  and  a  believer  in  military  training.  From  a 
political  standpoint  alone  the  effort  and  expense  involved  is  worth 
while.  The  officers'  training  corps  in  England  furnished  20,500 
officers  to  the  army  between  the  opening  of  the  war  and  the  spring 
of  1915. 

530 


12 

(e)  Graduates  to  enter  reserve  offioers''  corps. — Provision  in  law 
must  be  made  for  taking  these  young  graduates  in  the  reserve  officers' 
corps.  It  is  very  necessary  that  some  inducement  be  made  to  the 
students  who  are  willing  to  take  military  instruction  as  well  as  to 
those  who  are  required  to  take  it.  They  should  be  given  assurance 
that  if  they  qualify  they  will  be  accepted  as  officers  of  the  reserve 
corps  with  all  the  rights  and  allowances  and  the  duties  of  same. 
There  is  no  use  of  wasting  time  and  money  to  educate  and  train 
young  men  for  military  service  unless  some  use  is  to  be  made  of  them. 
It  is  true  that  any  training  given  is  of  some  value,  even  though 
the  student  become  lost  to  the  reserve,  but  it  should  be  the  policy  to 
keep  a  hold  on  these  young  men  and  to  build  up  a  dependable  reserve 
of  trained  officers  who  will  be  at  hand  when  needed. 

(/)  Uniformity  of  instruction. — All  officers,  noncommissioned 
officers,  and  enlisted  men  who  may  be  detailed  as  military  instructors 
at  these  institutions  should  be  assembled  prior  to  their  entry  upon 
such  duty  for  instructions  relative  to  same.  Standardization  in 
instruction  can  not  be  secured  unless  all  the  military  instructors 
understand  what  is  required  of  them  and  the  manner  in  which  they 
are  to  perform  their  duties.  It  is  very  difficult  to  accomplish  this 
through  correspondence,  as  has  been  found  by  practical  experience 
during  the  past  two  years.  Each  officer  places  his  own  interpretation 
upon  all  instructions  received,  and  it  has  been  found  very  difficult 
if  not  impossible  to  get  officers  to  follow  a  standard  course  laid  down 
in  orders.  A  system  similar  to  that  employed  by  the  Recruiting 
Service  should  be  adopted  and  all  instructors  should  receive  this 
preliminary  instruction.  Then  they  would  all  work  along  the  same 
lines  and  uniformity  would  be  secured. 

{g)  Courses  of  instruction. — Courses  of  instruction  for  each  class 
of  institution  should  be  prescribed  in  detail,  showing  exactly  what 
is  required.  These  courses  should  be  so  outlined  as  to  take  into 
consideration  the  limitations  and  capabilities  of  each  class  of  insti- 
tution. The  courses  suggested  as  being  proper  are  shown  elsewhere 
in  this  paper  in  detail. 

(A)  Minimum  requirements. — A  minimum  requirement  as  to  the 
time  to  be  devoted  to  military  instruction  in  each  class  of  institution 
should  be  prescribed.  This  provision  is  necessary  in  order  that  the 
proper  amount  of  military  instruction  may  be  given  and  also  that 
all  institutions  of  the  same  class  receive  the  same  kind  and  amount 
of  instruction. 

(^)  System  of  bulletins. — A  system  of  bulletins,  including  photo- 
graphic bulletins,  showing  the  work  as  it  is  being  carried  out  at 
the  various  institutions  should  be  prepared  and  issued  from  time  to 
time  to  aid  instructors  in  the  performance  of  their  duties.     These 

530 


13 

bulletins  should  be  prepared  by  the  General  Staff  section  directing 
the  work  whenever  it  desires  to  Ccall  attention  to  methods  being  used 
and  to  any  changes  in  the  work.  These  bulletins  should  be  the 
medium  through  which  cooperation  is  secured  between  the  General 
Staff  section  and  the  institutions.  They  will  be  of  the  greatest  value 
to  officers  on  duty  as  instructors,  as  they  will  enable  them  to  profit 
by  the  work  of  others,  and  they  will  tend  to  keep  the  instruction 
uniform  at  the  various  institutions. 

(;■)  Use  of  graduates. — Provision  should  be  made  to  use  in  some 
way  all  students  who  complete  the  prescribed  course  of  military  in- 
struction. Those  who  are  not  qualified  for  service  as  officers  can  be 
used  as  noncommissioned  officers  and  privates. 

8.  ARRANGING  THE  SCHEDULES  OF  THE  COURSES. 

The  amount  of  time  devoted  to  military  instruction  varies  from 
two  years  to  four  years.  In  the  institutions  of  the  preparatory  class 
the  military  training  is,  as  a  rule,  compulsory  during  the  entire  time 
that  the  student  attends  school.  At  most  of  the  land-grant  colleges 
the  military  training  is  compulsory  for  two  years,  while  at  some  of 
them  and  at  all  of  the  military  colleges  the  training  is  compulsory 
during  the  entire  time. 

There  is  a  tendency  to  decrease  the  number  of  years  required  of 
students  for  graduation  at  the  land-grant  colleges.  The  Depart- 
ment of  Agriculture  has  stated  that  it  is  the  intention  to  have  courses 
of  two  and  three  years.  It  is  thought  desirable,  therefore,  to  make 
the  course  in  military  training  a  course  of  two  years.  It  will  be 
necessary  to  prescribe  the  manner  in  which  the  various  subjects  shall 
be  taken  up  and  completed,  in  order  that  the  work  may  be  standard- 
ized and  completed  in  a  logical  manner. 

Any  student  who  completes  any  part  of  the  military  course  at  an 
institution  should  be  given  credit  in  case  he  transfers  to  another  in- 
stitution. 

In  order  that  proper  supervision  may  be  had  of  the  work,  the 
courses  of  instruction  should  be  divided  into  two  yearly  periods. 

It  is  not  practicable  to  show  in  this  paper  just  how  the  courses 
suggested  should  be  scheduled,  as  the  work  to  be  covered  each  year 
will  largely  depend  upon  the  local  conditions  at  each  institution. 
It  is  only  essential  that  at  the  end  of  the  stated  period  at  such  place 
all  students  shall  have  received  the  same  kind  and  amount  of  military 
instruction. 

The  preparation  of  the  schedule  of  the  courses  should  therefore 
be  entrusted  to  the  professor  of  military  science  and  tactics  at  each 
institution. 

630 


14 
9.  USES  OF  THE  RESERVE  OFFICERS'  TRAINING  CORPS. 

The  officers'  reserve  corps  is  to  be  used  as  a  reservoir  from  which 
to  take  officers  as  needed  for  line  and  staff  of  reserve  forces,  of  vol- 
unteers, and  for  temporary  appointments  in  the  Kegular  Army,  as 
provided  for  in  section  8  of  the  act  of  Congress  to  provide  for  rais- 
ing the  volunteer  forces  of  the  United  States  in  time  of  actual  or 
threatened  war,  approved  April  25,  1914. 

The  reserve  officers'  training  corps  will  serve  as  one  of  the  most 
important  agencies  for  training  young  men  to  become  officers  in  the 
officers'  reserve  corps. 


Appendix  A. 

[Jan.  27,  1916.] 

A  BILL  To  establish  a  reserve  officers'  training  corps. 


J 


Be  it  enacted  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the  United  States 
of  America  in  Congress  assembled.  That  for  the  purpose  of  securing  a  sufficient 
reserve  of  officers  for  tlie  military  forces  of  the  United  States  the  President  is 
hereby  authorized  to  establish  and  maintain  in  civil  educational  institutions  a 
reserve  officers'  training  corps,  which  shall  consist  of  a  senior  division  organized 
at  universities  and  colleges  requiring  four  years  of  collegiate  study  for  a  degree, 
including  those  State  institutions  that  are  required  to  provide  instruction  in 
military  tactics  under  the  provisions  of  the  act  of  Congress  of  July  second, 
eighteen  hundred  and  sixty-two,  donating  lands  for  the  establishment  of  colleges 
where  the  leading  object  shall  be  the  practical  instruction  of  the  industrial 
classes  in  agriculture  and  the  mechanic  arts,  including  military  tactics,  and 
a  junior  division  organized  at  all  otlier  public  or  private  educational  institu- 
tions, and  each  division  shall  consist  of  units  of  tlie  several  arms  or  corps  in 
such  number  and  of  such  strength  as  the  President  may  prescribe. 

Sec.  2.  That  the  President  may,  upon  the  application  of  any  State  institu- 
tion described  in  section  one  of  this  act,  establish  and  maintain  at  such  institu- 
tion one  or  more  units  of  the  reserve  officers'  training  corps:  Provided,  That  no 
such  unit  shall  be  established  or  maintained  at  any  such  institution  at  which  an 
officer  of  the  Army  is  not  detailed  as  professor  of  military  science  and  tactics  or 
at  any  such  institution  which  does  not  maintain  under  military  instruction  at 
least  one  hundred  physically  lit  male  students. 

Sec.  3.  That  the  President  may,  upon  the  application  of  any  established  edu- 
cational institution  in  the  United  States  other  than  a  State  institution  described 
in  section  one  of  this  act,  the  authorities  of  which  agree  to  establish  and  main- 
tain a  two-years'  elective  or  compulsory  course  of  military  training  as  a  mini- 
mum for  its  physically  fit  male  students,  which  course  when  entered  upon  by 
any  student  shall,  as  regards  such  student,  be  a  prerequisite  for  graduation, 
establish  and  maintain  at  such  institution  one  or  more  units  of  the  reserve 
officers'  training  corps:  Provided,  That  no  such  unit  shall  be  established  or 
maintained  at  any  such  institution  at  which  an  officer  of  the  Army  is  not  de- 
tailed as  professor  of  military  science  and  tactics,  or  at  any  such  institution 
which  does  not  maintain  under  military  instruction  at  least  one  hundred 
physically  fit  male  students. 


15 

Sec.  4.  That  the  Secretary  of  War  Is  hereby  authorized  to  prescribe  standard 
courses  of  theoretical  and  practical  military  training  for  units  of  the  reserve 
officers'  training  corps,  and  no  unit  of  the  senior  division  shall  be  organized  or 
maintained  at  any  educational  institution,  the  authorities  of  which  fail  or 
neglect  to  adopt  into  their  curriculum  the  prescribed  courses  of  military  train- 
ing for  the  senior  division,  or  to  devote  at  least  an  average  of  five  hours  per 
week  per  academic  year  to  such  military  training;  and  no  unit  of  the  junior 
division  shall  be  organized  or  maintained  at  any  etlucational  institution,  the 
authorities  of  which  fail  or  neglect  to  adopt  into  their  curriculum  the  pre- 
scribed courses  of  military  training  for  the  junior  division,  or  to  devote  at 
least  an  average  of  three  hours  per  week  per  academic  year  to  such  military 
training. 

Skc.  5.  That  eligibility  to  membership  in  the  reserve  officers'  training  corps 
shall  be  limited  to  students  of  institutions  in  which  units  of  such  corps  may  be 
established  who  are  citizens  of  the  United  States  or  have  legally  declared  their 
intention  to  become  such,  who  are  over  thirteen  years  of  age,  and  whose  bodily 
condition  indicates  that  they  are  physically  fit  to  perform  military  duty  or  will 
be  so  upon  arrival  at  military  age. 

Sec.  6.  That  the  President  is  hereby  authorized  to  detail  such  numbers  of 
officers  of  the  Army,  either  active  or  retired,  not  above  the  grade  of  colonel, 
as  may  be  necessary,  for  duty  as  professors  and  assistant  professors  of  military 
science  and  tactics  at  institutions  where  one  or  more  units  of  the  reserve  oIRcers' 
training  corps  are  maintained ;  but  the  total  number  of  active  officers  so  de- 
tailed at  educational  institutions  shall  not  exceed  three  hundred,  and  no  active 
officer  shall  be  so  detailed  who  has  not  had  five  years'  commissioned  service 
in  the  Army.  Retired  officers  shall  not  be  detailed  under  the  provisions  of  this 
section  without  their  consent.  Retired  officers  below  the  grade  of  lieutenant 
colonel  so  detailed  shall  receive  the  full  pay  and  allowances  of  their  grade,  and 
retired  officers  above  the  grade  of  major  so  detailed  shall  receive  the  same  pay 
and  allowances  as  a  retired  major  would  receive  under  a  like  detail.  No  detail 
under  the  provisions  of  this  section  shall  extend  for  more  than  four  years. 

Sec.  7.  Tliat  the  President  is  hereby  authorized  to  detail  for  duty  at  insti- 
tutions where  one  or  more  units  of  the  reserve  officers'  training  corps  are 
maintained,  such  number  of  enlisted  men,  either  active  or  retired,  as  he  may 
deem  necessary,  but  the  number  of  active  noncommissioned  officers  so  detailed 
shall  not  exceed  five  hundred,  and  all  active  noncommissioned  officers  so  de- 
tailed shall  be  additional  in  their  respective  grades  to  those  otherwise  author- 
ized for  the  Army.  Retired  enlisted  men  shall  not  be  detailed  under  the  pro- 
visions of  this  section  without  their  consent.  While  so  detailed  they  shall 
receive  active  pay  and  allowances. 

Sec.  8.  That  the  Secretary  of  War,  under  such  regulations  as  he  may  pre- 
scribe, is  hereby  authorized  to  issue  to  institutions  at  which  one  or  more  units 
of  the  reserve  officers'  training  corps  are  maintained,  such  public  animals,  arms, 
uniforms,  equipment,  and  means  of  tran.sportation  as  he  may  deem  necessary, 
and  to  forage  at  the  expense  of  the  United  States  public  animals  so  issued. 
He  shall  require  from  each  institution  to  which  property  of  the  United  States 
is  issued  a  bond  in  the  value  of  the  property  issued  for  the  care  and  safe- 
keeping thereof,  and  for  its  return  when  required. 

Sec  9.  That  the  Secretary  of  War  is  hereby  authorized  to  maintain  camps 
for  the  further  practical  instruction  of  the  members  of  the  reserve  officers' 
training  corps,  no  such  camps  to  be  maintained  for  a  period  longer  than  six 
weeks,  except  in  time  of  war  or  when  war  is  imminent;  to  transport  members 
of  such  corps  to  and  from  such  camps  at  the  expense  of  the  United  States  so 
far  as  appropriations  will  permit ;  to  subsist  them  at  the  expense  of  the  United 
C30 


16 

states  while  traveling  to  and  from  such  camps  and  while  remaining  therein 
so  far  as  appropriations  will  permit ;  to  use  the  Regular  Army,  the  continental 
army,  and  such  Government  property  as  he  may  deem  necessary  for  the  mili- 
tary training  of  the  members  of  such  corps  while  in  attendance  at  such  camps ; 
to  prescribe  x*egulations  for  the  government  of  such  corps ;  and  to  authorize,  in 
his  discretion,  the  formation  of  company  units  thereof  into  battalion  and  regi- 
mental units. 

Sec.  10.  That  the  President  alone,  under  such  regulations  as  he  may  pre- 
scribe, is  hereby  authorized  to  appoint  as  a  reserve  officer  any  graduate  of  the 
senior  division  of  the  reserve  officers'  training  corps  or  any  graduate  of  the 
junior  division  who  shall  have  satisfactorily  completed  the  courses  of  mili- 
tary training  prescribed  for  the  senior  division  and  participated  in  such  prac- 
tical instruction  as  tlte  Secretary  of  War  may  prescribe  subsequent  to  gradua- 
tion and  who  is  twenty-one  years  of  age  and  shall  agree,  under  oath  in  writing, 
to  serve  the  United  States  in  the  capacity  of  a  reserve  officer  of  the  Army 
during  a  period  of  at  least  ten  years  from  the  date  of  his  appointment  as  such 
reserve  officer,  unless  sooner  discharged  by  proper  authority,  but  the  total 
number  of  reserve  officers  so  appointed  shall  not  exceed  iifty  thousand :  And 
provided,  That  any  graduate  of  the  senior  division  of  the  reserve  officers' 
training  corps  undergoing  a  postgraduate  course  at  any  institution  shall  not 
be  eligible  for  appointment  as  a  reserve  officer  while  undergoing  such  post- 
graduate course,  but  his  ultimate  eligibility  upon  completion  of  such  postgradu- 
ate course  for  such  appointment  shall  not  be  affected  because  of  his  having 
undergone  such  postgraduate  course. 

Sec.  11.  That  when  any  member  of  the  senior  division  of  the  reserve  officers' 
training  corps  has  completed  two  academic  years  of  service  in  that  division,  and 
has  been  selected  for  further  training  by  the  president  of  the  institution  and  by 
its  professor  of  military  science  and  tactics,  and  has  agreed  in  writing  to 
continue  in  the  reserve  officers'  training  corps  for  the  remainder  of  his  course 
in  the  institution,  including  such  camp  training  as  shall  be  prescribed  by  the 
Secretary  of  War,  he  may  be  furnished,  at  the  expense  of  the  United  States, 
with  commutation  of  subsistence  at  such  rate,  not  exceeding  the  cost  of  the 
garrison  ration  prescribed  for  the  Army,  as  may  be  fixed  by  the  Secretary  of 
War,  during  the  remainder  of  his  service  in  the  reserve  officers'  training  corps. 

Sec.  12.  That  any  physically  fit  male  citizen  of  the  United  States  between 
the  ages  of  twenty-one  and  twenty-seven  years  who  shall  have  graduated  prior 
to  the  date  of  this  act  from  any  educational  institution  at  which  an  officer  of 
the  Army  was  detailed  as  professor  of  military  science  and  tactics  and  who 
while  a  student  at  such  institution  completed  courses  of  military  training  under 
the  direction  of  such  professor  of  military  science  and  tactics  substantially 
equivalent  to  those  prescribed  pursuant  to  this  act  for  the  senior  division  shall, 
after  satisfactorily  completing  such  additional  practical  military  training  as 
the  Secretary  of  War  shall  prescribe,  be  eligible  for  appointment  as  a  reserve 
officer  and  as  a  temporary  additional  second  lieutenant  in  accordance  with  the 
terms  of  this  act. 

Sec.  13.  That  the  President  alone  is  hereby  authorized  to  appoint  and  com- 
mission as  a  temporary  second  lieutenant  of  the  Regular  Army  for  a  period  of 
at  least  six  months  with  the  allowances  now  provided  by  law  for  that  grade, 
but  with  pay  at  the  rate  of  $100  per  month,  any  reserve  officer  appointed  pur- 
suant to  this  act  and  to  attach  him  to  a  unit  of  the  Regular  Army  for  duty  and 
training  during  the  period  covered  by  his  appointment  as  such  temporary  second 
lieutenant,  and  upon  the  expiration  of  such  service  with  the  Regular  Army 
such  officer  shall  revert  to  his  status  as  a  reserve  officer. 
630 


17 

Sec.  14.  That  no  reserve  officer  or  temporary  second  lieutenant  appointed  pur- 
suant to  this  act  shall  be  entitled  to  retirement  or  to  retired  pay  and  shall  be 
eligible  for  pension  only  for  disability  incurred  in  line  of  duty  in  active  service 
or  wrhile  serving  with  the  Regular  Army  pursuant  to  the  provisions  of  this  act. 

Sec.  15.  That  in  time  of  war  the  President  may  order  reserve  officers  ap- 
pointed under  the  provisions  of  this  act  to  active  duty  with  any  of  the  military 
forces  of  the  United  States  in  any  grades  not  below  that  of  second  lieutenant, 
and  while  on  active  duty  they  shall  be  subject  to  the  Rules  and  Articles  of 
War. 

Sec.  16.  All  laws  or  parts  of  laws  in  cionflict  with  the  provisions  of  this  act 
are  hereby  repealed. 
630 

o 


I 


STATISTICAL  COMPARISON  OF  UNIVERSAL  AND 
VOLUNTARY  MILITARY  SERVICE 


PREPARED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION.  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

AS    A    SUPPLEMENT    TO    THE    STATEMENT    OF    A    PROPER    MILITARY 

POLICY  FOR  THE  UNITED   STATES 


WCD  4886-25 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE  :  WASHINGTON 

NOVEMBER.   1915 


I 


581 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 

1916 


t 


War  Department, 

Document  No.  531. 

Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff . 


i 


SYNOPSIS. 


Page, 

Analysis  of  Table  1 6 

Analysis  of  Table  II 6 

General  comments ,  8 

30669°— No.  631—16  (3) 


1 


STATISTICAL  COMPARISON  OF  UNIVERSAL  AND 
VOLUNTARY  MILITARY  SERVICE. 


The  leading  European  powers,  and  Japan,  are  organized  for  in- 
dustrial competition  in  peace  and  for  full  preparedness  against  war. 
England  and  the  United  States  are  not  so  organized. 

The  principal  "  tool "  used  by  the  European  nations  and  by  Japan 
in  such  organization,  has  been  universal  military  service,  an  institu- 
tion extending  back  into  the  last  century,  adopted  and  made  compul- 
sory by  vote  of  their  peoples;  and  with  time  so  adjusted,  developed, 
and  corrected  as  to  coordinate  with  the  industrial,  commercial,  and 
financial  life  of  the  nation,  and  make  the  transition  from  peace  to 
war  conditions  least  disturbing  to  the  nation. 

By  means  of  this  tool,  we  find,  early  in  1914,  that  the  war  man 
power  of  the  universal  service  nations  is  limited  by  their  respective 
financial  conditions,  by  the  material  which  is  disposable  for  war,  and 
by  the  numbers  of  able-bodied  male  citizens  who  can  be  taken  from 
those  interior  industries  and  vocations  that  are  essential  to  the  con- 
tinuance of  the  national  life  and  to  the  prosecution  of  war;  and  we 
find  further  that  some  of  those  nations  can  place  in  the  field  one- 
tenth  of  their  total  population,  organized,  armed,  and  equipped, 
trained  and  physically  fit  for  actual  fighting. 

On  the  other  hand  we  find,  at  this  time,  the  two  English-speaking 
nations  whose  geographical  situation,  populations,  and  resources 
place  them  in  the  front  rank  of  world  powers,  pursuing  parallel 
policies  in  avoiding  any  semblance  of  military  strength  on  land, 
seeking  rather  to  confine  their  preparedness  to  power  on  the  sea; 
and  hoping  when  atacked  to  find  defense  on  land  through  volun- 
teers, supplemented  in  great  stress  by  conscripts. 

The  world  military  situation  existing  to-day  and  created  by  uni- 
versal service,  by  which  the  principal  European  nations  and  Japan 
are  able  to  place  the  trained  masses  of  their  peoples  in  the  fighting 
fronts,  is  om.inous,  and  it  makes  pertinent  a  comparison  of  the  uni- 
versal and  voluntary  service  systems.  With  the  object  of  giving  a 
concise  statistical  view  of  the  situation,  the  accompanying  tables  have 
been  prepared,  based  upon  data  found  in  the  "Statesman's  Year 
Book,  1915,"  most  of  the  items  pertaining  to  conditions  existing  prior 
to  the  present  European  war. 

(5) 


ANALYSIS  OF  TABLE  L 

While  some  of  the  universal  service  nations  hold  their  young  men 
to  liahllity  for  service  prior  to  the  age  of  20  years,  and  their  older 
men  after  the  age  of  38  years,  they  do  not,  as  a  rule,  enroll  men  fo7' 
training  before  the  twentieth  nor  after  the  thirty-eighth  year.  This 
may  be  explained  by  the  fact  of  many  immature  youths  of  less  than 
20,  and  to  marked  depreciation  in  fitness  after  38. 

Generally,  therefore,  we  find  that  training,  and  actual  service  as 
soldiers,  begins  at  the  age  of  20  and  extends  through  three  periods 
of  relative  fitness,  with  average  about  as  follows : 

(a)  A  first  line  period,  consisting  of  two  or  three  years  of  inten- 
sive training,  followed  by  seven  or  eight  years  of  first  reserve  service, 
the  latter  with  some  training.  During  this  period,  physical  fitness 
is  considered  at  the  maximum,  i.  e.,  from  20  to  30  years. 

(&)  A  second  line  period,  consisting  of  about  10  years  of  second 
reserve  service,  with  short  periods  of  supplementary  training,  gener- 
ally at  maneuvers. 

(c)  A  home  defense  or  auxiliary  service  period,  generally  without 
any  training,  for  men  betwen  40  and  45  years. 

Included  in  this  table  will  be  found  corresponding  figures  pertain- 
ing to  Australia  and  Switzerland,  States  which  have  adopted  limited 
compulsory  service  for  home  defense  only,  the  results  of  which  have 
not  been  tested  by  war.  It  must  be  admitted  that  the  systems  of  these 
two  States  are  of  doubtful  utility  to  a  world  power  facing  the  ques- 
tion of  adequate  preparedness  in  all  its  phases. 

ANALYSIS  OF  TABLE  IL 

That  the  figures  in  this  table  may  be  understood,  it  must  be  borne 
in  mind  that  not  only  do  financial,  industrial,  and  economic  condi- 
tions, varying  in  the  different  nations,  seriously  affect  the  cost  of 
military  efficiency,  but  also  that  in  some  nations  utilities  owned  by 
the  Government  are  made  use  of  in  military  training  without  corre- 
sponding charge  against  the  military  budget. 

It  must  be  evident  that  under  equal  financial  and  industrial  condi- 
tions, mobilization  for  training  will  cost  more  in  an  extensive  coun- 
try like  Russia  than  in  a  compact  country  like  Italy  or  Japan. 

And,  further,  it  is  admitted  that  a  comparative  analysis  may  be 
misleading,  but  not  vitally  so,  for  the  reason  that  we  can  not  ascer- 
tain what  proportion  of  the  budgets  is  expended  for  training  proper 
and  what  proportion  is  spent  for  armament,  munitions,  and  other 
utilities  necessary  for  the  prevention  or  the  prosecution  of  war. 

With  reference  to  man  power,  it  appears  that  the  total  number  of 
males  of  military  age  in  a  nation  fit  for  service  is  about  one-sixth  of 
the  total  population.     All,  however,  are  not  equally  fit  for  service 

631 


in  the  fighting  line,  and  a  large  proportion  could  be  used  only  for 
service  of  the  interior.  In  addition  many  exemptions  must  be  made, 
owing  to  the  inadvisability  of  withdrawing  men  from  those  indus- 
tries and  vocations  that  are  essential  to  the  life  of  the  nation,  and 
that  proceed  in  many  cases  with  acceleration  during  war. 

For  these  and  other  reasons  the  proportion  of  one-sixth  that  are 
fit  for  service  dwindles  to  about  one-tenth,  and  this  is  the  proportion 
that  experience  shows  as  representing  the  maximum  man  power 
which  any  nation,  however  farsighted  or  methodical  its  statesmen, 
has  been  able  to  place  in  the  fighting  fronts  or  actual  operations  at 
the  outbreak  of  war. 

In  attempting  to  prepare  a  trustworthy  comparative  estimate  of 
the  actual  man  power  of  the  principal  nations  in  terms  of  men  fully 
trained,  organized,  armed,  equipped,  and  fit  for  actual  fighting  it 
has  been  found  that  most  nations  hold  secret  much  of  the  information 
required.  Therefore  estimates  must  rest  upon  a  comparison  of  vari- 
ous factors  that  are  known,  the  principal  ones  being  as  follows : 

(a)  The  extent  and  effectiveness  of  the  peace  training  system  and 
the  length  of  time  the  system  has  been  in  operation : 

In  a  nation  where  a  thorough  system  of  universal  training  has 
been  long  established,  where  the  extent  and  effectiveness  of  training 
is  properly  coordinated  with  financial  conditions,  and  where  the 
training  system  has  through  experience  been  so  corrected  and  ad- 
justed that  it  minimizes  interference  with,  while  taking  full  advan- 
tage of,  industrial,  educational,  and  other  features  essential  to  the 
national  life,  we  are  justified  in  the  conclusion  that  a  full  maximum 
of  man  power  can  be  developed. 

On  the  other  hand,  a  nation  that  stints  or  maladministers  its 
training  system,  or  that  has  not  long  applied  such  a  system,  must  suf- 
fer a  material  reduction  in  a  comparative  statement  of  its  trained 
man  power. 

(5)  Limitations  of  organization,  armament,  equipment,  and  mobil- 
ization. These  essentials  to  preparedness  can  not,  like  mushrooms, 
spring  up  during  the  night.  A  nation  with  an  available  man  power 
of  ten  millions,  but  which  limits  the  total  of  its  organizations  ready 
for  war  to  but  one-half  of  that  number,  must  be  estimated  as  having 
but  five  millions  of  man  power. 

Similarly,  reductions  must  be  made  to  correspond  to  what  a  na- 
tion actually  has  in  armament,  munitions,  and  equipment. 

And  if  details  of  mobilization  are  not  worked  out  by  peace  prac- 
tice, defective  results  wall  be  expected  in  the  placing  of  men  and 
materials  at  the  fighting  fronts  at  the  outbreak  of  war.  There  will 
then  be  a  corresponding  decrease  in  the  effective  man  power. 

(c)  Proportionate  exemption  of  those  that  are  unfit,  unworthy, 
or  of  those  that  are  fit,  but  can  not  be  spared  from  the  industries  or 

531 


8 

vocations  essential  to  national  life  and  to  the  prosecution  of  war. 
And  to  this  must  be  added  the  elimination  of  those  no  longer  fit  for 
actual  fighting.  These  exemptions  and  eliminations,  with  a  nation 
aiming  at  the  development  of  its  maximum  man  power,  result  in  a 
man  power  of  not  more  than  one-tenth  of  the  total  population.  If 
the  essential  conditions  are  not  fully  organized,  a  further  reduction 
of  man  power  will  result. 

{d)  Relative  financial  and  economic  conditions  of  nations. 

The  development  of  effective  man  power  for  war  is  inseparably 
connected  with  these  features.  Where  these  features  are  defective, 
or  where  the  peace  training  system  does  not  interweave  therewith, 
there  will  result  strains  and  limitations,  with  corresponding  reduc- 
tions of  man  power. 

{e)  Psychological  fitness  of  the  people  of  a  nation  for  war. 

A  nation  which  for  generations  has  directed  all  its  energies  to 
commercialism  will  be  found  peopled  with  those  whose  mental  at- 
tributes unfit  them  for  effective  collective  action  in  war;  and  such  a 
nation  can  not  for  a  considerable  period  develop  for  war  an  effective 
peace-trained  man  power.  On  the  other  hand,  a  nation  that  has 
directed  its  energies  toward  military  efficiency  will  be  found  with 
people  mentally  equipped  for  and  capable  of  united  action  in  war; 
and  such  a  nation  develops  readily  a  full  man  power  by  its  peace 
training. 

It  will  be  noted  that  the  yearly  cost  per  effective  of  man  power 
is  very  much  less  in  those  nations  that  have  universal  service.  This 
is  but  the  natural  result  of  the  policy  pursued.  The  English- 
speaking  nations  go  into  the  labor  market  in  wage  competition  for 
their  professional  soldiers.  On  the  other  hand,  the  nations  with 
universal  service  coordinate  their  training  with  industrial  and  finan- 
cial conditions;  and  pay  their  men  under  training  a  nominal  sum, 
sufficient  only  for  their  minor  wants  and  for  the  contentment  of  the 
average  man. 

GENERAL  COMMENTS. 

Broadly  speaking,  universal  service,  being  maintained  by  a  tax 
upon  manhood  as  well  as  upon  wealth,  it  distributes  more  reasonably 
the  effort  of  government;  supplementing  the  universal  system  of 
education,  which  it  rounds  out,  it  broadens  and  educates  the  youth 
of  the  nation  individually  and  in  duty  to  the  State,  offsetting  the 
harmful  influences  of  crowded  modern  conditions  of  life,  it  im- 
proves and  builds  up  the  physical  characteristics  of  the  people  of  a 
nation;  and  finally,  when  coordinated  with  other  essential  features 
of  national  life — and  it  is  inseparably  connected  with  them — it 
improves  every   condition   thereof,   and   harmoniously  secures  the 

631 


maximum  of  military  preparedness  now  so  essential  to  the  very 
existence  of  the  modern  nation  in  peace  as  well  as  in  war. 

Although  not  included  in  the  tables  herewith,  it  is  pertinent  in 
connection  with  thought  of  Pan  Americanism,  which  must  now  be 
recognized  as  a  great  fact,  to  state  that  Argentina,  Chile,  and  Brazil, 
which  may  be  considered  as  the  feading  nations  of  South  America, 
have  all  adopted  compulsory  military  service. 

Each  of  these  nations  has  been  divided  into  military  districts  for 
peace  training  and  for  war,  and  each  expends  annually  an  average 
of  10  per  cent  of  its  total  budget,  at  an  average  cost  of  $1  per  in- 
habitant, for  military  preparedness. 

It  is  evident  that  a  nation  first  adopting  universal  service  to  secure 
military  efficiency  will  not  begin  at  once  to  reap  its  benefits.  Sev- 
eral years'  trial,  with  corresponding  years  of  adjustments  and  cor- 
rections to  meet  conditions,  are  necessary,  if  a  nation  would  secure 
the  full  benefits  arising  from  a  well-devised,  well-maintained  pro- 
gram of  universal  service. 

Table  I. — Universal  service — lAability  and  enrollment. 


Kation. 


Liability. 


Actual  enrollment  for  service. 


First 
period. 


is  ° 


i2.g 


Second 
period. 


Third 
period. 


is  o 


Universal-service  nations: 

Austria-Hungary 

France 

G  ermany 

Italy 

Japan 

Russia 

Limited  compulsory-service  nations: 

Australia 

Switzerland 

Voluntary-service  nations: 

United  Kingdom 

United  States 


631 


19-42 
2(M8 
17-45 

20-38 
17-40 
20-43 

19-26 
17-48 

18-45 
18-45 


32 


12 
14 

7 

8 

7J 

18 


2} 

31 

2i 

2 

2J 

3i 

4 


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681 


STRATEGIC  LOCATION  OF 

MILITARY  DEPOTS,  ARSENALS,  AND  MANUFACTURING 

PLANTS  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES 


PREPARED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION.  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

AS   A    SUPPLEMENT   TO    THE    STATEMENT    OF   A   PROPER   MILITARY 

POLICY  FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES 


WCD  8121-42 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE  :  WASHINGTON 

NOVEMBER,  1915 


I 


582 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 

1916 


War  Department, 

Docmnent  No.  532. 

Offic«  of  the  Chief  of  Staff. 


'i' 

1 


STRATEGIC  LOCATION  OF  MILITARY  DEPOTS,  ARSENALS, 
AND  MANUFACTURING  PLANTS  IN  THE  UNITED 
STATES. 


1.  Paragraph  60  of  the  Statement  of  a  Proper  Military  Policy 
for  the  United  States,  prepared  by  the  War  College  Division,  Gen- 
eral Staff  Corps,  in  compliance  with  instructions  of  the  Secretary  of 
War  and  submitted  September  11,  1915,  is  as  follows: 

60.  As  a  general  military  principle,  no  supply  depot,  arsenal,  nor  manufac- 
turing plant  of  any  considerable  size,  supported  by  War  Department  appropri- 
ations for  military  purposes,  should  be  established  or  maintained  east  of  the 
Appalachian  Mountains,  west  of  the  Cascade  or  Sierra  Nevada  Mountains,  nor 
within  200  miles  of  our  Canadian  or  Mexican  borders,  and  steps  should  be 
taken  gradually  to  cause  to  be  moved  depots  and  manufacturing  plants  already 
established  in  violation  of  this  military  principle. 

2.  The  soundness  of  the  general  principle  of  establishing  perma- 
nent Government  arsenals  and  supply  depots  at  a  safe  distance  from 
national  frontiers  seems  so  clear  that  no  lengthy  discussion  or  ex- 
planation of  paragraph  60,  just  quoted,  seems  necessary.  It  may 
be  of  service,  however,  to  illustrate  graphically  the  trouble  liable  to 
arise  from  violation  of  this  cardinal  principle. 

First,  take  the  case  of  France  in  1870,  during  the  war  with  Ger- 
many, and  note  the  handicap  imposed  upon  her  by  the  capture  of  a 
number  of  her  arsenals,  clue  to  their  faulty  location. 

Plate  I  tells  the  story  at  a  glance.  It  shows  the  positions  of  the 
principal  arsenals  and  depots  as  they  existed  at  the  outbreak  of 
hostilities.  The  shaded  portion  indicates  the  territory  eventually 
occupied  by  the  invader.  Attention  is  especially  invited  to  the  prox- 
imity to  the  frontier  of  Douai,  La  Fere,  Metz,  Mutzig,  Strasbourg, 
and  Besancon.  All  were  captured  except  the  first  two,  and  these 
were  cut  off  from  the  French  armies. 

3.  Next  take  our  own  case  to-day,  which  is  even  worse,  from  a 
military  standpoint,  than  that  of  France  in  1870.  Plate  II  shows 
the  present  locations  of  the  principal  Government  arsenals  and  sup- 
ply depots  as  they  exist  to-day  in  the  United  States.  The  shaded 
portions  indicate  reasonable  and  probable  objectives  for  an  invader, 
due  to  our  present  state  of  unpreparedness.  Attention  is  especially 
invited  to  the  proximity  to  the  frontiers  of  all  our  arsenals  and  sup- 
ply depots  except  Rock  Island,  Omaha,  Fort  Leavenworth,  St.  Louis, 

30669°— No.  632—16  (3) 


and  Jeffersonville.     Our  handicap,  if  these  places  were  captured, 
can  not  be  overestimated. 

4.  Plate  III  shoTvs  the  locations  of  some  of  our  more  important 
privately  owned  manufactories  of  war  munitions,  such  as  cartridge 
cases,  fuses,  shells,  explosives,  ammunition,  binoculars,  pistols,  wag- 
ons, rifles,  and  bayonets. 


■^ 


100 


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•/ 


PLATE  I. 

France  in  1870. 

notes  sho"n"ing  general  character  cf  stores  at  the  places  indicated. 

1.  Toulouse :  Cannon  foundry,  artillery  forges,  powder  mills,  arsenal,  military  magaBines.J 

2.  Chateauroux :  Carriages  of  the  military  train. 

3.  Chatellerault :  Manufactory  of  small  arms. 

4.  Rennes  :  Arsenal. 

5.  St.  Etienne :  Manufactory  of  small  arms. 

6.  Versailles :  Large  park  of  artillery,  camp  equipment. 

7.  Lyons  :  Arsenal. 

8.  Tulle :  Manufactory  of  small  arms. 

9.  Vernon  :  Manufactory  of  the  equipages  of  the  military  train. 

10.  Besancon  :  Foundries,  artillery  arsenal. 

11.  Mutzlg :  Manufactory  of  small  arms. 

12.  Metz :  Arsenal,  cannon  foundry,  powder  mills,  engineer  equipment. 

13.  Douai :  Arsenal,  cannon  foundry. 

14.  La  Fere  :  Artillery  arsenal. 

15.  Strasbourg :  Artillery  arsenal. 

532 


PLATE  II. 

NOTES    SHOWING    GENERAL    CHAKACTEK    OF   STOKES   AT    THE    PLACES    INDICATED. 

Augusta  :  Arsenal. 

NYashington  :  Engineer  depot,  medical  depot. 
Philadelphia  :  Quartermaster  depot,  arsenal. 
Picatinny  :  Powder  manufactory. 

New  York  :  Arsenal,  signal  corps  depot,  medical  depot,  quartermaster  depot. 
Springfield  :  Arsenal. 
Watervliet :  Arsenal. 
Jeffersonville  :   Quartermaster  depot. 

St.  Louis  :  Quartermaster  depot,  medical  depot,  engineer  depot. 
Chicago  :  Quartermaster  depot. 
Rock  Island  :  Arsenal. 
Fort  Leavenworth  :  Engineer  depot. 
Omaha  :   Signal  corps  depot. 
San  Antonio :  Arsenal. 
Vancouver  Barracks  :  Engineer  depot. 

San  Francisco  and  vicinity  :  Arsenal,  quartermaster  depot,  signal  corps  depot,  medical 
depot. 

632 


PLATE   III. 
The  following  placea  are  indicated  on  this  plate  ; 


Watertown,  N.  Y. 
Ilion,  N.  Y. 
Chicago,  111. 
Allentown,  Pa. 
Giesboro,  D.  C. 
Worcester,  Mass, 
Bridgeport,  Conn. 
New  Haven,  Conn. 
Alton,  111. 
Lowell,  Mass. 

532 


liochester,  N.  Y. 
Cleveland,  Ohio. 
Detroit,  Mich. 
Cincinnati,  Ohio 
Eddystone,  Pa. 
Schenectady,  N.  Y. 
Richmond,  Va. 
Boston,  Mass. 
Philadelphia,  Pa. 
South  Bethlehem,  Pa. 


Brooklyn,  N.  Y. 
Pittsburgh,  Pa. 
Wilmington,  Del. 
Parlin,  N.  J. 
Pompton  Lakes,  N.  J. 
Lynn,  Mass. 
Harrison,  N.  J. 
Harrisburg,  Pa. 


o 


I 


I 


SANITARY  TROOPS  IN  FOREIGN  ARMIES 


( 


PREPARED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION,  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

AS  A  SUPPLEMENT  TO  THE  STATEMENT  OF  A  PROPER  MILITARY 

POLICY  FOR  THE  UNITED  STATES 


WCD  9319-1 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE  :  WASHINGTON 

NOVEMBER,   1915 


533 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFIOE 

1916 


War  Department, 

Document  No.  533. 

Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff. 


\ 


SYNOPSIS. 


Introduction. 

Page. 

Duties  of  Banitary  troopa 7 

General  scheme  of  distribution 7 

(a)  The  zone  of  advance 7 

(6)  The  zone  of  the  lines  of  communication 7 

(c)  The  zone  of  the  interior  or  home  territory 7 

Utilization  of  reserve  forces 9 

Organization  and  administration  adopted  by  leading  powers 10 

I.  England. 

Peace  establishment 10 

Regular  Army 10 

Territorial  force  (military  service) 10 

Indian  force 10 

Colonial  forces 10 

Organization  of  the  medical  services 11 

Royal  Army  Medical  Corps 11 

Distribution  of  personnel  (Royal  Army  Medical  Corps) 11 

The  Indian  Medical  Service 11 

Territorial  force  (medical  corps) 12 

Distribution  of  personnel  (territorial  force) 12 

Royal  Army  Reserve  Corps 12 

War  organization 12 

Service  with  combatant  units 13 

Mobile  medical  units 13 

Motor  workshop  section 14 

Lines  of  communication 14 

Casualty  clearing  stations 14 

Sanitary  section 14 

Stationary  hospitals  and  base  hospitals '. 15 

Hospital  trains 15 

Hospital  ships 15 

Home  territory 15 

■    II.  France. 

Peace  establishment 15 

Organization  of  the  medical  services 16 

Service  de  sante  de  I'armie  de  terre 16 

Corps  de  sante  militaire  (commissioned  medical  oflicers  and  pharmacists) 16 

Officers  d 'administration 17 

Section  d'infirmiere  (hospital  corps) 17 

Sanitary  soldiers  belonging  to  combatant  units 17 

Administration  and  distribution  of  personnel 18 

533  (3) 


II.  France — Coutiuued. 

Page. 

The  colonial  medical  service 18 

Enlisted  personnel 19 

War  organization 19 

Regimental  service 19 

Mobile  field  units 19 

Ambulance  sections 20 

Sections  D  'hospitalization 20 

Divisional  bearer  companies 20 

Cavalry  ambulances 20 

Corps  bearer  companies. 20 

Lines  of  communication 21 

Evacuation  hospitals 21 

Auxiliary  convoys 21 

Motor  ambulance  sections 21 

Reserve  medical  personnel 21 

Hospital  trains 22 

Zone  of  the  interior 22 

111    Germany. 

Military  service 22 

The  standing  army 23 

General  organization  of  the  medical  service 23 

The  sanitats  korps 23 

The  sanitats  offizier  korps 23 

The  sanitats  offizier  diensttuer 23 

The  stanitats  mannschat 24 

The  militar  krankenwarter 24 

The  krankentrager 24 

Apothecaries  and  quartermasters 25 

Administration  and  distribution  of  personnel 25 

War  organization 26 

Medical  personnel  with  combatant  organizations 26 

Sanitats  bataillon 26 

Field  hospitals 27 

Lines  of  communication 27 

Hospital  trains 29 

Home  territory 29 

IV.  Austria-Hungary. 

Military'  service 29 

Organization  of  the  medical  service 30 

The  militar  arzliches  offizers'  korp 30 

The  sanitats  truppe 30 

Sanitats  hilfspersonal  bei  den  truppen 31 

Medical  assistants 31 

Litter  bearers 32 

Carriers  of  equipment 32 

Pharmacists  and  supply  officials 32 

Isursing  sisters 32 

Administration  and  distribution  of  personnel 32 

Regimental  hospitals 33 

Garrison  hospitals 33 

533 


5 

IV.  Austria-Hungary — Continued. 

Page. 

War  organization 33 

Medical  service  in  the  zone  of  advance 34 

Regimental  medical  service 34 

The  divisional  medical  unit 35 

Other  medical  units 35 

Field  Hospitals 35 

Lines  of  communication 36 

Mobile  reserve  hospitals 36 

Field  depots  for  slightly  sick 36 

Rest  stations 36 

Field  medical  supply  depot 36 

Hospital  trains 36 

Mobile  laboratories 37 

Surgical  detachments 37 

Zone  of  the  interior 37 

V.  Italy. 

Peace  establishment 37 

General  organization  of  the  medical  service 38 

Ufficiali  medici  di  corps  sanitario  (officers  of  the  medical  corps) 38 

Pharmacists 39 

Administration  officers 39 

Enlisted  personnel 39 

Nursing  sisters 40 

General  distribution  of  personnel 40 

War  organization 41 

Medical  service  with  combatant  units 42 

Medical  field  units 42 

Ambulance  companies 42 

Field  hospitals 43 

Lines  of  communication 43 

Home  territory 43 

VL  Russia. 

Peace  establishment 44 

Organization  of  the  medical  service 45 

Administration  and  distribution  of  personnel 46 

Feldshers 47 

Nadzirateli 47 

War  organization 48 

Medical  service  with  combatant  units 48 

Mobile  medical  units 48 

The  divisional  lazaret 49 

Field  hospitals 49 

Lines  of  communication — Transport  column 49 

Hospital  trains 50 

Sanitary  detachments 50 

Evacuation  hospitals 50 

Home  territory 50 

533 


VII.  Japan, 

Page. 

Peace  establishment 51 

Gueneki  (the  active  army) 51 

Yobi  (first  reserve) 51 

Kobi  (second  reserve) 51 

Hoju  (replacement  troops,  reserve  of  recruitment) 51 

Kakurnin,  first  part  (the  national  army,  first  part) 51 

Kakurnin,  second  part  (the  national  army,  second  part) 51 

Organization  of  the  medical  department 51 

Commissioned  officers 51 

Reserve  medical  ofiicers 52 

Pharmacists 52 

Enlisted  personnel 52 

Administration  and  distribution  of  personnel 53 

War  organization 53 

Divisional  medical  service 54 

Medical  service  with  combatant  units 54 

Enlisted  personnel 54 

Field  medical  units 54 

Bearer  battalions 55 

Field  hospitals 55 

Lines  of  communication 55 

Reserve  medical  personnel 55 

Sick  and  wounded  transport  detachments 56 

Base  hospitals 56 

Home  territory 56 

SUMATAUY. 

The  percentage  of  medical  ofiicers  in  permanent  peace  establishments 57 

The  percentage  of  medical  personnel  for  duty  directly  with  troops  as  taken 

from  tables  of  organization 57 

633 


1 


SANITARY  TROOPS  IN  FOREIGN  ARMIES. 


INTRODUCTION. 

DUTIES  OF  SANITARY  TROOPS. 

A  study  of  the  sanitary  troops  in  foreign  armies  shows  that  all  the 
great  powers  have  adopted  practically  the  same  principles  govern- 
ing the  employment  of  these  troops.  The  organization  and  distribu- 
tion of  the  various  units  is  to  some  extent  governed  by  the  military 
conditions  affecting  the  various  countries,  but  it  is  generally  recog- 
nized that  the  duties  of  sanitary  troops  are  (a)  the  care  and  treat- 
ment of  sick  and  wounded;  (b)  their  prompt  removal  out  of  the  zone, 
of  combat;  (c)  the  maintenance  of  the  health  of  troops  by  the  insti- 
gation of  proper  sanitary  measures;  {d)  the  maintenance  of  an 
adequate  supply  of  medical  and  surgical  materiel;  (e)  the  prepara- 
tion and  preservation  of  records  of  sick  and  wounded. 

GENERAL   SCHEME    OF   DISTRIBUTION. 

For  the  proper  performance  of  these  duties  all  countries  make  a 
more  or  less  uniform  distribution  of  their  medical  personnel  in 
(a)  the  zone  of  advance;  (b)  the  zone  of  the  lines  of  communication; 
(c)  the  zone  of  the  interior  or  home  territory. 

The  general  scheme  of  medical  service  in  the  zone  of  advance  is 
to  provide  a  medical  detachment  for  each  regiment  or  similar  unit  to 
render  service  directly  to  that  unit,  and  to  provide  mobile  medical 
units  for  service  with  divisions,  corps,  and  field  armies. 

The  service  on  lines  of  communication  is  organized  so  as  to  provide 
means  for  (a)  evacuation  of  sick  and  wounded;  (h)  the  replenish- 
ing of  supplies  expended  at  the  front  by  the  mobile  field  units;  {c) 
the  transportation  of  wounded  to  those  points  where  definite  and 
complete  care  and  treatment  can  be  given  them;  (d)  the  care  of 
such  wounded  during  transportation. 

In  the  present  war  extensive  use  has  been  made  of  motor  transport 
to  convey  wounded  from  the  dressing  stations  to  the  rail  head,  and  of 
hospital  trains  and  hospital  ships  to  conve}^  them  to  the  zone  of  the 
interior  or  home  territory.    Qearmg  stations  or  evacuation  hospitals 

(7) 

633 


8 

have  been  established  at  the  advanced  bases  for  the  temporary  care 
of  patients  until  they  could  be  transferred  to  hospital  trains,  and 
large  semipermanent  hospitals  established  at  the  base  of  the  lines  of 
communimation  for  the  treatment  of  all  wounded  until  permanent 
disposition  could  be  made  of  them. 

Because  of  the  limited  territory  in  each  country,  the  greater  part 
of  the  wounded  have  been  returned  to  home  territory  as  quickly  as 
possible.  The  number  necessarily  retained  on  lines  of  communica- 
tion, however,  has  been  large.  The  English  Army,  after  the  first 
six  months  of  war,  had  established  at  Boulogne-Sur-Mer,  their  port 
of  embarkation,  22  hospitals,  where  an  average  of  some  11.000  pa- 
tients were  daily  under  treatment.  For  bringing  patients  to  these 
hospitals  they  were  employing  12  hospital  trains,  with  an  average 
capacity  of  400  patients  each.  And  for  transporting  to  England 
such  patients  as  it  was  necessary  to  invalid  home  there  was  a  fleet  of 
14  hospital  ships,  with  an  average  capacity  of  500  patients. 

The  French  Government  has  maintained  on  its  railways  90  hos- 
pital trains,  with  a  carrying  capacity  of  36,000  patients,  and  recently 
recommendations  have  been  made  to  increase  this  capacity  to  100,000 
patients.  In  accordance  with  these  recommendations  250  hospital 
trains  have  now  been  provided. 

In  the  zone  of  the  interior  provision  is  made  for  the  final  disposi- 
tion of  all  sick  and  wounded  and  the  preparation  and  shipment  of  all 
necessary  sanitary  material.  The  extent  of  preparation  necessary  in 
this  zone  can  be  realized  when  the  extent  of  casualties  is  considered. 
The  following  shows  the  number  of  wounded  reported  in  the  present 
war  up  to  July  1,  1915:  France,  700,000;  Great  Britain,  229,000; 
Russia,  1,982,000;  Germany,  852,000;  Austria-Hungary,  711,000;  Bel- 
gium, 100,000;  Serbia,  112,600;  Turkey,  40,000;  Japan,  910;  total, 
4,837,510  in  one  year  of  war.  Of  these  wounded  at  least  60  per  cent, 
or  approximately  3,000,000  were  sent  to  the  hospitals  in  home  terri- 
tory. Recent  reports  from  France  show  that  she  is  now  maintaining 
5,000  territorial  hospitals,  wnth  a  total  capacity  of  600,000  beds. 

For  the  performance  of  their  medical  service,  both  in  peace  and 
war,  all  armies  have  maintained  a  permanent  medical  personnel,  both 
commissioned  and  enlisted.  In  no  army,  however,  has  this  perma- 
nent personnel  been  sufficient  to  perform  all  the  duties  required  of  it 
in  the  present  war. 

A  study  of  the  war  tables  of  foreign  armies  shows  that  an  average 
proportion  of  4  officers  and  52  enlisted  men  of  the  sanitary  forces 
per  thousand  of  total  strength  are  prescribed  for  duty  directly  with 
troops  in  the  zone  of  advance.  The  proportion  for  duty  in  the  other 
two  zones  is  not  prescribed  definitely,  but  a  general  outline  is  given 
of  the  personnel  required  for  each  of  the  several  units.  Experience 
has  shown,  however,  that  a  slightly  smaller  proportion  is  required 

533 


9 

for  duty  on  lines  of  communications  than  for  duty  in  the  zone  of 
advance  and  a  much  greater  proportion  for  duty  in  the  zone  of  the 
interior. 

UTILIZATION   OF  RESERVE   FORCES. 

All  countries  have  therefore  been  obliged  to  utilize  in  large  measure 
medical  assistance  from  sources  outside  of  the  army.  In  countries 
having  universal  military  service  nearly  eveiy  medical  man  has  had 
a  certain  amount  of  military  training,  and  there  is,  in  consequence,  a 
large  force  of  partially  trained  medical  officers  available  both  in  the 
reserves  and  in  volunteer  aid  societies.  In  1913  Germany  had  34,136, 
France  20,809,  and  Austria  13,734  men  so  available.  These  men  have 
been  utilized  largely  on  service  in  hospitals  and  with  units  on  lines 
of  communication  and  the  zone  of  the  interior  and,  while  there  has 
been  some  shortage  of  men  for  medical  service  in  those  countries, 
practically  the  whole  medical  profession  was  able  to  render  satis- 
factorily some  service. 

In  England,  however,  where  no  appreciable  number  of  reserves 
were  available,  the  shortage  in  medical  personnel  has  been  keenly 
felt.  Urgent  appeals  have  been  made  to  the  entire  medical  profession 
in  the  United  Kingdom  to  give  some  part  of  their  time  to  service 
with  the  army.  A  statement  by  the  war  office,  September  4,  1915,  was 
to  the  effect  that  there  were  at  that  time  m  army  medical  service 
6,265  officers,  and  that  there  were  residing  in  England,  Wales,  and 
Ireland  6,555  medical  men  of  military  age  not  then  engaged  in  war 
service ;  and  that  of  these  latter  one-third  were  immediately  required. 

Owing  to  her  inability  to  secure  from  her  own  population  a  suffi- 
cient number  of  medical  m-^n  for  army  service,  England  has  been 
compelled  to  draw  men  from  Canada,  Australia,  and  New  Zealand 
and  to  make  request  of  various  medical  colleges  in  this  country  to 
send  over  as  many  doctors  as  could  be  induced  to  accept  commissions. 
B}^  utilizing  to  the  utmost  all  available  medical  material  she  has  been 
able  to  secure,  approximately,  8,000  men  for  service  as  medical 
officers.  Of  this  number,  however,  only  1,100  are  men  trained  in 
medico-military  duties. 

Because  of  the  great  similarity  between  our  military  ser\ice  and 
that  of  England  this  shortage  of  trained  medical  officers  and  the 
difficulty  being  experienced  in  getting  even  untrained  medical  officers 
should  be  instructive  to  us. 

In  all  countries  considerable  reliance  has  been  placed  in  volunteer 
aid  societies  to  supplement  the  permanent  personnel.  In  Austria- 
Hungary  particularly  the  war  plans  contemplated  association  of  the 
Red  Cross  Society  with  the  medical  service  even  in  the  zone  of  ad- 
vance. The  assistance  rendered  by  these  societies  has  been  of  con- 
siderable value  in  establishments  on  lines  of  communication  and  the 
30669°— No.  533—16 2 


10 

zone  of  the  interior  in  positions  not  requiring  military  training; 
but  they  have  not  been  of  much  value  in  actual  field  service  nor  in 
administrative  positions.  For  these  latter  men  thoroughly  trained  in 
medico-military  matters  have  been  found  essential. 

ORGANIZATION   AND   ADMINISTRATION    ADOPTED   BY    LEADING   POWERS. 

The  organization,  administration,  and  distribution  of  sanitary 
personnel  adopted  by  the  leading  powers  both  in  peace  and  in  war 
are  shown  in  the  following  pages. 

I.  ENGLAND. 

PEACE  ESTABLISHMENT. 

The  military  services  in  England  comprise  (a)  the  regular  army; 
(b)  the  territorial  forces;  (c)  the  Indian  force;  (d)  militia  forces  in 
various  colonies. 

REGULAR   ARMY. 

The  Regular  Army  is  organized  into  an  expeditionary  force,  serv- 
ing in  the  British  Isles,  and  a  colonial  force,  serving  in  the  various 
colonies  and  India.    The  peace  strength  of  this  army  is : 

British  Isles 134.  339 

Colonies  (other  than  India) 45,215 

India 75,884 

Total 255,  438 

TERRITORIAL    FORCE. 

The  Territorial  Force  corresponds  to  our  militia  and  is  organized 
into  divisions  in  the  same  proportion  of  arms  but  in  smaller  num- 
bers than  the  regular  army.  It  has  a  strength  on  paper  of  315,408, 
but  probably  the  actual  strength  does  not  exceed  250,000  men. 

INDIAN  FORCE. 

The  Indian  Force  is  composed  of  native  troops  with  English  offi- 
cers. It  is  a  distinct  service  from  that  part  of  the  regular  army 
which  also  serves  in  India.  It  has  a  strength  of  approximately 
162,000  men. 

COLONIAL  FORCES. 

All  colonies  maintain  bodies  of  native  troops,  officered  by  English- 
men. Canada,  Australia,  and  New  Zealand  maintain  considerable 
bodies  of  militia.  Their  organization  is  similar  to  that  of  the  reg- 
ular army. 

533 


1 


11 

ORGANIZATION    OF   THK    ^MKHICAL    SERVICES. 

The  medical  personnel  for  the  various  forces  is  organized  along 
the  same  general  lines,  bnt  there  is  a  distinct  medical  force  for  each 
of  the  distinct  combatant  forces. 

These  various  medical  forces  are  (a)  the  Royal  Army  Medical 
Corps;  (7))  the  Indian  Medical  Service;  (c)  the  Medical  Corps  of  the 
Territorial  Forces;  (d)  the  Royal  Army  Medical  Reserve  Corps. 

ROYAL  ARMY  MEDICAL  CORPS, 

This  corps  comprises  both  a  commissioned  and  enlisted  personnel. 

At  the  head  of  this  corps  is  the  Director  General  of  Medical  Serv- 
ices, with  rank  of  lieutenant  general.  The  other  officers  are  11  major 
generals,  29  colonels,  130  lieutenant  colonels,  331  majors,  418  cap- 
tains, 128  lieutenants,  and  42  quartermasters;  total  commissioned, 
1,090. 

In  addition  to  these  officers  there  were  on  duty  before  the  outbreak 
of  the  present  war  65  medical  officers  from  the  retired  list  and  182 
officers  from  the  reserve  corps,  making  a  total  in  peace  of  fifty-three 
one-hundredths  of  1  per  cent  of  the  total  strength  of  the  regular 
army. 

The  enlisted  personnel  is  composed  of  warrant  officers,  staff  ser- 
geants, sergeants,  corporals,  and  privates.  It  has  a  total  strength  of 
approximately  4,000, 

DISTRIBUTION  OF  PERSONNEL. 

Officers  of  the  corps  serve  both  at  home  and  abroad.  The  enlisted 
personnel  serves  only  in  the  military  hospitals  at  home  stations.  In 
India  the  subordinate  duties  of  the  medical  department  are  performed 
by  noncommissioned  officers  and  privates  belonging  to  combatant 
units  who  volunteer  for  and  are  detailed  to  medical  work. 

The  pay  of  enlisted  men  in  the  Royal  Army  Medical  Corps  is 
slightly  higher  than  for  those  of  similar  rank  in  the  line.  In  addi- 
tion to  their  base  pay  all  men  below  the  rank  of  staff  sergeant  are 
also  granted  "corps  pay "  (extra  duty  pay)  while  on  duty.  This 
"  corps  pay  "  is  further  increased  by  Gd,  per  day  for  those  men  who 
have  taken  a  course  in  and  been  graduated  from  the  "  Queen  Alex- 
andria's Nursing  Service." 

THE  INDIAN  MEDICAL  SERVICE. 

Medical  service  for  the  Indian  force  is  provided  by  a  separate  corps 
of  British  medical  officers  with  native  assistants  detailed  from  the 
line  for  subordinate  duties.  The  Indian  Medical  Corps  has  4  major 
generals,  15  colonels,  147  lieutenant  colonels,  227  majors,  318  captains, 

533 


12 

and  75  lieutenants;  total,  786.    Percentage  of  medical  officers  to  total 
strength  of  Indian  forces,  forty-eight  one-hundredths  of  1  per  cent. 

TERRITORIAL  FORCE. 

The  Medical  Corps  for  the  Territorial  Force  is  similar  to  that  of 
the  Royal  Army  Medical  Corps.  It  comprises  14  colonels,  62  lieu- 
tenant colonels,  140  majors,  836  captains  and  lieutenants,  80  quarter- 
masters, and  57  transport  officers;  total  commissioned,  1,189.  Pro- 
portion to  total  strength  fortj'-seven  one-hundredths  of  1  per  cent. 

DISTRIBUTION  OF  PERSONNEL. 

The  Territorial  Force  is  divided  into  14  divisions,  and  the  medical 
service  of  each  division  is  under  the  direction  of  a  colonel  of  the  Ter- 
ritorial Medical  Corps.  The  other  medical  officers  for  the  division  are 
organized  into  either  field  ambulance  detachments  or  general  hos- 
pital detachments. 

With  each  division  there  are  3  field  ambulances,  with  a  staff  con- 
sisting of  1  lieutenant  colonel  in  command,  2  majors,  6  captains  or 
lieutenants,  1  quartermaster,  and  1  transport  officer.  In  addition 
to  the  42  field  ambulances  assigned  to  the  infantry  divisions  there 
are  14  mounted  brigade  field  ambulances,  with  a  staff  of  1  lieutenant 
colonel  in  command,  1  major,  4  captains  or  lieutenants,  1  quartermas- 
ter, and  1  transport  officer. 

Twenty-three  general  hospitals  are  organized  and  distributed 
throughout  the  divisions.  Each  general  hospital  is  under  the  com- 
mand of  1  lieutenant  colonel,  with  1  captain  and  1  quartermaster  as 
assistants.  The  medical  staff  consists  of  4  lieutenant  colonels,  8 
majors,  and  2  captains  or  lieutenants. 

In  addition  to  the  general  hospitals  and  field  ambulances  thus  pro- 
vided for  there  are  two  sanitary  companies  and  a  corps  of  special 
sanitary  officers  numbering  106. 

ROYAL  ARMY  RESERVE  CORPS. 

There  is  no  definite  number  of  officers  in  this  corps. 

WAR  ORGANIZATION. 

The  administrative  unit  in  time  of  war  is  the  infantry  division 
(19,558  officers  and  men). 

The  medical  service  of  the  division  is  under  the  direction  of  a 
Principal  Medical  Officer  (colonel),  with  1  captain  as  assistant  and  5 
enlisted  men  as  clerks  and  messengers. 

533 


13 

SERVICE  WITH  COMBATANT  UNITS. 

In  time  of  war  each  batallion  of  infantry,  regiment  of  cavalry, 
brij^ade  of  field  artillery,  etc.,  has  attached  to  it  1  medical  officer. 
The  enlisted  personnel  for  sanitary  duty  with  these  units  is  not 
derived  from  the  Royal  Army  Medical  Corps,  but  from  the  units 
themselves.  In  each  unit  30  men  are  specially  trained  in  sanitary 
duties:  1  noncommissioned  officer  and  8  privates  are  detailed  to 
act  as  sanitary  police;  1  noncommissioned  officer  and  4  privates  are 
detailed  to  insure  purity  of  the  water  supply;  IG  privates  are  de- 
tailed as  litter  bearers;  and  1  lance  corporal  and  1  private  are 
detailed  as  orderlies  to  the  medical  officer.  The  latter  also  drives 
the  cart  or  pack  animal  carrying  medical  supplies  with  which  each 
unit  is  equipped. 

MOBILE  MEDICAL  UNITS. 

In  general  the  medical  units  prescribed  in  the  British  field-service 
regulations  for  both  the  zone  of  advance  and  lines  of  communication 
r,re  fewer  in  number  and  more  limited  in  capacity  than  those  pre- 
scribed by  other  armies.  The  only  mobile  units  are  the  field  ambu- 
lances with  the  divisions,  three  of  which  are  assigned  to  each 
division.  These  units  are  analogous  to  a  combination  of  ambulance 
companies  and  field  hospitals  in  our  service. 

Each  field  ambulance  is  under  the  command  of  a  major.  Royal 
Army  Medical  Corps,  and  is  made  up  of  a  bearer  division  and  a 
tent  division.  The  capacity  of  the  tent  division  is  150  patients, 
and  the  entire  ambulance  is  capable  of  being  subdivided  into  three 
complete  sections. 

The  personnel  of  the  bearer  division  comprises  3  medical  officers, 
6  noncommissioned  officers,  and  118  privates.  Royal  Army  Medical 
Corps. 

That  of  the  tent  division  comprises  6  medical  officers,  1  warrant 
officer,  16  noncommissioned  officers,  and  -11  privates,  Royal  Army 
Medical  Corps. 

In  addition  to  this  personnel  from  the  Royal  Arm}'^  Medical 
Corps  there  are  4  sergeants,  2  artificers,  and  48  privates  of  the  army 
service  corps  attached.  Of  the  medical  personnel,  3  officers  ma}^  be 
civilian  physicians  specially  employed,  and  90  litter  bearers  may  be 
recruits  specially  enlisted. 

The  total  personnel  of  each  field  ambulance  is  10  officers  and  23G 
men. 

Recently  a  change  has  been  made  in  the  transportation  for  field 
ambulances,  motor  ambulances  being  largely  substituted  for  horse- 
drawn  vehicles. 

533 


14 

The  present  allowance  of  transportation  consists  of  4  carts,  11 
wagons,  3  horse-drawn  ambulances  and  7  motor  ambulances,  14 
riding  horses  and  39  draft  animals. 

MOTOR    WORKSHOP    SECTION. 

Attached  to  the  division  for  service  with  the  field  ambulances  is 
one  "workshop"  (army  service  corps).  The  function  of  this  unit 
is  to  keep  in  repair  the  motor  ambulances.  Its  personnel  consists 
of  1  officer,  12  artificers,  and  8  privates,  army  service  corps,  and  7 
drivers  from  the  transport  troops.  Its  transportation  is  3  motor 
trucks  for  stores  and  1  motor  car  for  personnel. 

The  total  sanitary  personnel  provided  for  each  division  in  war  is — 
commissioned,  52;  enlisted,  1,244.  Of  the  enlisted  personnel  556 
are  drawn  from  the  Royal  Army  Medical  Corps,  506  from  line 
organizations,  and  182  from  the  army  service  corps. 

LINES  OF  COMMUNICATION. 

The  fixed  establishments  in  the  British  service  are  casualty  clear- 
ing stations,  sanitary  sections,  stationary  hospitals,  base  hospitals, 
hospital  trains  and  hospital  ships,  and  motor-transport  convoys, 
the  latter  having  been  recently  introduced. 

CASUALTY    CLEARING   STATIONS. 

These  stations  are  located  at  the  head  of  the  lines  of  communica- 
tion, and  are  simply  temporary  stopping  places  for  wounded  until 
they  can  be  evacuated  farther  to  the  rear  by  hospital  trains.  No 
beds  or  other  conveniences  are  provided,  as  patients  are  usually 
passed  through  these  stations  in  24  hours.  Their  personnel  com- 
prises 7  medical  officers  (4  of  whom  may  be  civilian  phj^sicians 
specially  engaged),  1  quartermaster,  1  warrant  officer,  8  noncommis- 
sioned officers,  and  69  privates,  royal  army  medical  corps.  (Of  the 
latter  20  may  be  specially  enlisted.) 

Recently  motor-ambulance  convoys  have  been  organized  and  used 
very  successfully  in  bringing  the  wounded  from  the  dressing  sta- 
tions to  the  clearing  stations.  These  convoys  have  a  varying  number 
of  ambulances  and  each  ambulance  has  a  driver  and  orderly  from 
the  royal  army  medical  corps. 

SANITARY  SECTION. 

A  sanitary  section  includes  1  medical  officer,  2  noncommissioned 
officers,  and  25  privates,  royal  army  medical  corps.  Transporta- 
tion for  this  unit  is  provided  from  the  advanced  mechanical  trans- 
port depot,  and  consists  of  1  motor  truck  with  2  drivers.  Its  duties 
are  confined  exclusively  to  sanitary  work. 

533 


i 

i 


15 

STATIOXAKV  HOSPITALS  AND  BASE  HOSPITALS. 

These  hospitals  are  arranged  at  tlie  base  section  of  the  line  of 
connnunications.  At  present  22  of  these  hospitals  arc  established  at 
Boulogne-siir-Mer.  Stationary  hospitals  have  a  capacity  of  200  beds 
and  a  staff  of  8  officers  and  86  men.  Royal  Army  Medical  Corps. 

General  hospitals  have  a  capacity  of  500  beds  and  a  staff  of  21 
officers  and  143  men  of  the  Royal  Army  Medical  Corps,  supplemented 
by  43  nursing  sisters. 

HOSPITAL  TRAINS. 

As  in  other  armies  in  the  present  war,  the  hospital  train  is  largely 
utilized  in  the  English  service.  A  number  of  these  trains  have  been 
provided,  with  an  average  carrying  capacity  of  396  cases.  The  med- 
ical personnel  consists  of  2  officers  and  45  men,  and  their  e(|uipment 
includes  operating  cars,  kitchen  cars,  and  every  convenience  to  make 
them  practically  rolling  hospitals. 

HOSPITAL  SHIPS. 

Because  of  the  necessity  of  sea  transport  to  return  wounded  to 
home  territory,  England  has  equipped  a  number  of  hospital  ships. 
Details  as  to  the  personnel  and  equipment  of  these  ships  are  not 
available. 

HOME    TERRITORY. 

The  large  military  hospital  at  Xetley  has  been  greatly  increased 
in  capacity  and  is  the  main  military  hospital  in  England.  Every 
other  available  military  and  civil  hospital  hag  been  utilized,  how- 
ever, and  new  pavilion  hospitals  constructed.  Recent  reports  from 
the  Dardanelles  campaign  show  112,000  wounded  and  78.000  sick 
in  that  campaign  alone.  These  men  nearly  all  returned  to  England. 
An  idea  as  to  the  amount  of  hospital  capacity  required  in  home 
territory  may  be  gained  from  these  figures.  As  mentioned  in  the 
preface  of  this  study,  England  has  made  every  effort  to  utilize  her 
entire  medical  population  and  has  even  sought  medical  assistance 
abroad. 

II.  FRANCE. 

PEACE    ESTABLISHMENT. 

Tlie  military  service  in  Erance  are — (a)  the  Metropolitan  Army; 
(h)  the  Colonial  Forces;  (c)  the  Territorial  Army. 

Service  in  the  Metropolitan  Army  is  compulsory.  That  in  the 
Colonial  Forces  by  voluntary  enlistment.  All  males  between  the  ages 
of  18  and  45  are  liable  to  military  service.     This  service  is  divided 


16 

into  (a)  that  with  the  colors  (3  years) ;  (6)  that  in  the  Metropolitan 
Army  Eeserve  (10  years)  ;  (c)  that  in  the  Territorial  Army  (5  years) ; 
and  that  (final  service)  in  the  Territorial  Army  Reserve  (9  years). 

The  Metropolitan  Army  is  organized  into  the  Army  of  the  In- 
terior, comprising  19  army  corps  (472,946  officers  and  men),  and  the 
Algerian-Tunisian  Army,  comprising  four  infantry  divisions  (68,620 
officers  and  men).  The  colonial  forces  (49,500  officers  and  men)  are 
partly  French  and  partly  native  troops.  The  portion  serving  in 
France  forms  a  colonial  army  corps  of  three  divisions  of  infantry 
and  one  brigade  of  artillery. 

ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  MEDICAL  SERVICES. 

The  Metropolican  Army  and  the  Colonial  Forces  have  separate 
medical  services.  That  for  the  Metropolitan  Army  is  the  "  Service 
de  sante  de  I'armie  de  terre"  (army  medical  service).  That  for  the 
Colonial  Forces  is  the  "  Service  de  sante  des  troops  coloniales"  (colo- 
nial military  medical  service). 

SERVICE  DE  SANTE  DE  l'aRMIE  DE  TERRE. 

This  service  comprises — (a)  the  Corps  de  Sante  Militaire;  (&)  Offi- 
ciers  d'administration ;  (c)  Sections  d'infirmieres. 

CORPS    DE    SANTE    MILITAIRE. 

(Commissioned  medical  officers  and  pharmacists.) 
The  titles,  rank,  and  number  of  medical  officers  and  pharmacists  ii 
this  corps  are: 

MEDICAL  OFFICERS. 


Title. 


Rank. 


Number. 


M6decin  inspecteur  general 

M^decin  inspectenr 

Mt^decin  principal  de  premiere  classe . . . 
M^decin  principal  de  deuxi6.me  classe .  . 

M6de,cin  major  de  premiere  classe 

Medecin  major  de  deuxieme  classe 

Medecin  aide-major  de  premiere  classe. . 
Medecin  aide-major  de  deuxieme  classe. 


IJeutenant  general 

Maj  or  general 

Colonel 

Lieutenant  colonel . . . 

Major 

Captain 

Lieutenant 

Second  lieutenant 


5 

20 

50 

95 

370 

580 

.570 


Total. 


1,710 


PHARMACISTS. 


Pharmacien, 
Pharmacien, 
PharmacieTi, 
Pharmacien, 
I'harmacien, 
I'harmacien, 
I'harmacien, 

Total.. 


inspeclpur 

principal,  premiere  classe. . 
principal,  deuxieme  classe. 

major,  premiere  classe 

major,  oeuxieme  classe 

aide-major,  premiere  classe. 
aide-major,  deuxieme  classe 


Major  general 

Colonel 

Lieutenant  colonel . 

Major 

Captain 

Lieutenant 

Second  lieutenant.. 


5;i3 


17 

OFFICIERS   d'aDMINISTRATION". 

These  officers  f<;i-ni  one  of  the  four  sections  into  which  the  French 
Quartermaster  Corps  is  divided.  Their  service  is,  however,  exclu- 
sively with  the  Medical  Department,  and  they  are  under  the  com- 
mand of  the  senior  medical  officer  of  the  command  with  which  they 
are  stationed.  In  addition  to  administrative  duties  in  the  matter 
of  supply,  etc.,  the}^  act  as  company  officers  for  the  sections  d'in- 
firmieres. 

Their  titles,  rank,  and  numbers  are: 


Title. 

Rank. 

Number. 

Offieier  d'admiiiistration,  principal 

IS 

Officier  d'administration,  premiere elasse... 

Captain 

175 

Offieier  d'administration,  deuxifeme  elasse 

\           157 

OiTicier  d'administration,  troisi^me  elasse 

Second  lieutenant 

Total 

350 

SECTION  d'iNFIRMIERE    (HOSPITAL  CORPS). 

The  army  hospital  corps  is  organized  into  25  sections  under  regu- 
lations as  regards  discipline  and  interior  economy  similar  to  infantry 
units.  One  section  is  usually  assigned  to  each  corps.  The  strength 
of  each  of  these  sections  varies  according  to  requirements  and  is 
fixed  by  the  minister  of  war.  They  vary  in  peace  from  GO  to  800 
men. 

Recruits  are  received  direct  into  these  sections,  or  men  may  be 
transferred  from  combatant  units.  After  a  period  of  preliminary 
drill  and  instruction  they  are  distributed  to  the  various  hospitals  in 
the  army  corps  to  which  their  section  is  attached  for  duty  as  hos- 
pital attendants. 


SANITARY   SOLDIERS   BELONGING  TO   C0:MBATANT   UNITS. 

In  addition  to  the  soldiers  of  the  sections  d'infirmieres  whose 
services  are  confined  to  military  hospitals,  there  are  three  classes 
of  men  belonging  to  combatant  units,  but  performing  medical  service 
under  the  medical  officers  attached  to  those  units.  These  sanitary 
soldiers  are  (a)  soldat  infirmieres  (hospital  attendants),  {h)  soldat 
brancardiers  (litter  bearers),  (c)  brancardiers  d'ambulance  (litter 
bearers  obtained  from  bandsmen,  mechanics,  and  others),  (d)  mede- 
cine  auxiliares  (doctors  or  medical  students  in  second  year  of  serv- 
ice; these  men  hold  W' arrant  rank). 

In  peace  two  men  (soldat  infirmieres)  are  detailed  from  each 
battalion  of  infantry,  artillery,  or  engineers,  and  four  from  each 

30669°— No.  533—16 -3 


18 

regiment  of  cavalry  or  artillery  for  service  under  the  medical  officers 
attached  to  the  organization.  Their  duties  are  assisting  in  caring 
for  the  sick  of  the  organization  who  do  not  require  extensive  hospital 
treatment. 

Four  men  in  each  company  of  infantry  or  engineers  and  in  each 
battery  of  field  or  foot  artillery  are  designated  soldat  brancardieres 
and  are  trained  while  serving  with  their  organization  in  the  work 
of  litter  bearers.  Their  services  are  not  utilized  as  litter  bearers  in 
time  of  peace  (except  during  maneuvers),  but  upon  mobilization 
they  take  up  these  duties. 

Any  bandsmen,  mechanics,  etc.,  in  excess  of  the  number  required 
as  litter  bearers  for  the  regimental  units  are  also  trained  in  duties 
of  litter  bearers.  They  are  designated  brancardiers  d'ambulance, 
and  on  mobilization  they,  together  with  reservists  and  unattached 
men  from  the  sections  d'infirmieres  militaire,  form  the  litter  squads 
for  bearer  companies. 

ADMINISTRATION    AND    DISTRIBUTION    OF    PERSONNEIj. 

Each  corps  or  district  has  a  Principal  Medical  Officer  with  rank,  of 
major  general  (or  colonel),  with  one. major  (corps  de  sante)  and  two 
officiers  d'administration  as  assistants.  The  duties  of  these  officei's 
comprise  not  only  the  general  administration  and  inspection  of  the 
medical  service  of  the  standing  army,  but  that  of  the  reserves  and 
territorial  army  also. 

A  large  proportion  of  the  junior  medical  officers  are  assigned  to 
regiments  and  smaller  units  for  service  directly  with  those  units. 

Other  medical  officers  are  distributed  to  the  large  militar_y  hos- 
pitals and  to  duty  with  civil  hospitals  in  which  army  patients  are 
treated. 

THE   COLONIAL  MEDICAL  SERVICE. 

This  service  is  similar  in  organization  to  that  for  the  Metropolitan 
Army.     The  commissioned  personnel  comprises: 

MEDICAL    OFFICERS. 


Title. 


M(^decin-inspecteur  general 

M^decin-inspecteiir 

Mtklecin-principal  premiere  cla?se . , 
M(5decin-principal  deuxifeme  classe . 

Mpdecin-major  premiere  classe 

Medecin-major  deuxiSme  classe 

Aide-major,  premiere  classe 

Aide-major,  deuxi&me  classe 


Total. 


Rank. 


Lieutenant  general 

Major  general , 

Colonel , 

Lieutenant  colonel 

Major 

Captain 

Lieutenant 

Second  lieutenant 


Number.     ^ 


1 
1 

12 

IS 

ss 

175 


533 


19 

PHARMACISTS. 


Pharmacien  principal,  premiere  classe 

Pharmacien  principal,  deuxieme  classe... 

Pharmacien  major,  premiere  classe 

Pharmacien  major,  deuxieme  classe 

Pharmacien  aide-major,  premise  classe  . . 
Pharmacien  aide-major,  deuxieme  classe  . 


Total. 


\ 


Colonel 

Lieutenant  colonel 

Major 

Captain 

Lieutenant 

Second  lieutenant 


ENLISTED  PERSONNEL. 

The  enlisted  personnel  comprises  1  section  d'infirmieres  and  the 
personnel  supplied  by  combatant  units.  Men  for  the  section  d'in- 
firmieres are  enlisted  in  France  and  sent  to  the  colonies  after  a 
period  of  instruction  in  the  home  depots.  The  regimental  medical 
personnel  is  native. 

WAR  ORGANIZATION. 

With  the  headquarters  staff  of  each  field  army  is  a  "Medical  In- 
spector General "  (lieutenant  general)  or  "  Medical  Inspector  "  (major 
general)  with  a  staff  of  1  medical  major,  1  supply  officer,  and  3  cooks. 

With  each  corps  is  a  "Medical  Inspector"  (major  general)  or 
"Principal  Medical  Officer,  first  class"  (colonel)  with  a  staff  of  1 
lieutenant,  medical  corps;  1  supply  officer  and  4  enlisted  men,  hos- 
pital corps  (including  1  cyclist). 

With  each  division  headquarters  is  a  "Principal  Medical  Officer, 
second  class"  (lieutenant  colonel).  His  staff  consists  of  2  privates, 
hospital  corps  (1  being  a  cyclist). 

REGIjMENTAL  SERVICE. 

In  time  of  war  this  service  is  increased  by  the  incorporation  of 
reserve  officers,  regimental  hospital  attendants,  and  regimental  litter 
bearers  from  the  reserves.  The  war  personnel  consists  of  7  medical 
officers  (3  from  the  reserve),  12  attendants,  and  92  litter  bearers  (40 
from  the  band). 

MOBILE  FIELD  UNITS. 

The  field  hospitals  formerly  forming  part  of  the  medical  service 
for  each  corps  have  recently  been  abolished,  and  wounded  are  now 
removed  directly  from  the  dressing  stations  to  the  evacuation  hos- 
])ita]s  at  the  rail  head.  The  mobile  medical  units  attached  to  each 
division  are  noAv  4  field  ambulance  sections,  3  sections  d'hospitaliza- 
tion,  and  1  bearer  company. 

Those  attached  to  each  corps  are  1  cavalry  ambulance  section  and 
1  corps  bearer  company. 

533 


I 


20 

AMBTTLANCE  SECTIONS. 

Ambulance  sections  establish  dressing  stations.  Each  section  has 
a  personnel  of  6  medical  officers,  1  pharmacist,  2  supply  officers,  2 
noncommissioned  officers,  and  36  privates,  hospital  corps,  and  1  non- 
commissioned officer  and  9  privates,  train  troops.  Three  enlisted 
men  are  also  provided  as  officers'  orderlies.  The  transportation  con-  fl 
sists  of  5  riding  horses,  14  draft  animals,  and  6  wagons  (1  for  per- 
sonnel and  5  for  supplies). 

SECTIONS  d'hOSPITALIZATION. 

These  sections  furnish  additional  personnel  and  supplies  to  ambu-  S 

lance  sections  temporarily  immobilized.     The  personnel  of  each  sec-  I 

tion  is  1  medical  officer,  3  noncommissioned  officers,  and  1  private,  I 
hospital  corps,  and  1  noncommissioned  officer  and  3  privates,  train 
troops.     The  transportation  is  1  riding  horse,  6  draft  animals,  and  3 

wagons.  1 

DIVISIONAL  BEARER   COMPANIES. 

These  sections  work  in  conjunction  with  the  ambulance  sections. 

The  personnel  consists  of  6  medical  officers  (4  of  whom  are  warrant 
officers  from  the  reserve),  2  supply  officers,  1  transport  officer,  1 
chaplain,  6  noncommissioned  officers,  and  132  privates,  hospital 
corps;  and  4  noncommissioned  officers  and  58  privates,  train  troops; 
total,  10  officers  and  194  enlisted  men.  Transportation  comprises  14 
riding  horses,  59  draft  animals,  11  ambulances,  9  wagons,  and  1 
rolling  kitchen. 

CAVALRY  AMBULANCES. 

Personnel :  3  medical  officers,  1  supply  officer,  1  chaplain,  8  pri- 
vates, hospital  corps;  9  privates,  train  troops;  4  officers'  orderlies. 

Transportation:  5  riding  horses,  14  draft  animals,  2  carts,  and 
ambulances. 

CORPS  BEARER  COMPANIES. 

These  companies  are  similar  to  division  bearer  companies  but  arc 
larger.  Their  personnel  comprises  9  medical  officers  (G  being  war-j 
rant  officers  from  the  reserve),  2  supply  officers,  1  transport  officer,  ij 
veterinarian,  4  chaplains,  14  noncommissioned  officers,  and  205  pri- 
vates, hospital  corps;  5  noncommissioned  officers  and  73  privates,! 
train  troops;  and  5  ollicers'  orderlies;  total,  17  officers  and  298  en-J 
listed  men. 

Transportation  consists  of  19  riding  horses,  79  draft  animals,  llj 
ambulances  and  17  wagons,  and  1  rolling  kitchen. 

533 


21 

LINES   OF   COMMUNICATION. 

The  French  system  of  medical  service  contemplates  rapid  evacua- 
tion of  wounded  from  the  zone  of  combat  to  the  zone  of  the  interior. 
For  this  reason  temporary  hospitals  (evacuation  hospitals)  are  estab- 
lished at  the  head  of  the  lines  of  communication  and  wounded  evac- 
uated directly  from  the  front  into  these  hospitals. 

EVACUATION  HOSPITALS. 

These  hospitals  are  established  at  the  railhead  in  the  proportion 
of  one  to  each  corps.  Their  personnel  comprises  8  medical  officers, 
2  pharmacists,  2  quartermasters,  12  noncommissioned  officers,  and  40 
privates,  hospital  corps.  Their  equipment  consists  of  200  litters 
which  are  used  as  beds.  Medical  and  surgical  supplies  and  cookery 
utensils  are  secured  from  the  medical  advanced  supply  depot. 

AUXILIARY  CONVOYS. 

When  occasion  demands  all  wagons  and  personnel  of  the  train 
troops  under  the  commander  of  the  line  of  communications  are,  upon 
request  of  the  principal  medical  officer,  organized  into  an  auxiliary 
convoy  and  placed  vmder  his  direction  for  use  in  quickly  evacuating 
the  wounded  from  the  field  units.  These  convoys  consist  of  720 
wagons  in  four  sections  of  180  wagons  each. 

MOTOR  AMBULANCE  SECTIONS. 

Recently  motor  ambulance  sections  have  been  organized  in  the  pro- 
portion of  one  to  each  corps.  They  are  employed  in  the  daily  evacua- 
tion of  the  sick  from  the  front  to  the  railhead  and  in  taking  up  sani- 
tary materiel  to  replace  that  expended  at  the  front.  These  sections 
are  composed  of  from  18  to  24  motor  cars,  one  of  which  is  a  repair 
car.  Recommendation  has  recently  been  made  that  the  number  of 
these  motor  ambulances  be  increased  to  60.  The  carrying  capacity 
is  about  120  patients,  40  recumbent  and  80  sitting  up. 


ft 


RESERVE   MEDICAL  PERSONNEL. 

Detachments  of  reserve  medical  personnel  for  the  purpose  of  estab- 
lishing improvised  hospitals  are  maintained  in  the  proportion  of  4 
to  each  corps.  These  detachments  consist  of  1  medical  officer  phar- 
macist, 1  quartermaster,  1  warrant  medical  officer,  5  noncommissioned 
officers,  and  39  privates  of  the  hospital  corps.  Recent  recommenda- 
tions of  a  committee  appointed  to  investigate  the  French  medical 

533 


22 

service  include  one  to  the  effect  that  special  surgical  units  similar  to 
the  surgical  units  in  the  Austrian  service  be  organized  in  the  propor- 
tion of  one  to  each  corps,  their  duties  being  to  perform  the  most 
serious  surgical  work. 

HOSPITAL  TRAINS. 

Hospital  trains  are  largely  used  for  carrying  patients  direct  from 
the  zone  of  advance  to  the  zone  of  the  interior,  and  in  this  latter  the 
permanent  hospitals  are  established.  Five  of  these  trains  were  main- 
tained in  time  of  peace.  They  were  prepared  by  the  railway  com- 
panies who  maintain  and  use  them  for  ordinary  traffic.  The  cars 
were  specially  constructed  for  conversion  into  hospital  cars  whenever 
the  order  for  mobilization  is  given.  The  railway  companies  keep 
ready  all  the  necessary  fittings  for  the  conversion  of  these  cars,  while 
the  army  medical  department  keeps  ready  in  its  storehouses  addi- 
tional materiel  necessary  for  forming  complete  rolling  hospitals. 
Two  hundred  and  fifty  such  hospital  trains,  with  a  carrying  capacity 
of  100,000  patients,  are  at  present  in  use  in  France. 

ZONE  or  THE  INTERIOR. 

France  has  in  time  of  peace  40  military  hospitals  with  a  capacity 
of  10,192  patients,  and  there  are  many  large  civil  hospitals  available 
for  military  use.  In  addition  to  these,  however,  France  has  found  it 
necessary  to  establish  5,000  territorial  hospitals  with  a  total  bed  capa- 
city of  000,000  patients.  The  j^ersonnel  of  all  these  permanent  hos- 
pitals and  for  most  of  the  work  on  lines  of  communication  has  been 
obtained  from  the  reserves  and  from  voluntary  aid  societies. 

III.  GERMANY. 

There  are  two  main  divisions  of  the  military  service  in  Germany- 
(a)  regular  service;  (6)  service  in  the  "Landsturm." 

All  males  between  the  ages  of  17  and  45  are  required  to  perform 
service  in  one  or  the  other  of  these  main  divisions. 

Men  selected  for  the  regular  service  serve  7  years  with  the  stand- 
ing army  (3  with  the  colors  and  4  in  the  reserve) ,  and  are  then  passed 
into  the  "  Landwehr,"  where  they  continue  service  until  their  thirty- 
ninth  year.  Service  from  the  thirty-ninth  to  the  forty-fifth  year  is  in 
the  "Landsturm." 

Men  who  for  any  reason  are  not  required  to  serve  in  the  standing 
army  are  placed  in  the  "  Ersatz  "  reserve  (special  reserve)  for  12 
years,  and  then  passed  to  the  Landsturm. 

Men  of  good  education  who  clothe  and  feed  themselves  during  their 
service  are  known  as"  Einjahrige  Freiwillige "  (one-year  volunteers), 

588 


23 

and  are  passed  into  the  reserve  of  the  standing  army  after  one  year  of 
service  with  the  colors. 

The  Landsturm  is  composed  of  (a)  men  between  the  ages  of  17 
and  20;  (6)  those  between  the  ages  of  39  and  45;  (c)  men  from  the 
Ersatz  reserve;  and  (d)  men  who  are  for  some  reason  exempt  from 
regular  service. 

THE  STANDING  ARMY. 

The  standing  army,  as  organized  in  peace,  consists  of  25  army 
corps  and  1  cavalry  division,  besides  special  troops,  schools,  etc. 
(Total  strength,  budget,  1912,  644,267  officers  and  men.) 

These  corps  are  distributed,  19  in  Prussia,  2  in  Saxony,  1  in  Wurt- 
temberg,  and  3  in  Bavaria.  Each  of  these  independent  kingdoms  has 
its  own  war  office  and  administers  its  oAvn  army,  but,  combined,  they 
form  the  army  of  the  German  Empire. 

GENERAL  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  MEDICAL  SERVICE. 

The  Sanitats  Korps. — The  army  medical  department  is  called  the 
Sanitats  Korps  and  is  composed  of  the  following  elements:  {a)  "The 
Sanitats  offizier  korps"  or  corps  of  medical  officers  (Prussia,  Saxony, 
and  Bavaria  each  have  a  separate  corps  of  this  character)  ;  (5)  the 
"Sanitats  offizier  diensttuer";  (c)  the  "Sanitats  mannschaft";  {d) 
the  "  Militarkranenwarter  " ;  (e)  "  Krankentrager  " ;  (/)  apothecary 
officials;  {g)  quartermaster  officials ;  {h)  army  nursing  sisters. 

The  Sanitats  Oifizier  Korps. — This  is  a  corps  of  commissioned 
medical  officers.    The  titles,  rank,  and  number  of  these  officers  are ; 


Title. 

Rank. 

Number. 

General  stabsarzt 

Lieutenant  general 

1 

General  arzt  and  sanitats  inspecteur 

4 

General  arzt 

Colonel 

25 

General  ober  arzt 

Lieutenant  colonel 

60 

Oberstabsarzt 

494 

Stabsarzt 

640 

Assistenarzt 

1,143 

Total 

2,367 

THE    SANITATS    OFFIZIER    DIENSTTUER. 

This  is  an  auxiliary  corps  to  the  corps  of  permanent  medical 
officers  and  is  a  most  important  element  in  the  German  medical 
service.  It  is  composed  of  {a)  medical  men  who  are  doing  their 
service  with  the  colors  as  one-year  volunteers  and  who  are  appointed 
to  junior  positions  in  the  medical  corps  (Oberarzt  or  Assistenarzt) 
and  (5)  medical  students  who  have  practically  completed  their 
medical  studies  and  are  doing  their  regular  military  service.  These 
latter  serve  with  the  medical  corps  as  warrant  officers  (TJnterarzte) . 

633 


24 

The  presence  of  these  men  in  subordinate  positions  permits  the 
maintenance  of  a  permanent  commissioned  medical  personnel  very 
much  smaller  than  would  otherwise  be  required  and  provides  a  large 
supply  of  reserve  medical  officers  for  war. 

THE  SANITATS  MANNSCHAFT. 

The  Sanitats  Mannschaft  is  recruited  entirely  from  men  in  the 
combatant  units  of  all  arms  who  have  completed  one  year  of  service 
with  their  unit.  They  may  be  either  men  who  have  volunteered  for 
service  in  the  medical  corps  or  men  who  have  been  transferred  to 
that  corps  by  command.  After  being  transferred  these  men  are  sent 
for  a  six  months'  tour  of  instruction  to  the  largest  garrison  hospital 
in  the  district  where  they  are  serving.  While  serving  at  these  hos- 
pitals they  are  given  a  graded  course  of  instruction  in  all  the  duties 
of  sanitary  soldiers.  Upon  completion  of  the  course  each  man  is 
examined  and  if  found  proficient  is  returned  to  his  original  organi- 
zation for  duty  with  the  medical  service  thereof.  Noncommissioned 
officers  of  the  Sanitats  Mannschaft  are  not  all  returned  to  their  units 
but  many  continue  their  service  in  various  military  hospitals. 

The  various  ranks  in  the  Sanitats  Mannschaft  are :  Sanitats  Feld- 
webel  (sergeant  major),  Sanitats  Yize  Feldwebel  (quartermaster 
sergeant),  Sanitats  Sergeant  (sergeant),  Sanitats  Unteroffizier 
(corporal),  Sanitats  Gefreiter  (lance  corporal),  Sanitats  Soldat 
(private). 

THE  MILITAR  KRANKENWARTER. 

These  men  are  enlisted  directly  into  the  medical  corps  and  perform 
the  whole  of  their  service  with  the  colors  as  hospital  attendants  in 
the  larger  military  hospitals.  The  number  of  men  in  this  class  is 
determined  by  the  hospital  requirements  of  each  army  corps  accord- 
ing to  estimates  prepared  yearly  by  the  principal  medical  officer 
thereof. 

THE  KRANKENTRAGER    (lITTER  BEARERS ). 

Litter  bearers  for  the  army  are  not  incorporated  into  the  army 
medical  service.  Every  combatant  unit  trains  a  certain  number  of  its 
personnel  in  the  duties  of  litter  bearers.  Each  company  of  infantry, 
cavalry,  foot  artillery,  and  engineers  trains  annually  four  men,  and 
each  machine-gun  battery  and  field  artillery  battery  trains  annually 
two  men  in  these  duties.  Upon  mobilization  men  so  trained  are 
assigned  exclusively  to  bearer  duty  with  their  organizations,  and 
men  so  trained  who  have  passed  into  the  reserve  are,  upon  mobiliza- 
tion, assigned  to  duty  with  bearer  companies  in  the  medical  battalion. 

633 


25 

APOTHECARIES  AND  QUARTERMASTERS. 

The  duties  required  of  apothecaries  and  quartermasters  are  per- 
formed by  men  belonging  to  the  class  known  as  military  officials. 
They  are  not  commissioned  officers,  although  those  in  the  higher 
grades  have  military  titles. 

ADMINISTItATION   AND  DISTRIBUTION   OF  PERSONNEL. 

The  general  administration  of  the  medical  department  is  under 
the  Director  General  of  Medical  Services,  with  rank  of  Lieutenant 
General  and  stationed  in  the  war  office  in  Berlin.  His  personal  staff 
consists  of  1  colonel,  3  majors,  and  3  captains,  medical  corps. 
Directly  under  him  are  4  "  General  Arzte  und  Sanitats  Inspecteurs," 
with  rank  of  major  general.  One  of  these  officers  is  assigned  to  duty 
with  each  of  the  four  military  districts  into  which  the  Prussian 
Army  is  divided.  Their  duties  are  the  general  inspection  of  medical 
and  sanitary  matters  in  their  districts.  Each  has  one  captain,  medi- 
cal corps,  as  assistant. 

At  each  army  corps  headquarters  is  a  "Korps  Arzt,"  with  rank  of 
colonel.  He  is  in  charge  of  all  medical  matters  pertaining  not  only 
to  the  active  army  but  also  to  the  reserve,  Landwehr,  Landsturm,  and 
voluntary  aid  societies  within  his  corps.  His  assistants  are  1  captain, 
1  apothecary,  and  2  clerks,  medical  corps. 

Each  division  has  a  "Division  Arzt,"  with  rank  of  lieutenant 
colonel  as  principal  medical  officer  of  the  division. 

Medical  officers  are  distributed  in  each  corps  for  duty  with  troops 
or  at  garrison  hospitals.  Forty-five  medical  officers  are  on  duty  as 
professors  and  instructors  in  the  army  medical  school  in  Berlin. 

Medical  service  is  provided  in  regimental  infirmaries  and  garrison 
hospitals.  A  garrison  hospital  is  established  in  all  garrisons  having 
a  strength  of  600  or  more  men. 

Each  combatant  unit  has  a  fixed  medical  personnel.  A  major, 
medical  corps,  is  attached  to  the  staff  of  each  regiment  and  a 
captain,  medical  corps,  to  each  battalion.  In  addition  to  the  regular 
officers  there  are  also  attached  a  number  of  subaltern  officers  from 
the  Diensttner.  In  many  garrisons  a  retired  medical  oflicer  is  on 
duty  as  garrison  surgeon  for  attendance  on  officers'  families  and 
officials  not  belonging  to  combatant  units. 

The  enlisted  medical  personnel  comprises  one  noncommissioned 
officer  and  one  private  of  the  Sanitatsmannschaft  with  each  company 
and  the  litter  bearers  mentioned  above. 

The  junior  medical  officers  for  duty  wdth  garrison  hospitals  are 

derived  from  those  detailed  for  such  service  from  the  regiment  to 

which  they  are  attached.    Such  details  are  for  a  period  of  one  year. 

30669°— No.  533—16— 


26 

The  enlisted  personnel  for  hospitals  is  derived  from  members  of  the 
Sanitatsmannschaft  and  from  Militar  Krankenwarter. 

WAR  ORGANIZATION. 

The  general  direction  of  the  medical  services  in  time  of  war  is 
under  a  "  Chef  des  Feld — Sanitiits  wesens,"  with  rank  of  lieutenant 
general,  who  belongs  to  the  staff  of  the  Imperial  Headquarters. 

On  the  headquarters  staff  of  each  field  army  is  the  "  Armee-arzt" 
with  rank  of  major  general.  His  personal  staff  consists  of  two  Ober 
arzt  and  one  Stabsarzt.  On  the  staff  of  each  army  corps  commander 
is  a  "Korpsarzt"  (colonel),  with  two  assistants  (one  as  major  and 
sanitary  officer). 

In  addition  to  the  regular  medical  officers  at  army  corps  head- 
quarters there  is  one  "  consulting  surgeon  "  with  the  rank  of  colonel, 
lieutenant  colonel,  or  major.  This  consulting  surgeon  is  appointed 
by  the  Emperor,  on  the  recommendation  of  the  Director  General  of 
Medical  Services,  from  amongst  civil  surgeons  of  eminence. 

On  the  staff  of  each  division  commander  is  the  "Division  arzt" 
(lieutenant  colonel),  with  one  assistant. 

The  Director  of  the  Medical  Services  on  lines  of  communication  is 
an  important  position  in  the  German  service.  There  is  one  such 
official  to  each  field  army,  and  he  is  known  as  the  "  Etappenarzt," 
with  rank  of  colonel.  Under  his  direction  are  the  "  Krieglazaretten 
directoren"  (directors  of  hospitals),  one  to  each  corps  of  which  the 
field  army  is  composed,  and  a  "  consulting  sanitary  officer,"  appointed 
from  among  eminent  civilian  physicians  in  the  same  manner  as  the 
consulting  surgeon  is  appointed  at  corps  headquarters. 

MEDICAL   PERSONNEL   WITH    COMBATANT   ORGANIZATIONS. 

There  are  2  medical  officers,  4  men  from  the  Sanitatsmannschaft, 
and  16  litter  bearers  with  each  battalion  of  infantry  or  similar  units. 
The  litter  bears,  while  belonging  to  the  combatant  units,  are  carried 
on  the  rolls  of  their  organizations  as  noncombatants  and  therefore 
wear  the  Red  Cross  crosses.  They  are,  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  a 
part  of  the  medical  organization. 

SANITATS    BATAILLON. 

One  "  sanitiits  bataillon  "  is  attached  to  each  corps.  This  unit  is 
analogous  to  the  sanitary  train  in  our  service  and  comprises  3 
bearer  companies  and  12  field  hospitals.  It  is  commanded  by  a 
major  of  the  line,  with  an  adjutant  and  a  detachment  of  enlisted 
men,  also  from  the  line.  The  commanding  officer  of  the  battalion 
directs  its  movement  and  the  movement  of  the  units  of  which  it  is 

533 


27 

composed.  He  does  not,  however,  control  the  administration  of 
the  field  hospitals  belonging  to  the  battalion ;  these  being  under  the 
direction  of  the  senior  medical  officer. 

Similarly,  too,  a  divided  authority  exists  in  the  bearer  companies. 
These  organizations  are  commanded  by  line  officers  and  their  enlisted 
personnel  is  obtained  from  reserve  soldiers  of  the  line,  but  accompany- 
ing each  bearer  company  is  a  dressing-station  section  composed  of 
eight  medical  officers  who,  while  nominally  attached  to  the  bearer  com- 
panies, are  not  under  the  authority  of  its  commander.  They  are, 
however,  dependent  upon  him  for  the  enlisted  personnel  necessary 
to  assist  in  the  work  of  the  dressing  station.  This  divided  authority 
in  the  German  field  medical  units  somewhat  impairs  their  efficiency 
and  has  proven  a  frequent  source  of  friction. 

The  personnel  of  each  bearer  company  is  4  officers,  36  noncom- 
missioned officers,  and  208  privates  from  the  line ;  4  noncommisioned 
officers  and  28  privates  from  train  troops;  and  1  officer,  9  noncom- 
missioned officers,  and  8  privates  from  the  medical  corps,  composing 
the  bearer  company  proper;  and  8  medical  officers  composing  the 
dressing-station  section.  Total,  13  officers,  49  noncommissioned  offi- 
cers, and  244  privates. 

The  transportation  consists  of  21  riding  horses,  26  draft  animals, 
8  ambulances,  and  5  wagons. 

FIELD   HOSPITALS. 

The  general  direction  of  field  hospitals  is  under  the  Korps  Arzt, 
who  controls  their  disposition  by  orders  issued  through  the  corps 
commander.  Each  field  hospital  has  a  capacity  of  200  patients  and 
is  capable  of  expansion.  Its  personnel  comprises  6  medical  officers, 
1  apothecary,  2  quartermasters,  11  noncommissioned  officers,  and  17 
privates,  medical  corps;  and  2  noncommissioned  officers  and  19 
privates,  train  troops.  Total,  6  officers,  3  officials,  13  noncommis- 
sioned officers,  and  36  privates. 

The  transportation  consists  of  9  riding  horses,  18  draft  animals,  1 
ambulance,  and  8  wagons. 

LINES  OF   COMMUNICATION. 

The  service  at  the  head  of  a  line  of  communication  is  slightly  dif- 
ferent from  that  in  other  armies.  For  the  care  of  wounded  two  dis- 
tinct units  are  organized  in  the  proportion  of  1  of  each  to  each  corps. 
These  units  are  a  "  war  hospital  detachment "  and  a  "  wounde  dtrans- 
port  detachment."  These  two  units  combined  perform  the  work  of 
the  evacuation  hospitals  in  our  service,  but  they  are  more  mobile  and 
operate  independently. 
I  ess 


28 

The  function  of  the  war  hospital  detachments  is  to  take  over  from 
the  field  hospitals  such  wounded  as  can  not  bear  further  transporta- 
tion.    In  other  words,  they  become  immobilized  field  hospitals. 

Their  personnel  consists  of  19  medical  officers,  1  dentist,  3  apothe- 
caries, and  6  quartermaster  officials,  3  clerks,  3  cooks,  27  noncom- 
missioned officers,  and  36  privates,  medical  corps ;  and  26  privates  of 
train  troop.    Total,  19  officers,  10  officials,  and  95  enlisted  men. 

These  units  have  no  authorized  equipment,  but  obtain  it  from  the 
field  hospitals  they  relieve  (which  in  turn  are  replenished  from  the 
advanced  medical-supply  depot)  or  from  local  resources. 

The  wounded  transport  detachment  also  has  no  fixed  equipment, 
but  obtains  it  as  needed  from  local  sources  or  from  the  medical- 
supply  depot.  Its  personnel  comf)rises  7  medical  officers,  6  noncom- 
missioned officers,  and  6  privates,  medical  corps ;  and  8  privates  from 
train  troops. 

The  duties  of  these  detachments  are  to  establish  dressing  and  re- 
freshment stations  at  the  railhead  or  other  points  where  large  num- 
bers of  wounded  are  being  brought  for  disposition.  At  the  dressing 
or  collecting  station  the  wounded  are  classified,  and  those  able  to 
bear  transportation  are  turned  over  to  the  hospital  trains.  Those 
not  able  to  bear  railroad  transportation  are  sent  to  the  nearest  hos- 
pital. For  this  latter  purpose  all  available  transportation  in  the 
vicinity,  including  army  transportation,  is  utilized  by  these  detach- 
ments. 

Both  the  war  hospital  detachments  and  the  wounded  transport 
detachments  are  under  the  direction  of  the  Etappenarzt  and  form 
freely  movable  units  of  personnel,  which  can  be  utilized  to  establish 
hospitals  and  collecting  stations  at  the  most  convenient  places. 

Like  the  other  European  nations,  Germany  has  largely  employed 
motor  ambulances  for  evacuating  wounded  from  the  front.  No  de- 
tails of  the  organization  of  this  service  are  available. 

Outside  of  the  zone  of  advance  Germany  makes  free  use  of  her 
civilian  population  and  voluntary  aid  societies.  At  frequent  inter- 
vals along  the  line  she  establishes  base  hospitals.  The  command  of 
these  hospitals  is  always  given  to  a  regular  medical  officer  of  the 
active  or  retired  list,  but  the  routine  hospital  work  is  done  by  local 
civil  practitioners. 

If  no  regular  medical  officer  is  available  to  command  such  a  hos- 
pital, the  control  is  placed  under  a  "  hospital  committee  "  consisting 
of  a  line  officer  and  a  civil  surgeon.  A  similar  arrangement  is  in 
effect  in  the  home  territory,  where  each  garrison  hospital  is  sup- 
plemented and  used  as  a  "reserve  hospital"  (general  hospital). 
Eminent  physicians  and  surgeons  from  civil  life  are  employed  in 
these  hospitals. 

533 


29 

HOSPITAL  TRAINS. 

Germam^  has  in  service  150  regularly  equipped  hospital  trains. 
The  capacity  of  these  trains  is  about  250  patients  each,  and  they 
are  complete  rolling  hospitals  with  a  fixed  medical  personnel. 

In  addition  to  these  hospital  trains  she  uses  ambulance  trains 
consisting  of  cars  returning  from  the  front  and  temporarily  equipped 
for  patients  by  supplies  kept  for  that  purpose  at  the  advanced  supply 
depots.  These  trains  have  no  fixed  personnel,  hut  as  a  rule  are  pro- 
vided with  two  medical  officers,  two  noncommissioned  officers,  and 
12  attendants  for  each  100  patients.  Ordinary  passenger  coaches  are 
also  utilized  for  carrying  wounded  not  requiring  more  elaborate 
transportation.  Medical  officers  do  not  accompany  these  trains,  but 
they  supervise  the  loading  and  unloading.  Attendance  en  route  is 
furnished  by  voluntary  aid  societies. 

HOME   TERRITORY. 

All  garrison  hospitals  in  time  of  war  become  "  reserve  hospitals  " 
(general  hospitals).  The  capacity  of  these  hospitals  is  increased  by 
erecting  additional  buildings  and  by  utilizing  other  buildings  as 
branch  hospitals.  Regular  army  medical  officers  are  always  in  com- 
mand of  these  hospitals,  but  civil  surgeons  are  largely  utilized  for 
the  personnel. 

As  with  other  European  nations  the  greater  part  of  Germany's 
wounded  are  promptly  transported  to  well-equipped  hospitals  in 
home  territory. 

IV.  AUSTRIA-HUNGARY. 

The  military  service  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire  is  divided 
into — (a)  the  Landwehr,  or  national  army  of  Austria;  (b)  the 
Honved,  or  national  army  of  Hungary ;  (c)  the  Gemeinsames  Heer, 
or  common  army  of  both  countries;  (d)  the  Landsturm,  or  second 
reserve  of  xVustria  and  Hungary. 

All  males  betAveen  the  ages  of  19  and  42  are  liable  to  military 
service,  and  it  is  decided  by  lot  whether  such  service  will  be  in  a 
national  army  or  in  the  common  army.  Actual  service  begins  at  the 
age  of  21  and  lasts  for  12  years. 

Men  drawing  assignment  to  the  common  arm}'  serve  three  years 
with  the  colors  and  seven  years  in  the  reserve  of  that  army.  They 
then  serve  an  additional  two  years  in  the  reserve  of  a  national  army, 
and  at  the  expiration  of  this  service  pass  to  the  Landsturm,  where 
they  are  available  to  call  until  they  reach  the  age  of  45. 

Men  drawing  assignment  to  a  national  army  serve  two  years  with 
the  colors  of  that  army  and  ten  years  in  its  reserve.  They  then  pass 
to  the  Landsturm. 

533 


30 

Men  not  required  to  keep  up  the  standing  armies  to  required 
strength  are  given  eight  weeks'  training  and  then  passed  into  the 
Ersatz  reserve. 

All  men  between  the  ages  of  19  and  21  and  those  men  who  have 
completed  service  in  one  or  the  other  of  the  armies  form  until  their 
forty-second  year  the  Landsturm  or  second  reserve. 

The  peace  strength  of  the  three  armies  is : 

Officers  and  men: 

Common  army 370,  725 

Austrian  Army 55, 195 

Hungarian   Army 42,  800 

Total 468,  720 

ORGANIZATION  OF  THE   MEDICAL  SERVICE. 

The  medical  service  is  composed  of  the  following  elements: 
(a)  The  Militar  arzliches  Offiziers  Korp  (medical  officers'  corps) 
(6)  the  Sanitiits  triippe  (hospital  corps,  officers  and  men)  ;  (c)  the 
"  Sanitiits  hilf personnel  bei  den  triippen  "  (men  belonging  to  com- 
batant units  but  employed  in  the  medical  service  with  those  units)  ; 
{d)  medicamenten  beamte  (medical  officials,  pharmacists,  and  supply 
officers);   (e)  nursing  sisters;   (/)   voluntary  aid  personnel. 

THE  MILITAR  ARZLICHES  OFFICERS'  KORP. 

Each  army  has  a  separate  corps  of  commissioned  medical  officers. 
The  titles,  rank,  and  numbers  in  these  corps  are : 


Rank. 

Number. 

Common 
Army. 

Land- 
wehr. 

Honved. 

Total. 

Lieutenant  General 

Major  General 

1 

8 

50 

75 

154 

711 

229 

1 

1 

6 
15 
19 
152 
10 

1 
8 
10 
22 
122 
15 

10 

Colonel . 

64 

Oberstabsarzt,  second  klasse 

Lieutenant  colonel 

100 

195 

985 

Oberarzt 

Lieutenant    

254 

Total 

1,228 

203 

178 

1,609 

THE    SANITATS    TRUPPE. 


This  corps,  while  organized  as  a  distinct  corps,  is  in  fact  a  sub- 
ordinate part  of  the  medical  officers'  corps,  being  somewhat  similar 
to  the  Hospital  Corps  in  our  service.  The  officers  are  not  medical 
men  and  have  no  medical  training.  They  are  line  officers  and  are 
commissioned  directly  into  the  corps  in  the  same  way  that  officers 


31 

are  commissioned  into  the  combatant  branches  of  the  army.  They 
may  subsequently  exchange  with  officers  of  combatant  units,  and 
officers  of  combatant  units  may  exchange  with  officers  of  this  corps, 
especially  if  they  are  unfit,  for  medical  reasons,  for  combatant  duties. 

The  officers  of  this  corps  are  in  direct  command  of  the  detachments 
of  enlisted  personnel  and  have  the  relative  position  of  company 
officers.  Their  duties  consist  in  regulating  the  discipline  and  internal 
economy  of  the  detachment  and  training  its  members  in  military 
duties.  They  are,  however,  under  the  command  of  the  senior  medical 
officer  of  the  hospital  to  which  they  are  attached.  In  other  words, 
the  senior  medical  officer  of  the  hospital  commands  the  whole  unit, 
including  all  personnel,  medical  or  otherwise,  who  are  on  duty 
with  it,  and  all  officers  and  men  who  are  patients  in  it;  while  the 
sanitats  truppe  detachment  commander  commands  the  detachment 
only. 

The  enlisted  personnel  consists  of  warrant  officers,  noncommis- 
sioned officers  and  privates.  They  are  recruited  directly  into  the 
corps  on  the  levying  of  each  annual  contingent  and  are  organized 
into  companies  or  detachments,  one  for  each  garrison  hospital. 
There  are  27  of  these  detachments,  varying  in  strength  according 
to  the  size  and  importance  of  the  garrison  hospital  to  which  assigned. 
The  largest  detachment  consists  of  5  officers  and  270  men,  and  the 
smallest  of  3  officers  and  58  men.  The  total  peace  strength  of  the 
corps  is  85  officers  and  3,062  men. 

The  duties  of  these  detachments  are  those  of  the  subordinate 
personnel  of  military  hospitals,  e.  g.,  w^ard  masters,  nursing,  cooking, 
and  general  duties.  None  of  the  officers  and  men  of  the  "  sanitats 
truppe  "  do  duty  with  combatant  units,  but  in  the  event  of  war  they 
are  distributed  among  the  field  sanitary  units. 

SANITATS    HHiFSPERSONAL    BEI    DEN    TRUPPEN. 

This  division  of  the  medical  service  consists  of  noncommissioned 
officers  and  men  who  belong  to  combatant  units  and  who  Avear  the 
uniform  of  their  organizations.  They  are,  however,  permanently 
under  the  command  of  medical  officers  and  perform  only  medical 
duties. 

They  are  of  three  classes:  (a)  Medical  assistants  (Sanitats  unter 
offizieres) ;  (b)  litter  bearers  (Blassierten  trager) ;.  (c)  carriers, 
for  medical  and  surgical  equipment  (Bandagentrager). 

MedicaZ  assistants  are  noncommissioned  officers  and  number,  in 
peace,  1  per  battalion,  and,  in  time  of  war,  1  per  company,  or 
similar  unit.  They  perform  the  duties  of  ward  masters  in  regi- 
mental hospitals. 

533 


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32 

Litter  hearers  (4  to  each  compajiy)  are  trained  in  time  of  peace 
as  such,  and  in  addition  perform  all  the  medical  duties  which,  in 
garrison  hospitals,  are  performed  b}^  men  in  the  sanitats  truppe. 

Carriers  of  equipment  (2  to  each  battalion  or  similar  unit). — These 
men  have  general  charge  of  the  regimental  medical  equipment  and 
carry  it  when  on  the  march. 

PHARMACISTS   AND   SUPPLY   OFFICIALS. 

These  men  form  a  special  branch  of  the  medical  service,  both  in 
the  common  army  and  the  Hungarian  Army.  They  have  charge  of 
all  the  medical  and  surgical  stores  in  time  of  peace,  and  are  assisted 
by  a  small  technical  personnel  as  well  as  by  men  of  the  medical  corps. 

The  number  of  pharmacist  officials  in  time  of  peace  is  108,  with 
relative  rank  varying  from  lieutenant  colonel  to  second  lieutenant. 

NURSING    SISTERS. 

There  is  no  corps  of  female  nurses  provided  in  peace,  but  sisters 
of  the  order  of  St.  Vincent  de  Paul  are  employed  in  the  larger  gar- 
rison hospitals,  while  in  officers'  wards  lay  nurses  may  be  employed 
as  required. 

ADMINISTRATION   AND  DISTRIBUTION   OF   PERSONNEL. 

All  general  administration  of  the  medical  service  in  the  common 
army  is  performed  in  the  war  office  in  Vienna  by  the  fourteenth 
division  of  that  office.  This  division  is  under  tlie  direction  of  a  chief 
(lieutenant  general  or  major  general,  medical  officers'  corps)  with 
9  medical  officers,  1  supply  officer,  and  1  pharmacist  as  assistants. 
In  connection  with  this  bureau  are  two  auxiliary  bureaus,  one  under 
the  direction  of  a  colonel  of  the  line,  for  the  administration  of  the 
affairs  of  the  "  sanitats  truppe,"  and  one  under  the  direction  of  the 
senior  medical  officer,  for  administration  of  the  medical  officers' 
corps.  The  Landwehr  and  Honved  each  have  separate  administrative 
officers.  That  for  the  landwehr  is  under  the  direction  of  a  major  gen- 
eral, medical  officers'  corps,  at  Vienna,  and  that  for  the  Honved  is  in 
charge  of  a  similar  officer  at  Budapest.  Both,  however,  are  subordi- 
nate to  the  kriegs  ministerium. 

Each  army  corps  has  an  administrative  medical  officer  called  thej 
"  Sanitats  chef."  His  rank  is  either  that  of  major  general  or  colonel. 
(There  are  no  brigadier  generals  in  the  Austro-Hungarian  Army.) 
He  has  permanently  one  major  and  several  captains  as  assistants. 
In  each  division  a  lieutenant  colonel,  usually  the  commanding  officer 
of  the  garrison  hospital,  is  appointed  to  carry  on  the  administratiA^e 
medical  duties  within  the  division.    Each  Austrian  and  Hungarian 

533 


33 

territorial  command  has  a  colonel  or  lieutenant  colonel  as  Chief  Sur- 
geon (Sanitats  Chef). 

The  remaining  officers  of  the  medical  officers'  corps  are  distributed 
among  the  various  garrison  hospitals  and  other  establishments  or  are 
attached  to  regiments  for  regimental  medical  duties.  As  a  rule  junior 
medical  officers  serve  one  or  two  years  in  a  garrison  hospital  and 
then  are  assigned  to  regimental  duty,  where  they  remain  until  they 
reach  the  rank  of  major,  when  they  are  returned  to  duty  in  garrison 
hospitals  in  charge  of  the  various  departments  in  those  hospitals. 
There  are  no  specialist  sanitary  officers  as  there  are  in  the  British 
and  German  Armies.  All  sanitary  services  are  carried  out  regi- 
mentally  under  the  supervision  of  the  reghnental  surgeon. 

The  sick  are  cared  for  in  regimental  infirmaries,  regimental  hospi- 
tals, and  garrison  hospitals.  At  the  regimental  infirmary  dispensary 
treatment  only  is  given.  Regimental  hospitals  correspond  to  post 
hospitals  and  their  personnel  is  supplied  from  the  regiment. 

Garrison  hospitals  are,  in  effect,  large  general  hospitals.  Their 
personnel  is  supplied  by  the  medical  officers'  corps,  and  the  sanitats 
truppe.  There  are  27  of  these  hospitals  for  the  "  common  army." 
The  Landwehr  possesses  no  garrison  hospitals,  but  there  is  one  for 
the  Honved  in  Budapest. 

Garrison  hospitals  not  only  care  for  the  sick  but  serve  as  training 
schools  for  one-year  volunteer  medical  students  and  the  men  of  the 
sanitats  truppe.  In  addition,  they  maintain  a  reserve  store  of  medi- 
cal and  surgical  supplies  and  act  as  mobilization  centers  for  the  field 
juedical  units.  Each  garrison  hospital  is  commanded  by  a  medical 
officer  Avith  rank  of  colonel  or  lieutenant  colonel,  with  a  large  staff 
of  medical  officers.  In  addition,  there  is  also  1  supply  officer,  1  pay- 
master, 1  pharmacist,  and  a  detachment  of  the  sanitats  truppe. 

AVAR  ORGANIZATIONS. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Army  in  war  time  is  not  divided  into  three 
forces  as  in  peace,  but  forms  one  army  composed  of  all  three  ele- 
ments. The  administrative  unit  is  the  field  army,  consisting  of  from 
two  to  four  corps,  and  these  in  turn  of  usually  three  divisions.  Two 
of  these  divisions  are  drawn  from  the  common  army,  and  the  third 
from  the  Landwehr  or  Honved,  or  from  the  reserves  of  the  first  line. 

In  the  field  each  Headquarters  Staff  of  each  field  army,  corps, 
division,  and  independent  brigade  has  attached  to  it  a  Chief  Medical 
Officer  with  one  or  more  assistants.  These  officers  are  administrative 
officers  for  the  medical  service  of  their  respective  commands  and 
receive  their  orders  and  instructions  from  the  general  officer  com- 
manding either  direct  or  through  his  chief  of  staff'.    They  are  era- 

533 


34 

powered  to  issue  orders  direct  to  the  medical  units  of  their  command ; 
but  orders  directing  a  change  of  position  on  the  march  or  in  combat 
must  be  concurred  in  by  the  chief  of  staff. 

The  Chief  Medical  Officer  of  a  field  army  is  the  "  Armee-Chef- 
Arzt,"  with  rank  of  major  general.  He  has  one  regiments- arzt  as 
assistant.  There  is  an  administrative  medical  officer  also  on  the  staff 
of  the  general  commanding  the  lines  of  communication.  His  official 
title  is  "  Sanitats  Chef  beim  armee  etappen-kommands."  He  has  a 
staff  of  assistants  consisting  of  1  regiments- arzt,  and  4  delegates,  4 
assistant  delegates,  and  1  clerk  from  the  Red  Cross  Society.  (In  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Army,  volunteer  aid  is  intimately  associated  with 
the  army  medical  service.) 

Each  army  corps  has  a  Korps- Chef -Arzt  with  rank  of  colonel.  He 
has  a  regiments- arzt  as  assistant,  and  a  delegate  from  the  Red  Cross 
Society  is  also  with  him  in  the  field. 

The  chief  medical  officer  of  the  division  is  the  "  Division-Chef- 
Arzt"  with  rank  of  major.  He  has  no  commissioned  assistant,  but 
four  mounted  orderlies  are  assigned  to  him  for  duty. 

MEDICAL  SERVICE  IN  THE  ZONE  OF  ADVANCE. 

Medical  service  in  the  zone  of  advance  is  performed  by  the  regi- 
mental medical  service,  the  divisional  medical  unit  and  such  other 
medical  units,  e.  g.,  field  hospitals,  field  depots  for  slightly  sick, 
mobile  reserve  hospitals,  and  mobile  rest  stations,  as  may  be  assigned 
from  the  line  of  communications  to  the  various  divisions  and  corps. 

The  service  of  these  latter  medical  field  units  differs  from  the 
service  of  similar  units  in  other  armies,  inasmuch  as  they  are  not 
permanently  attached  to  divisions  and  corps,  but  are  field  army 
units,  and  the  Armee- Chef -Arzt  of  the  field  army  determines  the 
time,  occasion,  and  maimer  of  their  being  brought  up  and  distributed 
to  the  various  corps. 

REGIMENTAL   MEDICAL   SERVICE.  jfl 

The  regimental  medical  personnel  consists  of  officers  of  the  medi- 
cal officers'  corps  and  a  subordinate  personnel  consisting  of  noncom-  - 
missioned  officers  and  privates  detailed  from  the  regiment  itself.  ^ 
The  general  principle  is  to  attach  one  medical  officer  to  each  bat- 
talion or  similar  unit  and  to  have  two  or  more  in  addition  with 
regimental  headquarters.  The  total  personnel  for  an  infantry  regi- 
ment consists  of  7  medical  officers,  16  medical  assistants,  48  litter 
bearers  and  6  pack  carriers  for  medical  supplies;  total,  7  officers 
and  70  men. 

533 


35 

THE  DIVISIONAL  MEDICAL  TTNIT. 

One  of  these  units  is  a  part  of  each  division.  It  is  complex  in 
character  and  has  no  counterpart  in  the  medical  service  of  other 
armies.  It  is  intended  to  combine  the  functions  of  reserve  medical 
supply,  ambulance  transport  and  the  dressing-station  service.  It 
takes  the  place  of  the  divisional  sanitary  train  of  our  army,  except 
there  are  no  field  hospitals  and  no  litter-bearer  sections. 

The  personnel  of  the  infantry  divisional  unit  consists  of  6  officers 
of  the  medical  officers'  corps,  2  officers  and  125  men  of  the  sanitats 
truppe,  and  77  men  of  the  train  troops.  Its  transportation  consists 
of  145  horses  and  38  vehicles.  Each  unit  is  divided  into  the  follow- 
ing elements:  (a)  A  supply  section,  for  replenishing  supplies  ex- 
pended by  regimental  detachments;  (&)  a  slightly  wounded  section, 
to  establish  stations  for  slightly  wounded;  (c)  a  dressing-station  sec- 
tion, to  establish  dressing  stations;  (d)  an  ambulance  section,  con- 
sisting of  15  ambulances,  4  of  which  are  furnished  by  the  Teutonic 
Order  of  Knighthood. 

"' [visional  units  for  cavalry  and  for  mountain  warfare  are  gener- 
ally similar  to  infantry  division  units,  but  with  less  personnel  and 
transportation. 

OTHER  MEDICAL  UNITS. 

In  support  of  the  regimental  detachments  and  the  divisional  med- 
ical units  there  are  the  mobile  units  belonging  to  the  field  army  and 
assigned  to  divisions  and  corps  as  the  need  may  arise.  These  units 
are  field  hospitals,  field  depots  for  slightly  sick,  mobile  reserve  hos- 
pitals, and  depots  of  medical  supplies.  Materiel  and  units  are  also 
provided  for  field  armies  by  volunteer  aid  societies  and  are  distrib- 
uted in  a  manner  peculiar  to  Austria-Hungary.  To  nearly  every 
medical  unit  of  the  regular  army  there  is  attached  a  supplemental 
unit  furnished  by  organized  volunteer  aid. 

FIELD  HOSPITALS. 

These  are  army  units,  but  are  mobilized  in  the  proportion  of  three 
to  each  division  of  which  the  army  is  composed.  Each  field  hospital 
has  a  capacity  of  200  bed  patients.  Its  personnel  consists  of  3 
medical  officers,  1  chaplain,  1  pharmacist,  1  officer  and  about  60 
men  of  the  hospital  corps,  and  about  40  men  of  the  train  troops.  It 
has  17  vehicles,  including  1  rolling  kitchen. 

Attached  to  each  field  hospital  is  a  wounded  transport  column  of 
the  Red  Cross  Society.  This  column  is  equipped  with  five  two-horse 
ambulances  and  is  commanded  by  a  Red  Cross  Society's  delegate. 

533 


36 

LINES  OF  COMMUNICATION MOBILE  RESERVE   HOSPITALS. 

These  hospitals  are  similar  in  purpose  to  the  evacuation  hospitals 
of  the  French  and  of  our  own  service.  They  are  provided  in  the 
proportion  of  six  to  each  corps,  and  each  accommodates  200  patients, 
with  possible  expansion.  They  are  similar  in  equipment  to  field  hos- 
pitals, but  have  no  transport  assigned  them,  being  required  to  obtain 
locally  vehicles  necessary  for  transportation  of  their  equipment. 
Three  of  these  hospitals  for  each  corps  are  organized  on  mobilization 
and  the  others  held  in  storage  in  the  advance  depot  until  needed. 

The  personnel  for  these  hospitals  is  obtained  from  the  reserve 
medical  personnel  held  on  lines  of  communication  and  is  similar  to 
that  of  field  hospitals. 

FIELD  DEPOTS  FOR  SLIGHTLY  SICK. 

Field  depots  for  slightly  sick  are  provided  in  the  proportion  of 
three  to  each  corps ;  one  is  usually  mobilized  and  two  held  in  storage. 
The  personnel  consists  of  2  medical  officers  and  1  officer  and  30  men 
of  the  army  medical  corps.  They  usually  take  care  of  about  500 
slightly  sick  and  wounded. 

REST  STATIONS. 

These  stations  are  either  mobile  or  stationary,  and  are  located 
where  required  on  lines  of  travel.  They  are  usually  under  the  charge 
of  civilian  personnel. 

FIELD  MEDICAL  SUPPLY  DEPOT. 

One  supply  depot  is  organized  for  each  field  army,  but  it  is  com- 
posed of  a  number  of  army  corps  units,  each  with  personnel  and 
materiel  enabling  it  to  be  attached  to  an  army  corps  and  act  as  an 
independent  unit.  These  corps  units,  in  addition  to  stores  for  re- 
plenishing medical  materiel  expended  in  the  field,  contain  reserve 
materiel  for  three  mobile  reserve  hospitals,  two  field  depots  for 
slightly  sick,  two  mobile  rest  stations,  and  materiel  for  improvising 
two  hospital  trains. 

HOSPITAL  TRAINS. 

Hospital  trains  are  constructed  out  of  ordinary  freight  trains  on 
mobilization.  The  personnel  of  a  hospital  train  is  2  medical  officers, 
1  pharmacist,  and  34  noncommissioned  officers  and  men  of  the  medi- 

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37 

cal  corps.     Six  specially  built  hospital  trains  were  maintained  in 
time  of  peace  by  the  Knights  of  the  Sovereign  Order  of  Malta. 

MOBILE  LABORATORIES. 

Twenty  complete  laboratories,  capable  of  being  moved  from  place 
to  place,  have  been  organized  and  are  in  use  in  the  sanitary  service 
on  lines  of  communication. 

SURGICAL  DETACHMENTS. 

Some  50  "  surgical  detachments "  have  been  organized  to  furnish 
the  operating  staff  of  corps  hospitals.  Each  detachment  consists  of 
two  or  three  eminent  civilian  surgeons  and  four  specially  tramed 
surgical  nurses  and  is  furnished  with  adequate  surgical  instruments 
and  supplies. 

The  function  of  these  detachments  is  to  provide  a  freely  movable 
unit  of  expert  surgeons  which  may  be  readily  assigned  to  hospitals 
on  lines  of  communication  or  home  territory  when  their  services  are 
needed. 

ZONE    or   THE    INTERIOR. 

There  are  no  distinctive  features  of  the  medical  service  in  this 
zone.  Austria  utilizes  her  material  and  her  medical  personnel  in  the 
same  way  as  other  countries  in  Europe. 

V.  ITALY. 

PEACE   ESTABLISHMENT. 

Military  service  in  Italy  comprises  (a)  that  in  the  standing  array; 
(h)  that  in  the  mobile  militia;  and  (c)  that  in  the  territorial  militia. 

Every  adult  male  between  the  ages  of  20  and  39  years  is  liable  to 
service  in  one  of  these  branches. 

Examinations  are  made  annually  of  all  men  reaching  military  age, 
and  as  the  result  of  these  examinations  men  are  assigned  as  follows: 

(a)  A  sufficient  number  of  men  are  assigned  to  the  standing  army 
to  maintain  it  at  peace  strength.  Men  so  assigned  serve  two  years 
with  the  colors  and  are  then  placed  on  furlough  for  six  years.  At 
the  end  of  the  furlough  period  they  pass  into  the  mobile  militia,  or 
first  reserve,  where  they  serve  for  four  years.  At  the  end  of  this 
service  they  pass  to  the  territorial  militia,  or  second  reserve,  where 
they  remain  until  their  thirty-ninth  year. 

(h)  Men  physically  fit  but  in  excess  of  the  number  required  to  fill 
the  ranks  of  the  standing  army  are  not  required  to  do  service  with 
the  colors,  but  are  placed  immediately  upon  furlough  for  eight  years, 

533 


38 

at  the  end  of  which  period  they  pass  to  the  mobile  militia  and  terri- 
torial militia  in  the  same  way  as  do  men  who  have  served  with  the 
colors. 

(c)  Men  who  are  exempt  by  law  for  family  reasons  from  serving 
with  the  active  army  are  enlisted  directly  into  the  territorial  militia, 
where  they  remain  until  their  thirty-ninth  year. 

(d)  Men  specially  qualified  by  reason  of  education  and  position 
and  who  volunteer  for  service  are  allowed  to  serve  one  year  with  the 
colors  and  are  then  placed  on  permanent  furlough  as  underofficers,  or 
reserve  officers.  From  this  class  a  number  of  medical  officers  are 
drawn  in  time  of  war. 

The  standing  army  is  divided  into  12  army  corps,  each  with  a 
definite  territorial  area.  The  total  strength  of  this  army  (budget 
1912)  was  252,340. 

GENERAL  ORGANIZATION   OF  MEDICAL  SERVICE. 

The  medical  service  is  composed  of  the  following  elements:  (a) 
Officers  of  the  army  medical  corps;  (h)  pharmacist  officials;  (c)  ad- 
ministration and  other  officers  and  officials;  (d)  enlisted  men  belong- 
ing to  combatant  units;  (e)  enlisted  men  in  the  medical  corps;  (/) 
nursing  sisters. 

UFFICIALI  MEDICI  DI  CORPS  SANITARIO    (OFFICERS  OF  THE  MEDICAL  CORPS). 

Officers  of  the  medical  corps  are  divided  into  two  classes :  (a)  Those 
on  continuous  active  service  (ufficiali  medici  di  carriera)  ;  (6)  those 
on  permanent  furlough  (ufficiali  medici  in  congedo). 

The  latter  are  in  turn  subdivided  into  four  classes : 

(a)  Uffieicdi  medici  di  convplemento. — These  are  a  kind  of  special 
reserve.  According  to  their  years  of  service,  they  may  be  on  per- 
manent furlough  from  the  standing  army  or  on  the  lists  of  the  mobile 
militia. 

( h )  Ufficiali  medici  di  mUizia  territorials. — These  are  medical  men 
who  have  completed  their  service  in  the  mobile  militia  or  who  have 
been  passed  directly  into  the  territorial  militia. 

{c)  Auxiliary  mediccd  officers. — These  are  medical  officers  who 
have  been  relieved  from  the  active  army  but  are  capable  of  perform- 
ing special  duties. 

{d)  Reserve  medical  officers. — These  are  officers  di  complemento 
who  have  passed  the  age  of  39  years. 

In  these  four  classes  of  the  ufficiali  medici  in  congedo  Italy  is  able! 
practically  to  have  her  whole  medical  profession  enrolled  for  wax 
service. 

533 


39 

The  titles,  rank,  and  number  of  medical  officers  in  active  service  are: 


Title. 

Rank. 

Number. 

Tenente  generale  medico 

Lieutenant  general 

1 

Maggiare  generale  medico 

3 

Colonells  medico 

26 

Tenente  colonells  medico 

I-ieutcnant  colonel 

36 

Maggiare  medico 

113 

Capitano  medico 

314 

Tenente  medico . 

274 

Total 

767 

PHARMACISTS. 


Pharmacists  are  appointed  from  university  graduates  in  pharmacy. 
They  have  relative  but  not  actual  rank.  The  grades  and  titles  of 
those  in  permanent  service  are: 


Grade  and  title. 


Relative  rank. 


Number. 


Chiniico  Carniacista  inspectore , 

Chimico  farmacista  directore 

Farmacista  capo  di  prima  classe... 
Farmacista  capo  di  seconda  classe 

Farmacista  di  prima  classe 

Farmacista  di  prima  classe 


Total . 


Colonel 

Lieutenant  colonel . 

Major 

Captain 

do 

Lieutenant 


96 


In  addition  to  the  above  permanent  personnel  there  are  on  duty 
at  all  times  with  the  standing  army  about  30  "  Farmacista  di  comple- 
mento  di  3a  classe."  Men  in  this  grade  (relative  rank  of  second 
lieutenant)  are  obtained  from  students  of  pharmacy  who  are  doing 
their  period  of  service  Avith  the  colors  and  who  have  passed  an  exami- 
nation entitling  them  to  this  grade.  After  passing  into  the  reserve 
these  men  form  a  large  body  of  men  available  for  pharmacist  ser\  ice 
in  war. 

ADMINISTRATION  OFFICERS. 

Officers  and  officials  belonging  to  the  services  of  administration, 
pay,  and  accounts  are  detailed  for  service  in  the  medical  department. 
Their  services  are  similar  to  those  of  administration  and  supply 
services  in  other  continental  armies. 


ENLISTED  PERSONNEL. 

The  enlisted  personnel  for  the  medical  service  consists  of  two 
parts — (a)  the  regimental  medical  service  (derived  from  combatant 
units)  ;  (h)  the  hospital  medical  service  (men  enlisted  directly  into 
the  army  medical  corps). 

The  regimental  medical  service  consists  of  noncommissioned  officers 
called  "  medical  assistants  "  and  litter  bearers  recruited  from  amongst 
the  soldiers  of  the  unit  with  which  they  do  duty.    Medical  assistants 

533 


40 

go  through  a  course  of  two  months'  instruction  in  the  military  hos- 
pital of  the  division  to  which  their  regiment  belongs  and  are  then 
employed  as  assistants  to  the  medical  officer  in  the  regimental  in- 
firmary. There  is  one  "  medical  assistant "  to  each  regiment  in  time 
of  peace,  but  the  number  is  increased  to  six  in  time  of  war  by  utilizing 
men  who  have  passed  into  the  reserve. 

Each  year  two  men  per  company  of  nonmounted  units  are  selected 
to  go  through  a  course  of  three  months'  instruction  as  litter  bearers 
under  the  medical  officer  of  the  unit.  They  do  general  duty  in  the 
regimental  infirmary  in  peace  and,  after  passing  into  the  reserve,  sup- 
ply, on  mobilization,  the  litter  bearers  of  field  medical  units  in  time 
of  war. 

The  hospital  medical  service  is  performed  by  the  subordinate 
ranks  of  the  medical  corps.  Its  personnel  consists  of  warrant  offi- 
cers, noncommissioned  officers,  and  men  recruited  directly  into  the 
corps  at  the  time  of  the  annual  levies.  The  strength  of  enlisted 
personnel,  medical  corps,  1912,  was  3,729.  These  men  are  organized 
into  12  companies,  one  for  each  army  corps.  The  headquarters  of 
each  company  is  at  the  military  hospital  at  army  corps  headquar- 
ters, detachments  being  distributed  to  other  hospitals  and  medical 
establishments  within  the  command.  There  is  no  fixed  establish- 
ment for  each  company,  the  establishment  depending  upon  the  num- 
ber of  medical  units  in  the  army  corps.  The  number  is  restricted, 
however,  as  much  of  the  general  work  in  hospitals  is  done  by  men 
attached  to  the  medical  companies  from  combatant  units.  These 
attached  men  are  called  "  aggregati."  They  do  not  remain  perma- 
nently with  the  companies  but  are  replaced  by  others  from  time  to 
time. 

NURSING  SISTERS. 

There  is  no  recognized  service  of  nursing  sisters  in  the  Italian 
Army,  but  sisters  of  the  order  of  St.  Vincent  de  Paul  are  employed 
in  the  larger  military  hospitals. 

GENERAL  DISTRIBUTION   OF  PERSONNEL. 

The  technical  administration  of  the  medical  service  is  vested  in 
an  Inspectorate  of  Medical  Services  at  the  war  office  in  Rome.  This 
body  has  no  administrative  power  but  acts  as  a  consultative  or  ad- 
visory medical  board.  The  details  of  army  medical  organization  as 
a  whole  are  in  the  hands  of  a  medical  officer  attached  to  the  general 
staff  at  army  headquarters,  while  the  more  direct  administration  and 
command  are  vested  in  the  general  officers  commanding  army  corps 
and  their  principal  medical  officers.  At  each  corps  headquarters 
there  is  a  Principal  Medical  Officer  (colonel),  with  one  captain  and 
one  official  of  administration  as  assistants.     The  remainder  of  the 

533 


41 

medical  oflBcers  are  distributed  to  military  hospitals  and  other  estab- 
lishments and  to  regiments.  The  senior  medical  officer  of  the  larger 
hospitals  is  a  colonel  or  lieutenant  colonel,  and  under  him  there  are 
usually  one  or  two  lieutenant  colonels,  six  majors,  and  seven  or  eight 
captains. 

Pharmacist  officials  are  distributed  to  the  various  hospitals,  the 
larger  hospitals  having  usually  three. 

Each  regiment  in  peace  has  a  regimental  infirmary  under  charge 
of  the  regimental  surgeon  and  one  assistant.  The  enlisted  personnel 
consists  of  a  "medical  assistant"  and  litter  bearers  from  the  regi- 
ment. 

Where  several  regiments  together  form  a  small  garrison  a  "  gar- 
rison hospital "  is  established.  These  hospitals  correspond  to  the 
post  hospitals  at  our  larger  posts.  A  major,  medical  corps,  is  in 
command,  with  the  medical  officers  of  the  regiments  as  assistants. 
The  enlisted  personnel  is  derived  from  the  regiments  and  supple- 
mented by  men  of  the  army  medical  corps. 

Principal  hospitals,  corresponding  to  our  general  hospitals,  are 
established  at  each  corps  headquarters  and  with  one  division  head- 
quarters, so  that  there  are  two  general  hospitals  to  each  corps.  The 
personnel  for  these  hospitals  is  supplied  from  the  medical  corps  and 
the  "  aggregati."    A  chaplain  is  appointed  to  each  general  hospital. 

WAR   ORGANIZATION. 

The  field  army  is  the  grand  unit  of  organization  in  the  Italian 
service.  Each  field  army  is  composed  of  three  corps,  one  division  of 
cavalry  and  auxiliary  troops.  At  each  field  army  headquarters  is  a 
Director  of  Medical  Services  (surgeon  general).  For  military  pur- 
poses he  belongs  to  the  administrative  staff.  He  has  direct  military 
as  well  as  technical  command  of  all  medical  units  in  the  zone  of  field 
operations  and  lines  of  communication.  As  assistants  he  has  4 
captains  and  4  lieutenants,  medical  corps,  4  pharmacists,  2  clerks, 

2  orderlies,  and  11  servants.    He  has  also  a  transport  detachment  of 

3  noncommissioned  officers  and  15  men  of  the  artillery  train.  He  is 
responsible  for  keeping  the  medical  service  in  the  advance  supplied 
with  personnel  and  materiel  and  for  the  transportatiofi  and  distri- 
bution of  the  sick  and  wounded.  He  cooperates  for  this  purpose  with 
the  Director  of  transport  and  the  Director  of  lines  of  communication. 

Each  corps  has  a  Principal  Medical  Officer  (colonel)  with  one 
assistant  (captain),  a  clerk,  orderly,  and  two  servants.  He  coordi- 
nates the  medical  services  and  directs  the  movements  of  the  corps 
medical  units. 

Each  division  has  a  Principal  Medical  Otlicer,  with  one  lieutenant 
as  assistant,  and  one  enlisted  clerk.    He  is  directly  under  the  chief 
of  staff  of  the  division. 
633 


42 

MEDICAL  SERVICE  WITH  COMBATANT  UNITS. 

The  medical  personnel  for  each  combatant  unit  is  augmented  in 
time  of  war  by  officers  from  the  "  complement "  and  men  from  the 
reserve.  That  for  an  infantry  regiment  is  7  medical  officers  (1  cap- 
tain, 6  lieutenants)  and  30  enlisted  men  from  the  regiment  (6  medi- 
cal assistants  and  24  litter  bearers) . 

That  for  a  cavalry  regiment  consists  of  3  medical  officers  and  2 
enlisted  "  assistants." 

Smaller  units,  such  as  engineer  companies,  batteries  of  artillery, 
etc.,  have  1  medical  officer  and  1  enlisted  man. 

MEDICAL  FIELD  UNITS. 

The  medical  field  units  consist  of  ambulance  companies,  assigned 
to  both  divisions  and  corps;  and  field  hospitals,  assigned  to  corps. 
There  are  also  reserve  field  hospitals,  assigned  to  the  field  armies. 

AMBULANCE    COMPANIES. 

Ambulance  companies  establish  dressing  stations  and  send  out 
litter  squads  to  evacuate  wounded  from  the  combatant  units.  Their 
organization  is  in  general  the  same,  with  slight  modifications  to  fit 
them  for  service  with  infantry,  with  cavalry,  and  with  mountain 
troops.  The  personnel  of  an  ambulance  company  for  duty  with 
infantry  is  6  medical  officers,  a  quartermaster,  chaplain,  and  228 
noncommissioned  officers  and  privates,  medical  corps,  with  a  trans- 
port personnel  attached  from  the  artillery  train  of  1  officer  and  31 
noncommissioned  officers  and  privates.  Its  transportation  consists 
of  3  carts,  2  wagons,  and  8  ambulances. 

The  mountain  ambulance  company  has  the  same  medical  per- 
sonnel, with  1  officer  and  60  enlisted  men  for  transport.  It  has  30 
puck  mules  in  addition  to  the  transportation  provided  for  the  in- 
fantry ambulance  company. 

The  cavalry  ambulance  company  is  a  smaller  unit,  with  only  3 
medical  officers,  a  quartermaster,  chaplain,  32  noncommissioned 
officers  and  privates,  medical  corps,  and  13  enlisted  men  for  trans- 
port. Its  transportation  consists  of  1  cart,  1  wagon,  and  4  ambu- 
lances. 

Ambulance  companies  are  not  organized  in  peace.  Materiel  for 
them  is  kept  in  storage  at  each  corps  headquarters,  and  in  time  of 
war  they  are  mobilized  under  the  direction  of  the  Principal  Medical 
Officer  of  the  corps.  Officers  are  secured  from  the  various  classes  of 
officers,  and  enlisted  men  for  these  units  are  drawn  from  those  avail- 
able within  the  corps.  One  infantry  ambulance  company  is  organ- 
ized for  each  division,  and  one  reserve  infantry  ambulance  company 
for  each  corps.    A  cavalry  ambulance  company  is  assigned  to  each 

533 


43 

cavalry  division,  and  a  mountain  ambulance  company  to  each  moun- 
tain force  (7  Alpine  battalions). 

riELD  HOSPITALS. 

Field  hospitals  are  of  three  kinds :  (a)  ^O-bed  hospitals  on  wheeled 
transport;  (b)  50-bed  hospitals  on  pack  transport;  (c)  lOO-bed  hos- 
pitals. 

Fifty-bed  hospitals  are  army  corps  units  in  the  proportion  of  8  to 
each  corps.  One  hundred-bed  hospitals  are  fiehl  army  units.  Each 
field  army  has  12  hospitals.  The  personnel  of  a  50-bed  hospital  con- 
sists of  3  medical  officers,  1  quartermaster,  1  pharmacist,  1  chaplain, 
29  noncommissioned  officers  and  privates,  medical  corps,  and  1  non- 
commissioned officer  and  6  privates  for  transport  personnel.  Its 
transportation  consists  of  3  wagons.  The  50-bed  liosj^itals  with  ]iack 
transportation  have  an  additional  sergeant  and  35  additional  privates 
in  the  transport  section.  Its  transportaion  is  30  pack  mules.  The 
personnel  of  the  field  army  hospital  (100  beds)  consists  of  G  medical 
officers,  1  quartermaster,  1  pharmacist,  1  chaplain,  26  enlisted  men, 
medical  corps,  and  7  enlisted  men  for  transport.  Its  transportation 
consists  of  4  carts  and  1  wagon. 

LINES   OF   CO.^IMUNICATIOX. 

The  medical  service  on  lines  of  communication  is  under  the  direc- 
tion of  the  Director  of  Medical  Services  for  the  field  army.  There  is 
no  Principal  Medical  Officer  for  lines  of  communication  as  in  other 
armies.  Aside  from  the  medical  supply  depots  and  the  field  hos- 
l)itals  belonging  to  the  field  army,  there  are  no  fixed  medical  for- 
mations, the  general  scheme  being  to  establish  hospitals  and  rest 
stations  as  occasion  demands.  For  the  evacuation  hospitals  or  clear- 
ing stations  at  the  railhead  common  toother  armies,  the  Italian  medi- 
cal service  utilizes  the  field  hospitals  held  in  reserve.  There  is  also 
no  definite  transport  unit  for  evacuation  of  the  wounded  to  the  rail- 
head. This  work  is  done  by  the  intendence  department  as  required. 
Nearly  all  medical  work  on  lines  of  communication  and  in  home  terri- 
tory is  performed  by  personnel  from  the  territorial  militia  and  from 
that  furnished  by  volunteer  aid  societies.  Of  these  latter,  two  are 
otKcially  recognized  as  part  of  the  Italian  Army.  They  are  the 
Italian  Ecu  Cress  Society  and  the  Military  Sov,ireign  Order  of  Malta. 
These  societies,  and  especially  the  Red  Cross,  are  organized  to  supply 
an  appreciable  part  of  the  medical  personnel  and  supplies  required 
bv  war.  The  Eed  Cross  keeps  ready  and  is  prepared  to  furnish  64 
mountain  ambulance  companies,  47  \?ar  hospitals,  14  hospital  trains, 
2  equipmonts  for  hospital  ships,  and  65  rest  stations.    In  addition 

533 


44 

to  these  units  on  hand,  similar  units  may  be  organized  in  unlimited 
numbers,  and  it  is  upon  these  units  that  entire  dependence  is  placed 
in  time  of  war  for  service  on  the  line  of  communication.  They  all 
come  under  the  control  of  the  field  army  Medical  Director,  but  each 
unit  is  commanded  and  operated  by  Red  Cross  personnel. 

HOME  TERRITORY. 

For  patients  sent  to  home  territory,  the  military  hospitals  and  con- 
valescent depots  maintained  in  peace  are  utilized,  and,  if  necessary, 
enlarged.  Many  convalescent  patients  are  also  sent  to  their  homes 
and  paid  20  cents  daily  in  lieu  of  rations.  In  addition  to  the  regular 
military  hospitals,  civil  hospitals  are  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the 
militaiy  authorities  and  new  hospitals  are  organized  by  voluntary 
aid  societies. 

VI.  RUSSIA. 

PEACE  ESTABLISHMENT. 

All  male  Russian  subjects,  with  the  exception  of  the  Mohammedan 
native  Caucasian  population  and  the  population  of  a  few  Provinces, 
are  liable  to  military  service  from  the  twenty-first  to  the  forty-fourth 
year  of  age. 

This  service  is  divided  into  (a)  that  in  the  standing  army  and 
reserves,  and  (h)  that  in  the  Imperial  Militia.  At  the  annual  levy 
the  class  of  service  to  which  a  man  is  assigned  is  determined  by  lot. 

Service  in  the  standing  army  comprises  3  years  with  the  colors 
and  15  years  in  the  reserve  for  the  infantry,  and  4  years  with  the 
colors  and  13  years  in  the  reserve  for  the  other  arms.  The  reserve 
is  divided  into  two  classes.  Service  in  the  first  class  is  for  7  years, 
and  that  in  the  second  class  for  the  remaining  period  of  reserve  serv- 
ice. Upon  completion  of  service  in  the  reserve  men  pass  to  the  Im- 
perial Militia,  wdiere  they  remain  until  they  reach  the  age  of  44. 

All  men  not  required  in  the  standing  army,  and  men  who  have 
completed  their  service  in  that  army,  form  the  Imperial  Militia. 
Men  engaged  in  certain  occupations  are  exempt  from  service  with  the 
colors  in  time  of  peace  and  may,  if  they  draw  a  number  for  the 
standing  army,  be  passed  immediately  into  the  reserve.  Medical 
men  are  so  exempt. 

Men  may  also  volunteer  for  service  with  the  colors,  in  which  case 
they  serve  for  one  year  and  then  pass  to  the  reserve.  INTedical  men, 
pharmacists,  and  veterinarians  who  so  volunteer,  if  accepted,  are 
allowed  to  serve  as  such. 

The  standing  army  is  divided  into  37  corps  located  in  13  military! 
districts.  The  total  peace  strength  of  this  army  in  1912  was  1,284,000] 
officers  and  men. 

533 


45 

ORGANIZATION    OF  THE   MP:DICAL  SERVICE. 

The  medical  oriranization  for  the  Russian  Army,  while  following 
the  same  general  lines,  differs  materially  from  those  of  other  armies. 
From  top  to  bottom  there  exists  a  system  of  dual  control,  tlie  duties 
of  medical  officers  being  of  a  purely  technical  character,  while  the 
administrative  duties  are  in  the  hands  of  line  officers.  In  her  field 
medical  units,  too.  lUissia,  while  providing  a  large  enlisted  pei-sonnel. 
has  a  connnissioned  personnel  much  smaller  in  proportion  than  tliat 
provided  for  similar  units  in  other  armies.  Apparently  this  system 
of  dual  control  and  di\aded  responsibility,  together  with  an  insuffi- 
cient number  of  medical  officers,  has  not  proved  satisfactory.  A 
committee  was  appointed  r.fter  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  under  the 
presidency  of  Gen,  Trekov,  of  the  line,  who  was  Director  of  Hospitals 
in  Kuropatkinls  arm3\  to  consider  questions  of  improving  the  medi- 
cal service,  and  as  a  result  of  the  recommendations  of  that  committee, 
more  authority  has  now  been  given  medical  officers  in  the  matter  of 
command,  but  there  is  still  a  great  portion  of  the  medical  service  in 
which  this  complicated  system  exists  and  the  medical  field  units  are 
still  underofficered. 

Another  improvement  in  the  medical  service  resulting  from  the 
recommendations  of  this  committee  was  the  passing  of  a  law  in  1913 
giving  military  rank  to  medical  officers.  Heretofore  they  had  been 
merely  military  officials  in  various  grades,  but  without  actual  rank. 
The  actual  rank  they  now  hold  is  the  same  as  that  of  officers  of  the 
line.  There  are  no  brigadier  generals  and  no  majors  in  the  Russian 
Army,  and  hence  medical  officers  are  commissioned  in  the  medical 
corps  in  the  various  grades  of  lieutenant  general,  major  general, 
colonel,  lieutenant  colonel,  captain,  and  lieutenant. 

The  law  authorizing  the  giving  of  commissioned  rank  is  verv 
broad  and  does  not  specify  any  definite  numbers  for  each  rank  nor 
for  the  whole  corps.  It  provides  generally  that  certain  positions 
shall  carry  with  them  certain  ranks  and  that  medical  officers  occupy- 
ing these  positions  shall  be  given  rank  commensurate  Avith  the  posi- 
tion irrespective  of  the  number  of  medical  officers  holding  similar 
rank. 

Promotion  is  entirely  by  selection  and  is  largely  in  the  hands  of 
the  Director  General  of  the  army  medical  department.  Appoint- 
ments of  officers  to  positions  carrying  with  them  the  higher  ranks 
are  made  by  the  Minister  of  War  upon  the  recommendation  of  the 
Director  General,  but  in  positions  carrying  with  them  lower  rank, 
the  Director  General  has  the  power  to  appoint  or  transfer  officers. 
He  also  has  the  authority  to  retire  at  will  officers  occupying  such 
positions. 

533 


46 

ADMINISTRATION   AND  DISTRIBUTION  OF  PERSONNEL. 

The  whole  of  the  strictly  medical  service  is  under  the  direction  of 
the  Director  General  of  the  medical  department,  which  is  a  bureau  of 
the  war  department.  He  has  the  rank  of  lieutenant  general  and  is 
ex  officio  a  member  of  the  chief  military  sanitary  committee  of  the 
war  office.  This  committee,  besides  the  Director  General  of  the 
medical  services,  consists  of  the  Chief  of  Staff,  Chief  of  Engineers, 
and  Chief  of  the  Intendance.  The  committee  supervises  the  entire 
operation  of  the  medical  department. 

To  each  military  district  there  is  assigned  a  District  Medical  In- 
spector with  rank  of  lieutenant  general  and  an  Assistant  District 
Medical  Inspector  with  rank  of  major  general.  When  troops  in  the 
district  are  mobilized  the  District  Medical  Inspector  becomes  the 
Principal  Medical  Officer  of  the  field  army  formed  from  the  troops 
in  the  district  and  the  Assistant  District  Inspector  takes  over  his 
duties  in  the  district. 

On  the  headquarters  staff  of  each  corps,  division,  or  separate 
brigade  there  is  a  Chief  Surgeon.  The  new  law  provides  that  one- 
third  of  the  total  number  of  Corps  Surgeons  shall  have  the  rank  of 
lieutenant  general  and  two-thirds  of  those  surgeons  shall  have  the 
rank  of  major  general.  It  also  provides  that  one-third  of  the  Divi- 
sion Surgeons  shall  be  major  generals  and  two-thirds  colonels.  The 
rank  of  the  Chief  Surgeon  of  a  separate  brigade  is  also  that  of 
colonel. 

Fortress  troops  are  distinct  from  troops  of  the  mobile  army,  and 
with  each  fortress  there  is  also  a  Chief  Surgeon  with  rank  of  major 
general  or  colonel. 

With  each  infantry  regiment  there  is  one  regimental  surgeon,  and 
with  each  infantry  battalion  or  similar  unit  there  is  one  junior  medi- 
cal officer.  The  new  law  provides  that  one-third  of  the  senior  regi- 
mental surgeons  shall  have  the  rank  of  colonel  and  that  two-thirds  of 
them  shffll  have  the  rank  of  lieutenant  colonel.  The  junior  regi- 
mental medical  officers  rank  as  captains  or  lieutenants.  The  total 
number  of  medical  officers  of  all  ranks  holding  permanent  commis- 
sions in  the  standing  army  is  3,758.     (Budget,  1913.) 

The  subordinate  medical  personnel  is  divided  into  two  main  classes: 
(a)  That  belonging  directly  to  the  medical  department  and  (b) 
that  belonging  to  combatant  units,  but  doing  duty  with  the  medical 
department. 

The  subordinate  personnel  belonging  directly  to  the  medical  de- 
partment comprises  (a)     feldshers,  (h)  nad  zirateli. 

533 


I 


47 

FELDSHERS. 

Feldshers  are  a  peculiar  element  in  the  medical  service.  They  are, 
in  effect,  partially  trained  medical  men  who  have  not  received  a  de- 
gree in  medicine,  and  correspond  practically  to  the  "  Practicante " 
in  Spanish  countries. 

They  are  divided  into  two  classes:  (a)  Those  who  have  received 
their  medical  training  before  entering  the  army  and  (b)  those  who 
have  been  trained  in  the  army. 

The  first  are  permitted  to  practice  medicine  in  civil  life  after  com- 
pleting their  army  service,  but  the  second  are  not  so  permitted. 

Feldshers  of  both  classes  serve  as  assistants  to  medical  officers  in 
military  hospitals  and  with  combatant  units. 

NADZIRATELI, 

The  nadzirateli  are  men  specially  trained  in  nursing  and  other 
hospital  duties,  and  serve  in  both  the  large  general  hospitals  and 
regimental  hospitals.  Those  serving  in  the  general  hospitals  usually 
rank  as  noncommissioned  officers. 

In  addition  to  these  two  classes  belonging  directly  to  the  medical 
department,  noncommissioned  officers  and  men  belonging  to  the  line 
are  detached  from  combatant  units  for  duty  as  hospital  atendants 
and  litter  bearers.  Hospital  attendants  from  combatant  units  are 
detailed  for  duty  under  the  medical  department  in  regimental  hos- 
pitals. Litter  bearers  are  not  detached  from  their  units,  but  are 
classed  as  combatants.  The  number  of  men  trained  in  the  duties  of 
litter  bearers  is  sufficient  to  not  only  supply  the  numbers  of  bearers 
required  by  the  regiment  in  war,  but  also  to  furnish  the  cadres  for 
divisional  bearer  companies. 

In  addition  to  the  enlisted  personnel,  officials  corresponding  to 
our  civil-service  men  are  employed  for  quartermaster  duties,  clerical 
duties,  etc. 

Each  regiment  is  provided  with  a  regimental  hospital  (lazaret) 
for  use  of  the  regimental  sick.  It  is  operated  by  the  regimental 
medical  personnel  if  no  permanent  hospital  is  available.  If,  how- 
ever, a  permanent  military  hospital  is  available,  the  regimental 
lazaret  is  not  established,  but  is  kept  in  storage  and  the  regimental 
sick  are  treated  in  the  "regimental  receiving  rooms"  (infirmaries), 
the  seriously  sick  being  sent  to  the  permanent  hospitals. 

When  regiments  are  mobilized  for  field  service  their  lazarets  al- 
ways accompany  them  and  become  part  of  the  medical  mobile  units 
in  the  field  army. 

Distributed  among  the  military  districts  are  large  permanent  hos- 
pitals, varying  in  capacity  from  150  to  800  beds.     At  the  outbreak 

533 


I 


48 

of  the  present  war  there  were  27  of  these  hospitals  in  Russia,  with  a 
total  bed  capacity  of  15,221  beds.  The  general  administration  of 
permanent  hospitals  is  under  the  direction  of  a  line  officer,  and  he 
commands  all  the  personnel  of  the  hospital.  The  strictly  technical 
service  is  under  the  direction  of  a  chief  surgeon,  with  rank  of  colonel 
or  lieutenant  colonel,  with  a  staff  consisting  of  two  or  more  senior 
medical  officers  with  rank  of  lieutenant  colonel  and  a  number  of 
junior  medical  officers  with  rank  of  captain  and  lieutenant.  The 
enlisted  personnel  consists  of  feldshirs  and  nadzirateli  from  the 
regular  medical  service. 

WAR  ORGANIZATION. 

The  medical  service  of  field  armies  is  under  the  direction  of  either 
the  Adjutant  General  of  the  field  army  or  of  a  "  Director  of  Medical 
Services,"  who  is  a  lieutenant  general  of  the  line.  Assisting  him  in 
the  general  administration  of  his  office  is  an  office  director,  also  a 
line  officer,  whose  duties  are  similar  to  those  of  a  chief  of  staff.  The 
administration  of  this  office  is  divided  into  (a)  the  field  military  hos- 
pital department,  (h)  the  field  military  medical  department,  (c) 
the  field  veterinary  department,  and  (d)  the  department  of  volun- 
tary aid. 

At  the  head  of  the  field  military  hospital  department  is  the  Field 
Inspector  of  Hospitals,  a  combatant  officer  with  rank  of  lieutenant 
general.  He  is  in  command  of  all  the  medical  units  in  the  army 
except  for  their  technical  service.  This  latter  is  under  the  direction 
of  the  Field  Medical  Inspector  with  rank  of  lieutenant  general  in  the 
medical  corps.  The  department  of  voluntary  aid  has  at  its  head  a 
Commissioner  of  the  Red  Cross  Society, 

At  each  army  corps  headquarters  there  is  also  a  line  officer  in 
charge  of  the  general  police,  upon  whom  rests  the  responsibility  of 
evacuating  the  wounded  from  the  field  units.  For  this  purpose  he 
arranges  the  necessary  transportation  and  for  additional  men  to  be 
detached  from  combatant  units  when  necessary  to  assist  in  collecting 
the  wounded. 

MEDICAL    SERVICE    WITH    COMBATANT    UNITS. 

Each  regiment  is  accompanied  by  its  lazaret,  and  this  forms  the 
basis  of  the  regimental  service.  Its  personnel  consists  of  5  medical 
officers  (1  lieutenant  colonel  in  command),  21  feldshers,  1  nadziratel 
of  the  medical  corps,  and  128  litter  bearers  from  the  line.  m 

The  transportation  consists  of  1  wagon,  4  carts,  and  4  ambulances. 

MOBILE  MEDICAL  UNITS. 

The  mobile  medical  units  assigned  to  each  division  are  one  divi- 
sional lazaret  and  two  field  hospitals. 

533 


49 

THE   DIVISIONAL   LAZARET. 

The  nnit  is  directly  under  the  command  of  the  Division  Surgeon. 
Under  him  is  one  medical  officer  in  charge  of  the  dressing-station 
section  and  a  line  officer  in  charge  of  the  bearer  section  and  wheeled 
transportation.  The  function  of  the  divisional  lazaret  is  to  form  a 
main  dressing  station  as  a  link  between  the  regimental  stations  and 
the  field  hospitals. 

The  personnel  of  the  dressing-station  section  comprises  4  medical 
officers,  1  officer  of  administration,  7  noncommissioned  officers  and 
20  privates  (medical  corps),  and  2  clerks.-  The  personnel  of  the 
bearer  section  comprises  1  officer  of  administration,  1  clerk,  17  non- 
commissioned officers  and  200  privates  from  line  troops,  and  2  non- 
commissioned officers  and  37  drivers  from  transport  troops;  total,  6 
officers,  3  clerks,  26  noncommissioned  officers,  and  257  privates. 

The  transportation  consists  of  8  ambulances,  16  wagons,  and  3 
carts. 

FIELD  HOSPITALS. 

Field  hospitals  are  provided  in  the  proportion  of  eight  to  each 
division.  Four  of  these  are  mobile  hospitals  and  the  other  four  are 
held  in  reserve  on  the  line  of  communications.  Of  the  four  mobile 
hospitals  two  only  are  assigned  to  the  divisional  sanitary  train  and 
the  other  two  are  field-army  units.  Each  field  hospital  has  a  ca- 
pacity of  200  beds.  The  total  number  of  beds  in  the  eight  field 
hospitals  allowed  for  each  division  is  sufficient  to  provide  for  lA  per 
cent  of  the  total  strength  of  the  division.  This  is  in  addition  to  the 
beds  in  the  regimental  and  divisional  lazarets. 

The  personnel  of  a  mobile  field  hospital  comprises  4  medical  officers, 
1  pharmacist,  1  officer  of  administration,  1  chaplain,  16  noncommis- 
sioned officers,  and  59  privates  (medical  corps),  and  2  noncommis- 
sioned officers  and  26  drivers,  transport  troops.  In  addition  to  the 
enlisted  personnel,  there  are  4  clerks  and  4  Sisters  of  Mercy.  Total, 
7  officers,  18  noncommissioned  officers,  and  85  privates,  and  8  civilians. 

The  transportation  consists  of  20  wagons,  4  carts,  and  1  ambulance. 

« 

LINES  or  COMMUNICATION — TRANSPORT  COLUMNS. 

For  evacuating  wounded  from  the  front  to  the  railhead,  sick  and 
wounded  transport  columns  are  organized  as  definite  units  in  the 
proportion  of  1  to  each  corps.  The  movements  of  these  units  is 
controlled  by  the  Director  of  Medical  Services  for  the  field  army  and 
each  hospital  is  commanded  by  an  officer  of  the  line.  The  personnel 
consists  of  2  medical  officers,  1  quartermaster,  7  noncommissioned 

533 


50 

officers  and  17  privates  (medical  corps),  3  noncommissioned  officers 
and  68  drivers  transport  troops,  2  clerks,  and  2  Sisters  of  Mercy. 
Total,  3  officers,  10  noncommissioned  officers,  85  privates,  and  4  civil- 
ians. The  transportation  consists  of  27  ambulances,  7  wagons,  1  cart, 
and  1  rolling  kitchen. 

HOSPITAL  TRAINS. 

Hospital  trains  are  made  up  from  third-class  passenger  coaches 
and  have  a  capacity  of  250  patients.  They  are  commanded  by  line 
officers  and  have  a  medical  personnel  of  2  officers  and  45  attendants. 

SANITARY  DETACHMENTS. 

Special  sanitary  detachments  are  organized  in  the  proportion  of 
1  to  each  division  and  1  to  each  corps.  They  are  divided  into  (a) 
bacteriological  columns  and  (b)  disinfecting  columns.  They  are 
under  the  command  of  the  Director  of  Medical  Services  and  are  util- 
ized where  needed  for  special  sanitary  work.  The  personnel  of  a 
bacteriological  column  is  3  medical  officers,  3  noncommissioned  offi- 
cers and  6  privates  (medical  corps),  and  5  drivers  (transport 
troops).    For  transportation  it  has  5  wagons. 

The  personnel  of  a  disinfection  column  is  1  medical  officer,  3  non- 
commissioned officers,  6  privates  (medical  corps),  and  4  drivers 
(transj)ort  troops).    Transportation,  4  wagons. 

EVACUATION    HOSPITALS. 

There  are  no  distinct  evacuation  hospitals  or  clearing  stations  at 
the  head  of  the  line  of  communications  in  the  Kussian  service,  but 
in  each  area  where  field  armies  are  operating  an  "  evacuation  com- 
mission "  is  appointed,  whose  duty  it  is  to  arrange  a  classifjdng  sta- 
tion, where  wounded  can  be  collected  and  their  disposition  deter- 
mined, and  to  arrange  rest  stations,  stationary  hospitals,  etc.,  on  the 
line.  This  commission  is  a  cumbersome  body  and  is  composed  of  a 
president  (general  officer),  1  assistant  (line  officer),  1  medical  officer, 
and  a  delegate  of  the  Reci  Cross  Society. 

HOME  TERRITORY. 

The  general  provisions  for  final  disposition  of  sick  and  wounded 
in  home  teritory  are  on  similar  lines  to  those  of  other  nations,  ex- 
cept that  this  disposition  is  under  the  direction  of  commissions  simi- 
lar in  character  to  the  commissions  for  evacuating  the  wounded  on 
lines  of  communication.  The  commissions  in  home  territory  arrange 
hospital  accommodations  and  distribute  sick  and  wounded  accord- 
ingly- 

533 


51 

VII.  JAPAN. 

PEACE    ESTABLISHMENT. 

The  military  survice  is  divided  into — (a)  the  active  army  (Gue- 
neki) ;  (b)  first  reserve  (Yobi) ;  (c)  second  reserve  (Kobi) ;  (d)  re- 
placement troops  (reserve  of  recruitment)  (Hoju) ;  (e)  the  na- 
tional arm}^,  first  and  second  parts  (Kakiirnin). 

Service  is  obligatory  on  all  males  between  the  ages  of  17  and  40. 
The  period  of  service  is  regulated  as  follows : 

Gueneki. — Three  years,  save  for  the  infantry,  where  men  pass  the 
third  year  under  the  status  of  furlough,  and  in  the  train  troops, 
where  the  service  is  but  six  months. 

Yohi. — Comprising  men  coming  from  Gueneki;  4  years  and  4 
months. 

Kobi. — Men  from  Kobi;  10  years. 

Hoju. — Comprising  men  in  excess  of  the  needs  of  Gueneki;  12 
years  and  4  months. 

Kakumin,  first  part. — Two  years  and  8  months  for  men  coming 
from  Kobi  and  7  years  and  8  months  for  men  coming  from  Hoju. 

Kakurnin,  second  part. — All  men  between  17  and  40  not  comprised 
in  the  preceding  categories. 

The  active  army  is  divided  into  19  divisions  and  19  reserve  divi- 
sions. It  is  contemplated  to  gradually  increase  this  army  to  25 
divisions,  with  a  similar  number  of  reserve  divisions. 

Each  of  these  divisions  occupies  a  military  district  and  is  com- 
plete in  itself,  not  only  as  regards  combatant  troops,  but  as  regards 
auxiliary  troops,  including  the  medical  department. 

The  total  peace  strength  of  the  active  army  is  235,500. 

ORGANIZATION    OF   THE    MEDICAL   DEPARTMENT. 

The  medical  department,  both  in  peace  and  war,  is  organized 
largely  along  the  lines  of  the  German  medical  service. 

CXDMMISSIONED   OFFICERS. 

The  commissioned  officers  in  the  medical  service  consist  of  medical 
officers  and  apothecaries.  The  titles,  ranks,  and  numbers  of  medical 
officers  are: 


Title. 


Rank. 


Number. 


Director  general  (pun-i-cho) 

Surgeon  general  (gun-i-kan) 

Senior  surgeon,  first  class  (itto-gun-i-sei; . . . . 
Senior  surgeon,  second  class  (nito-gun-i-sei; . 
Senior  surgeon,  third  class  (santo-gun-i-sei). 

Surgeon,  first  class  (itto-gun-i; 

Surgeon,  second  class  (nito-gun-i) 

Surgeon,  third  class  (santo-gun-i) 


Lieutenant  general. 

Major  general 

Colonel 

Lieutenant  colonel . 

Major 

Captain 

First  lieutenant 

Second  lieutenant.. 


Total. 


533 


23 
39 
12.5 
473 
279 
2S1 

1,231 


52 

EESERVE   MEDICAL  OFFICERS. 

In  addition  to  the  medical  officers  on  permanent  duty  with  the 
active  army,  there  are  always  a  large  number  of  reserve  medical 
officers  available  for  service.  These  reserve  medical  officers  are 
formed  out  of  several  elements. 

(a)  Medical  officers  retired  from  active  service  but  who  are  able 
to  perform  certain  services. 

(b)  Medical  officers  who  were  "one-year  volunteers."  These  are 
men  who,  while  medical  students,  were  drafted  to  the  colors,  and 
whose  service  was  limited  to  one  year  on  condition  that  they  enter 
the  reserve  as  medical  officers  upon  receiving  their  qualification. 

((?)  Reserve  medical  officers  maintained  by  the  Red  Cross  Society. 

PHARMACISTS. 

Pharmacists  hold  commissioned  rank  and  comprise  those  serving 
with  the  active  army  and  those  serving  in  the  reserve  in  the  same 
way  as  medical  officers.  With  the  active  army  there  are  chief  phar- 
macists (yaku-zai  sei)  to  the  number  of  10  and  pharmacist  officers 
(yaku-zai  kwan)  to  the  number  of  112 ;  total  in  active  service,  122. 

ENLISTED   PERSONNEL. 

The  enlisted  personnel  for  medical  service  is  selected  from  men 
who  have  passed  the  first  year  of  their  service  in  line  organizations. 
These  men,  in  the  proportion  of  two  per  company,  are  detailed  for 
medical  service  with  their  organization  and  receive  training  in  their 
duties  from  medical  officers  serving  with  the  organization.  After  a 
period  of  such  training  they  are  transferred  to  the  garrison  hospital 
at  the  headquarters  of  the  division  in  which  they  are  serving,  and  are 
there  given  a  course  in  hospital  training.  When  their  hospital  train- 
ing is  completed,  they  may  be  returned  to  their  organizations  as  non- 
commissioned officers  of  the  medical  service  or  they  may  continue  on 
duty  as  ward  masters,  clerks,  etc.,  in  hospitals.  Eventualh^  they  pass 
to  the  reserve  as  reserves  of  the  army  medical  service,  and  wpon 
mobilization  they  are  utilized  to  form  the  various  medical  field  imits. 

The  duties  of  nurses  and  hospital  attendants  in  military  hospitals 
are  not  performed  by  enlisted  men.  Such  duties  are  performed  by 
men  who  were  not  of  sufficient  physique  to  be  enlisted.  They  are 
civil  employees  and  are  used  largely  in  time  of  war  in  hospitals  on 
lines  of  communication  and  in  home  territory. 

533 


I 


53 

ADMINISTRATION   AND   DISTRIBUTION   OF  PERSONNEL. 

The  general  administration  of  the  medical  department  is  vested 
in  a  Director  General,  with  the  rank  of  lieutenant  general,  who  is  the 
head  of  the  medical  bureau  of  the  war  department. 

In  matters  of  general  administration,  decentralization  is  the  key- 
note of  the  Japanese  Army,  and  each  division  is  almost  autonomous. 
It  is  maintained  complete  in  all  its  branches  in  time  of  peace  so 
that  it  can  be  moved  in  its  entirety  in  time  of  war  and  its  place  im- 
mediately taken  by  a  reserve  division.  The  medical  department  is 
no  exception  to  this  general  rule. 

At  the  headquarters  of  each  division  district  there  is  a  Chief  Medi- 
cal Officer,  with  rank  of  colonel,  who  is  in  direct  charge  of  the  medical 
personnel,  hospitals,  supply  depots,  etc.,  within  his  division. 

There  is  also  at  each  division  district  headquarters  a  garrison  hos- 
pital to  which  all  of  the  seriously  sick  of  the  division  are  sent.  This 
hospital  is  under  a  Hospital  Director,  with  rank  of  colonel  or  lieu- 
tenant colonel,  and  a  considerable  staff  of  medical  officers.  Attached 
to  each  division  hospital  is  one  pharmacist  and  one  officer  of  the  "  in- 
tendance"  in  charge  of  supplies  other  than  medical. 

In  time  of  war  these  garrison  hospitals  become  the  principal  hos- 
pital of  the  division  and  all  other  hospitals,  convalescent  camps,  etc., 
which  are  established  within  the  division,  become  its  branches  and  are 
under  the  control  of  the  Hospital  Director. 

No  hospitals  are  maintained  by  individual  regiments.  Dispensary 
treatment  is  given  in  those  units  and  all  sick  requiring  hospital  treat- 
ment are  sent  to  the  garrison  hospital.  There  is,  however,  a  regi- 
mental medical  service  consisting  of  medical  officers  belonging  to  the 
medical  corps  and  an  enlisted  personnel  belonging  to  the  regiment 
itself. 

Japan  is  the  only  nation  which  maintains  in  peace  a  commissioned 
medical  personnel  with  regiments  and  other  combatant  units  larger 
than  that  provided  for  similar  units  in  war.  The  regulation  allow- 
ance for  medical  officers  in  peace  is  10  to  each  regiment,  Avhile  in  war 
it  is  only  6  to  each  regiment.  This  unusual  provision  is  made  so 
as  to  have  available  medical  officers  trained  in  military  duties  for 
use  in  time  of  war  with  field  medical  units. 

WAR  ORGANIZATION. 

In  time  of  war  two  or  more  divisions  (usually  3)  are  mobilized 
to  form  field  armies.  At  the  head  of  the  medical  services  of  all  field 
armies  is  a  Principal  Medical  Officer  of  field  forces,  with  the  rank  of 
lieutenant  general.  His  station  is  with  the  g-eneral  staff  at  headquar- 
ters in  Tokyo. 

533 


54 

Each  field  army  has  a  Principal  Medical  Officer,  with  rank  of  major 
general,  on  the  staff  of  the  field  army  commander,  and  there  is  a 
Principal  Medical  Officer,  with  rank  of  colonel,  on  the  staff  of  the  in- 
spector general  of  lines  of  communication  for  each  field  army. 

Each  division  has  a  Principal  Medical  Officer,  with  rank  of  colonel. 
All  Principal  Medical  Officers,  including  those  of  divisions,  have  two 
medical  officers  as  assistants  and  several  enlisted  men  of  the  medical 
service  as  clerks. 

DIVISIONAL  MEDICAL  SERVICE. 

When  a  division  is  mobilized  and  joins  a  field  army,  the  whole  of 
its  peace  staff  accompanies  it  into  the  field,  and  their  place  in  the 
depot  division  is  taken  by  officers  of  the  reserve  or  from  the  retired 
list.  The  medical  personnel  accompanying  the  division  is  rearranged 
and  augmented  by  personnel  obtained  from  the  reserve  in  order  to 
form  the  field  medical  units  authorized  for  each  division  in  time  of 
war. 

MEDICAL  SERVICE  WITH  COMBATANT  UNITS. 

Medical  officers  on  duty  with  regiments  have  rank  of  captain  or 
lieutenant.  Each  battalion  of  infantry  has  two  medical  officers,  and 
similar  units,  such  as  a  battery  of  artillery,  have  one  medical  officer. 
Thus  a  regiment  of  infantry  (three  battalions)  has  six  medical 
officers;  a  regiment  of  artillery  (three  batteries)  has  three  medical 
officers;  a  regiment  of  cavalry  (two  squadrons)  has  two  medical 
officers;  etc. 

ENLISTED  PERSONNEL. 

In  each  regiment  of  infantry  there  is  one  senior  noncommissioned 
officer  and  junior  noncommissioned  officers  in  the  proportion  of  one 
to  each  company.  In  addition  to  these  men  who  have  been  trained 
in  the  medical  service,  four  men  from  each  company  are  detailed  as 
litter  bearers.  The  total  enlisted  personnel  for  medical  service  in  a 
regiment  is  15  noncommissioned  officers  as  medical  assistants  and  48 
privates  as  litter  bearers.  In  the  smaller  units,  such  as  a  battery  of 
artillery,  company  of  engineers,  etc.,  there  are  no  litter  bearers,  but 
one  noncommissioned  officer  of  the  medical  service  is  on  duty  with 
each  medical  officer. 

FIELD   MEDICAL  UNITS. 

The  medical  units  with  each  division  are  one  bearer  battalion  and 
six  field  hospitals. 

533 


55 

BEARER  BATTALIONS. 

Bearer  battalions  are  under  the  command  of  a  major  of  the  line, 
with  an  intendance  officer  attached.  Each  bearer  battalion  consists 
of — (a)  two  litter  bearer  companies;  (&)  a  dressing  station  section. 

Each  litter  bearer  company  is  commanded  by  a  captain  of  the  line 
and  is  composed  of  40  litter  squads  or  160  bearers,  with  an  additional 
personnel  for  auxiliary  services,  such  as  drivers,  cooks,  etc. 

The  dressing  station  section  consists  of  eight  medical  officers  (two 
captains  and  six  lieutenants),  one  apothecary,  and  senior  and  junior 
noncommissioned  officers  of  the  medical  service  as  assistants  to  the 
medical  officers.  The  exact  number  of  such  noncommissioned  officers 
can  not  be  ascertained. 

FIELD  HOSPITALS. 

Field  hospitals  have  a  capacity  of  200  bed  cases  each.  During  the 
Russo-Japanese  War,  however,  field  hospitals  were  frequently  called 
on  to  take  care  of  as  many  as  600  serious  cases.  Each  field  hospital 
is  under  command  of  a  major  surgeon,  with  five  medical  officers  as 
assistants.  Its  personnel  comprises,  in  addition,  one  apothecary,  one 
intendance  officer,  18  noncommissioned  officers,  and  90  privates. 

LINES  or   COMMUNICATION. 

The  medical  establishments  usual  to  lines  of  communication  are 
maintained  by  the  Japanese  Army.  The  personnel  for  these  estab- 
lishments is  largely  derived  from  that  furnished  by  the  Red  Cross 
Society  and  that  procurable  from  among  the  civilian  population.  It 
is  a  fixed  rule,  however,  that  all  of  these  establishments  shall  be  un- 
der the  command  of  a  regular  medical  officer  of  experience. 

The  organization  of  several  units  on  the  lines  of  communication  is 
peculiar  to  Japan.  The  usual  evacuation  or  clearing  hospitals  at  the 
head  of  lines  of  communication  are  replaced  by  "  the  reserve  medical 
personnel." 

RESERVE  MEDICAL  PERSONNEL. 

These  units  are  organized  in  the  proportion  of  one  to  each  division, 
to  follow  up  the  field  hospitals  during  an  action  and  establish  sta- 
tionary field  hospitals  at  suitable  points  to  relieve  them.  They  also 
establish  rest  stations  along  the  route  of  evacuation.  Each  unit  is 
under  command  of  a  major,  medical  corps,  with  12  other  medical 
officers,  3  apothecaries  and  an  enlisted  personnel  approximately 
three  times  that  of  a  field  hospital. 

633 


56 

SICK  AND  WOUNDED  TRANSPORT  DETACHMENT. 

One  of  these  units  is  organized  for  each  division.  Its  duty  is  to 
evacuate  wounded  from  the  field  hospitals  to  the  stationary  field 
hospitals  or  to  the  railhead. 

Each  unit  is  commanded  by  a  major  from  the  retired  or  reserve 
list  of  the  line.  It  has  three  medical  officers  and  a  small  staff  of 
noncommissioned  officers  and  privates  of  the  medical  department. 
No  provision  is  made  for  transport  materiel  or  bearer  personnel. 
The  former  is  improvised  or  requisitioned  and  the  latter  organized 
out  of  local  resources. 

BASE   HOSPITALS. 

Base  hospitals  are  established  as  necessary  on  lines  of  communi- 
cation. There  is  no  definite  schedule  for  their  personnel  and  equip- 
ment, but  they  are  supplied  from  local  resources  or  from  the  per- 
sonnel of  the  Red  Cross  Society.  Regular  medical  officers  are  in 
command  of  these  hospitals,  however.  In  conducting  the  medical 
service  on  lines  of  communication,  it  is  the  policy  of  Japan  to 
utilize  voluntary  aid  to  the  greatest  extent.  It  is  a  fixed  rule  that 
all  medical  units,  however,  such  as  hospitals,  hospital  trains,  hospital 
ships,  etc.,  shall  at  all  times  be  under  the  command  or  regular 
medical  officers  of  experience. 

HOME  TERRITORY. 

All  of  the  sick  and  wounded  that  are  sent  to  the  home  territory 
are  treated  in  reserve  hospitals.  These  reserve  hospitals  are  simply 
the  peace  garrison  hospitals  at  the  headquarters  of  each  division 
enlarged  as  the  occasion  demands.  During  the  Russo-Japanese  War 
many  of  these  garrison  hospitals  were  expanded  to  accommodate  from 
10,000  to  15,000  patients.  These  hospitals  are  under  the  command  of 
the  Hospital  Director  (colonel  or  lieutenant  colonel)  of  the  division 
district.  Through  subordinate  commanders  he  directs  the  operations 
of  all  subsidiary  hospitals,  convalescent  camps,  etc.  The  necessary 
personnel  for  these  reserve  hospitals  is  derived  from  the  depot  divi- 
sional medical  service,  from  the  reserves,  from  the  Red  Cross 
Society  and  from  available  civilian  sources. 

533 


57 

SUMMARY. 

Pcrcentof/c  of  medical  officcrti  i)i  pennnncnt  peace  establishments. 


Nation. 


Remarks. 


Japan 

United  States 

England 

France 

Austria 

Germany 

Italy 

Russia 


In  addition  to  permanent  personnel,  there  are  on  duty  96  officers  from  the 

raserve  corps  and  15  contract  surgeons,  makmg  a  total  peace  percentage 

of  0.54. 
In  addition  to  permanent  personnel,  there  are  on  duty  65  officers  from  the 

retired  list  and  182  from  the  reserve  Ust,  making  a  total  peace  percentage 

of  0.53. 

All  these  countries  having  compulsory  service,  augment  their  permanent 
peace  personnel  by  medical  men  domg  their  service  with  the  colors. 


Percentage  of  medical  personnel  for  duty  directly  with  troops  as  taken  from 

tables  of  organization. 


Nation. 


1.  Japan. . . 

2.  France. . 

3.  Germany 

4.  Austria.. 


Commis- 
sioned. 


0.52 
.49 
.44 
.42 


Enlisted. 


5.10 
6.30 
4.70 
5.30 


Nation. 


5.  United  Stat 

6.  Italy 

7.  Russia 

8.  England.... 


Commis- 
sioned. 


0.42 
.40 
.33 
.26 


Enlisted. 


3.80 
3.20 
7.00 
6.50 


A  study  of  these  figures  shows  that  the  percentage  of  medical  per- 
sonnel maintained  by  the  United  States  is  about  the  same  as  that  of 
England,  less  than  that  of  Japan  and  greater  than  that  of  continental 
countries  where  compulsory  service  exists. 

It  also  shows  that  upon  mobilization  for  war  the  entire  medical 
personnel  of  the  continental  armies  was  not  sufficient  to  complete  the 
sanitary  quota  of  the  field  armies;  and  that  of  Japan  and  the  United 
States  would  be  just  sufficient,  while  England,  by  reason  of  the  fact 
that  she  does  not  make  such  ample  provision  for  her  field  forces  as 
do  other  armies,  had  a  slight  surplus  of  medical  personnel  available 
for  duty  in  administrative  positions  with  volunteer  forces  and  on 
lines  of  communications  and  home  territory. 

Experience  has  shown  that  the  total  number  of  sanitary  personnel 
required  for  the  various  hospitals  and  other  establishments  on  lines 
of  communication  and  in  the  zone  of  the  interior  is  even  greater  than 
that  required  for  service  directly  with  troops;  and  it  has  also  shown 
that  the  higher  administrative  positions  in  these  establishments,  as 
well  as  with  field  arms  composed  of  raw  troops,  should  be  under  the 
direction  of  trained  military  surgeons. 

In  countries  having  compulsoiy  service,  and,  consequently,  a  large 
reserve,  it  is  the  custom  to  detail  regular  medical  officers  from  the 


533 


58 

standing  army  for  such  administrative  positions  and  to  supply  the  de- 
ficiency so  caused  from  the  reserves. 

In  countries  not  having  large  reserves  instantly  available,  it  is 
necessary  to  maintain  in  time  of  peace  a  medical  personnel  sufficiently 
large  to  be  capable  of  proper  expansion  and  the  proper  absorption  of 
untrained  volunteer  aid  in  time  of  war.  ■ 

533 

o 


\ 


TRAINING  OF  FORCES  OF  BELLIGERENT  NATIONS 

OF  EUROPE 


PREPARED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION,  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

AS    A    SUPPLEMENT    TO    THE    STATEMENT    OF    A    PROPER    MILITARY 

POLICY   FOR  THE  UNITED   STATES 


WCD  9289-1 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE  :  WASHINGTON 

NOVEMBER,   1915 


i 


534 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFIOB 

1916 


War  Department, 

Document  No.  C34. 

Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff. 


SYNOPSIS. 


Pago. 

1.  Information  desired 5 

2.  Nations  involved 5 

3.  Information  available  is  incomplete  and  indefinite 5 

4.  Training  in  countries  having  compulsorj'-  service 6 

5.  British  Regular  Army 7 

6.  British  Territorial  Army  (established  in  IOCS') 8 

7.  British  "New  Army" 8 

8.  Training  extended  to  six  months 9 

9    Additional  training  during  the  war 9 

10.  Additional  training,  German  troops 9 

11.  Additional  training,  French  troops 10 

12.  Additional  training,  Canadian  troops 11 

13.  British  cadet  school  in  the  field 11 

14.  British  machine-gun  school  in  the  field 12 

15.  Practical  experience  for  higher  unit  commanders 12 

16.  British  central  training  camp  at  Havre 12 

17.  Deductions 13 

18.  Application  to  situation  in  the  United  States 14 

30669°— No.  534—16  (3) 


I 


TRAINING  OF  FORCES  OF  BELLIGERENT  NATIONS  OF 

EUROPE. 

1.  INFORMATION  DESIRED. 

In  a  memorandum  dated  November  15,  1915,  the  Chief  of  Staff 
directs  tliat  a  brochure  be  submitted  giving  the  following  informa- 
tion: 

The  amount  of  training  stated  in  terms  of  total  number  of  hours  given  in 
time  of  peace  for  each  arm  and  the  technical  troops  of  all  the  belligerent  nations 
of  Europe  involved  in  the  war,  stating  what  additional  training  has  been  given 
during  the  progress  of  the  war : 

(c)  To  troops  that  had  previously'  been  trained;  (&)  to  troops  that  had 
received  no  previous  training. 

The  brochure  should  show,  in  case  of  the  latter,  the  period  of  training  ex- 
perience in  this  war  has  shown  to  be  necessary  to  obtain  satisfactory  results. 
Particular  attention  will  be  given  to  England's  attempted  solution  of  the  prob- 
lem of  training  volunteers  after  war  had  been  declared,  as  their  condition 
more  nearly  approximates  our  own  than  any  other  belligerent. 

2.  NATIONS  INVOLVED. 

The  belligerent  nations  of  Europe  thus  far  (December,  1915)  in- 
volved in  the  war  are: 
Austria-Hungary. 
Belgium. 
Bulgaria. 
France. 
Germany. 
Great  Britain, 
Italy. 

Montenegro. 
Russia. 
Servia. 
Turkey. 

3.  INFORMATION  AVAILABLE  IS   INCOMPLETE   AND   INDEFINITE. 

The  total  number  of  hours  of  training  prescribed  or  given  in 
peace  in  the  various  arms  of  the  armies  of  all  the  belligerent  nations 
now  at  war  is  not  a  matter  of  record  in  the  War  College  Division, 

(5) 

634 


I 


nor  is  such  information  available  without  correspondence.  Train- 
ing in  the  armies  of  the  above  countries,  except  that  of  Great  Britain, 
is  compulsory  and  is  prescribed  in  years  rather  than  hours.  Such 
countries  in  this  brochure  will  be  treated  separately  from  Great 
Britain.  In  some  it  is  possible  to  ascertain  the  customary  period  of 
training  each  day  during  the  six  months  devoted  as  a  rule  to  train- 
ing individuals  and  smaller  units.  The  daily  periods  devoted  to 
training  during  regimental,  brigade,  division,  and  grand  maneuvers 
varies  with  the  customs  of  each  country,  its  climate,  etc.  In  some 
reports  troops  of  a  certain  arm  are  said  to  drill  from  —  o'clock  to 
—  o'clock  a.  m.,  and  —  o'clock  to  —  o'clock  p.  m.,  but  such  reported 
periods  do  not  agree  for  the  same  arm  of  service  and  country  in  all 
reports,  and  it  seems  possible  that  they  are  not  uniform  for  all 
organizations  of  the  same  arm,  if,  indeed,  prescribed  at  all  from 
army  headquarters.  For  example,  the  military  attache,  Paris,  France, 
reporting  on  French  cavalry,  once  wrote: 

The  matter  of  drill  hours  is  left  largely  in  the  hands  of  subordinate  com- 
manding officers,  except,  of  course,  when  the  whole  regiment  drills  together  on 
days  and  at  hours  designated  by  the  colonel  commanding. 

Later,  an  officer  on  duty  with  a  French  cavalry  regiment  reported 
that  from  October  1  to  April  1  training  was  given  daily,  except 
Sundays  and  holidays,  from  6  to  10  a.  m.  and  12.15  to  5  p.  m.,  or 
8f  hours.  He  did  not  report  hours  employed  during  maneuvers  of 
regiments,  brigades,  etc.,  April-September  each  year. 

4.  TRAINING  IN  COUNTRIES   HAVING  COMPULSORY   SERVICE. 

The  following  table,  showing  number  of  years'  service  in  active 
army,  approximate  number  of  hours'  training  per  year  (assuming 
that  all  time  available  is  utilized)  for  various  arms  and  total  train- 
ing required  of  members  of  variously  termed  reserves,  is  as  close 
an  estimate  of  training  in  peace  as  can  be  made.  While  service  is 
compulsory  for  all  citizens,  within  certain  ages  and  subject  to  cer- 
tain exemptions,  it  is  known  that  some  enlisted  men  detailed  on 
various  duties  of  administration  are  excused  from  a  portion  or  all 
training  in  certain  countries.  The  approximate  training  represents 
that  received  by  soldiers  not  thus  detailed  and  excused: 

634 


Belligerent  nations  of  Europe. 


Years 
with 
active 
army. 


Hours 
per  day, 

except 
Sundays 

and 
holidays. 


Total 
hours 
active 
army. 


Reserve 
training. 


Appre- 

pate 

hours. 


Austria-Hungary: 

Cavalry 

Horse  artillery 

Other  artillery 

Infantry 

Encineers 

Belgium: 

Cavalry 

Field  artillery 

Other  artillery 

Infantry 

Engineers 

Bulparia: 

Cavalry 

Field  artillery 

Other  artillery 

Infantry 

Enc-ineers 

France: 

Cavalry 

Fi"ld  artillery 

Other  artillery 

Infantry 

Eneineers 

Germany: 

Cavalry , 

Horse  artillery , 

Othi^r  artillery , 

Infantry 

Engineers 

Italy: 

Cavalry 

Field  artillery 

Oth^r  artillery 

Infantry , 

Eneineers 

MontenofTo  (militia  system,  18  to  62  years  of  age): 

Artillery,  recruit  service , 

Other  arms,  recruit  service , 

Russia: 

Cavalry  and  Cossacks , 

Horse  artillery 

Other  artillery 

Infantry , 

Engineers 

Servla: 

Cavalry 

A  rtillery 

Infantry 

Turkey: 

Cavalry 

Artillery 

Infantry 

Engineers 


0) 

(') 

(') 
(') 
(') 
(') 


0) 

(') 
(') 

(•) 
(') 
(') 
(') 


7,200 
5,R50 
3,900 
4,SO0 
4,800 

(•) 
(') 
(') 
(') 
(') 

(') 
(') 
(') 
(■) 
(') 

7,6,50 
7,6.tO 
7,6.50 
7,650 
7,650 

8,100 
8,100 
5,400 
5,400 
5,400 

(') 
(') 
(>) 
(') 
(') 

1,200 

.  800 

4,800 
4,800 
3,600 
3,600 
3,600 

(') 
(') 
(') 

(') 
(') 
(') 
(') 


11  weeks 

...do 

14  weeks 

...do 

...do 

8  weeks. 

6  weeks. 
4  weeks. 
...do 

..do 

48  weeks 

..do 

..do 

54  weeks 
48  weeks 

7  weeks. 

..do 

..do 

..do 

..do 

8  weeks. 

..do 

..do 

..do 

..do , 

(') 

0) 

( 

( 

( 

330  days 
..do 

0) 
(') 
(') 
(') 
(') 

(') 
(') 
(') 

0) 
(') 
(') 
(') 


7,728 
6,279 
4,446 
5,472 
5,472 

0) 
(') 
(') 

0) 
(') 

('^ 
(') 
0) 

8,014 
8,014 
8,014 
8,014 
8,014 

8,532 
8,532 
5,832 
5,832 
5,832 

(') 
(') 
0) 

('^ 
(0 

3,300 
2,900 

(1) 

(') 

(') 

0) 

8 


1  No  report. 

Hours  shown  above  represent  the  possible  aggregate,  not  the  aver- 
age duration,  of  training.  For  reasons  given  in  paragraph  3,  the 
total  hours  are  founded  partially  on  estimates  and,  while  approxi- 
mately correct  for  some  forces,  are  not  reliable  indices  of  training 
given  to  an  entire  army  of  any  nation. 

5.  BRITISH  REGULAR  ARMY. 


The  land  forces  of  the  United  Kingdom  consisted  (in  peace)  of  the 
regular  army  and  territorial  army.  Enlistment  in  each  is  still  volun- 
tary.    Service  in  the  regular  army  was  for  12  years,  with  permission 

634 


8 

to  extend  to  21  years.  Of  the  original  12,  the  majority  of  men  served 
7  years  with  the  colors  and  5  in  the  army  reserve.  The  regular  army 
included  a  special  reserve  consisting  of  troops  not  permanently  em- 
bodied in  units  of  the  regular  army.  As  to  training  in  the  regular 
army — 

The  battalion  commander  is  responsible  that  the  company  commanders  are 
thoroughly  instructed,  and  he  supervises,  but  does  not  lay  down,  the  methods 
which  they  employ  to  train  their  companies.  The  company  commanders  as- 
sisted by  their  subalterns  and  noncommissioned  officers  are  directly  responsible 
for  the  efficiency  of  the  rank  and  file,  and  their  advancement  in  the  service  de- 
pends On  their  success.  Recruits  after  a  course  of  three  months'  training  at  a 
depot  should  be  sufficiently  trained  to  take  their  places  in  the  ranks  of  the 
company.     *     *     * 

No  record  is  found  of  total  hours'  training  prescribed  for  any 
branch  of  the  regular  army. 

6.  BRITISH  TERRITORIAL  ARMY  (ESTABLISHED  IN  1908). 

Service  in  the  territorial  army  was  for  four  years.  Such  men  re- 
ceived as  training  a  fortnight  in  camp  and  a  certain  number  of  drills 
per  year  and  a  musketry  course  according  to  branch  of  the  service. 


Terri- 

Schedule 

torial 

of  train- 

army 

T^otal 

Anns  of  the  service. 

ing  (pre- 

(subse- 

liminary 

cjuent 

hours). 

annual 

hours). 

40 

10 

50 

45 

20 

65 

40-45 
45 

10-15 
15 

50-60 

Signal  service 

60 

40 

10 

50 

Service  corps 

28 

15 

43 

42 

10 

52 

In  addition:  Recruits'  course  of  musketry  (preliminary)  and  an- 
nual course  of  musketry,  and  from  8  to  15  days  of  annual  training 
in  camp  for  each  corps.  Six  hours  per  day  devoted  to  training  in 
camp. 

7.  BRITISH  "  NEW  ARMY." 

Between  August  and  November,  1914,  Parliament  authorized  an 
increase  of  the  army  of  2,000,000.  As  the  territorial  army  is  not 
obliged  to  serve  abroad,  this  force  is  called  the  "  new  army." 

In  September,  1914,  army  orders  prescribed  for  "  trained  sol- 
diers;^'' i.  e.,  those  who  had  qualified  in  a  recruit  course  of  musketry, 
the  course  being  fired  after  two  months'  service,  the  following 
training : 

534 


Same  as  recruits'  fourth,  fifth,  and  eighth  weeks,  at  36  hours  each 
week  individual,  and  also  20  hours'  company  and  16  hours'  battalion 
training  during  first  month.  Later,  these  men  were  to  have  five 
weeks'  company,  two  weeks'  battalion,  and  two  weeks'  brigade  train- 
ing.   In  addition,  a  lecture  (one  hour  7  to  8  p.  m.)  daily. 

Trained  soldiers  for  home  service  were  to  receive  the  same  train- 
ing, utilizing  18  weeks  instead  of  13  weeks. 

Recruits  for  service  abroad  were  to  have  prescribed  individual 
training  in  three  months,  and  those  for  home  service,  in  four 
months. 

8.  TRAINING  EXTENDED  TO  SIX  MONTHS. 

Army  orders  of  October,  1914,  prescribed  the  following  periods 
of  training  for  the  arms  of  service  shown : 


British  new  army. 


Weel<'s  of 

recruit 

training. 


Hours 

per 
week. 


Section, 
training. 


Com- 
pany or 
battery 
training. 


Battalion 
or  brigade 
training 


Division 
training. 


Total 
hours. 


Artillery 

Engineers: 

Mounted . . . 

Dismounted 
Infantry 


4S 


1,248 

1,248 
1,248 
1,248 


In  addition  lectures  from  two  hours  weekly  to  one  hour  daily 
were  given  on  subjects  such  as  the  following: 

Discipline ;  organization  of  expeditionary  force ;  causes  and  history 
of  the  war ;  characteristics  of  hostile  and  allied  armies ;  special  duties 
of  the  arm  receiving  lectures;  sanitation  and  health;  the  German 
Army,  etc. 

9.  ADDITIONAL  TRAINING  DURING  THE  WAR. 

Due  to  lack  of  authority  for  representatives  of  the  United  States 
Army  to  remain  at  the  front  with  armies  of  belligerent  nations, 
reports  of  steps  taken  to  provide  additional  training  during  the  war 
are  few  and  incomplete. 

10.  ADDITIONAL  TRAINING,  GERMAN  TROOPS. 

A  camp  for  recruit  training  was  established  at  Beverloo,  Belgium, 
for  a  course  of  eight  weeks'  training,  especially  in  firing  and  combat 
exercises,  following  preliminary  training  at  home  stations.  Capacity 
of  camp,  2,500  animals,  25,000  men.  Similar  depots  for  increased 
training  in  essentials  of  the  character  of  warfare  experienced  were 
established  throughout  Germany,  the  course  at  each  being  eight 
weeks.  Men  were  trained  to  fire  from  trenches  and  trees,  practicing 
concealment.    They  were  trained  in  construction  of  types  of  trenches. 

634 


10 

Cavalry  of  the  German  Army  was  trained  to  endure  long  marches 
rather  than  to  charge,  and  to  accustom  horses  to  bivouac  in  the  open 
rather  than  rely  upon  stabling. 

Field  artillery  were  trained  in  construction  of  trenches  and  con- 
cealment from  aerial  observation. 

Aviators  were  taught  better  cooperation  with  field  artillery. 

Candidates  for  appointment  as  second  lieutenant  are  given  prac- 
tical training  at  the  recruit  depots  above  referred  to. 

11.  ADDITIONAL  TRAINING,  FRENCH  TROOPS. 

Independently  of  the  student  reserve  officers,  200  noncommissioned 
officers  of  the  active  army  were  given  special  courses  of  training, 
April  6-May  31,  1915,  at  St.  Cyr,  Maixent,  Joinville,  and  Fon- 
tainebleau,  to  qualify  for  appointment  as  second  lieutenants. 

It  is  impracticable  to  ascertain  how  much  training  during  the  war 
is  given  men  forwarded  from  regimental  depots  to  replace  casualties, 
but  most  if  not  all  such  received  training  in  former  years.  This 
number  is  very  large.  The  Seventy-ninth  and  One  hundred  and 
thirty-first  Infantry  to  June,  1915  (10  months  of  war),  each  received 
13,000  men  in  all  to  maintain  its  effective  strength  of  3,000. 

Imagine  the  result  if  such  proportion  of  untrained  volunteers  join 
an  American  regiment  in  war ! 

It  was  soon  developed  that  the  reconnoissance  service  of  cavalry 
was  badly  performed,  infantry  being  surprised,  as  no  warning  was 
received  from  cavalry  screen. 

The  marksmanship  of  infantry  was  poor,  too  little  ammunition 
being  allowed  for  instruction  of  recruits  (120  rounds  instead  of  200 
allowed  in  peace). 

In  September,  1915,  the  class,  due  in  October,  1916,  for  compulsory 
service,  assembled  at  depots  for  training. 

During  service  at  the  front  a  French  regiment  of  infantry  or  cav- 
alry in  the  first  line  spends  3  days  in  trenches,  3  days  in  canton- 
ment exposed  to  bombardment,  and  6  days  in  quiet  cantonment; 
then  12  days  in  the  second  line  (reserve).  Thus  it  has  3  days  on 
the  alert,  3  days  in  danger,  and  18  days  in  security.  Artillery,  less 
tried  by  fire,  are  continually  in  action  and  not  withdrawn  to  the  rear 
for  rest.  Rest  given  infantry  and  cavalry  is  moral  rather  than 
physical.  While  in  second  line  (12  days)  a  15-kilometer  march  is 
had  each  day,  and  company,  battalion,  or  regimental  maneuvers. 
Bayonet  fencing,  throwing  petards,  reversing  parapets  of  trenches, 
crawling,  running,  target  practice,  machine-gun  practice,  etc.,  utilize 
entire  period  in  second  line.  One  half  the  French  Army  drills  while 
the  other  half  guards  the  trenches. 

French  infantry  is  trained  to  organize  and  carry  out  the  assault  of 
three  lines  of  trenches  constructed  in   rear  of  their  positions   to 

634 


11 

resemble  the  German  trenches  in  their  front  and  on  terrain  similar 
to  that  in  their  front.  Men  are  trained  to  rush  100  kilometers  and 
lunge  at  figures  dressed  as  German  soldiers  in  the  trenches  used  for 
assault  training. 

12.  ADDITIONAL  TRAINING,  CANADIAN  TROOPS. 

Although  the  Canadian  contingent  had  had  some  training  before 
sailing,  the  first  expedition  (31,250  men)  was  sent  to  camp  at  Salis- 
bury Plain  for  six  months'  additional  training.  One  regiment 
(Princess  Patricia's)  was  given  only  two  months  in  England  and 
two  months  in  France  before  being  placed  in  the  trenches  in  Feb- 
ruary, 1915.  It  was  composed  largely  of  men  with  previous  service 
in  the  regular  army  or  South  Africa. 

Other  than  this  regiment  the  personnel  and  training  of  the  Cana- 
dians is  said  to  have  been  inferior  to  the  territorial  force. 

The  First  Canadian  Division  was  sent  to  France  after  four  and 
one-half  months'  training  at  Salisbury  Plain.  The  second  division 
was  not  sent  to  France  until  September,  1915.  These  two  divisions, 
with  authorized  strength  of  40,000  men,  have  met  heavy  casualties, 
and  as  selected  men  are  transferred  to  them  to  replace  losses,  it 
lepresents  the  strength  which  Canada  can  maintain  in  the  field  in 
view  of  preliminary  training  given  in  Canada  and  supplementary 
training  in  England  and  France  before  troops  with  no  previous 
training  can  be  safely  employed  at  the  front.  Such  strength  was 
not  reached  at  the  front  until  after  14  months'  of  war. 

13.  BRITISH  CADET  SCHOOL  IN  THE  FIELD. 

In  January,  1915,  to  replenish  the  corps  of  officers,  sadly  depleted 
since  August,  1914,  Field  Marshal  Sir  John  French,  commander  in 
chief  of  the  British  forces  in  the  field,  established  a  school  for  train- 
ing officers  at  Blendecques  near  St.  Omer,  France.  Cadets  are 
selected  from  enlisted  men  of  educational,  physical,  and  moral 
qualities,  who  have  been  tested  as  good  field  soldiers  in  actual  cam- 
paign. The  course,  which  lasts  one  month,  is  one  of  demonstration 
and  practice  coupled  with  a  minimum  of  theory.  Each  cadet  passes 
48  hours  in  the  trenches  and  visits  observation  posts  of  a  battery  or 
group  of  batteries,  submitting  report  of  his  tour.  Machine-gun 
tactics  is  an  important  subject  of  instruction.  Among  others  are 
range  finding,  siting  and  construction  of  trenches,  sapping,  sketch- 
ing, night  operations,  use  of  rifle  and  hand  grenades,  cooperation  of 
infantry,  artillery,  and  engineers,  etc.  The  capacity  is  105  cadets, 
that  number  being  graduated  each  month.  Graduates  have  been 
favorably  reported  by  divisional  and  corps  commanders.  The 
Artists'  Eifles  (twenty-eighth  battalion,  London  regiment)  was 
utilized  as  the  basis  for  this  training  corps  for  officers  in  the  field. 

6ii4t 


12 

14.  BRITISH  MACHINE-GUN  SCHOOL  IN  THE  FIELD. 

A  school  for  training  the  increased  personnel  employed  with  ma- 
chine guns,  the  number  of  which  guns  with  field  units  was  doubled, 
was  established  at  Wisques,  near  St.  Omer,  France,  under  an  enthusi- 
astic musketry  officer.  The  course,  which  lasts  two  weeks,  consists 
of  improvising  positions  and  gun  shelter,  oblique  or  enfilade  fire, 
firing  from  behind  houses  through  openings  in  walls,  or  from  within 
houses  and  cellars  through  openings  in  the  roofs,  firing  from  armored 
motor  cars  and  aeroplanes,  etc. 

15.  PRACTICAL  EXPERIENCE  FOR  HIGHER  UNIT  COMMANDERS. 

It  is  reported  that  regimental  and  battalion  commanders  of  the  ex- 
peditionary forces  still  training  in  Great  Britain  were  sent  to  France 
in  relays  for  a  week's  experience  and  training  at  the  front,  that 
on  returning  they  might  make  the  training  of  their  proper  com- 
mands more  practical  and  appropriate  to  the  service  anticipated 
when  such  commands  reach  the  front. 

16.  BRITISH  CENTRAL  TRAINING  CAMP  AT  HAVRE. 

In  the  summer  of  1915  a  camp  was  established  near  the  base  at 
Havre  for  the  supplementary  training  of  men  arriving  from  Eng- 
land and  considered  deficient  in  the  essentials  of  infantry  training. 
All  men  passing  the  camp  were  subjected  to  "  tests,"  and  not  per- 
mitted to  go  to  the  front  until  found  proficient  by  the  commandant, 
Maj.  H.  F.  Whinney,  Eoyal  Fusiliers.  Instructors  are  experienced 
officers  and  noncommissioned  officers  recently  returned  from  active 
service  in  the  trenches,  some  of  them  recuperating  from  wounds  or 
sickness.  In  addition  a  very  good  officer  is  selected  from  each 
division  at  the  front  and  detailed  for  a  tour  of  two  months  as  in- 
structor. This  maintains  instruction  in  pace  with  the  evolution  of 
the  peculiar  conditions  of  warfare  which  characterize  the  struggle 
in  France.  The  course  includes  musketry,  entrenching,  first  aid, 
pack-saddlery,  bayonet  fencing,  bombing,  revetting,  construction  of 
obstacles,  particularly  barbed-wire  entanglements,  machine-gun  prac- 
tice, the  disabling  of  guns,  and  conduct  of  artillery  fire.  Lectures 
and  practical  instruction  are  given  groups  of  officers  and  men,  at 
times  to  as  many  as  300  in  a  group  or  class.  All  are  impressed 
with  the  idea  that  their  lives  may  depend  upon  following  the  advice 
given.  Subjects  are  so  practical,  and  the  necessity  for  knowledge 
is  so  vital,  the  hour  so  solemn,  and  lecturers  men  who  have  learned 
by  wounds  and  bitter  experience  in  action  what  to  avoid,  that  there 
is  no  lack  of  interest  or  attention.  In  musketry  targets  represent 
German  helmets  barely  visible  over  a  parapet,  bobbing  up  over  a 

634 


13 

front  of  several  hundred  yards.  Men  are  taught  the  character  of 
trees  and  houses  in  the  landscape,  so  as  readily  to  recognize  aiming 
points  and  division  lines  between  sectors.  They  are  taught  the  dis- 
tinction between  cover  from  view  and.  cover  from  fire.  Trenches 
of  patterns  found  best  at  the  front  are  built,  faced  by  trenches 
similar  to  those  used  by  the  Germans.  Men  under  instruction 
occupy  these  trenches  24  hours  to  test  their  knowledge  of  what  they 
have  been  taught  in  lectures.  Men  are  taught  to  throw  dummy 
bombs  from  a  narrow  fire  trench  into  trenches  in  front  and  to 
advance  in  specified  formations  of  small  groups  or  squads,  clearing 
"  pockets  "  between  traverses  of  any  hostile  occupants  by  "  lobbing  " 
bombs  into  such  pockets.  They  are  taught  to  hurl  live  bombs  and 
shown  how  to  avoid  accidents,  relieving  men  in  fire  trenches,  form- 
ations for  assault,  bringing  up  supports,  attacking  "  hostile  "  trenches 
occupied  by  dummy  "  Germans "  which  must  be  bayoneted  or 
bombed,  use  of  respirators  to  avoid  effects  of  gas,  positions  taken  in 
trenches  when  aeroplanes  are  sighted,  use  of  trench  sprayers  to  nega- 
tive effects  of  gas  that  has  been  thrown  by  "  Germans,"  are  inter- 
esting and  practical  exercises  undertaken.  They  represent  the  last 
word  in  practical  infantry  training  for  the  character  of  warfare 
peculiar  to  the  situation  in  northeastern  France. 

17.  DEDUCTIONS. 

(a)  The  time  devoted  in  peace  to  training  in  all  other  countries 
exceeds  that  given  all  British  forces,  excepting  possibly  the  British 
Regular  Army,  which  constituted  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  the 
only  British  force  fit  for  service  on  the  Continent,  and  compared 
with  strength  of  the  new  army  was  very  small.  It  included  many 
men  of  several  years'  training,  reenlisted  and  professional  soldiers, 
and  its  service  in  August  and  September,  1914,  demonstrated  the 
value  of  troops  thoroughly  trained  and  habituated  to  discipline. 
But  its  casualties,  fighting  against  odds,  were  very  heavy. 

(h)  All  other  British  troops,  excepting  possibly  those  from  Aus- 
tralia, required  from  six  to  nine  months'  training  after  organization, 
regardless  of  previous  training,  before  they  were  considered  fit  for 
service  at  the  front.  No  reports  have  been  received  to  indicate 
whether  Australian  troops  required  more  training  than  had  been 
received  under  the  compulsory  training  required  by  the  defense  act. 
It  is  probable  that  such  additional  training  was  necessary  and  was 
given  in  camps  in  Egypt  before  such  troops  were  sent  to  the  Dar- 
danelles in  the  spring  of  1915. 

(c)  Casualties  in  the  ranks  of  units  from  countries  having  com- 
pulsory training  were  replaced  by  men  of  reserve  forces,  variously 
designated,  who  had  had  training  in  peace.     Casualties  in  British 

634 


14 

and  Canadian  units  had  to  be  replaced  by  men  with  no  training  in 
peace,  and  the  preparation  of  such  men  required  at  least  six  months' 
intensive  training  in  Great  Britain,  after  which  many  were  found 
unfit  and  were  given  supplementary  training  in  France  before  join- 
ing units  at  the  front. 

(d)  The  proportion  of  the  British  regular  and  territorial  forces 
to  the  population  of  Great  Britain  and  Canada  being  greater  than 
that  of  the  Regular  Army  and  Organized  Militia  of  the  United 
States  to  the  population  of  the  United  States,  a  greater  percentage 
of  British  citizens  than  of  United  States  citizens  had  received  some 
military  training  before  the  war  commenced,  and  the  amount  of 
such  training  in  the  territorial  forces  was  greater  than  in  the  Organ- 
ized Militia  of  the  United  States. 

18.  APPLICATION  TO  SITUATION  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES. 

(a)  If  imminence  of  war  should  warrant  mobilization  of  the 
United  States  land  forces,  it  is  obvious  that  only  the  Regular  Army 
and  such  of  the  Army  reserve  as  have  very  recently  served  in  the 
Regular  Army  can  be  considered  ready  at  once  for  active  field  serv- 
ice against  a  force  from  any  country  now  at  war,  including  the 
British  New  Army  thus  far  sent  to  the  Continent. 

(b)  The  United  States  has  now  no  adequate  method  of  supply- 
ing properly  trained  men  to  replace  casualties  in  the  ranks  of  the 
Regular  Army  or  to  compose  the  ranks  of  the  large  number  of 
combatant  units  required  in  addition  to  the  existing  mobile  regular 
troops  to  resist  invasion. 

(c)  The  experience  of  the  British  with  the  new  army  confirms 
the  estimate  in  paragraph  42  of  A  Statement  of  a  Proper  Military 
Policy  (W  C  D  9053-90)  that— 

Twelve  months'  intensive  training  is  the  minimum  that  will  prepare  troops 
for  war  service.  Therefore  the  500,000  partly  trained  troops  above  referred  to 
require  nine  months'  military  training  before  war  begins. 

(d)  Conditions  of  modern  war  do  not  afford  time  to  train  an 
army  after  war  becomes  imminent.  Not  only  must  material  be 
secured,  but  personnel  must  be  trained  before  military  operations 
can  be  undertaken  with  any  hope  of  success. 

634 

o 


STUDY  ON 

THE  UTILIZATION  OF  OUR  RESOURCES  IN  VARIOUS 

MEANS  OF  TRANSPORTATION  AND  OF  THE 

SERVICES  OF  TRAINED  SPECIALISTS 


PREPARED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION,  GENERAL  STAFF  CORPS 

AS    A    SUPPLEMENT    TO    THE    STATEMENT    OF    A    PROPER    MILITARY 

POLICY   FOR  THE   UNITED   STATES 


WCD  9053-111 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE  :  WASHINGTON 

NOVEMBER,   1915 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 

1916 


535 


War  Department, 

Document  No.  535. 

Office  of  the  Chief  of  Staff. 


STUDY  ON  THE  UTILIZATION  OF  OUR  RESOURCES  IN 
VARIOUS  MEANS  OF  TRANSPORTATION  AND  OF  THE 
SERVICES  OF  TRAINED  SPECIALISTS. 


PRESENT  STATUS. 

1.  Motor  transport. — Automobiles  can  now  be  manufactured  in 
the  United  States  at  the  rate  of  over  50,000  per  month,  motor  trucks 
at  the  rate  of  about  5,000  per  month,  and  motorcycles  at  the  rate  of 
about  4,000  per  month.  There  are  now  about  1,500,000  motor  cars, 
140,000  motor  trucks,  and  100,000  motorcycles  in  the  United  States. 
An  army  of  1,000,000  men  might  need  about  4,000  motor  cars,  4,000 
motorcycles,  and  24,000  motor  trucks. 

2.  Only  a  small  proportion  of  existing  motor  vehicles  are  suitable 
for  military  service,  and  in  view  of  the  small  number  of  such 
vehicles  required  and  the  rapidity  with  which  they  can  be  manu- 
factured, it  would  be  neither  economical  nor  wise  to  plan  upon 
using  any  and  all  kinds  of  motors  offered  for  service. 

Accepting  and  using  old  motor  vehicles  of  many  different  models 
when  new  ones  of  a  few  good  models  can  be  obtained  as  soon  as 
needed  would  result  in  poor  transportation  and  great  cost  for  the 
United  States.  It  is,  therefore,  not  planned  to  use  every  vehicle 
that  may  be  presented,  but  rather  to  accept  individuals  as  chauffeurs 
and  mechanicians,  and  only  such  vehicles  as  may  be  of  an  approved 
type  and  serviceable.  A  bonus  might  encourage  the  accumulation 
of  suitable  types  of  motor  vehicles,  but  it  is  not  thought  to  be 
necessary. 

3.  The  type  of  motor  ambulance  best  suited  for  military  use  in 
this  country  is  now  under  consideration  by  a  board  of  Army  medical 
officers.  Few  automobile  ambulances  suitable  for  military  purposes 
are  available  at  present,  and  most  of  them  will  probably  continue 
to  be  needed  by  the  cities,  hospitals,  etc.,  now  using  them. 

Types  of  motor  trucks  and  tractors  for  use  in  the  other  depart- 
ments of  the  Army  are  under  trial  and  study  at  the  present  time. 

4.  Aircraft. — No  private  aircraft  suitable  for  military  purposes 
are  known  to  be  available  to  the  Federal  Government  at  present. 
It  is  estimated  that  military  aeroplanes  can  be  manufactured  in  this 
country  at  the  rate  of  about  200  per  month.  The  few  civilian  aero 
pilots  or  mechanicians  available  in  this  country  will  be  commissioned 

30669°— No.  536—16  (3) 


or  enlisted,  but  only  machines  of  approved  types  should  be  taken 
over ;  all  others  should  be  purchased  new. 

5.  Medical  personnel. — Civilian  physicians,  trained  nurses,  hos- 
pital attendants,  pharmacists,  laboratory  workers,  etc.,  who  volunteer 
for  military  service  may  be  utilized  in  certain  positions  in  the  Medi- 
cal Department,  which  is  attempting  to  improve  the  Medical  Reserve 
Corps  and  to  perfect  organizations  comprising  all  the  necessary 
personnel  of  complete  sanitary  units  in  various  localities.  These 
units  will  be  listed,  kept  track  of,  and  used  as  far  as  possible  in  time 
of  war. 

6.  Ordnance  personnel. — Civilians  suitable  for  employment  in  the 
Ordnance  Department  who  volunteer  for  military  service  are  to  be 
utilized  as  officers,  etc..  in  that  department  according  to  their  qualifi- 
cations. Information  regarding  this  is  contained  in  General  Orders, 
No.  3,  Office  of  the  Chief  of  Ordnance,  United  States  Army,  August 
25,  1913,  and  in  War  Department  General  Orders,  No.  57,  1909,  and 
No.  26,  1911. 

7.  Signed  Corps  personnel. — Civilian  telegraphers,  telephone  op- 
eratives, aviators,  etc.,  to  be  employed  with  the  military  forces  are 
to  be  organized  and  used  in  that  corps  as  men  of  similar  qualifications 
are  organized  and  employed  in  the  regular  Signal  Corps,  field  and 
telegraph  battalions,  and  aero  squadrons.  Other  telegraph  and  tele- 
phone operatives  working  for  military  forces  are  to  be  organized, 
employed,  and  controlled  about  as  they  habitually  are  for  their  work 
in  civil  life. 

8.  Engineer  personnel. — Volunteer  civilian  railroad  builders  and 
operators,  bridge  builders,  civil,  mechanical,  and  other  engineers  can 
now  have  their  names  placed  on  an  eligible  list  (G.  O.,  57,  1909,  as 
amended),  and  in  time  of  war  will  be  offered  commissions  as  engineer 
staff  officers  or  in  engineer  organizations.  These  organizations  will 
be  pioneer,  ponton,  or  railway  battalions  or  regiments  wherein  will 
be  found  need  for  specialists  in  all  branches  of  engineering,  in  the 
various  building  trades  and  mechanic  arts,  and  in  the  construction, 
operation,  and  maintenance  of  railways. 

9.  QuarterTrmster  personnel. — Volimteer  civilians  having  special 
tiaining  in  handling  transportation  or  knowledge  of  other  quarter- 
master duties  are  to  be  organized  and  employed  in  the  Quartermaster 
(]orps  in  a  manner  similar  to  that  described  for  the  other  depart- 
ments. Individual  experts  can  have  their  names  placed  on  the  eli- 
gible list.  When  volunteers  are  authorized,  motor-truck  companies, 
wagon  companies,  bakery  companies,  etc.,  will  be  organized,  and 
the  necessary  number  and  class  of  experts  will  be  commissioned  in  the 
Quartermaster  Corps. 

10.  The  foregoing  are  the  plans  of  the  various  departments  of  the 
Army,  but  aside  from  the  laws  providing  for  the  Medical  Reserve 

536 


Corps  and  for  the  list  of  persons  eligible  for  volunteer  commissions 
there  are  no  provisions  of  law  that  authorize  any  measures  of  pre- 
paredness along  the  lines  indicated.  Neither  in  the  Medical  Reserve 
Corps  nor  in  the  "List  of  eligibles"  is  there  a  dependable  source 
of  officers,  for  there  is  absolutely  no  assurance  that  any  of  them  will 
respond  when  their  services  are  required,  nor  is  there  any  provision 
in  the  laws  compelling  them  to  do  so. 

WAR  COLLEGE  PLANS. 

11.  The  War  College  Division  recommends  utilizing  these  great 
resources  of  the  Nation  in  men  and  materiel  in  two  ways :  First,  by 
forming  the  various  units  that  make  up  divisions,  and  lines  of  com- 
munications, etc.;  and,  second,  by  commissioning  individuals  whose 
personal  abilities  make  them  desirable  for  planning  in  time  of  peace 
and  for  execution  in  time  of  war. 

These  two  methods  which  require  legislation  are  to  be  put  into 
operation  as  follows: 

(a)  Organizations  such  as  motor-truck  companies,  motor-cycle 
companies,  motor-ambulance  companies,  etc.,  are  to  be  provided  for 
in  a  civilian  force,  organized  and  trained  in  time  of  peace,  and  for 
convenience  called  the  continental  army.  They  can  be  formed  in 
such  numbers  as  the  law  may  authorize  and  the  Secretary  of  War 
may  direct. 

(b)  Individual  experts  will  be  provided  for  in  an  officers'  reserve 
corps.  It  is  proposed,  in  time  of  peace,  to  commission  as  reserve 
officers  all  kinds  of  experts  from  civil  life  in  such  numbers  and  pro- 
portions as  the  law  may  authorize  and  the  Secretary  of  War  may 
direct. 

12.  In  connection  with  this  subject  it  is  submitted  that  without 
legislation  authorizing  this  civilian  army  and  the  officers'  reserve 
corps  nothing  can  be  done  that  is  of  the  least  value.  Peace-time 
volunteer  organizations,  unsanctioned  by  law,  can  not  be  relied  upon 
for  use  in  time  of  war ;  they  can  be  of  value  only  when  their  mem- 
bers are  legally  bound  to  render  military  service  to  the  United  States 
for  a  fixed  period  and  to  serve  in  the  armies  in  any  war  that  may 
occur  during  that  period  if  legally  called  upon  to  do  so. 

13.  Methods  suggested. — The  following  is  an  outline  of  how  the 
War  College  Division  plans  to  utilize  the  national  resources  hereto- 
fore discussed,  if  authority  therefor  can  be  obtained  from  Congress : 

A.  In  the  Continental  Army. 

(1)  Motor  truck  companies.     Organized  and  trained  under  the  Quarter- 

master Corps.     These  will  include  chauffeurs,  drivers,  mechan- 
icians, etc. 

(2)  General  hospital  units; 

(3)  Base  hospital  units; 
635 


(4)  Field  hospital  companies;  and 

(5)  Ambulance  companies. 

Organized  and  trained  under  the  Medical  Corps.  These  will 
include  physicians,  surgeons,  pharmacists,  hospital  assistants, 
nurses,  laboratory  assistants,  chauffeurs,  drivers,  mechanicians, 
etc. 

(6)  Field  battalions,  Signal  Corps; 

(7)  Telegraph  battalions,  Signal  Corps;  and 

(8)  Aero  squadrons. 

These  will  be  organized  and  trained  under  the  Signal  Corps 
and  will  include  telephone  and  telegraph  engineers,  wireless  ex- 
perts, and  aero  pilots,  telephone,  telegraph,  and  wireless  opera- 
tors, and  mechanics,  mechanicians,  chauffeurs,  motorcycle  men, 
etc. 

(9)  Railway  regiments. 
(10)    Engineer  regiments. 

These  will  be  organized  and  trained  under  the  Corps  of  Engi- 
neers and  will  include  railway  officials  and  engineers,  civil, 
mechanical,  electrical,  and  other  engineers;  enginemen,  firemen, 
conductors,  brakemen,  train  dispatchers,  signalmen,  bridgemen, 
trackmen,  machinists,  and  all  other  railway  operatives.  They 
will  also  include  carpenters,  blacksmiths,  mechanics,  draftsmen, 
surveyors,  lithographers,  etc. 
B.  In  the  Officees'  Reserve  Corps.  (A  reserve  of  officers  to  replace  casual- 
ties in  organizations  of  the  Regular,  Continental,  and  Volunteer 
Armies.) 

(1)  Quartermaster  Corps.     Automobile  engineers  and  experts,   wagon 

and  other  vehicle  experts,  railway  transportation  experts. 

(2)  Medical  Corps.     Physicians,   surgeons,   chemists,  dentists,  hospital 

superintendents,  laboratory  experts,  sanitary  experts,  etc. 

(3)  Signal  Corps.    Telephone,  telegraph,  and  wireless  engineers,  aero 

pilots. 

(4)  Corps  of  Engineers.     Civil,  mechanical,  electrical,  and  other  engi- 

neers ;  railway  officials,  including  experts  in  the  operating,  mainte- 
nance of  way,  bridges  and  buildings,  signal,  motive  power,  car 
building,  car  repairing,  and  other  departments 

LEGISLATION. 

14.  The  draft  of  a  proposed  bill  to  authorize  a  civilian  force,  called 
herein  the  Continental  Army,  will  be  submitted  in  the  near  future,  if 
desired.    It  is  now  under  preparation. 

15.  The  draft  of  a  proposed  bill  to  authorize  the  officers'  reserve 
corps  was  submitted  in  War  College  Division  memorandum  No. 
9153-2,  1915. 

635 

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